Framing Security Policy: Media Interference in the case of the “Toronto 18” Terrorists Arrests

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Abstract

The mass media function as an adjudicator of information. The manner in which the news is crafted may affect public perception. This study explores the media’s potential to influence one’s perception through the process of framing news content. Specifically, can media frames regarding the “Toronto 18” arrests in 2006 shape public perception of terrorism and influence expectations of legislative policies? This question was tested through an experiment, whereby a sample of 245 respondents was randomly assigned one of three articles. The first article from The Toronto Sun primed the threat of terrorism as a dominant concern and focused on the need for stricter security laws. The second article from The Toronto Star downplayed the threat of terrorism and focused on civil liberties being violated due to stricter security laws. The third article, also from The Toronto Sun, served as the control and had no relevance to the issue of terrorism; it focused on poverty. Effects from the two “treatment” articles were measured against the control. Respondents were also given a questionnaire to measure their views and reactions to the article. Statistically significant results were found. These results confirm media frames can affect public perception of terrorism and expectations of legislative policies.

Paper delivered to the 2010 meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Montreal, June 1-3
I- Introduction

The media are powerful conduits for delivering information and their very survival depends on spewing “newsworthy” information. The delivery, however, is often compromised due to subtle techniques the media use when crafting news, which affects citizens’ representations of reality. Therefore, “truth” is interrupted by media interference, skewing citizens’ perceptions. Although journalists are expected to report the news as mirror images of reality (Taras, 1990), this rarely occurs. The resulting distorted mirror image works in conjunction with framing.

Framing relates to “subtle alterations in the statement or presentation of judgment” (Iyengar, 1991: 11), calling “attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements, which might lead audiences to have different reactions” (Entman, 1993: 55). The effect of the distorted mirror image in conjunction with framing was explored to discover how susceptible public perception is to media tampered content.

The case study of the arrests of the “Toronto 18” served as the basis of determining whether varying media frames surrounding this event affect individuals’ attitudes and perceptions of terrorism, as well as post 9-11 security legislation. On June 2 and 3, 2006, counter-terrorism raids were conducted in the Greater Toronto Area, resulting in the arrests of 18 alleged members of a terrorist cell, who allegedly sought to “behead” Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and other government officials. They also allegedly conspired to invade the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the Parliament buildings, and planned a series of terrorist attacks in Southern Ontario. Flashing four years forward, the accused are being tried under the Anti-Terrorism Act.

Framing effects were examined through an experiment. Different articles, each with a distinct “angle” on an issue, were randomly assigned to participants, and their responses to a series of questions determined if different frames have any effect on individuals’ perceptions towards positions on public policy. The two frames utilized were: 1) the framing of terrorism as a dominant threat and the need for stricter laws, known as the “threat” frame; and 2) the downplay of the threat of terrorism and the focus on civil liberties being violated due to stricter security laws, known as the “reassurance” frame.

The “Toronto 18” arrests was selected as a case study due to little media attention that it received during the time the experiment was being administered. It must be noted that it was not just the media’s impact on opinions that was being examined, but also how these opinions lead to a particular position on important public policy matters. For instance, is a “threat” frame likely to move a person to desire stricter security laws, even at the cost of civil liberties?

II- Media Effects

Lippmann’s (1922) seminal research concluded that the media has direct effects upon society and shapes individuals’ reality. These effects, frequently referred to as the “hypodermic needle” model, assert the media has the capacity to create a “pseudo-environment,” (1922: 25) and implant “pictures inside people’s heads” (1922: 31). Individuals’ preconceived perceptions skew their reality and responses to political issues.

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1 This ensured respondents would not be primed.
Lasswell (1927, 1928, 1948) examined the propagandist effects of the media, revealing citizens’ receptivity to political issues is affected by the manipulation of political meanings. He believed the media functions as: surveyors of events, interpreters of events; and agents of political socialization. His (1948) five part question continues to be relevant today: “Who says what to whom via which channels and with what effect” (1948: 37)? Graber (2006) adds another function, that being a manipulator of politics.

The ability of the media to “manufacture reality” is shared by Chomsky and Herman (1988), who maintain the “propaganda model,” is used to keep the elite in control. They question the role of elites’ power, and how this system manipulates, imposes illusions, and deceives the ignorant.

Studies reveal the media is a source of persuasion that manipulates messages with the objective of citizens willfully accepting the message (Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992: 9). Pratkanis and Aronson (1992) expand upon Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) classification of peripheral persuasion; focusing on how citizens are attracted by cues, and on central persuasion; being the deliberation individuals employ in discovering the transparency of information witnessed. They believe modern propaganda occurs through the peripheral lens and plays on dissonance.

Dissonance occurs when individuals hold two conflicting opinions and due to uneasiness these conflicting opinions are mixed to resolve the discomfort. This concept is developed by Festinger’s (1962) theory of cognitive dissonance, referring to individuals’ attempts to make sense of their surroundings and behaviour in order to live meaningfully.

A more subtle effect of the media is its ability to alter feelings through persuasion. Simmons et al. (2001) assert persuasion is “human communication designed to influence autonomous judgments and actions of others,” (Simmons, 2001: 7, emphasis in original); conducted so subliminally that those being persuaded appear free from outside interference. Media personnel can influence citizens’ judgments by the manipulation of media content, known as framing.

The aforementioned evidence of powerful effects theories leads to the hypothesis that media content can directly influence and shape individuals’ political attitudes and emotions surrounding political issues, as well as influence policy expectations.

Contrary to powerful effects theorists, “Columbia School” theorists believe the media have a limited effect on individuals’ perceptions (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955; Katz, 1957). Lazarsfeld et al. (1948) and Smith et al. (2002) revealed people formulate beliefs and opinions from friends and family, rather than from media sources.

Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) and Katz (1957) subsequently developed the two-step flow of communication concluding the media influence “opinion leaders” (referring to those most exposed to media), and how opinion leaders subsequently influence the masses. This reveals personal interaction is more influential than media exposure.

Although the media is perhaps not as “powerful” as Lippmann believed, the effects from the techniques of agenda setting, framing and priming will reveal the minimalist influence of the media.

