Good, Bad, or Ugly? Narratives of Democratic Legitimacy in Western Public Spheres

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work in progress – please do not cite – comments welcome
This contribution explores the issue of political legitimacy in the post-national constellation. How much support do the nation state and international regimes enjoy today, and what are its normative foundations? The academic literature offers starkly different answers to these questions, but most contributions assume a tight link between democratic quality and regime support in the post-war Golden Age of the nation state. By contrast, whether the political developments of the last few decades have fostered a legitimacy crisis of established liberal democracies and whether the international regimes to which authority has increasingly shifted are plagued by democratic and legitimacy deficits remains disputed.

We first propose a classification of extant crisis scenarios gleaned from Northrop Frye’s fourfold typology of narrative modes. In the next step, we briefly review the attitudinal and behavioural indicators of support or discontent that are usually drawn on to gauge the legitimacy of political regimes and then outline the rationale for a constructivist, discourse analytical perspective on a third, so far neglected dimension of legitimacy – political communication. In the main section of the paper, we present findings from a study of media discourses in four Western democracies in which the legitimacy of national political orders and their institutions, the EU, the G7/8, and the United Nations is evaluated.

As it turns out, the tragic narrative of legitimacy crises or deficits, and even an ironic version of it, is more prevalent in public discourses than the comedian or romantic narratives put forward in more sanguine academic evaluations of democratic quality and legitimacy in the post-national constellation. However, there are clear differences between evaluations of the nation state and of the three international regimes, as well as differences between national public spheres and types of speakers. Moreover, instead of trends in any particular direction, cyclical fluctuations appear to prevail in the discursive (re-)production and transformation of legitimacy. We conclude by suggesting a few directions in which the narrative analysis of academic and media discourses might be taken.

Legitimacy in the Age of Globalization: Four Academic Narratives

The emergence of the “post-national constellation” (Habermas 1998) has led to renewed academic interest in the concept of legitimacy (Hurrelmann/Schneider/Steffek 2007; Gilley 2009; Coicaud/Heiskanen 2001). Economic globalization and the internationalization would, first of all, seem to affect the foundations of democratic legitimacy at the level of the nation state (Pharr/Putnam 2000; Dalton 2004; Torcal/Montero 2006). Where political authority is shifted to international and private governance arrangements, the autonomy of national governments, the control functions of representative institutions, and hence the capacity and democratic quality of national political orders seem to be threatened. Yet there is no consensus on the legitimacy of the democratic nation state in the age of globalization: While many observers indeed diagnose a performance and legitimacy crisis, others are less pessimistic (Schneider et al. 2010).

The literature on the legitimacy of international or supranational organizations and regimes such as the United Nations, the G7/8, and the European Union is equally undecided. For instance, the diagnosis of a legitimacy deficit of the EU – widespread as it may be (Abromeit 1998; Kohler-Koch/Rittberger 2007; Lord 2008; see also Dahl 1994) – is no more than a “myth” according to Andrew Moravcsik (2008), and there are also more sanguine observers of other international regimes (Keohane et al. 2009). Some of this disagreement is arguably due to the fact that normative and empirical perspectives on legitimacy are often confused (Barker 2007, 19-21). But legitimacy is undoubtedly an “essentially contested” concept (Gallie 1956; Collier et al. 2006; Hurrelmann/Schneider/Steffek 2007, chapter 12). Much of the
disagreement is therefore genuine, illustrating divergent normative positions and equally divergent readings of the available empirical indicators for legitimacy.

Here we follow Ronald F. King and Thomas S. Langston (as well as Hayden White before them), and use Northrop Frye’s famous typology of four archetypal plots for a classification of non-fictional texts – namely, academic and media discourses on the legitimacy of political systems (King/Langston 2008; White 1974, 1989). According to King and Langston (2008, 239), “theories-in-time” that deal with issues of political development and change “embody narrative characteristics regarding dramatic interaction, potential resolution, and connection between the events recounted and the receptive audience.” In a similar vein, the literature on shifts in the levels and normative foundations of support for the democratic nation state and international regimes may serve as an example for the “standardized trajectories inherent to many of the empirical analyses we advance” in political (science) discourses (2008, 235).

