For an inductive, interpretative and ethnographic (re)turn in political science.
The case of the European integration and its influence on the post-communist
democratization.
(Working paper)

Simeon Mitropolitski,
University of Montreal

Annual conference of the Canadian Association of Political Science, Concordia
University, Montreal, June 1-3, 2010

The political science research is predominantly positivist and hypothetico-
deductive nowadays; it takes one-size-fits-all models created within particular context
and applies them to new regions or new time periods. Implicitly, it is considered to be the
best way of doing social science; doing it differently raises brows and demands additional
explanations from those daring not to follow the positivist and hypothetico-deductive
types of analysis. This is as if the social scientific designs have heuristic values attached
to their internal logic; some are considered to be more scientific; some others are less;
and some still need to prove to be within the realm of science. The danger of being
declared non-scientific being always present, many doubt whether it is worth risking and
therefore follow on the well-beaten footsteps of their masters. I call for (re)turn towards
inductive, interpretative and ethnographic way of analysis. This analysis builds upon
information gathered from extensive field studies, not from simple testing of existing
theories and of multilevel models. It takes the data as being rich and in need of
interpretation as opposed to discrete and ready for quantitative correlations within the
traditional approaches. I start from the premise that everything can potentially be
interesting and not only what is supposed to be, following one or another pre-existing
models.

There are two ways of assessing my call for changes within the discipline: first is
formal, based on the logical coherence of both approaches, traditional and alternative,
and, second, based on case study, which shows the advantages of the alternative approach
using a real case. This presentation uses the case study as the main tool, but also makes
some brief comments alongside the formal way of assessment. The case is the European
integration and its influence on the post-communist democratization. The existing
literature is quite ambivalent on this topic; there are models that predict either positive or
negative results as far as the democratization is concerned. They all use the traditional
positive and deductive approaches; they are all parcimomial regarding the pre-established
circle of what constitutes interesting phenomena. Against this way of analyzing I offer an
alternative inductive, interpretative and ethnographic approach. The results show that it is
superior in terms of advancement of knowledge, even if it requires some special skills
from the researcher and arguably more time and more preparations. Given the impasse
within the literature on this and other topics using the traditional type of analysis,
however, this alternative approach is worth making these additional costs.

1. Political science as following the hypothetico-deductive approach of proof
Is the hypothetico-deductive approach (HDA) the main, if not the only way of producing research that meets the standards of science? Apparently it is considered to be the case, at least for the large majority working on the field of political science. The alternative inductive approach, that triggered the scientific revolution in the West several centuries ago, an approach more friendly of producing new theories or new theoretical models, yet more difficult in making general conclusions, is now almost absent from the literature. If and when it is present, it is often presented as no more than a preliminary, yet not even as an indispensable first step, within the vast nomothetical framework (King et al. 1994). The result is resemblance of publications based on same or similar theoretical models, in which the new elements are often just the country name and the historical period.

Furthermore, the research based on the deductive logic of proof demonstration is forcibly positivist as far as the epistemology is concerned. The data collected and analyzed is necessarily discrete and not rich. The units of analysis are possibly ready to, if not already made to fit, quantitative methods of analysis, i.e. from finding correlations to building causalities. The alternative interpretative or hermeneutical approach is almost absent from the literature. The hermeneutical richness of the data goes contrary to the quantitative logic that needs to put any event, act, and opinion within a single case, ready to be analyzed by the SPSS software. Third, by following the HDA, the most recent publications are forced to play by the rules of the models they try to confirm or even to infirm. This means that researchers must apply the conceptual apparatuses already in use, and to stay away from others considered being part of other disciplines; you cannot infirm a model based entirely on hypotheses coming from another model. An alternative ethnographic methodology is therefore often neglected to the point of being almost absent in the literature despite some bold recent moves (Lauren 2007; Schatz 2009).