Agenda setting is the amount of importance the media attributes to specific issues, setting the agenda for what political issues people think about. Cohen (1963) concludes that the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about. And it follows from this that the world looks different to different people” (Cohen, 1963: 13).

2 Cues are signals stimulating a response from individuals.
McCombs and Shaw (1972) coined the term “agenda setting” and analyzed how agenda setting affects individuals’ issue priorities. Their research concurs with Cohen, revealing a direct correlation between the significance the media attributes to a story and the significance assigned by those individuals who were exposed to a particular media source.

Dearing and Rogers (1996) concluded that the public agenda, once determined by the media agenda directly affects the policy agenda. Agenda-setting “offers an explanation of why information about certain issues, and not other issues is available to the public in a democracy; how public opinion is shaped; and why certain issues are addressed through policy actions while others are not” (Dearing and Rogers, 1996: 2).

McClure and Patterson (1976) revealed media sources have different agendas and produce diverse content, concluding television was not as effective as newspapers in providing in-depth coverage of an event. Broadcast coverage, however, was effective in the agenda setting process. Those who watched excessive amounts of news were not more susceptible to agenda setting effects compared to those who did not watch news frequently. Newspaper exposure, however, was related to agenda setting effects.

Additional research (Terkildsen and Schnell, 1997; Ghanem, 1997) exposes “how media coverage affects both what the public thinks about and how the public thinks about it” (Ghanem, 1997: 3). Second-level agenda setting examines the attributes that affect individuals and asserts two hypotheses about salience. First, the way “an issue or other object is covered in the media (the attributes emphasized in the news) affects the way the public think about that object” (Ghanem, 1997: 4). Second, the way “an issue or other object is covered in the media (the attributes emphasized in the news) affects the salience of that object on the public agenda” (Ghanem, 1997: 4).

Second-level agenda setting was gauged here by assessing how media content can shape one’s perception into believing that the threat of an issue is not only a dominant concern, but also the appropriate response to the threat is the solution advocated in the frame.

Framing and priming work in conjunction with second-level agenda setting effects. These theories may affect individuals’ perceptions of media messages.

Framing can be described as “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation” (Entman, 2004: 5, emphasis in original). The particular framing of a news article can profoundly affect public perception surrounding the topic framed.

Researchers have examined how media frames impact individuals’ political attitudes (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Zaller, 1992), and how they receive and recall the frame (Valkenburg et al., 1999; Graber, 2007; Iyengar, 1991). Notable are Neuman, et al., (1992) who explore how the electorate is motivated to gather information. They conclude that people can learn “at every level of cognitive ability, interest, and education” (Neuman et al., 1992: 21), however, those less knowledgeable rely heavily upon media presentations of events. Citizens and the media use similar frames; but, citizens use more constructions of the outside world, and filter information meaningfully (1992: 76-77). Neuman et al. (1992) consider this to be the construction of common knowledge. Their findings also revealed those who watch television are less informed because television conveys information regarding issues that are of low salience, while print media conveys information about issues with high salience.

Based on these findings exploration was conducted into whether exposure to different media sources can affect attitudes and perceptions regarding terrorism. Due to past research indicating an effect from televised frames (Nelson et al., 1997a), similar effects from newspaper-
generated frames were expected.

The constructivist approach, described by Gamson (1988, 1989a, 1992), Gamson and Modigliani (1989b) maintains frames can create symbolic constructions of reality. Gamson and Modigliani (1989b) examine how an “issue frame” — a story with metaphors and catchy phrases, can help individuals reason. Individuals however use their own life histories in the process of constructing meaning. Understanding how individuals frame issues depicted in the news is of central importance to Gamson (1992) because it offers insight into how opinions are formed.

Similar to the constructivist approach is the “appraisal theory” (Step et al., 2002) wherein emotions are the effect from evaluations of events. The emotional involvement regarding an issue determines the level of media involvement. It is hypothesized, based on this theory, that the way the media frames an issue affects levels of emotional involvement, creating a sharp divide in public perception. For example, if the media frames an issue as a national safety concern and pushes stricter security legislation those exposed to this frame will have higher levels of fear compared to those exposed to a frame that focuses on human rights violations due to heightened security legislation.

Research concludes the emotional arousal produced in frames can affect how individuals receive the frame or make it consistent with their preferences (Just et al., 2007: 238-239; Graber, 2007: 289). Furthermore, correlations between media exposure and stress-related emotions have been found (Snyder and Park, 2002; Riffe and Stovall, 1989; Brown, et al., 2002), especially among children (Hoffner and Haefner, 1993; Smith et al, 2002).

Research has confirmed media frames affect tolerance. Nelson et al. (1997a) supplied respondents with one of two frames regarding a Ku Klux Klan rally. One framed the rally as a freedom of speech issue, and the other as a disturbance of public order. Results reveal those who viewed the freedom of speech frame demonstrated more tolerance for the KKK than those who were exposed to the disturbance frame.

Similarly, Domke et al. (1999) revealed “news coverage influences the considerations that individuals draw on in thinking about political issues” (1999: 590) and issues in news stories influence which “racial cognitions are activated and how strongly those cognitions are linked to political judgments” (1999: 590). Their study confirms frames affect individuals’ tolerance.

Based on these findings, those who read a frame advocating human and civil rights protection will be more in favour of having civil liberties and human rights protected by the government than those who do not read this frame. Conversely, those who read an article pushing the threat of terrorism will be less in favour of having civil liberties and human rights protected.

Research examining correlations between media frames and fear is best described by Altheide (1997) who coins the “problem frame—a discourse of fear that may be defined as the pervasive communication, symbolic awareness and expectation that danger and risk are a central feature of the effective environment” (Altheide, 1997: 648, emphasis in original). He reveals content regarding fear shifts over time and “carried with the message of fear are images and targets of what and who is to be feared” (1997: 665). Based on Altheide’s “problem frame,” it is hypothesized that a frame pushing the threat of terrorism will provoke more fear than those not exposed to this frame.