Table 1 Narratives of Legitimacy

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<th>Frye’s archetypal plots</th>
<th>Elevation</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Satire</td>
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<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Romance</td>
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<th>Crisis scenarios</th>
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<tr>
<td>Delegitimation</td>
<td>Erosion of democratic legitimacy (tragedy)</td>
<td>Collapse of democratic legitimacy (satire)</td>
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<td>Stable democratic legitimacy (romance)</td>
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<th>Scenarios of multilevel legitimacy</th>
<th>International regime legitimate</th>
<th>International regime illegitimate</th>
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<td>National regime illegitimate</td>
<td>Zero-sum relationship (tragic version)</td>
<td>Negative-sum relationship (satire)</td>
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<td>National regime legitimate</td>
<td>Positive-sum relationship (romance)</td>
<td>Zero-sum relationship (comedy version)</td>
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Frye’s archetypal plots may be linked to four scenarios relating to the legitimacy of the democratic nation state and of international regimes, and to emerging scenarios of multilevel legitimacy (Table 1). Each narrative is characterized by a set of actors (heroes and villains...), and by a temporal structure: a conflict-free beginning, some kind of event or development ushering in a crisis, and a dénouement (or its failure) at the end. The beginning of the story is usually told somewhat like this: Once upon a time – in the Golden Age of the trente glorieuses – democracy and the nation state were happily married in the western world. It was not least democratic quality that secured high levels of citizen support – and legitimacy – for national political regimes. Or put differently, legitimacy was presumably anchored in a

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1 On the concept of multilevel legitimacy, see Hurrelmann 2008; Scharpf 2009.
match between the democratic nature of (representative) political institutions and the democratic evaluation standards privileged in the legitimacy beliefs and assessments of citizens.\(^2\)

To be sure, the nation state had already begun to develop a “relationship” with emerging international organizations and regimes but it appeared to be an unsuspicious one that did not jeopardize the success of that marriage, and hence did not raise any issues of legitimacy. The state-centred, intergovernmental perspective that dominated the field of International Relations (IR) in the post-war decades treated legitimacy as a non-issue, or at best as a concept that played a very limited role in the analysis of member-state compliance with the regulations of international regimes. To the extent that these were viewed as mere handmaidens of national governments or as forums of consensual decision making in a system of executive multilateralism, and the (democratic) chain of legitimation between national political communities and their representative institutions was considered to be intact, the IR literature could afford to concentrate on governments as authors and addressees of international regulations and to use the concept of legitimacy only in order to explain the “puzzle” of state compliance in an anarchical international system. Since the EC, too, essentially remained an intergovernmental regime with limited powers and responsibilities, even the burgeoning European polity and its institutions could plausibly be viewed as “a-legitimate” in the described sense (Hurd 1999; Steffek 2007, 190).

All four scenarios that may be distinguished in the current literature, however, imply that the (re-)production of legitimacy has become more problematic in recent decades both for the democratic nation state and for international regimes. Yet the scenarios differ in two respects. First, some authors expect a resolution of the legitimacy challenges that the post-national constellation brings about, while others are more pessimistic. Secondly, one may see an equivalent to Frye’s elevation dimension in the literature, and hence distinguish between “high mimetic” and “low mimetic” variants; assuming that traditional benchmarks of democratic quality remain the gold standard of legitimacy assessments from a normative point of view, their use marks high mimetic variants of legitimation discourses. For our purposes, these dimensions translate into two variables – first, the diagnosed extent of legitimacy (is a regime said to enjoy a lot of support or not, is it described as – mostly – legitimate or illegitimate?), and secondly, the criteria privileged in legitimacy assessments (do they – mostly – focus on aspects of democratic quality or on other, non-democratic benchmarks?). What, then, are the narratives entailed in the four main scenarios proposed by current legitimacy research?

The tragic scenario arguably dominates the literature. King and Langston (2008, 237) characterize this plot as a “trajectory of brilliant rise and inescapable fall” that reveals the gap between human “aspiration and inevitability, a quest for emancipation yet the ultimate triumph of fate.” In a similar vein, the scenario of an erosion of legitimacy assumes that the processes of globalization and political internationalization are inescapable (and perhaps necessary) today. At the same time, it implies that democratic quality is now essentially without plausible normative alternatives when the legitimacy of political regimes is evaluated, and that criteria of democratic quality should therefore prevail in the empirical world – that is, in the legitimacy beliefs and assessments of citizens – as well. Yet, if the autonomy and democratic quality of the state and its representative institutions are truly undermined by internationalization processes (the villains in this story...), then citizens (as “dissatisfied democrats,” Hofferbert/Klingemann 2001) are bound to react to the growing mismatch between democratic quality at the national level and their own democratic expectations – that is, to the unravelling of the happy marriage of the post-war era – with a withdrawal of regime support.