The following presentation illustrates these trends with a small but indicative sample including four periodicals with a total of twenty-six articles. Two of these four periodicals: British journal of political science and World Politics, deal potentially with different topics of any field and sub-field of political science. The other two periodicals: Communist and Post-Communist Studies and Canadian Political Science Review, are dedicated to either regional or to a particular country studies; the first of these two journals can cover not only political science matters. The sample of four periodicals includes only free-access articles. It is not representative for the trends in political science in positivist sense; therefore the analysis that follows will not be based on statistical correlations. Choosing free-access materials allow us to see the political science in the way its publishing “captains” would like to make it to be seen from inside and outside in first place, from both peers and students. Instead of looking for material that is statistically representative, I apply the inductive validation criterion of saturation; I add cases until the moment when any new addition does not provide me with any new knowledge on the matter I am interested with. In this sense, having twenty-six arbitrary-chosen articles from four arbitrary-chosen periodicals proves to be sufficient regarding the general methodological trends in contemporary political science.

The main trajectory within the sample of articles, in fact presenting huge majority of publications (twenty out of twenty six), represents attempts to confirm or infirm already published theoretical models. These models either represent existing theories (for
example the democratic peace theory, in Henderson 2008) or represent combine elements of different theories (for example economic modernization plus rational choice, in Desposato et al. 2008). Approximately a half of these models’ confirmation/infirmation articles use quantitative methods of analysis; the other half use qualitative methods that are not interpretative. In both cases the authors look at the data either as already made for quantitative use, or as data that for different reasons cannot be used in quantitative analysis, even if such use would be appreciated as being more scientific. Most of those authors opting for quantitative analysis use already existing data, some prefer to produce data on their own (Martin 2004; Negretto 2008).

The research designs of all these twenty articles put accents on the HDA. The existing models, single theories or combined theoretical models, are usually presented as sets of hypotheses, ready to be tested. The original research consists of applying these hypotheses either to new time environment or to new regions or to individual countries. The results show that approximately half of all studies confirm the relevance of the models entirely or with some minor corrections. The other half either infirm entirely the presented models or make statements about relevance of alternative models that become possible once the initial models are rejected. Only some of the authors making qualitative research actually propose new explanatory models (Ziblatt 2004; Hooge et al. 2008) instead of only infirming the already existing models.

On the other extreme of the larger nomothetical group of types of analyses, following Belanger’s epistemological classification (in Olivier 1998), three articles present an alternative inductive approach that does not follow the simple logic of confirmation/infirmation (Raadt 2009; Desserud 2009; Everitt et al. 2009). These inductions follow methodologically the non-participant observations and the secondary literature content analyses. Their results are sometimes framed within bold new theoretical models. Three other articles (Nieguth et al. 2009; Pilon 2009; Wellstead 2009) present an intermediate type of research, in a halfway between the HDA and the open-ended inductive type of analysis. Instead of attacking rigid models in order to confirm or infirm, these three authors use instrumental ideal-types in binary oppositions that guide the collection of facts through the observation or through the literature analysis. This instrumentalization preordains social reality without accepting the primordial causal logic of one or another model. As in the case of the HDA, however, these three last articles confirm one of the proposed ideal-types and infirm the other.

To summarize the findings regarding the research design used within the sample articles, most authors prefer to evaluate already existing models or theories in a new context. Their presumptions are that the possible answers regarding particular causal chain are already given; the task is to evaluate which one is more relevant given the new circumstances of time and/or space. Very few are indeed ready to offer new ways of theorizing. They would start from the presumption that not all or at least not all important answers are already given, and that the task of the researcher is to push into new horizons, not just to test the masters’ answers and instruments. Those who embark of this pernicious road often produce new knowledge in a qualitative sense, i.e. new theoretical models. These new models, however, become possible only through the infirmation of already existing models; their existence is in a sense due to the fact that the existing models had some evident problems with one or another element of social reality. These new models therefore are only partly innovative; they cannot live without being
compared to the models they infirm. They explain why some authors at the end prefer to offer compromised versions that combine elements of the existing and alternative models. From theoretical point of view, this creates even more complicated models; some of them so complex that they lose any theoretical value.