Framing research has classified and created types of frames (Neuman et al., 1992; Entman, 1993, 2004; Hallahan, 1999; Altheide, 1997; Lau and Schlesinger, 2005; Domke et al., 1999; Scheufele, 1999), and revealed how different frames affect individuals’ perceptions of
issues and policy preferences (Iyengar, 1991; Terkildsen and Schnell, 1997). Notable is Iyengar’s (1991) distinction between “episodic” and “thematic” frames, whereby exposure to these frames affects individuals’ military opinions (Iyengar and Simon, 1993) and assessments of responsibility for national issues (Ansolabehere et al., 1993). Framing research also differentiates between substantive and procedural frames, claiming the way an issue is reported may affect the way people evaluate and understand the issue (Entman, 1993).

Framing can hence be thought of as a form of persuasion (Entman, 2004; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989b; Iyengar, 1991) convincing individuals that something occurred. The effect of this persuasion is measured by the relationship between media frames and individuals’ political preferences.

Nelson et al. (1997b) disagree with this effect, arguing framing differs theoretically and empirically from persuasion, claiming framing is a tool persuaders utilize. Frames for Nelson et al. (1997b) and Chong (1996) activate information stored in citizens’ memories affecting considerations that individuals weigh when thinking about political matters. Similarly, Bartels (1993) uncovers media messages are rarely inconsistent with individuals’ pre-existing opinions.

Chong (1996) concludes changing individuals’ attitudes relies on changing the balance of their considerations towards an issue or person and on the manipulation of their priorities (Chong, 1996: 197). His “framing model” asserts: issues can be interpreted using a number of frames of reference; frames influence one to take different positions on an issue; an individuals’ preference on an issue is attributed to the frames of reference selected and the associations between frames; and frames are specific interpretations of issues popularized through political discussion. Chong concludes more knowledgeable individuals give higher priorities to deliberations highlighted in public conversations of an issue, and certain frames of reference are “easier to promote because the public is already predisposed to give priority to some dimensions over others” (Chong, 1996: 222).

How various media outlets produce different frames, as well as their types of frames has been extensively explored (Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2006; Jasperson et al., 2003; Norris, 2003; Norris, 1997; Traugott and Brader, 2003; Brown, 2003; Fidas, 2008). Notable are Jasperson et al. (2003) who compared CNN and al Jazeera’s media content surrounding the war in Afghanistan. Evidence reveals a vast difference in content between media sources, creating two starkly varying perception pools. Norris (1997) additionally examined framing routines in U.S. television network news, revealing major fluctuations relating to the total number of international stories.

Research on media effects has also examined how stories generated by the media can prime the public to attribute more focus to specific issues when formulating evaluations of political figures. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) define priming as giving some attributes more attention than others, thereby making some issues more available. They assert individuals possess limited knowledge surrounding decisions regarding political matters and must use whatever information comes most readily to mind.

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3 Episodic frames represent “public issues in terms of concrete instances, or specific events,” (Iyengar and Simon, 1993: 369).
4 Thematic frames place “public issues in some general or abstract context” (Iyengar, and Simon, 1993: 369).
5 Substantive frames define effects, identify causes, and produce moral judgments regarding political matters (Entman, 2004: 5).
6 Procedural frames are “evaluations of political actors’ legitimacy, based on their technique, success, and representativeness” (Entman, 2004: 6).
Iyengar and Kinder reveal priming effects can change “standards that people use to make political evaluations” (1987: 63). Experiments showed citizens judge the president of the United States based on attributes newscasters decide to cover and “television news powerfully influences which problems viewers regard as the nation’s most serious” (1987: 4). When respondents were shown TV news clips of energy stories featuring the U.S president, their perception of the president’s performance on energy was “roughly twice as important in determining his overall performance ratings” (1987: 84) than those not exposed to clips featuring the president.

Priming reveals dynamics of persuasion through the utilization of specific and prior context on retrieval and interpretation of information. Within “the information processing framework, attitudes, needs, strategies, concepts, and norms are seen as information processing structures, which function in differentiating the environment and integrating perceptions into beliefs and actions” (McDaniel and Lawrence, 1990: 16).

Miller and Krosnick (1996) investigate priming effects with relation to political persuasion, distinguishing persuasion as the media delivering messages with a particular position, and priming, as a process in which attention is given to an issue, albeit not promoting a particular position. They hypothesized media content would only affect aspects of “public opinion that were directly implicated by a story and that the priming effect would be moderated by the relevance of the news stories to the judgments being made” (Miller and Krosnick, 1996: 84). Furthermore, they believed that the media would affect those with the most media exposure and lowest level of political knowledge. Studies confirmed the effects of priming.

Priming effects can be examined in terms of the way in which specific attributes regarding terrorism have been promoted. For example, if an article emphasizes the concern of another terrorist attack by promoting the attributes such as threat and fear of terrorism it will prime individuals to feel fearful and want more legislation to protect them. Subsequently they will evaluate the issue of terrorism as a dominant concern.

**Framing Terrorism**

The aforementioned theories demonstrate the potential powerful effects media frames can have on individuals’ attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions regarding political matters, albeit, the effects will vary according to the context of a news story. One is left to wonder how the topic of terrorism may affect individuals’ levels of susceptibility and whether the issue of terrorism yields a unique impact. For example, if different media sources frame the issue of terrorism in various contexts will it diversify opinions regarding terrorism? Furthermore, will the topic of terrorism accentuate the powerful effects of the media, or highlight the minimal effects of the media?

These theoretical questions are answered by literature pertaining to the effects of framing terrorism. Research concludes frames such as the “war on terror” shape public cognition through the constant evaluation of friend versus foe (Norris et al., 2003). Furthermore, citizens’ ability to understand September 11 was influenced by continued media exposure (Traugott and Brader, 2003).