\(^2\) For many, see Hurrelmann et al. 2007. This narrative, of course, ignores the wave of conservative and neo-Marxist crisis diagnoses already formulated in the late 1960s and 1970s.
What is more, no resolution at the international level appears to be in sight either. The intergovernmental perspective outlined above has arguably become obsolete, and the notion that international legitimacy may be (re-)produced by states and governments alone appears less and less convincing. Jens Steffek (2003, 2007) therefore conceptualizes legitimacy in the age of globalization as a threefold relationship between international regimes, their member states, and (trans-)national “constituencies.” In a similar vein, Michael Zürn and his co-authors (Zürn 2004; Zürn et al. 2007) hypothesize roughly the following development: First, growing citizen attention in Western democracies to the effects of globalization and to the internationalization of political authority; secondly, a politicization of international regimes triggered by the expansion of their responsibilities; thirdly, growing concern about the legitimacy of these arrangements and its normative foundations. Thus international political orders might no longer be a-legitimate but might – just like the democratic nation state – have to establish and secure their own legitimacy. Yet if the same criteria as for national political systems are used – or considered appropriate – for legitimacy assessments of international regimes – that is, standards of democratic quality – then crisis diagnoses along the lines of our tragic or “erosion of legitimacy” scenario appear, once again, plausible. The perception of a legitimacy deficit should be the more pronounced, (a) the more responsibilities an international regime has assumed and the more it has turned from a mere intergovernmental forum to a supranational regime (as indicated, for instance, by a shift from consensus to majority decisions or by judicialization), (b) the more discontent with the democratic quality of its procedures and institutions there is, and finally, (c) the less realistic it appears to meet the presumably necessary conditions for a thorough democratization of a regime (the existence of a transnational demos, identity, or public sphere as prerequisites for democratic legitimacy). And even a zero-sum development in which international regimes gain as much legitimacy as national democracies lose would, in the context of this storyline, represent an erosion of legitimacy if it was found to entail a shift to non-democratic legitimation standards.¹

Yet the tragic scenario is not uncontested in the literature; more optimistic assessments exist as well. The plot of a comedy is characterized by a “happy ending,” a resolution. Its “protagonists pursue ordinary desires, which are blocked by insensitive authority figures, absurd rules, or transparent confusion [...],” but the “unusual and outlandish can be accepted easily on the assumption that normality soon will be restored and contentment will reign at the climax” (King/Langston 2008, 237-8). In short, “[t]he essential social message of comedy is not to lose faith” (2008, 238). This corresponds to our “transformation of legitimacy” scenario, according to which we currently observe shifts in the normative foundations of legitimacy. The proponents of this storyline, then, see a new match between the political context of the post-national constellation and the evaluation standards privileged in legitimacy assessments on the horizon. According to their sanguine view, the legitimacy of political orders is not negatively affected by political internationalization because regime support is no longer primarily grounded in traditional criteria of democratic quality nor should it be; it is not that legitimacy itself is challenged, but its traditional normative basis is merely replaced with new, not genuinely democratic foundations that provide a more appropriate basis for the evaluation of political orders in the age of globalization.

This scenario is more frequently developed with a view to the international level than with regard to national political orders, where standards of democratic quality arguably continue to prevail, both normatively and empirically speaking. Most importantly, there is the prominent hypothesis that forms of output legitimation – drawing on standards like efficiency and effectiveness – have gained in importance and may in fact successfully underpin the legitimacy of international regimes. For Andrew Moravcsik and

¹ The term “non-democratic” should be read as “not genuinely democratic,” and hence as referring to criteria such as efficiency and effectiveness that may be met by authoritarian and democratic regimes alike.
others who follow his line of reasoning, standards of democratic quality indeed represent “absurd” criteria for the legitimation of the EU and other international regimes; academic proponents or citizens holding on to them are “insensitive” to the new political context. Viewed from this angle, the diagnosis of a marriage crisis at the national level – or, e.g., of a legitimacy deficit in Brussels – is no more than a big misunderstanding, and a zero-sum game between national and international regimes in which growing support for the latter is based on non-democratic foundations is no reason for concern. Normatively speaking, however, it seems entirely plausible to qualify this as a low mimetic crisis scenario – regime support is maintained at the price of the erosion of democratic legitimation standards and, by implication, a hollowing out of the concept of democracy (Majone 1998, 1999; Scharpf 1999; Moravcsik 2002, 2008).

