Candidate Nomination, ‘Parachuted Candidates,’ and Legislative Roles in Canada

Royce Koop & Amanda Bittner
Memorial University of Newfoundland

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Abstract

To get to Parliament, prospective MPs must first gain a party nomination. Most will win this through a local nomination contest or acclamation, but others are awarded a nomination by the party leader. These appointments have sparked a number of normative debates, including, for example, discussion about the role of women in politics and the democratic vitality of Canadian parties, but there has been little empirical examination of the consequences of parachuting candidates into ridings. We examine whether these two types of MPs differ in their legislative roles and activities. In particular, following findings from studies of list and constituency MPs elected under mixed-member proportional electoral systems, we examine whether appointed and non-appointed MPs play different legislative roles in Parliament. This paper examines a number of legislative activities of MPs in order to develop a profile of MPs based on the nomination process. We explore whether a dichotomous model of MPs such as that which has been posited with respect to constituency versus list MPs applies to representatives within an SMP electoral system. We find that the legislative roles of Canadian MPs differ depending on the nature of their initial electoral candidacy, with appointed MPs more likely to occupy high-profile legislative positions and non-appointed MPs more likely to engage in low-profile legislative activities.

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1. Introduction

The methods used to nominate candidates are important indicators of the distributions of power within political parties. As Schattschneider (1942, 101) argues, “...the nominating process has become the crucial process of the party. He who can make the nominations is the owner of the party.” Candidate nomination in Canadian political parties is understood to be very decentralized, with party constituency associations in each of the ridings allowing local members to vote for prospective candidates. For the most part, incumbent Members of Parliament (MPs) must also submit themselves to renomination contests if they are subsequently challenged, although the parties have sometimes protected incumbents or introduced schemes by which MPs can avoid such challenges by demonstrating the vitality of the organizations in their ridings. Since vanishingly few candidates are elected without a major party nomination, the nod of a major party is essential to success. However, there is an alternate path to Parliament for MPs: appointment to the party nomination by the leader. ‘Parachuting’ candidates into ridings means that those candidates can bypass local nomination races and therefore run under the party banner without the consent of local party members.

In this paper, we explore the characteristics of appointed candidates as well as the legislative consequences of parachuting candidates into party nominations. We first construct profiles of these two distinctive classes of MPs. Second, following studies of the legislative priorities of representatives elected under mixed-member electoral systems (Mcleay and Vowles 2007), we compare the legislative activities of MPs who were appointed as candidates in their ridings to those that won local nomination contests. Do nominated and appointed candidates differ in their legislative activities once they get to Ottawa? We find that there are significant differences in both the characteristics and legislative behaviours of appointed and nominated candidates. The legislative activities of these MPs fall into two distinctive legislative domains: high-profile for appointed candidates and low-profile for nominated candidates. In so doing we demonstrate that the leaders’ appointment power in the Liberal Party has consequences not just for the democratic vitality of Canadian parties but also for how we understand the activities of MPs in Parliament.

The paper proceeds as follows. We first briefly review the relevant literature on how electoral institutions and candidate selection methods in particular influence legislative behaviour in states that employ mixed-member proportional electoral system. Second, we outline the nomination and appointments processes in Canadian parties—particularly the Liberal Party—and review the advantages and disadvantages of candidate appointment. In our analysis section, we first construct a brief portrait of appointed MPs in the Liberal Party and then turn to addressing our primary research question: how does the manner in which MPs gain party nominations influence their subsequent legislative behaviour, if at all? We conclude by proposing avenues of future research.

2. The Impact of Institutions on Legislative Behaviour

Research across institutional contexts suggests that the manner in which legislators are elected affects their priorities and the types of activities they engage in once in office. Scholars point to three types of institutional incentives. First, candidates better represent those who they feel have a role to play in deciding their political futures. Second, candidates engage in institution-appropriate campaign activities. Third, certain types of political systems will lead to higher levels of internal party cohesion than others, thus influencing the nature of legislative debate and other activities.