The small number of idiographic studies in the sample, an avenue quite different from the nomothetical approach, both deductive and inductive, do not actually make any theoretical claims as if the authors either assume that the facts they gather and present speak of themselves, or that any form of generalization beyond these cases is not possible, or perhaps both. In general, both hypothetico-deductive and these inductive studies are not interpretative; they assume that the data gathered cannot be interpreted in more than one possible way, which is of course the way the authors do. All studies in the sample without exception are not ethnographic. They do not share its holistic assumptions. This fact looks normal regarding the research that follows the HDA; it looks less so regarding the inductive studies. The latter are not required to produce verifiable hypotheses based on some preexisting models, and therefore are not required not to pay attention to the larger social picture.

The sample therefore shows some prominent absentees. On the one hand, this is the inductive approach that combines with interpretative and ethnographic analyses. On the other hand, quite surprisingly, there are no formalistic types of analysis, the ones that do not need any empirical verification at all. Contrary to some arguments looking at the economics as the bright future of the political science, none of the articles get even close to their logic completely detached from the empirical social world. The political science so far holds firmly on the ground of the real life; it needs to test its hypotheses by the facts. What it misses is that the facts do not speak for themselves. Any concept that the political science uses such as “state” or “party” or “regime” is much more analytical than positive, and arguably more interpretative and constructivist than purely analytical, I should add. The social reality is not just social physics where certain causal mechanisms can be successfully detached from the rest of reality. Looking to new avenues may prove to be productive in order to explain some of the old puzzles in the discipline.

2. Alternative inductive, interpretative and ethnographic approach.

The main way of making nomothetical political scientific research is by affronting already existing theoretical models with new reality, with new time or space context. This is the way of being scientific in the political science; it is considered so natural that there is hardly any discussion as to its relative pro's and con's. What does not look as HDA is easily discarded as idiographic, as pre-scientific at best, or as non-scientific at worst. Yet the nomothetical type of analysis includes other possible options: formal analysis that looks at the models from the point of view of their logical coherence and not of their reality applicability, and inductive analysis, that applies bottom-up instead of top-down approach.

The modern science, and it seems quite surprising given the dominance of the HDA, started as an inductive enterprise, particularly in the natural disciplines. Bacon (1994), and later Comte (1988) and Durkheim (1982) suggested starting any investigation with the simple observation of reality, and not with pre-established general truths or models as they are known today. Bacon speaks about the dangers of idols, forms of thinking that come either from general conventions (idola tribus), or from the personal peculiarities
(idola specus), or from misuse of language (idola fori), or from abuse of authority (idola theatri). Comte at the beginning of the age of positivist social science or of the social physics calls for elimination of any religious or metaphysical causality. Later Durkheim, in a similar vein, calls for elimination of any pre-notion about the subject.

It is not of interest in this study to show how was that the contemporary positive and positivist research has been "kidnapped" by Bacon's "idols", Comte's "metaphysics" and Durkheim's "pre-notions". The fact is, however, that the political science's highway, the sample is too clear to put any doubt on it, starts not from observation of facts (no matter which epistemology we choose in order to define "facts"), but from already established possible relations between them. It is like looking at the night sky and seeing nothing but zodiacal constellations. No matter how useful they can be, particularly for traditional agricultural societies, these zodiacal constellations do not represent the only way of making connections between the dots (the stars) in the sky. Furthermore, by accepting the zodiacal constellations as starting point in understanding the sky, we enter into a particular paradigm of reasoning. At most, we can infirm the claims about putting one star within one instead of another constellation, or linking the sun passage through one instead of another zodiacal constellation with some agricultural work. Having accepted the logic of zodiacal constellations, however, we cannot go further and discover the galaxies. Our modern knowledge of astronomy therefore is not a simple accumulation of knowledge from the ancient times on. It needed going back to the simple observation of the sky instead of just playing with confirmation/infirmation of ancient models using HDA.