Fidas (2008) postulates that a “groupthink” paradigm—the majority of individuals in the U.S sharing one belief that terrorism is a severe threat, has dominated the media post 9/11 and that September 11 was an “anchoring” event in which perceptions and events were filtered; skewing Americans’ perceptions about the seriousness of terrorism. He evokes the ideology of
“Red Cell”—an analysis that the “terrorist threat to the United States and globally is real but exaggerated” (Fidas, 2008: 520), by directing attention to the “threat frames” generated by the media. Treating terrorism as an “endless ‘war’” (Fidas, 2008: 528) is problematic and the real danger may be the related rhetoric and stereotypes associated with the threat of terrorism.

Mogensen et al. (2002) examine terrorism frames and effects of agenda setting through a content analysis. Results revealed September 11 coverage was centered upon major themes such as the World Trade Centre and terrorist activity verses minor themes such as air traffic and safety. Some television networks however dedicated more coverage to terrorism than the World Trade Centre. This supports their hypothesis that the media shift focus of key issues during particular times and events.

Based on terrorism framing literature, a frame pushing the threat of terrorism is expected to cause higher levels of fear in individuals compared to a frame reassuring the public that terrorism is not a concern. Furthermore, if the media frames terrorism as a dominant concern and discusses the need for increased security measures, levels of fear will be aroused and individuals will feel less satisfied with anti-terrorism legislation.

Literature examining how different forms of media frame terrorism conclude that television remains a key medium of terrorist information (Stempel and Hargrove, 2002) and is the preferred media information outlet (Ansolabehere et al, 1993). Brown et al., (2002) found that a respondent’s exposure to television was significantly associated with levels of fear regarding the September 11 terrorist attacks. Television news conclusively shapes citizens’ political views (Gerbner and Gross, 1976; Gerbner et al., 1982) through the framing of public issues (Iyengar, 1991).

Exposure to different media outlets (McClure and Patterson, 1976, Neuman et al., 1992) and the frequency of exposure (Zaller, 1992) can cause diverse effects. Based on these findings, those who watch the most televised national news will exhibit lower levels of susceptibility to media frames than those who watch the least. These findings provide support for isolating the frequency of media exposure when examining media effects.

Literature pertaining to effects of framing terrorism substantiates terrorism falls under the powerful effects school of thought. The manner in which terrorism is reported creates diverse reactions. For example, if the media use a “war on terror” frame that increases levels of fear, the media can then offer a solution, i.e., more security.

The limited effects school would contend the media no longer has an ability to affect an audience due to the sensational nature of the “Toronto 18” making people immune. Zaller (1992) would agree people may have become immune because the “Toronto 18” received news coverage. Conversely, powerful effects theorists would challenge this proposition believing it is due to this issue having a public profile that it would have an effect. Whatever a frame advocates becomes absorbed into citizens’ minds and from this public opinion is formed. This debate is explored in the subsequent pages.

III- Methodology

The method of this study was an experiment to test whether media-generated frames affect participants’ views of appropriate security legislation and terrorism. The experiment served to determine if different frames of the “Toronto 18” arrests lead to different perceptions regarding terrorism.
Articles from *The Toronto Star* and *Toronto Sun* were selected as the stimuli.\(^7\) The first article, from *The Toronto Star* (Yew, 2006: A9), downplayed the threat of terrorism and focused on civil liberties being violated due to stricter security laws. This article is structured according to the “reassurance” frame. The second article, from *The Toronto Sun* (Jenkins, 2006: 2), elevated the threat of terrorism and focused on the need for stricter security laws. This article is referred to as a “threat” frame. The third article served as the control, having no relevance to the issue of terrorism; it focused on poverty and was taken from *The Toronto Sun* (Weese, 2008: 9). Due to the “treatment” articles being diverse and spinning the issue of terrorism in two different directions, effects from both stimuli can be compared to the placebo. It must be noted that the overall coverage in *The Star and Sun* reflect these respective themes.\(^8\)

In order to assess how media frames affect public perception, an experiment was conducted to determine individuals’ sensitivity to different frames and whether these frames can alter policy expectations and attitudes regarding terrorism. The experiment consisted of 245 students from Wilfrid Laurier University.\(^9\) Each respondent received a questionnaire to measure perceptions of terrorism and security legislation. There were twenty questions\(^10\) in each questionnaire, ranging from ranking the importance of civil rights protection, to listing the biggest problem facing Canada. Fourteen questions measured the perceptions of security legislation, fear of terrorism and civil rights protection and six questions served as the controls. These controls were utilized to alleviate significant differences among the respondents. Packages consisting of one of the three articles\(^11\) and a questionnaire were administered to respondents. The experimental design employed here controls for some external factors and a priori priming. For instance, a student’s sophistication was controlled for through variables that measure media exposure. Furthermore, respondents were not briefed at the beginning of the experiment.

Using student samples is based on the convenience of obtaining a rather homogeneous sample. An article’s influence on perceptions is partially determined by one’s susceptibility, which varies greater in the general public than within a sample of educated students, as students have “higher than average cognitive skills” (Basil, 1996: 433). If university students are to be future leaders and policy makers it is crucial to examine if their perceptions can be influenced by the media. If the research hypotheses are confirmed, one can speculate the effect would be larger among those who are less educated (and more susceptible).

In order to determine if agenda-setting, framing, priming and persuasion can affect and shape individuals perceptions, the following hypotheses shown in Table 1 were tested.

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\(^7\) Both were dated June 4, 2006.

\(^8\) These findings were revealed in a content analysis consisting of the exploration of the first week’s coverage of the “Toronto 18” terrorist arrests in *The Toronto Star* and *Sun* (Morano, 2009). It was revealed that a) there was a divergence between the two newspapers, and in the days following the initial arrests greater differences and ideological biases become more evident, and b) *The Toronto Star* was less sensational and focused on pro-human rights frames compared to *The Toronto Sun*, which focused on sensationalized threat and fearful frames.

\(^9\) Nearly half of the expected 444 students enrolled in the course did not attend.

\(^10\) Questions were carefully worded to maintain neutrality and unbiased reflections, and to avoid contamination of priming.

\(^11\) Articles were devoid of identifiable information, including: source, date, and journalist.