Mcleay and Vowles (2007) find that constituency and list MPs under New Zealand’s relatively new mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system focus on different aspects of the job while in office. While constituency MPs are elected in plurality races in single-member constituencies, list MPs are elected on a state-wide party list. Constituency MPs tend to be slightly more focused on
local activities and spend more time in contact with local constituents. In contrast, list MPs tend to
be more involved with the representation of descriptively defined minority groups. Lundberg (2006)
supports this finding, as his research in the Scottish, Welsh and German contexts suggests that list
representatives will seek out other types of constituencies such as interest groups or other minorities
to represent, because they lack a clear geographic constituency to represent in the legislature. This
distinction in representatives’ priorities is also found in the Hungarian context, as Judge and Ilonszki
(1995) find that list MPs tend to identify primarily with the party and nation, while constituency
MPs tend to focus on and identify primarily with local interests. In all these cases, the nuances of
the state’s electoral system constitute an institutional context that shapes the subsequent legislative
behaviours of representatives, with constituency and list representatives adapting their legislative
activities in response to institutional incentives.

Lundberg (2006) notes that list MPs are better able to shirk the local vote, while constituency
MPs tend to focus more of their attention on constituency service in order to increase their likelihood
of re-election. He also finds that constituency MPs are more likely to engage in pork-barrel politics,
as are constituency representatives in Germany, since these legislators spend more time than list MPs
in seeking out funding initiatives to benefit local projects. Research by Crisp et al. (2002) uncovers
similar findings. Their study of six presidential democracies suggests that pork-barrelling is more
common in systems with single member districts. This is because candidates hope to demonstrate
that they are strong advocates of their districts within the legislature, in particular when working
on a bill’s passage either in the House or behind the scenes. Crisp et al. find that legislators often
introduce bills that are aimed at targeting their constituency in hopes of re-election. Remarkably,
the effect holds even when these bills are defeated, suggesting that representatives are able to make
their legislative efforts known to constituents and that those constituents respond positively (2002:4).
The result is that representatives can positively influence their chances of re-election by properly
adapting their legislative activities to the incentives embedded in the electoral system.

Loewen et al. (2009) similarly find that government MPs can enhance their re-election chances by
introducing private members’ legislation in the Canadian House of Commons. Since the legislative
agenda in the House of Commons is dominated by government bills and party discipline is strong,
MPs are afforded few opportunities to play high-profile legislative roles. Private members’ business,
however, is one area where MPs can play a key legislative role which allows them (1) to exercise an
influence on government policy (Blidook 2010) and (2) be rewarded for their legislative activities
in re-election campaigns. The topics that MPs legislate on are also influenced by the need for
them to be re-elected in their own constituencies. 27% of MPs in the 38th and 39th Parliaments
introduced PMBs that were designed explicitly to appeal to constituency interests, although it
does not appear that doing so is necessary to benefit MPs in future races (Koop and Loewen,
forthcoming). Introducing PMBs in the Canadian Parliament may therefore be thought of as a
low-profile legislative means of enhancing re-election prospects, especially if MPs are deprived of
high-profile legislative positions. If appointed MPs are indeed more likely to occupy high-profile
legislative positions, we would expect non-appointed MPs to engage in this low-profile legislative
activity more often than appointed MPs.

Mitchell (2000) argues that the incentives set up by the institutional environments play a major
role in determining campaign activity—in particular, he suggests that electoral systems in which
representatives are elected based on their position on a party list lead politicians to spend their time
currying favour with the party, rather than focusing on raising money in hopes of being elected (as
legislators in the American context are likely to do) (2000: 345). Strom (1997) makes a similar
observation, as he suggests that party-focused systems encourage candidates to act in a way that
satisfies party requirements—and especially party elites—whereas locally-controlled selection processes
tend to lead to an incentive structure in which pleasing the local constituency is more of a priority.
Research conducted by Hazan (1999) on the adoption of primaries into the Israeli (PR) electoral
system provides additional support for the notion that institutional incentives affect campaign and legislative behaviour. He finds that the adoption of primaries served to weaken the link between candidates and parties in Israel, as candidates no longer depend on the party organization for nomination. As a result, he argues, the cohesiveness and influence of parties has diminished, and conflict between legislative and executive branches has increased, due to the lack of cohesion and party discipline.