Assuming that no significant truth lies beyond the existing models is like refusing our own capacity of being independent sources of qualitatively knowledge. The respect for those who preceeded us should not be replaced by blind acceptance of models that may or may not be relevant regarding one or another subject matter in our time. Any model structures reality in a way that it becomes part of it. Trying to confirm or even to infirm it makes us part of its logic of interpretation, and therefore the HDA is not independent from its theoretical assumptions. We accept to have our minds pre-structured by the models we think we are questioning; they force us to consider what is important to look for, how the dots should be linked, and finally, how the truth should come out of the analysis. It is of no surprise if an economist looks at the family from rational choice prospective. So it should be of no surprise that trying to understand the family from a different perspective requires not just infirming the rational choice model, but perhaps taking several steps back and starting from the observation of the family relations. Such approach does not exclude the possibility of producing knowledge that goes beyond the individual cases. On the contrary, the inductive type of analysis is as scientific as the other forms of nomothetical analysis.

Going into the new (in fact into the quite old) inductive rails is however not enough for a radical shift that the political science needs in order to escape the hegemonic monopoly of the HDA. The inductive analysis can still stand on positive grounds, assuming that facts, acts, behavior, and institutions have no hermeneutical deepness, that they are transparent and easy to classify and ready for quantitative analysis. In fact, if we get outside the positive box, the social reality becomes quite fuzzy and in need of interpretation. There should be no fear that such interpretative turn will lead to complete lack of objectivity and to total subjective relativism. This means only that we will not
make mistakes to put different cultural facts into the same box because of their physical similarities. On the contrary, facts with different physical appearance could fall into one group because of their symbolic similarity. The observation is a necessary starting point, but it is not sufficient to open the book of understanding. Other techniques become necessary to let people speak about the meaning of the ways they are behaving.

The HDA like all positive types of analyses starts from the atomistic assumption that society can be unraveled into relatively autonomous chains of causality that actually represent the main scientific interest. There is, however, an alternative approach that takes society as a whole. Since the demise of the structuro-functionalism under the attacks of Popper’s validation criterion of falsification, this alternative holistic approach is considered as a priori un-scientific. Yet, not all phenomena that political science is interested with are ready for observation; some societies are just far from the western-style institutional normalization. Looking at the popular elected presidents as menace for political liberties may be appropriate in the context of Latin America or the post-communist nations, but is it the same in the context of Iranian theocracy, where the political institutions are still not politically autonomous? If we cannot collect enough information from the "usual suspects", can we look outside the box and look for data that is of no interest for political science? The ethnographic study gives a possible answer for these and for other methodological difficulties; even if the data is readily available for observation, the ethnographic approach helps us to triangulate and confirm the answers. This is especially important within an interpretative study in order to eliminate the danger of subjectivism.


There are more than one theoretical model trying to explain the influence of the EU integration as independent variable regarding the post-communist democratization as dependent variable. At least two such models can be traced within the group of euro-optimists (Vachudova 2001 and 2005; Pridham 1999, 2001, 2002 and 2005); they are based mainly on socialization and on rational choice. According to the first model, the EU integration imposes norms and institutions that ultimately become universally accepted; the EU democratic principles ultimately sink into hearts and minds of transitional countries; the norms for good behavior become the real behavior. According to this model, the process of becoming more democratic is irreversible, as far as the democratic norms are present, although the speed of becoming democratic may vary depending on the pre-existing political culture. The model based on the rational choice sees the EU basically as institutional information provider and as financial incentives provider. The local post-communist elites, even if they reject the idea of political openness, finally succumb to the EU’s charm and liberalize the regime in exchange for grants (physical assets) and international recognition (symbolic assets). On the euro-pessimist pole, at least two models compete for explaining why the EU democratic principles have problems being integrated into the ordinary life. According to one of them, the entire process of asymmetrical accession negotiations creates second-class not-fully-sovereign and dependent countries; they cannot be fully democratic as far as they are not sovereign even to negotiate the terms of their accession (Raik 2004); the opting-out clauses are privileges reserved to the EU member states only. According to the
second model (Bideleux 2001), the EU indeed is not a political but simply an economic project; the emphasis on economic liberalization puts the nature of the political regime on second place of importance; the local elites therefore may use the European economic conditionality in order to circumscribe the domestic democratic bargaining.