\(^12\) Respondents were not initially given the true purpose of this study; instead they were invited to answer questions, read an article, and conclude by answering more questions. Willing respondents read and signed a consent form, were informed they were not required to answer all questions, could withdraw from the study at any time, and were notified of risks and benefits their participation could entail. Their identity remained anonymous. Once the questionnaires were collected the class was debriefed.
To ensure it is primarily the media causing the differences in levels of fear, controls were added. For instance, newspaper consumption was utilized as a control to identify how often respondents read the newspaper per week. Television consumption, measuring how often respondents watch televised news, also served as a control. These controls were implemented based on Zaller’s (1996) research analyzing how individuals use information gained from mass media to form political preferences. He draws attention to two phenomena: “how citizens learn about matters that are for the most part beyond their immediate experience and how they convert the information they acquire into opinions” (Zaller, 1992: 40), concluding, mass communication
is a powerful force in influencing citizens, and people are influenced proportionately by the amount they receive.

His “reception-acceptance model” examines the conditions under which political messages influence the public. The model includes axioms regarding individuals’ responses to political information they receive; these include: the reception, resistance, accessibility, and response axioms. Zaller concluded those with the most exposure are the most likely to receive messages, and the least likely to accept these messages, while those with the least exposure to the media are the least likely to receive the messages, but the most likely to accept. It is those in the middle who are the most malleable; they are not entirely tuned out, so they get some of the messages, and not highly sophisticated, so they can be persuaded.

Other controls were implemented, these included: age and gender. A dummy variable was also utilized to identify respondents who majored in political science, as nearly half of the student participants are enrolled in other disciplines.

IV- Findings

Regression analysis was used to determine the effects of the articles on respondents, where the three articles were entered as two dummy variables, with the placebo set as the reference group. The first model of Table 2 shows the effects of each article. As can be seen those who read The Sun were significantly more fearful of terrorists than those who read the placebo. However, those who read The Star did not differ significantly from those who read the placebo. Running regression to control for age and television viewship did not affect respondents’ responses to the “treatment” articles, nor did political science enrollment affect respondents’ levels of fear (see Model 2 of Table 2)

However, as shown in Model 2 of Table 2 the significance of The Sun moved from p<.05 to p<.10. This reveals other factors may be in play. When controlling for newspaper readership significant results were found. The amount of newspaper consumption affects the degree of individuals’ susceptibility to fearful frames. Results also illustrate females are more fearful than males. The rationale behind gender affecting fear may be due to a plethora of factors; however it is beyond the scope of this study to explain this.

Given that newspaper readership affects respondents’ levels of fear, the exact amount of newspaper readership per week was examined. The dataset was narrowed to isolate those who read the newspapers, in particular, those who indicated reading the newspaper less frequently. Regression results (see Model 3 of Table 2) confirm those who read the newspaper less than four days a week are more susceptible to media frames. This changes the relationship between fear and media exposure. Those who read the newspaper less than 4 days a week are significantly more fearful of terrorists than those who read the newspaper more frequently.

13 Zaller believes the four axioms taken as a whole have empirical implications. Although the axioms are not completely true, they are plausible approximations of the processes occurring when individuals acquire and use information to create statements regarding political preferences (1992: 42).
14 Converse (1962) can be credited with introducing the reception-acceptance dynamic. He found political awareness to be an important resistance factor, and those most and least exposed to the media difficult to influence, while those moderately exposed the most volatile.
15 Regression results also reveal those who read the newspaper four days or more were not fearful.
These results reveal the lower newspaper consumption the more fearful and susceptible individuals are to media frames. At four days consumption or more respondents become less

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<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
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<td>245</td>
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Table 2: Regression Analysis, Levels of Fear
affected by the media and are less susceptible to media frames. This relates partially to Zaller’s (1992) “receive accept model,” in that, those who read the newspaper more than four days a week were the least fearful and least susceptible to influence from treatment articles. Evidence also confirms Altheide’s (1997) findings relating to the effects messages of fear have on public perception.

Results from hypothesis 1a confirm hypothesis 2. Running a Pearson r correlation coefficient reveals a significant negative relationship between the variable “fear of terrorists” and newspaper readership (r = -0.164, p < .05, n=245). The negative coefficient indicates those with more media consumption are less fearful. Those more exposed to media frames (reading the newspaper frequently) are less susceptible to media influence.

Hypothesis 1b could not be verified as independent-samples t tests failed to uncover significant findings. But, as shown in Table 3, the Star group is directionally less fearful than the Sun group. Those who read the two treatment articles do appear to have moved respondents’ attitudes in the expected direction. See Table 3 for comparison of means.

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<th>Table 3: Average Scores on Attitude Measures</th>
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<td>Importance of civil/human rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Importance of civil rights protection</td>
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<td>Satisfaction with legislation in place to protect Canada from terrorists</td>
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Hypothesis 3 measured perceptions regarding the “importance of civil and human rights protection.”16 Multiple linear regression comparing the two “treatment articles” with the placebo, revealed a significant difference among these groups (see Model 1 of Table 4). The level of support for human and civil rights protection varied according to the article read. Those who read the placebo were more in favour of pro-civil and human rights than those who read the “threat” frame and those who read the placebo were more pro-civil and human rights than those who read the “reassurance” frame. Results did not change when controlling for the effects of variables such as the political science dummy, age, newspaper readership, television viewership and gender (see Model 2 of Table 4). An explanation for this finding may be connected to the content of both treatment articles; both were about terrorism, which primed concerns about human and civil rights.

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16 Hypothesis 3 required the recoding of three variables, whereby the alpha coefficient was 0.62. Variables, “innocence,” referring to respondents’ views of applying the presumption of “innocent until proven guilty” to suspected terrorists; “death,” referring to views of applying the death penalty to convicted terrorists, and “torture” referring to perceptions regarding the torture of one convicted terrorist to protect 100 people, were combined into an index, “importance of civil and human rights protection” where 1 reflects “in favour of protection of human and civil rights” and 0 reflects “not in favour of protection of human and civil rights.”
Results confirm the media’s ability to affect respondents’ perceptions of human and civil rights through framing. Although those who read the “reassurance” frame were expected to be more in favour of civil and human rights protection compared to those who did not read about terrorism, opposite results were revealed. These findings confirm the literature regarding the emotional effect from frames (Snyder and Park, 2002; Riffe and Stovall, 1989; Brown, et al., 2002; Just et al., 2007; Graber, 2007, Step et al., 2002; Hoffner and Haefner, 1993; Smith et al, 2002; Altheide, 1997). The mere subject matter of terrorism affects individuals’ attitudes regarding the protection of human and civil rights, revealing individuals are willing to sacrifice human and civil rights to thwart off terrorism when exposed to media content regarding terrorism.