Hix (2004, 196) furthers the notion that the selectorate matters, with his suggestion that without the need to appeal to a specific constituency, members have little incentive to break ranks with the party in parliament, and will be more likely to toe the party line and reinforce party platforms and positions. The extent to which electoral institutions influence the allegiances of legislators may also have an important impact on the nature of legislative debate and activities. Environments in which electoral success is based on an individual’s position within the party may leave legislators less likely to engage in ”individualistic” activities - such as introducing private members’ legislation or motions, and more likely to engage in ”group” activities - such as committee membership and organization. The opposite may be true in institutional environments which encourage legislators to stand out and stand up for the local constituency.

While these studies all point to the important role of institutional incentives in influencing the legislative activities of representatives, none speaks directly to the issue of the appointment of candidates, and the impact the appointment may have on legislators’ behaviour in the House versus the behaviour of a legislator who won the nomination process in the traditional manner. As Mishler (1978) notes, parachuting candidates is a rare occurrence. His observation remains valid today. As a result, little information is known about the behaviour of representatives who were selected as candidates in these two very different ways, or why they were parachuted in the first place.

3. Candidate Nomination in Canada

Canadian parties have always been characterized by very decentralized candidate selection methods. In order to run under the party banner, candidates must first win the party nomination of the local constituency association, which organizes and oversees nomination races. These contests culminate in a vote of the entire local party membership. Since the Liberal Party is for the most part a cadre party and therefore has no longstanding entrenched membership, candidates often win local nominations by recruiting instant members from outside the party. The memberships of Liberal constituency associations therefore often spike in the lead-up to nomination contests and decline shortly thereafter, as these members let their party memberships lapse (Carty 1991, 174).

Carty (2002) argues that this local right to select personnel in Canadian parties is enumerated in a franchise bargain between the party in central office and the parties in the ridings. In return for the right to select candidates, local candidates provide leaders with the freedom to formulate party policy in their capacity as elite brokers. Local members are protective of their right to select the personnel that staff public office and so are likely to respond to outside interference by protesting loudly or even by abandoning the party altogether, depriving the candidate of valuable volunteers in the ensuing election campaign (Carty and Cross 2006, 107).

Decentralized candidate nominations do not preclude interference on the part of the party’s national office. Prior to the 1972 national election, the Canada Elections Act was amended to require the party leader’s approval of each candidate. The result is that party leaders may simply refuse to sign the nomination papers of prospective candidates. Since this is a blunt measure, party officials may also discourage undesirable candidates by suggesting that the leader will not sign their nomination papers even if they win the local race (Cross 2004, 55). Central party officials may also present practical obstacles to undesirable candidates pursuing local nominations. In one infamous case, officials locked the doors to party headquarters in order to prevent candidates from submitting
their nomination papers before the deadline to do so (Ottawa Citizen 2005).

Candidates may also have to cope with interference on the part of their local constituency association executives, which are tasked with organizing nomination races. While executives are expected to organize contests in an impartial manner, there is significant potential for interference, particularly on the part of the executive president (Tremblay and Pelletier 2001, 161-62). Executives may even punish nominated candidates after they are successful by, for example, withholding local resources (Carty and Eagles 2005, 50-51). In some cases, members of local executives may be acting on behalf of the party leader and central office in placing obstacles before certain candidacies.

Party leaders’ power to appoint candidates represents a qualitative step beyond such interference by the party’s central office and constituency association executives. Following the selection of Jean Chretien as party leader in 1990 and several divisive nomination battles during the 1980s, the party constitution was amended to give the leader control over local nominations (Koehn 1998). The result was that Chretien and subsequent leaders were able to pre-empt local nominations contests and appoint candidates with little or even no input from the local party organizations. This power has been used sparingly; given the ecological diversity of these ridings and the party’s different competitive positions, it would be pointless for the central party to attempt to appoint candidates in a significant number of ridings. However, where the leader has appointed candidates, it has been for four reasons: to increase the representation of women and other groups, to appoint star candidates, to protect incumbents from local challenges, and to head off undesirable candidates and those from single-interest group backing.