What is common to all these four models, either euro-optimistic or euro-pessimistic, is their positivist epistemological assumptions and their HDA for demonstration of the proof. In all cases, the literature treats the post-communist countries as sums of atomistic elements that are transparent in their meaning, and causally enchained. A fairly narrow circle of relevant facts are used to confirm one or another model. The relevant actions take always place between Brussels and the local elites, and occasionally between Brussels and the local public opinion, but never among the local population. All relevant information is either quantified or quantifiable; even discourse analysis (Raik 2004) is made to fit preexisting symbolisms of language; e.g. certain official discourse (e.g. irreversibility of the accession) symbolizes political inequality instead of equality between Brussels and the post-communist candidates. Thus, to confirm the model of socialization, the authors need just to confirm the presence of the transfer and the enforcement of certain key legal documents. Infirming such model will also be an easy task given the enormity of the acquis communautaires to be enforced in the new social context; there will always be norms that are not well or not at all implemented. The models based on the rational choice are also easy to confirm and infirm depending on what criteria of instrumental rationality we establish to determine the cost-benefit equilibrium. The model of unequal domination may be considered confirmed by the simple fact that it is the post-communist country that demands to join the EU and not the other way around. The model of conflicting political and economic logics, imposed from outside on the post-communist studies, is in fact part of the older Latin American transitional studies. Although these two logics are indeed different as two ideal-types, no author has so far confirmed that difference without additional research necessarily means conflict.

To summarize, regarding the role of the EU integration on the post-communist political democratization, the existing literature applies already existing models that are created outside this historic context. These models come with their preferred hypotheses, with their best ways of being falsified, and therefore the authors that try to apply them into the new context need just finding empirical material that fits with one hypothesis or with its rejection. As far as the post-communist democratization is concerned, these key facts are the presence or absence of some legal norms and rules, and the presence or absence of instrumental incentives and rational responses. Having being found, these facts act as confirmation or infirmation for one or another hypothesis. The hermeneutical level of analysis is totally missing; the facts that may mean something and its opposite would be rejected as scientific nonsense. The circle of relevant information closely follows the relations between the EU and the post-communist states; anything that departs away from these relations is also rejected or neglected as irrelevant. Finally, with so many potentially approvable but competing models, the main question remains unsolved. It is time to make one or more steps back; it is time to look at the reality as if these models or analytical stenography do not exist; it is time to take the data as being rich and not discrete; it is time to step outside the box(es) and look without too much prejudice to areas away from the formal relations between Brussels and Central Eastern
Regarding the EU integration and its influence on the post-communist democratization it is possible to make a good research based on alternative methodology. A field-study in Bulgaria during the summer of 2009 and collection of text materials, images, cartoons on Bulgaria and Macedonia, using different techniques and models of analysis represent the basis for this alternative research. Tens of Bulgarian and some Macedonians, mostly civil servants in key positions within the EU integration and simple citizens, were interviewed extensively on open-ended topics instead by using closed questionnaires. These interviews had biographic dimension; they tried to shed light on the personal and professional development with the EU integration as possible intervening factor. For each country a set of EU-related events were identified in order to provoke people speaking openly about their lives. Another level of analysis is official political discourse and its development during the process of EU integration; secondary literature texts using different discourse analysis techniques is used to trace the dynamic process of acceptance or rejection of EU discourses on the governmental levels. The interviews with civil servants are used for triangulation and confirmation of the official discourse. Third level of analysis uses visual materials and all sorts of daily artifacts, even the predominant audio environment in major cities as criteria for accepting or rejecting the EU integration as dynamic process of symbolic interaction. This ethnographic level triangulates not only the official discourses but also the information collected from the interviews. At no point some source or type of information or results are considered to be more important or relevant than the others. At no points the conclusions as to the possible direction of the EU influence, and even over the fact of the influence itself, come before the information itself. All conclusions collected with this inductive, interpretative and ethnographic method are tentative, pending arrival of new information that may reframe the facts within new, more relevant model.