<table>
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<th>Table 4: Regression Analysis, Importance of Civil/Human Rights</th>
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<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
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Hypothesis 4 expected those who read the “reassurance” frame would be more in favour of having their civil rights protected by the government than those who read the “threat” frame. A comparison of means reveals those who read the “reassurance” frame did score higher (M=8.61) than those who read the “threat” frame (M=8.48). However, the “reassurance” frame (M=8.61) yielded a lower score than the placebo (M=8.95) (see Table 3), revealing perhaps content regarding terrorism affects respondents’ attitudes towards civil rights protection and they are willing to lose levels of protection when faced with terrorism.

Subsequent independent-samples t tests reveal a significant difference between those reading the placebo and those reading the “threat” frame. Those who read the “threat” frame had
a significantly lower mean score of wanting civil rights protected than those in the placebo group.  

Although results from independent-samples $t$ tests did not confirm a statistical difference between the “reassurance” and the “threat” frame, nor between the “reassurance” frame and placebo, the significant results between the placebo and “threat” frame direct attention to media frames affecting public opinion. Perhaps due to the “threat” frame pushing the fear of terrorism, individuals were primed to be less inclined to want their civil rights protected by the government when compared to those who did not read about terrorism.

Results support the theory of media frames affecting public perception. Those who read about the threat of terrorism were significantly less inclined to be in favour of civil rights protection, compared to those who did not read about terrorism. Results also reveal the effects of priming, and agenda setting, in that media content affects what individuals think about, as well as primes them to be less in favour of civil rights protection.

Hypothesis 5 analyzed perceptions regarding anti-terrorism legislation. Examining the means in Table 3 reveals those who read the “threat” frame were the least pleased with legislation when compared to those who read the “reassurance” frame and placebo. Results from independent-samples t-tests reveal a statistically significant difference between those who read the “threat” frame (M=5.54, SD=1.81) and those who read the placebo (M=6.38, SD=1.85). Results suggest respondents who read the “threat” frame were cued to the threat, and consequently over-reacted by wanting more legislation, rendering the current legislative framework as inadequate. Those who read the placebo were not primed to fear terrorists, nor to think about security legislation.

These results confirm the literature surrounding persuasion, priming and second-level agenda setting. Due to the content in the “threat” frame pushing the fear of terrorism, respondents were in turn less pleased with legislation. Due to the attributes of extreme fear and threat projected from this frame, individuals were less pleased with legislation and feared potential terrorist attacks.

Hypothesis 6 was not substantiated, as linear regression lacks significance. Televised national news consumption was not a predictor of fear level scores. The insignificant results may be attributed to the complex system of persuasion. Although respondents who watch television frequently may feel less fearful, it may be due to the subject of terrorism being a fearful topic, that respondents rated their fear somewhat higher than average. This relates to McClure and Patterson’s (1976) findings that “television news “is not an efficient communicator of everyday political information” (1976: 25) and those who watch news frequently do not differ in agenda setting effects from those who watch it less.

V - Discussion

This study established a series of linkages and relationships between media frames and public perception, confirming media content can directly affect individuals’ attitudinal and emotional responses to terrorism. The media do not report the news as mirror images of reality but rather in a multi-dimensional array of distorted images. Due to *The Star* and *The Sun* being

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17 $t (139.55) = -2.17, p < .05$.
18 $t (156) = -2.88, p < .05$. 
large newspapers and therefore plausibly representative of how the media function, one can infer all media sources differ in the frames they produce.

These distorted images impact and skew public perception regarding terrorism; revealing those exposed to fearful frames are less pleased with anti-terrorism legislation, more fearful of terrorism and less in favour of civil rights protection compared to those who did not read about terrorism. Furthermore, those who did not read about terrorism were significantly more in favour of civil and human rights protection compared to those who read the two “treatment” articles.

These results expose the impact terrorism related frames have on individuals’ emotions, values, and attitudes towards civil and human rights protection, as well as the fact media exposure affects individuals’ susceptibility to media frames. These effects reveal the powerful force the media plays in individuals’ lives, albeit, this force only works within a particular context.

The insignificant results of this study may be attributed to the demography; in that, university students imply a greater breadth of intellect than in the average population. This may have created a greater resistance to media effects.  

Regardless of whether external factors were involved, evidence supports the media affects individuals’ emotions and perceptions regarding terrorism and appropriate legislation. Exposure to different media frames, and frequency of exposure can affect susceptibility.

One is left to question where the findings of this research fit within the powerful and limited effects debate. Evidence reveals media frames can affect individuals’ perceptions and emotional involvement regarding an issue, substantiating the powerful effects assumptions. However, insignificant findings reveal individuals may not be as susceptible to the media as Lippmann thought. The findings of this research create a point of divergence from traditional framing effects literature and exposes the possibility of a new theory emerging.

Due to significant results validating the ability of the media to affect public perception, a more pervasive theory merits exploration. Media effects, as revealed, are not always limited, nor are they always powerful, but powerful effects are more likely to surface with issues framed in a fearful manner. The media can interfere in individuals’ assessments of an issue by distorting reality and hence stimulating an emotional response. This lends weight to a possible emerging theory, although perhaps still in the embryonic stage there is evidence to suggest that issues of a fearful nature can alter individuals’ values. The mere fact that individuals’ values can be tampered with suggests a form of media interference.