But even the plot of a romance has its proponents in the literature. This is the high mimetic variant of successful resolution, “a sequence that proceeds from original innocence, to a disturbing call to the quest, to a critical threshold crossed, to purification by trials and temptations, to apotheosis and the awarding of a special gift, and finally to return and recognition by ordinary society that is enriched by the encounter with its enlightened hero” (King/Langston 2008, 238); it is

a statement of moral aspiration, representing the triumph of virtue over vice, justice over injustice, harmony over dissonance. [It offers] a simple construction, with dichotomous choices, clear alternatives, and characters aligned either for or against the heroic quest [for democratic legitimacy]. As a consequence of heroic action, the civic union is strengthened, higher [democratic] principles are upheld, and disparate elements become better integrated.

The gist of this line of reasoning is that the democratic quality of international regimes is not necessarily lower than at the national level; political internationalization therefore does not jeopardize the legitimacy of national political systems – or better still, it might be that a new (deliberative etc.) form of democratic governance with full normative credentials, just different from traditional representative democracies, is emerging at the international level. This might even result in a positive-sum scenario, where the democratic quality and legitimacy of both national and international political orders is successfully defended or secured, and support for the resulting multilevel arrangements is higher than for the Golden Age nation state. The temporary marriage crisis at the national level is solved – or a divorce is followed by a new marriage between democracy and the multilevel arrangements of European and global governance (Keohane et al. 2009). However, few if any observers are this sanguine, and as King and Langston also remind us, “[r]omance is most challenging when set in the present or future. The society we ordinarily accept, the author implies, is inferior to the one we deserve. Remedy is available, but only through the intervention of some exceptional actor […]”

Finally, the empirical reality may well be turn out to be ironic, and hence correspond to the plot of a satire. This low mimetic narrative mode is characterized by the elements of contradiction and illusion. What is more, “[u]nlike in comedy or romance, there is no possibility of deliverance. Unlike in tragedy, there is no vision of release” (King/Langston 2008, 238). In our last, particularly alarming scenario, the “collapse” of democratic legitimacy, even normatively undemanding, non-democratic criteria are unable to secure the legitimacy of the nation state and its institutions or to address the legitimacy problems of international regimes: Despite the fact that such criteria are privileged in legitimacy assessments, regime support is withdrawn or denied. The marriage between democracy and the nation state fails for good, and there is no successful marriage or “relationship” between democracy and the EU in sight. We might thus be faced with a negative-sum development, in which the overall legitimacy of global governance arrangements falls below the legitimacy hitherto enjoyed by its component parts. In short, the story told about legitimacy in the post-national constellation may be “good” (along the lines of the romantic
scenario), “bad” (in the tragic or even ironic scenario), or “ugly” (in the comedy scenario). But who are the story-tellers and how should the extent and foundations of legitimacy – understood as an empirical concept – be measured?

(Re-)Producing Legitimacy and Its Normative Foundations: A Communicative Perspective

Indicators of empirical legitimacy may be gleaned from at least three dimensions. The two most prominent approaches measure the levels and foundations of legitimacy by way of public opinion research, thus focusing on legitimacy beliefs and political attitudes, or they observe forms of (non-) conventional political behaviour (acts of participation or protest) and (non-)compliance that are interpreted as expressions of regime support or its withdrawal (Haunss 2007). Data gleaned from surveys such as the Eurobarometer and others are, for instance, widely used to gauge the legitimacy of western democracies and the EU, and so are protest data (Anderson 1998; Gabel 1998; Rohrschneider 2002; Imig/Tarrow 1998). However, this kind of data is much more limited for other international regimes than for the EU, and as we have argued elsewhere, their value as indicators of legitimacy should not be overestimated. A third dimension – political communication – has so far been neglected (but see, e.g., Raufer 2005; Barbato 2005). Here we refrain from a detailed discussion of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of these methodological approaches and merely summarize the rationale for empirical research on legitimacy discourses (Schneider/Nullmeier/Hurrelmann 2007, 127-33; Schneider et al. 2010, chapter 2).