One argument in favour of central control of nominations is that the leader is in a good position to appoint women and members of other traditionally marginalized groups (Matland and Studlar 1996). It is well known that the proportion of female MPs is not representative of the Canadian population as a whole. The nomination race appears to be the crucial obstacle to the election of women to the House of Commons (Erickson 1998), so central appointment may be essential to increasing the diversity of the candidates fielded by the party. This was a particularly important consideration during Chretien’s early years as party leader. However, using appointments to allow women to bypass local nominations has always been controversial. For example: following Chretien’s claim that “it’s difficult for women to come into politics”, the Edmonton Journal editorialized that, “To suggest prominent women in the Liberal Party are incapable of winning a nomination democratically is itself an act of discrimination” (Koehn 1998, 70).

Leaders have also appointed star candidates in order to spare these candidates from having to contest local nomination races. Cross (2004, 60) notes the paradox of “star candidates” who appear unable to win local nomination races. However, leaders may value such stars despite their inability to marshal enough local supporters to win a nomination. Paul Martin, for example, appointed David Emerson as a party candidate given Emerson’s prior professional experience as a businessman and public servant, as it was unlikely that Emerson had either the organization or the inclination to pursue a strongly contested nomination, and would likely have dropped out instead of doing so. Instead, since Martin valued Emerson as a potential cabinet minister, Emerson was appointed as the party candidate. And Martin emphasized the qualifications of his appointed candidates in British Columbia by referring to them as his BC “Dream Team” (Hawthorn 2004).

Leaders may also re-appoint incumbent MPs. This occurs if the leader values a particular MP who is unable to withstand a local nomination challenge. Prior to the 1993 campaign, for example, Chretien foiled the ambitions of nomination challengers by re-appointing two incumbent MPs who could not hope to win these contests (Koehn 1998, 68). In an interview with an MP who benefitted from the leaders powers in a similar situation, the MP noted the hopelessness of his situation and argued that nomination challenges make it impossible for MPs to be effective legislators while in Ottawa. By reappointing this incumbent, the party leader allowed him to refocus on his legislative and representational roles rather than on the renomination challenge in his riding.
Finally, the leader may appoint candidates in order to pre-empt strong nomination campaigns from undesirable candidates or those with backing from single-issue interest groups. Such candidates may be particularly well positioned to win nomination races by signing up members from small, strongly motivated groups. However, such candidates may not be in a good position to win the riding in the ensuing general election, may be controversial during the campaign, or may provoke conflict within the caucus if elected. For these reasons, leaders may wish to pre-empt them by appointing candidates they deem more favourable.

An excellent example of these candidates—and likely the sorts of challengers that inspired the more widespread use of the appointment power in the Liberal Party—were pro-life candidates in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Candidates with strong backing from pro-life groups could depend on the highly-motivated members of these groups to become instant members of the party in order to vote in local nomination races. The result was that pro-life candidates were formidable nomination contenders (Carty and Erickson 1991, 98). But elites in the party feared that these candidates’ appeal in their wider constituencies would be more limited and, if they were elected, would rebel against the party line on issues of importance to social conservatives. The result was that the leader used his appointment power to pre-empt several of these candidacies.

The issue of candidate appointment raises important debates about the inner workings of Canadian parties, as the manner in which candidates are selected is an important indicator of their internal democracy. As Gallagher (1988, 1) argues, “the way in which political parties select their candidates may be used as an acid test of how democratically they conduct their internal affairs.” Whereas the ability to nominate candidates was previously guaranteed to Canadian party members in the ridings, appointments allow the party leader to repossess that power from the riding associations. The result is that party members are deprived of an important traditional function and intra-party power is further centralized in the office of the party leader. For those concerned with local participation and responsiveness, the more widespread use of appointment power by party leaders are a negative development (Cross 2004, 53).

On the other hand, the appointment power provides party leaders with opportunities to diversify the party caucus, with more MPs drawn from groups that have been traditionally unsuccessful in the nomination process. In any case, nomination contests have never represented perfect examples of local control, as party leaders and their subordinated have been willing to interfere in these processes (Whitaker 1977, 143). And in response to accusations of undemocratic practices, several scholars argue that the degree of internal democracy exhibited by parties in their nomination processes are not important since parties are private organizations free to conduct their own affairs as they see fit (Cross 2008, 599).