The effect of framing terrorism in a sensationalized fearful manner affects levels of fear, civil rights protection, as well as perceptions of security legislation. Truth is interrupted by the media’s manipulation of content. Furthermore, this study reveals content regarding terrorism can affect individuals’ attitudes towards human and civil rights protection, such as the presumption of innocence, torture, and the death penalty. These results imply the ability of the media to alter individual values. Further exploration is required to examine if the media’s effect can change individuals’ values in instances other than those deemed fearful.

The ability of the media to interfere with individuals’ values merits additional research by examining the effects of issues that are more pedestrian. It may be more difficult to move values deeply ingrained in individuals regarding more mundane issues, than issues that generate high

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19 It is interesting to ask: Are those who “skipped” class more likely to be less politically engaged, and therefore perhaps even more susceptible to media influence? Or, are those who did show up more likely to be studious and thus more resistant to media influence?
levels of fear. Therefore the gravity of an issue is a variable one must consider when examining the potential of the media to alter values, as it will amplify or attenuate the media’s interfering effect.

Due to the media’s ability to affect individuals’ perceptions of terrorism, what can be said for the role of democracy? Is it still as Lincoln said, “by the people, for the people,” (1863, Gettysburg) or is it now by the people with the art of persuasion for the people who are susceptible? Can the populace trust that the mass media are delivering accurate, fair, and balanced news, or is objectivity sliding down a slippery slope blurring what is real and what is contrived? This theoretical question begs to be answered. The media may play a larger role in individuals’ lives than most realize.

VI- Conclusion

The media is the vital link in the political system (Alger, 1989: 6) and functions as the bridge between the public and political actors. The media strategically sets the agenda of this linkage affecting message salience. Technology has revolutionized this landscape and created media supremacy, or perhaps an “aggressive fourth estate” (Larking, 2007: 353) of government, whereby individuals cannot escape the interfering effects of the media.

The media sees citizens as consumers and “must cater to public tastes because they need particular audiences” (Graber et al., 1998: 9). In order to be active participants of democracy, citizens must have accurate representations of reality, and not skewed information the media spews.

Street (2001) distinguishes two adverse effects biases can have upon democracy, “it can misrepresent the people or it can misinform them” (Street, 2001: 257). He contends that biases lead to misrepresentation of people, causing them to become subverted participants. Misinformation causes citizens to receive inaccurate information leading to misconceived political acts.

Democratic countries are faced with a dilemma. Liberal democracies grant freedom of the press; however, due to the freedom of the press, citizens are not receiving transparent information. This affects the democratic political freedom of citizens. Street postulates that in “Western liberal democracies, the mass media have claimed the right to represent the people and to uphold democracy, and the consumers of newspapers and television have come to treat these media sources as the basis on which to think and act in the world” (Street, 2001: 7). This is problematic.

The diversified selection of media sources and the twenty-four hour seven-day-a week news generation affects individual perceptions and causes information overload. Mendelsohn (1996) maintains news-makers call the shots on what is real, what is important, and what the over arching objective is in their reporting. Citizens’ information is consequently fragmented and tampers with democratic freedom.

Alger (2001) acknowledges two elements essential in a democracy. First, “alternative choices must be available to the public,” (Alger, 2001: 6) as choice is vital for democracy. Secondly, “the public must have “in its hands” what it takes to make a political decision on those choices in a meaningful fashion” (Alger, 1989:7). Citizens must be able to make choices in relation to their own beliefs and act upon them. The media can influence citizens’ decision making processes which negates political deliberation.
If the media’s choice of frames can influence positions people take on the security vs. civil rights debate, what does that say about the more general question about the media’s role in a democracy in other policy areas? Is society embroiled in a form of the propaganda model (Chomsky and Herman, 1988) wherein the media manipulate individuals into thinking a specific way regarding policy matters?

The results confirm some individuals can be manipulated by media content and there is potential for the media to use their “fair and balanced” voice in an insidious manner. The media is a powerful entity in citizens’ lives, and the ability to downplay, ignore, or skew events at their whim is unsettling.

The effect of multiple media sources framing the news to fit their own agendas can contaminate the process from which citizens gain information required to be participants in a democracy. The very rights protected under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Canada could be compromised due to the omnipotent media manipulating citizens into believing what they are receiving is fair and balanced news. As this study illustrates different news sources provide different frames of the same topic, which can ultimately shape a citizen’s reality. If public opinion is formulated from the realities the media create and individuals use these realities to formulate decisions regarding public policy, and to elect public officials, this could ultimately be conceived as a form of propaganda; hence, violating democracy as we know it.

It is due to the media’s control over message salience and layers of nuance that individuals are not receiving accurate representations of reality. This can profoundly affect the way in which they perceive the world. These effects impact individuals’ perceptions and attitudes regarding important political matters.

The language used by media sources is a transmitter of meaning (Larking, 2007) and if this language is sensationalized, dramatized, or fragmented it affects the accuracy of citizens’ reality. This is to say that the media is much more than an information provider, rather their modus operandi is to sell their particular frame to those with vulnerable receptors and nudge them into acceptance. The process, as subtle as it may appear has not so subtle consequences, as society may fall prey to “media interference.”
References


Appendix A: Articles

Threat Frame: The Toronto Sun (Jenkins, 2006: 2)

The al-Qaida inspired terrorist cell police say they smashed was plotting to bomb “hard” government targets rather than “soft” civilian ones such as shopping malls or nightclubs.

“They were going after institutional targets,” a source said.

Federal agencies such as the CSIS headquarters on Front St. W. and an RCMP building were on the hit list.

Three tons of ammonium nitrate was in the hands of the would-be bombers and was seized in a series of co-ordinated raids across southern Ontario led by CSIS, the RCMP, OPP and several police services including Toronto’s.

The chemical haul is three times the amount white supremacists used to shatter a federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995, killing 168.

“This group posed a real and serious threat,” RCMP Michael McDonell said. “It had the capacity and intent to carry out these attacks.

“Our investigation and arrests prevented the assembly of any bombs and the attacks from being carried out.”

A cellphone wired to a circuit board seized in the raids was intended “to cause the explosion,” McDonell said.