Our starting point is the obvious normative and empirical role of language, communication, and public spheres for the functioning of democratic regimes in general and for the (re-)production, challenging, or transformation of legitimacy in particular (Peters 2007). The legitimacy of the democratic nation state and its normative foundations are socially – that is, discursively – constructed (Luckmann 2001; Mulligan 2007). Against the backdrop of the “novel dynamics in the age of global communication” (Steffek 2007, 176), the same should more and more hold true for international regimes. The successful (re-)production of legitimacy in (trans-) national public spheres may then be viewed as an interactive process, engaging political elites with their self-legitimating claims on the one hand, and citizens with more or less critical assessments of their political order on the other (Barker 1990, 2001, 2007; Beetham 1991). Hence legitimacy is no more than the (temporary) outcome of debates on the acceptability of political orders and institutions, on the plausibility of legitimacy claims and assessments, and on the appropriateness of the justifications and evaluation standards used. Both political elites and “simple” citizens or their interest-group representatives participate in this kind of political communication – legitimation discourses – using a range of discursive practices and strategies. The term legitimacy, in other words, refers to a temporary “equilibrium,” as it were, between the legitimacy claims of rulers and the legitimacy assessments of the ruled. Conversely, challengers of a regime are forced to communicate their critical assessments and underlying normative standards, and such criticism must be publicly acknowledged and accepted to usher in the erosion or transformation of a regime’s legitimacy or its normative foundations.

The attitudinal, behavioural and communicative dimensions are obviously connected – legitimacy-related attitudes are developed and formulated against the backdrop of legitimation discourses in which hegemonic and subversive collective representations of political reality, values and normative positions – often in the form of narratives – manifest themselves; similarly, legitimacy-related forms of behaviour tend to be linked with – or to consist of – discursive practices (Ewick/Silbey 1995). Thus we need a text-analytical approach to fully come to terms with the multi-dimensional nature of (de-)legitimation processes. A focus on legitimation discourses reveals what may be said in public debates on legitimacy and also has a fair chance of being heard and taken seriously, which positions and justifications are
hegemonic in these debates, and ultimately, which rules there are for the formulation of acceptable legitimacy evaluations. The legitimacy assessments that come to dominate such discourses, in turn, play a key role in the (re-)production of political legitimacy. Yet a genuine consensus on the acceptability of a regime is neither empirically likely nor does it seem normatively desirable – after all, one function of (democratic) public spheres is to enable criticism of the rulers. A certain amount of “critical citizenship” appears “normal” and desirable both in an empirical and in a normative perspective (Norris 1999; Sniderman 1981). We expect legitimation discourses to be kindled by political conflicts – these discourses may start with debates about policies or authorities, but then generalize beyond conflicts about authorities and their decisions, thus turning into debates about the legitimacy of an entire regime and its foundations (Easton 1965). In other words, a regime and its core institutions get politicized, and legitimacy becomes an explicit issue. Therefore, legitimation discourses should typically be characterized by the juxtaposition of legitimating and delegitimating speakers and assessments, but stable legitimacy may be diagnosed as long as legitimizers and the evaluation standards they privilege remain hegemonic.

In our own research on legitimation discourses, we treat individual propositions of an evaluative kind – legitimation statements – as basic units. These propositions are identified and described with the help of a stylized legitimation “grammar” (Table 2; see Franzosi 2004). Three key variables define a legitimation statement: the legitimation object that is assessed, the legitimating (positive) or delegitimating (negative) thrust of the evaluation, and the normative criterion (legitimation pattern) on which it is based.

**Table 2 Legitimation grammar and examples**

Example 1: The people and their representatives have been sent to the sidelines by the courts, and that’s not right (*Washington Post*, 6 February 2004).

The US judiciary... is illegitimate... because... it undermines popular sovereignty.


The EU Commission... is illegitimate... because... (1) it is inefficient/ineffective and (2) does not conform with legal standards.

Example 3: They [the G8] are pure conspicuous consumption, make-work for the “rich white trash” of international diplomacy. They yield vacuous communiques and mountains of unread paper. Their only substantive conclusion is “to meet again” (*Times*, 20 July 2001).

The G8... is illegitimate... because... (1) it is inefficient/ineffective and (2) does not adequately represent the population of the world.