The result of leaders’ use of the appointment power is that there are now two potential paths to Parliament in the Liberal Party. First, the majority of candidates must first win a locally organized nomination race in order to run under the party banner in the ensuing election. Second, a relatively small number of candidates will be appointed as the party candidate, therefore bypassing the local nomination process. Figure one summarizes the proportion of the Liberal caucus that was made up of appointed candidates following each of the national elections between 1993 and 2008. These proportions are presented in two ways. First, Figure one presents the proportion of caucus members that were appointed in each election. Second, the figure also shows the proportion of caucus members who were appointed at some point in the past, typically in their first run for elected office.

The first point that can be made is that the number of successful appointed candidates in each election is relatively small. In the 1993 election, only eight appointed candidates were elected to parliament (five were unsuccessful). By 2008, that number had fallen to three. However, the smaller overall size of the Liberal caucus following the 2008 election meant that the proportion of successful appointed candidates was similar to 1993. More importantly, the cumulative effect of Chretien, Martin, and Dion appointing candidates over the fifteen years between 1993 and 2008 is that the
proportion of MPs who were originally appointed as candidates has steadily grown. In 1993, only five percent of the Liberal caucus consisted of appointed candidates. By 2008, that proportion had grown to nineteen percent—roughly one in five Liberal MPs elected in 2008 had commenced their careers or been helped by the leader at some point by skipping a local nomination process. Most of these MPs had in fact been appointed by Chretien or Martin, but had since been re-elected, in some cases several times.

The result is that the Liberal caucus can be understood as consisting of two groups. The first includes MPs who have had to win local nomination contests in order to make their ways to parliament. The second, a smaller, more elite group consists of MPs who were given the right to contest elected office as a Liberal candidate by the party leader. The question is whether the different experiences of these two types of MPs are related to their legislative activities.

4. Data and Analysis

In order to assess the impact of nomination versus appointment on the legislative activity of MPs, we collected data on each Liberal MP elected from 1993 to 2008. We collected not only demographic data (including the MPs’ sex, immigrant and visible minority status, and previous experience at municipal and provincial levels of government), information about the election contest itself (vote share and margin of victory in the riding) but also collected data on the types of activities performed once in political office. Cabinet and shadow cabinet appointments, the types of committee activities performed in office (including committee memberships and the holding of a committee chair or vice-chair), as well as the introduction of Private Members Business (PMB) or Motions are all important legislative activities, and understanding who does this work is key to understanding the effects of the nomination and appointment process during elections.

In combination, these data provide us with the opportunity to address our two research questions. First, ”who” are leaders appointing? Is the leader’s appointment power contributing to a more diverse, representative House of Commons? If so, we should expect to see higher numbers of women, immigrants, and visible minorities amongst those who have been appointed to their ridings. We also tentatively explore the extent to which the appointment power has been used to recruit ”quality
candidates”–those with prior experience in political office at the national, provincial, or municipal levels (Berkman and Eisenstein 1999)–into the House of Commons.

Second, does the manner in which MPs attain the right to run for their parties–either leader appointment or local nomination–influence the types of activities performed once in office? Do appointed and nominated candidates play distinctive legislative roles?

We hypothesize that appointed candidates are more likely to be appointed by the prime minister to important legislative roles. These include roles as cabinet ministers, members of the shadow cabinet, or ministers of state. This is for the simple reason that the qualities that cause party leaders to appoint candidates in the first place are also qualities that might convince the prime minister to include appointed members in high profile legislative roles. Candidates that are appointed as a result of their "star” attributes are likely to be appointed to these roles because of their talents. In addition, some appointed candidates run for office only with the party leader’s promise that they will subsequently be appointed to cabinet (Docherty 1997, 106). Further, candidates appointed in order to enhance the diversity of the House of Commons are also more likely to make it into cabinet since the prime minister must also take diversity issues into consideration when crafting a cabinet or shadow cabinet.

We also hypothesize that nominated members are more likely to play other low-profile legislative roles. In particular they are likely to play legislative roles by introducing PMBs when they are able to do so and by playing important roles on parliamentary committees. Committee work is naturally more attractive to policy-oriented MPs than to stars recruited by the prime minister. Moreover, the high-profile legislative work of many appointed candidates means that they will be able to point to a record of accomplishment to their constituents; in contrast, non-appointed MPs turn to committee work and introducing PMBs in order to demonstrate some degree of legislative accomplishment to voters in their ridings. Indeed, recent research demonstrates that introducing PMBs can provide government MPs with an electoral boost in subsequent election campaigns (Loewen et al. 2009).