Police had been watching the group for a “very long time” and moved in for a specific reason.

“It was at the point when we felt we could no longer let them continue in their actions without a threat to the public,” McDonell said.

“Because of our concern for the public it was stopped.”

The bust, the largest ever in Canada since the war on terror began in 2001, netted 12 adults and five youths, all of whom are charged with participating in or contributing to the activity of a terrorist group, including training and recruitment; committing indictable offences, including firearms and explosives offences, for the benefit of a terrorist group and providing or making available property for terrorist purposes.

Most of the accused appeared in court, where they were held pending bail hearings.

But there were questions about the relationship between the arrests and another case.

Outside court, Mohammed Abdelhaleem, father of suspect Shareaf Abdelhaleem, posted bail for Mohammad Mahjoub who is being held in Kingston, Ont., on a national security certificate.

Abdelhaleem also confirmed he worked for Atomic Energy of Canada.

At least two of the accused are related by marriage and several live close to each other. All are residents of Canada and most are citizens. Police allege they used that most Canadian of summer activities – a trip to cottage country – to train for the attacks.

Luc Portelance, for the CSIS, said they have for some time been warning the public that there are Canadian-born and bred terrorists actively planning attacks.

“That threat is real and when we’ve spoken about that threat we were not limiting our thoughts to this one group,” Portelance said.

“I don’t want to be alarmist and have people think there are numerous others out there but CSIS and its policing partners are actively investigating others in Canada.”

And while the men are philosophical comrades of Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida group, there is no evidence of contact or communication with foreign terror groups.

He also stressed police were not singling out Muslims.

“It’s important to note this operation in no way reflects negatively on any specific community or ethnocultural group,” he said. “Terrorism is a dangerous ideology and a global phenomenon.”
Members of the Muslim community expressed shock and sadness – but not surprise – at the arrest of 17 people from the GTA who have been charged with terror-related offences.

Though some leaders worry that Muslims may feel the sting of backlash, others say the community must do more to fight extremist views within its own mosques.

Investigators made a point of saying yesterday that the arrests are not an indictment of any particular faith or national group. Muslim leaders also said they hope Canadians will remember that those charged are innocent until proven guilty, and that those who hold to violent and extreme religious views are a tiny fraction of the approximately 750,000 Muslims who call this country home.

"This is not something new to me or something I did not expect," said community activist Sohail Raza. "It was just a matter of time where something like this would crop up in Canada."

Raza said that even prior to the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S., there was a surge of extremist Wahhabi ideology in mosques around the world, including a few in the GTA. Wahhabism is an extreme version of Islam that originated in the 18th century and is now the state-sanctioned sect of the faith in Saudi Arabia.

Osama bin Laden, believed to have masterminded the Sept. 11 attacks, is an adherent of this sect.

"There is more hatred spewed out than logic," Raza said.

The Canadian Islamic Congress has asked provincial and federal governments for funding to study how and why Muslim youth are drawn to these extreme ideologies, but has been turned away, the group's national president said.

"The problem has a social dimension and governments are spending all their money on law enforcement but not on diagnosing this problem and finding solutions, which is short-sighted," said Mohamed Elmasy.

"We want to send a message to the community, especially youth, that in a liberal democracy, you can have a dissenting voice and you can be part of the political process by voting, running for office, by seeking careers in law, law enforcement, media, professions that the community needs."

There was a documented increase in hate crimes against Muslims in Canada following the Sept. 11 attacks. Community members also say they suffered incidents of verbal abuse after the transit bombings in Spain and London, Elmasy said. "We're expecting the same after this news."

He added, "The accused are innocent until proven guilty. We hope the media will not find the community guilty by association."

It is time for the Muslim community to "stop acting as though it is not a big issue," said Tarek Fatah of the Muslim Canadian Congress.

"These people are taking the name of Islam, these are fascist cult believers and they need to be combatcd within the Muslim community."

"This is the challenge that we have. We can't just go on behaving as if everything is normal."

As for the potential for backlash, Fatah said he is not concerned.

"I think by and large Canadians are very sensible people and they know this is not an issue with Muslims. This is a cult within the Muslim community."

"I don't think there would be a backlash, but it can take just one idiot to do that."
Poor health is not reserved for people below the poverty line, according to the city's top doctor.

A new Toronto Public Health study, called The Unequal City, was released yesterday and shows there is a direct correlation between the amount of money someone makes and how healthy they are -- even upper middle class earners are less healthy than the very rich.

Given the current economic crisis gripping the world, more people are going to rely on less income, and that means all their health will suffer, said Dr. David McKeown, Toronto’s medical officer of health.

“The economic trends we’re looking at now, they pose a real threat to our health,” said McKeown.

“There’s a gradient, so that everyone is on a scale of health according to their income,” he added. “I think this is particularly a concern given the worrisome economic news we’ve had in recent weeks.”

The report used 2005 and 2006 figures and when compared to higher income earners, lung cancer rates were 1.5 times higher for low-income males, the gonorrhea rate was 3.5 times higher among low-income females, and low-income males will die an average of 4.5 years earlier.

There were similar findings in the 12 other health indicators as well.

Councillor Joe Mihevc, who chairs the community development committee, said the health inequality between various income groups “is going to get worse.

“The way I read the report, it’s saying, basically, if you’re poor, you will die earlier, your babies will have lower birth weights, your children will have a lower readiness to learn, your teenagers will have higher rates of pregnancy, you will more likely smoke, you will more likely struggle with poor diet and obesity and you will suffer higher rates of lung cancer and heart disease,” he said.

McKeown called health inequalities in this city “unacceptable,” but the current economic crisis should not force social services program cuts because even in good economic times, things were bad.

“If people slip down that (health and income) scale, whether they’re slipping from high income into middle income or from middle income into poverty, there will be an impact on their health.”

The Toronto Public Health’s study, The Unequal City: Income and Health Inequalities in Toronto, released yesterday shows someone’s level of health is directly related to their level of income.

When comparing the lowest and highest income earners, rates of various “unhealthy” indicators reveal alarming trends, according to the city’s medical officer of health.