The information collected on the political level shows some signs of influence of the EU integration based on group shame self-justification, of course expressed not from all, but only from part of the governing elite. In the case of last-minute changes in the electoral law before the parliament election of 2009 in Bulgaria, a small number of governing coalition MPs decided not to vote for, thus rejecting the logic of power maximization and also rejecting the institutional pressure coming from their own parties. On the level of civil servants and ordinary citizens, the results are quite ambivalent. Some people show embedded signs of "subjects" culture, if we use the Almond and Verba (1963) terminology. These people, their political culture, are profoundly shaped within the old socialization, within the old norms and practices; the EU thus far cannot reshape them in any possible way. Other people, however, are changing and this change can be attributed, at least partly, to the EU integration influence. Among those, some turn their backs to the national community and quit political action on national level; preferring instead to act on the European level, even regarding local matters. Others, on the contrary, increase the level of political action within the national community, seeing the EU as symbol of new and more transparence norms that help them advance their social interests. Within this last group, most people do not act by instrumental rationality only, as the rational choice model would predict; the motivation of some reflects symbolic overcharge that cannot be explained by applying the model of objective interests only. On this and other levels, the presence of factors such as national shame or proud, personal
inferiority complexes, self-justification, happiness or sadness, feeling of freedom, sense of clarity, and others become part of complex social mechanisms, constantly in reshaping. This makes possible different trajectories of possible influence of the EU integration on the political culture and on political behavior.

To summarize, the alternative model of analysis does not pretend to offer simple and elegant answers. Its advantage is to offer a rich model, rich in a sense that it reveals the interpretative richness of the data. Instead of looking at key pieces of one-dimensional information in search for HDA demonstration, this model does not assume that some information is a priori more relevant than another. The radical change of music preferences in Bulgaria from the local version of pop-folk that dominates the radio chains in the early 2000's to western pop and rock that dominates the same frequencies in 2009 may turn to be far more interesting element in understanding the interiorization of the western cultural (and possibly political) models than any formal declaration of the Bulgarian government regarding the acceptance and enforcement of the EU’s *acquis communautaires*.

4. Discussion of the both approaches.

  We therefore have two quite different types of analysis regarding one phenomenon. On the one hand, we have different models, with deep historic roots in the literature, which are applied to post-communist context using pre-established hypotheses and the HDA as form of demonstration. Each model looks at different part of reality; therefore it is possible that all models are simultaneously possible to co-exist despite their theoretical differences and even mutual exclusivity (e.g. automatic transition of norms vs. instrumental rationally-based transmission). On the other hand, we have an alternative approach that does not take any a priori knowledge as relevant regarding this particular phenomenon; it builds its theoretical chains of causality upon the existing information, which is gathered inductively, interpretatively and ethnographically. The hypotheses, if any, are therefore not a priori given; they may arise from generalizations of already collected information in order to check it to other pieces of information still to be gathered. The alternative model is in constant process of (re)construction; it is potentially open-ended and never-finished as the scientific knowledge is supposed to be in general.