Example 4: The United Nations that the heads of state left behind last week is simply not worth such sacrifice [the 2003 bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad] – its structures are too ossified; its practices too compromised; its potential too limited (*New York Times*, 24 September 2005).

The UNO... is illegitimate... because... (1) it is outdated, (2) too consensus-oriented and (3) ineffective.

Our study of legitimation discourses in Britain, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States draws on a large corpus of newspaper articles, each of which contains at least one such statement and thus may be
viewed as contributing to broader legitimation discourses. One part of this corpus documents public communication on the legitimacy of the four national political orders; the remainder of the corpus focuses on discourses about the legitimacy of the EU, the G8, and the UN. In each case, statements were identified in relatively narrow time windows around important political events – the throne speeches and state of the union addresses in Britain and the US, as well parliamentary debates about the government agendas in Germany - Regierungserklärungen in the context of budget debates – and Switzerland (Jahresziele) at the national level, one Council summit per year for the EU, the annual G8 summit, and the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly.  

Table 3 Time periods and statements – national level

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There is no doubt that legitimation discourses unfold in different arenas of public spheres – in private conversations, in the parliamentary arena, or in the debates of political-science and legal scholars, to name but a few. In our own research, however, we concentrate on the mass media – and more precisely, the quality press – of the four countries examined, given their key role for the constitution and development of public spheres in modern democratic societies (Habermas 2008; Wessler et al. 2008). For each country, we examine two opinion-leading papers of the (centre-)left and right: Süddeutsche

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4 The EU Council meetings (of which there are up to four per year) were selected in a completely formalized way; we chose the summits that, according to a search in our database Factiva, generated the highest volume of media reporting in any given year (without, however, necessarily triggering intensive legitimation discourses).
Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Germany), Tages-Anzeiger and Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Switzerland), Guardian and Times (Britain), New York Times and Washington Post (United States).

Table 4 Venues, time periods and statements – international regimes

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* Special summit with Russia.
Empirical Findings: Legitimation Discourses in the Post-national Constellation

Implicit in the case we made above for a discourse analytical perspective on legitimation processes was the expectation that the kind of political communication examined here – evaluative statements and the articles they are embedded in – is relatively frequent, and increasingly frequent for international regimes; the latter should, in other words, no longer be α-legitimate in the context of political communication. The number of statements identified suggests that this is indeed the case. However, a few qualifications are in order. First, and quite in line with expectations that one might draw from the IR literature, the intensity of legitimation discourses is almost as high for the increasingly powerful and supranational political order of the EU as for national political systems; it is much lower for the two other regimes, whose intergovernmental elements remain more pronounced and whose decisions remain less binding. Secondly, there are also national differences in media attention. Unsurprisingly, the EU attracts less attention in the public spheres of non-member states and especially the US (where the G8 also attracts little attention despite US membership). Thirdly, as Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, there are strong cyclical effects at play both at the national and at the international level. Finally, Figure 3 shows that the examined media give “voice” to the political elites and to civil society speakers, as well as contributing their own legitimation statements.

Figure 1 Media attention to the legitimacy of national political orders (number of statements, $z$-transformed) by national public and year

![Figure 1](diagram.png)
With the exception of the G8 (where the legitimation discourse is very much dominated by journalists and their own evaluations), there is a rough balance between the three speaker groups (in addition, we differentiated between national and international-level political actors). In short, we see an ebb and flow of legitimacy-related communication to which the citizenry at large and its organizations, the media, and representatives of the evaluated political systems contribute: The discursive (re-)production or transformation is an interactive process.

Legitimacy levels: But what do these speakers say? The first dimension of our typology of legitimation scenarios captures the extent to which the four national political orders and the three international regimes are supported in the examined media, that is, legitimacy levels (simply defined as the percentage shares of positive evaluations).
Figure 4 shows the results for each national public and regime level. First of all, it is readily apparent that there is no pervasive, full-fledged legitimacy crisis of the democratic nation state in media discourses: Given that we should always expect a considerable amount of “critical citizenship” (and usually a negative media bias), the legitimacy levels of the Swiss and US national regimes are remarkably high; the levels of Germany are much lower in Germany and especially Britain. Such differences may be the result of nationally specific institutional arrangements, political and discursive cultures, and media systems, or with specific debates such as the British ones in recent years on the country’s institutional arrangements and constitution (Hepp/Wessler 2009; Hurrelmann et al. 2009; Biegon et al. 2010).