4.1. Profile of Appointed Candidates

Understanding who it is that the party leadership is choosing to appoint to a constituency is important because it can provide us with greater insight as to why they may have been appointed. Is it to increase the representation of women and other groups, to appoint star candidates, to protect incumbents from local challenges, or something else?

Figure 2 begins to answer some of these questions. The graph compares demographic and background information of MPs elected to the House of Commons from the 1993 to the 2008 national elections who were at one time appointed to their constituency with those who won the constituency nomination in the traditional way.

What becomes immediately clear is that those who were appointed look different from those who were not. Nearly half of the appointed candidates are women, compared to only 20% of those who were not appointed. Nearly 30% of appointed candidates are immigrants, compared to only 18% of non-appointed candidates. Among appointed candidates, 16% are visible minorities, while only 9% of those who won the riding nomination in the traditional way fit into this category. The appointment of Aboriginal candidates is less prominent, as only 1% of appointed candidates are Aboriginal, compared to 3% of non-appointed candidates. With the exception of Aboriginal candidates, the patterns are clear, and suggest that the party leadership is indeed attempting to increase the level of diversity in the House of Commons by appointing candidates.

Figure 2 also addresses the issue of appointment of "quality” candidates. Of all appointed candidates, 21% had experience in provincial politics while 9% had previous experience in municipal politics. The proportion of candidates with municipal experience is higher among non-appointed candidates, and the difference between appointed and non-appointed candidates regarding provin-
cial experience is minimal and not statistically significant. This suggests that party leaders are not generally using their appointment powers to bring quality candidates into the party caucus. In contrast, candidates with previous provincial and municipal electoral experience—Sayers’ ‘local notable’ candidate type—are well-prepared to win local nomination contests.

Nevertheless, there are "stars" who enter politics without experience at the other levels. Candidates who are prominent in the community and may raise the profile of the party, such as Ken Dryden (a retired professional hockey player), Belinda Stronach (former President and CEO of Magna International), and David Emerson (businessman and former public servant in British Columbia), will not have held political posts previously at either the municipal or provincial levels of government.

There is also a contingent of incumbent MPs who appear to be appointed in order to be protected from nomination challenges. Nearly 13% (data not shown) of candidates appointed in a given election were incumbents, suggesting that the party leadership wished to ensure that they would return to the House of Commons without having to worry about a competitive nomination race. Of those not appointed in a given election (who were elected in their race), approximately 76% were incumbents.

4.2. Legislative Activities of Appointed and Non-Appointed Candidates

Once elected to the House of Commons, are all MPs the same, regardless of how they became the party’s candidate in their riding? Or does the appointment process have an impact on their legislative activities? We expected there to be a difference in the activities of legislators depending on the process by which they became candidates. Simply put, star candidates and other appointees (women, immigrants, and visible minorities) are expected to be parachuted into higher offices in much the same way they were parachuted into the riding.

For the most part, our expectations were borne out. Table 1 provides the results of a series of logistical regression analyses where various legislative activities were regressed on appointment status and other demographic and explanatory variables. The total number of PMBs and motions introduced and standing and subcommittee chairmanships for each member are divided by the number of sessions in each parliament. Odds ratios are reported for ease of interpretation.

As Table 1 indicates, there is a clear and strong relationship between having been appointed as a candidate in a riding and being appointed to cabinet. Appointed candidates are nearly 4.4 times more likely to sit in cabinet than those candidates who were not appointed. This variable has a larger impact on propensity to be appointed to cabinet than all other included variables, including candidate vote shares in the election (a one-level jump from being in the tercile group with the lowest vote share leads to a increased likelihood of being appointed to office of nearly 1.7%), or incumbency status (incumbents are nearly twice as likely as fresh faces to be appointed to cabinet).