  I will put here some brief comments regarding the assessment of these two different types of analysis. The first makes internal assessment of their advantages and disadvantages; the second looks at the relative advantage of each one for the advancement of knowledge. The HDA model(s) are easy to apply to any new reality; they do not require special knowledge for each individual case outside some key elements that need for assessing the hypotheses associated with these models. The HDA has pretension of allowing for general conclusions going far beyond any particular case; therefore confirming the influence of one foreign factor (EU) on the democratization (in post-communist world) can, at least theoretically, be applied in other contexts (influence of the USA on democratization in Mexico; influence of Russia on the process of authoritarianism in Central Asia, etc.). These two elements of the HDA: easy to produce and easy to generalize make it appear like the way of analysis that creates global scientific community that transcends the national borders. Its main disadvantages are the overconfidence with the past research that made these old models possible; simplification and perhaps oversimplification of reality; advancement of knowledge, if any, only as a
result of mechanical repulsion from the existing models that still takes without criticism some of their fundamental premises.

The alternative inductive approach has its own disadvantages: it is more expensive and consuming, in terms of financing and time. It requires making field studies in addition to analyzing secondary literature; even in the era of the internet and skype (two good tools for collecting information and interviewing people). Taking as possible the interpretative richness of any piece of behavior creates risks of subjectivity; the triangulation can eliminate this danger, but also at the cost of more time spent on analyzing. Working on the field may require intimate knowledge of the language; this breaks up the sense of scientific community that transcends the national borders; even with fairly common research design the collection of information could be difficult; research results’ reproduction could become impossible even with the help of interpreter. The inductive, interpretative and ethnographic methodology is not easily, if at all, generalizable. It focuses on what makes certain phenomenon possible within particular context; it makes possible generalizations within the case, but prevents us from making big leaps beyond our case (Geertz 1973). On the positive note, this way of demonstration is more accurate; it pays attention to particularities; it easily builds new parcimomial models and theories without necessarily paying tribute to old masters; it creates a sense of scientific community as community of peers, and not of masters and apprentices.

Regarding the particular case of the EU-integration and its role in the post-communist democratization, the alternative approach shows its superiority over the traditional way of making science that uses ready models and the HDA. In brief, there is no single piece of information that can be gathered within the HDA and not to be produced following the alternative inductive, interpretative and ethnographic analysis. The socialization and the rational choice models and associated with them testable key elements are fairly easy to gather using different qualitative methods such as different types of observation, interviews, and discursive techniques. The alternative way of research, however, can produce additional information that lies beyond any current model; it can make inferences from domains as different as morality, feelings, will, subconscious impulses, tastes, (anti)social behavior, and link them to the phenomenon under investigation. Some of these new elements, naturally, will turn out to be irrelevant; other elements, however, will trigger new theoretical approaches to the initial question.

**Conclusion**

The alternative inductive, interpretative and ethnographic approach shows its relative superiority within the case study of the EU integration and its role in the post-communist democratization over the HAD or the testing of already existing theoretical models. It would be mistaken, and against the logic of induction, to claim that such superiority is inherent to this way of analysis; that everybody should apply it no matter what is the topic and research question at stake. A special research program that applies inductive approach to already existing hot topics within the discipline would be necessary in order to limit its usefulness. Such hot topics may include, even if they would not be limited to, research on new social movements, transnational politics, and international relations. Each of these topics may benefit from some new bottom-up collection of information, following the logic of the ethnographic holism and the interpretative richness.

Finding topics where the inductive analysis will show its relative superiority is just
the first step in the long way of convincing the scientific community in its merits. The question "why change and use alternative methods if the existing HDA is so simple and well-established" will always be present. Indeed, why waste time if the knowledge still can advance without it? The answer lies in the inherent flaws of the HDA regarding the scientific community as peer community. Within this approach there will always be masters who craft models and apprentices who test them; the ultimate goal of any apprentice will be to become a master itself. The more you use certain model in order to reject it, the more it will become indispensable and focal point of reference. The apprentices can overcome their inferior status without trying to confront their masters; all they need is to step out of the box(es) and start thinking independently. That was the way the scientific revolution originally started.
Reference list


Desserud, Donald. 2009. “The Governor General, the Prime Minister and the Request to Prorogue.” Canadian Political Science Review 3(3).


Olivier, Lawrence. 1998. *Epistémologie de la science politique*. PUQ.