Figure 4 Legitimacy levels (1998-2007) by regime and national public

Here we are more concerned with differences between the democratic nation state and the three international regimes. One finding stands out: The nation state, its regime principles, and its core institutions have in each case more discursive support than the international regimes (with the exception of the UN in the British discourse). Secondly, the “classical” intergovernmental regime of the UN is evaluated more positively than the G8 (with its exclusive membership and presumably intransparent decision-making procedures) or the EU (with its increasingly supranational character and related problems of democratic legitimation). There is, moreover, remarkably little difference in the overall highly negative evaluations of these two regimes. In other words, national public spheres do not fully honour the argument that there is an intact “chain” of legitimation between citizens, their elected representatives, and international decision-making forums as long as the latter make consensual decisions. The legitimation problems of the G8 are no less acute than the EU’s, albeit for different reasons, as we will show below.

A further qualification of these legitimacy levels relates to the specific regime elements that are assessed. We distinguish between evaluations of a political system or community as a whole (I), of its regime principles (II), its core institutions (III), and its major actor groups (for details of this rank ordering, see Schneider et al. 2010, chapter 3). We further assume that the delegitimation of level I and II objects is a more serious challenge to the legitimacy of a regime than criticism of level III and IV objects. A quick glance at Figure 5 reveals, that the upper ranks of our hierarchy indeed tend to be evaluated much more positively than the lower ranks (with the exception of level III objects in the case of the EU). Thus criticism of individual institutions and especially actor groups (the political class, the party or interest-group system) is much more widespread than criticism of, say, US democracy (II) or the European Union.
as a whole (I). Given its informal character, no such differentiated analysis for groups of legitimation objects was performed for the G8 – and so the regime as such has to bear the brunt of criticism while negative evaluations may often be deflected to individual, sometimes marginal institutions in the other cases.

**Figure 5 Legitimacy levels by regime and object category**

![Legitimacy levels by regime and object category](image)

Figure 6 shows a breakdown of legitimacy levels by regime and speaker type. Here we see what we should expect, namely, that the representatives of (inter-)national regimes are much more likely to contribute positive evaluations than journalists and civil society actors. Of course, national political actors might use international regimes (or specific institutions) as scapegoats (and vice versa), and so we find considerable shares of delegitimating assessments even in that speaker group, although these shares are usually not high enough to suggest that the examined regimes have lost support among their own representatives.

Finally, Figure 7 indicates that legitimacy levels – just like attention to the issue of legitimacy – are characterized by cyclical fluctuations. The legitimacy levels of the four national regimes are always higher than the respective values for the EU and the G8, and usually higher than the values achieved by the UN as well. Since 2001, these levels have even risen. Undoubtedly, legitimation discourses no longer unfold in isolation from each other, and so we might, for instance, hypothesize that the cyclical peak of the UN in 2002 and 2003 has a lot too do with criticism of the Bush administration’s war preparations and its treatment of UN institutions, at least in the three European public spheres.
Legitimation criteria: The second dimension of our typology of legitimation scenarios captures the extent to which speakers draw on aspects of democratic quality or other, not genuinely democratic evaluation criteria to assess political regimes and their institutions; in addition to evaluations using democratic or non-democratic evaluation standards, there might be assessments that do not make the underlying criterion explicit: “America is great,” and the like. Figure 8 shows the distribution of criteria for each regime type. We see that democratic criteria do not dominate any of the discourses but are most frequent in the ones on national political regimes and the EU, followed by the G8 and the UN. The group
of non-democratic criteria – and especially assessments on the basis of efficiency or effectiveness – are most frequent. Yet both democratic and non-democratic criteria might be used in an affirmative or in a critical fashion. Thus we have to consider the legitimacy levels of each group of legitimation criteria, as shown in Figure 9.