Consistent with our hypothesis, appointed candidates are also more likely to be appointed to
shadow cabinet. Those who have been appointed in the past are over four times more likely to be appointed to shadow cabinet than those who have not been appointed. In addition, appointed candidates are more likely to be appointed to the role of Minister of State. The impact of appointment on this particular legislative office is quite substantial: those MPs who were appointed in a given election are nearly 12 times more likely than non-appointed candidates to be given the post of Minister of State. This is the case for newly-elected appointed MPs, demonstrating the willing of party leaders to immediately move appointed candidates into high-profile legislative positions.

The relationships between visible minority status, candidate appointments, and high-profile legislative positions are very suggestive. Members of visible minority groups are nearly three times more likely than non-visible minority MPs to be given Minister of State positions. However, members of visible minority groups are 70% less likely than those of non-visible minority status to be appointed to cabinet, even when candidacy appointment status is controlled for. Visible minorities and women are more likely to be among appointed candidates than non-appointed candidates (as shown in Figure 2), but they are still less likely to be appointed to cabinet. Instead, the prime minister is more likely to place these MPs in minister of state positions.

Table 1 also demonstrates that appointed candidates are less likely to engage in the low-profile legislative activities that are for the most part the domain of nominated candidates. MPs who were appointed as candidates are 70% less likely than non-appointed candidates to introduce Private Members Business. When it comes to the introduction of either Private Members Business or Motions, opposition members are more likely to engage in this activity (nearly 4.5 times more likely and 2.5 times as likely as government MPs, respectively). Women are 40% less likely than men to introduce motions, and those MPs who ran as appointed candidates at some point in the past are 70% less likely than non-appointed candidates to introduce Private Members Business.

Patterns of committee work also demonstrate that nominated MPs are more likely than appointed MPs to engage in low-profile legislative activities. We distinguish between MPs who chair House of Commons standing committees and sub-committees, which are generally smaller and have a more specialized focus than standing committees. There is a statistically significant negative relationship between appointment and chairing a parliamentary sub-committee. While there is no significant difference between appointed and nominated candidates in terms of chairing parliamentary committees, the finding on sub-committee chairmanships demonstrates that appointed candidates are more likely to embrace low-profile parliamentary activities.

5. Conclusion

In this paper we have examined the activities of Canadian MPs on the basis of the manner in which they received party nominations. In particular, we asked whether appointed and nominated MPs differ in their legislative activities. There is a significant difference in the legislative activities of appointed and nominated MPs. Appointed MPs are more likely to occupy high-profile parliamentary positions, and much less likely to participate in lower-profile parliamentary activities such as introducing PMBs and chairing parliamentary sub-committees.

For some time, there has been an accumulation of power in the party leader’s office. Candidate appointments have further empowered party leaders by allowing them to bypass local nominations and install particular figures as their party candidates. In many ridings, then, the power to nominate candidates has been centralized in the office of the leader.

We argue that the ability to appoint candidates has augmented the power of party leaders in a much more substantial manner. In the past, party leaders have been constrained in the parliamentary organizations they can construct by the parties’ decentralized nomination processes. Leaders had to work with what they had: the MPs that had managed to secure a local nomination and subsequently win election. The propensity of leaders to place appointed candidates in high profile
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Observations 817  817  817  740  740  817  817

Odds Ratios Reported; Standard errors in parentheses
Bold reflects Odds Ratios significant at 5% or better
parliamentary positions, however, means that the power of the leader to shape the party’s parlia-
mentary organization as well as its public face is substantially augmented by their ability to appoint candidates. The result is two classes of MPs: appointed candidates provided with parachutes into party nominations and subsequently placed in high-profile positions by the party leader, and other MPs who have won local nominations and, as an alternative to high-profile positions, participate in lower-profile legislative activities such as introducing PMBs and chairing small, specialized parlia-
mentary committees.

This centralization of power cannot be justified on the basis of including women and visible minorities in the governing process; while appointed candidates are more likely to be women or visible minorities, this has not resulted in a higher likelihood that members of these groups will enter the cabinet or shadow cabinet. Indeed, members of ethnic minority groups are less likely than other MPs to enter the cabinet, though more likely to serve as ministers of state.
References


Peter John Loewen, Royce Koop, and James H. Fowler. The Power to Propose: A Natural Experiment in Politics. 2009.