**Figure 8** Groups of legitimation criteria by regime

![Figure 8](image)

**Figure 9** Legitimacy levels by groups of criteria

![Figure 9](image)

Here we add another distinction, the one between input and output criteria (for details, see Schneider et al., chapter 4). We see that generic, unspecific evaluations serve as a legitimation resource, and hence are more often used in a positive fashion, in discourses on national regimes and the UN. But only national regimes have a specific legitimation resource, evaluations on the basis of democratic output criteria such as successful human rights protection or the common good (Wiesner et al. 2006). For the UN and the EU, too, this group of criteria has higher legitimacy levels than, for instance, “classical” democratic input standards (derived from the principle of popular sovereignty). On the other hand, there is little in these data that suggests that international regimes might be able to compensate for their (real or perceived) lack of democratic quality by pointing to success in terms of non-democratic (output)
criteria such as effectiveness. Figure 10, moreover, indicates that while democratic criteria have become somewhat less important for evaluations of national regimes over the years, they seem to have become rather more frequent in evaluations of our three international regimes.

**Figure 10** Shares of democratic legitimation criteria by regime and year

[Graph showing the changes in shares of democratic legitimation criteria by regime and year from 1988 to 2007.]

Legitimation scenarios: We are now in a position to return to our four narrative scenarios of legitimacy in the post-national constellation. To be sure, a qualitative analysis of narrative practices and structures in the actual texts has to wait for another day. Here we simply use our quantitative data to explore which of the essentially normative assessments in the literature are more or less in line with the reality of legitimation discourses in our four national public spheres. In other words, to what extent are the more optimistic (romance, comedy) and pessimistic (tragedy, satire) assessments put forward by academic observers shared by the wider public in Switzerland, Germany, Britain, and the US when it evaluates national or international regimes?

**Figure 11** Shares of scenarios (narratives) by regime type

[Bar chart showing the distribution of scenarios by regime type.]
Figure 11 demonstrates that there is clearly no consensus within or across national public spheres and regime types as to the “correct” scenario. Each of the scenarios is present. However, the “good” romantic scenario of secure (or re-established) democratic legitimacy is least frequent, albeit more frequent at the national level than with a view to any of the three international regimes. The “ugly” comedy scenario does not fare much better in any of the four cases. Rather, the tragic and ironic (“bad”) scenarios dominate. Negative evaluations on the basis of democratic criteria are a bit more prevalent in national and EU-level discourses than in discourses on the G8 and the UN. Much of the criticism of the G8 and the UN, on the other hand, does not even concede that these regimes are effective problem-solvers in the age of globalization (that the UN nevertheless fares better than the G8 is due to the fact that it is supported by many of the generic positive evaluations described above). Differences between regime types and developments over time notwithstanding, Figures 12 to 15 also show that our “tragic” and “ironic” scenarios dominate while the others remain less prominent.

**Figure 12** Shares of narratives overall by year (national-level discourses)
Figure 13 Shares of narratives overall by year (EU discourses)

Figure 14 Shares of narratives overall by year (G8 discourses)
Conclusion

The point of this paper was to explore – in an admittedly rough and preliminary fashion – the degree to which academic diagnoses of (inter-)national legitimacy resonate with evaluations in public spheres and media discourses. We analyzed the basis structures of these discourses in light of a few key variables – the intensity of legitimacy-related communication and speaker groups, the positive or negative thrust of discourses, legitimation objects and criteria – and we linked these structures to four generic narratives of legitimacy in the post-national constellation gleaned from the academic literature.

A few results stand out: The nation state, its regime principles, and its core institutions remain more legitimate – attract more positive evaluations – overall than any of the three examined international regimes. Support for the UN, the G8, and the EU is precarious at best, and there is little evidence for the expectation of some observers (Moravcsik and others) that the “comedy” scenario resonates with the views of the wider public, as transported by national media. There is a substantial amount of communication on the legitimacy of these regimes and their foundations – the regimes are no longer a-legitimate but have conspicuous problems to mobilize support on democratic or non-democratic grounds. The “ironic” scenario is even more prevalent than the “tragic” one, and the infrequency of assessments of the “romance” type suggests genuine concern about the legitimacy of international (or multilevel) legitimacy.

Besides a more elaborate analysis of our data along the lines presented here, our next task will be to identify the actual discursive practices used to “sell” one or another of these narratives, that is, to perform a more thorough, qualitative analysis of our textual material. We saw that legitimation discourses are characterized by pronounced cyclical effects. These are likely to be related to the workings – and the success or failure – of legitimation strategies by the types of actors and speakers that we identified in our own material, and hence that the re(-)production of legitimacy is an ongoing, interactive process that mainly draws on language and communication, and on rhetorical devices such as narratives.
References


