Contrasting Images: “Multiculturalism” as conceptualized in Canada and the United States

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The word “multiculturalism”, now almost half a century old, continues to provoke discussion and controversy not only in North America, where it originated, but throughout the western world. Even had the word never been invented, the question of how rich western nation-states and their citizens should respond to the increasing cultural and ethnic diversity caused by immigration would provoke controversy by virtue of its intrinsic importance. Yet words and the meanings, favourable or unfavourable, that are attached to them may contribute to the structure, content and outcome of discourse. The meanings of words may change over time or may vary from place to place. Words may contribute to understanding or may, if their meanings are contested or ambiguous, be an obstacle to understanding.

The word “multiculturalism” is nowhere more prominent than in Canada, where it appears in the titles of federal and provincial statutes, and where its derivative, “multicultural heritage”, is even referred to, since 1982, in the constitution. Despite its sometimes contested status as a national symbol, the Canadian pedigree of the M-word is not entirely clear. Although the word “multi-cultural” (with a hyphen) appeared on the agenda of a convention of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association in March 1962, the word “multiculturalism” itself may have been invented by an American-born sociologist, Charles Hobart, who apparently used it in a speech the following year, not long after he was hired by the University of Alberta. As others have done before and since, Hobart praised Canada for its alleged willingness to let immigrants retain their existing cultural attributes and contrasted it with the “melting pot” philosophy that he attributed to his native country, the United States.

The contrast drawn by Hobart between Canada and the United States was not entirely original; an Estonian refugee quoted in Maclean’s as early as 1948 contrasted the two countries in a similar way, although without using the M-word.¹ Hobart, like the unnamed Estonian, may have been stretching the truth to tell his Canadian audience what they wanted to hear, but his observation has had a lasting effect on the Canadian psyche: a source of pride for some Canadians, frustration and (especially in Quebec) resentment for others, and ambivalence for many more. Although few Canadians noted Hobart’s presentation at the time it was delivered, it was given a wider audience a year later when Paul Yuzyk, sometimes called the father of multiculturalism, quoted it approvingly in his maiden speech as a Canadian senator.² Whatever its historical or sociological validity, it helped to give “multiculturalism” its prominent place in Canadian political discourse, replacing the term “mosaic” which was more commonly used prior to the 1960s but is rarely used today.
In the United States the word “multiculturalism”, according to the Dictionary of American History, began to appear in the media in the early 1970s, and became commonplace by the 1980s. With the passage of time the word has become more widely accepted, but it would be fair to say that very few, if any, Americans have embraced it as a national symbol in the way that some Canadians (and their governments) have done. Books denouncing multiculturalism as a concept have appeared; admittedly there have been some of those in Canada also, but the American examples, including some written by distinguished scholars, have tended to be more strident and alarmist in tone than their Canadian counterparts.

Many Canadians will say that this is not at all surprising, given the contrast which they presume to exist between the two countries. However, most Canadians are not nearly as knowledgeable about the United States as they believe themselves to be, and their impressions of that country, particularly with regard to this issue, are seriously misleading. The term “melting pot”, which was first appeared in 1909 as the title of a play, is rarely used by present-day Americans except in an ironic sense. For most of its history the United States has been more culturally diverse than Canada, and at times, particularly between 1880 and 1900, much more. The percentage of foreign-born persons in Canada has usually been higher than in the United States, but this is not an indication of greater cultural diversity insofar as a large percentage, and until quite recent times a majority, of the foreign-born in Canada have been Anglophones from the United Kingdom or the United States. Also, American data underestimate the numbers of the foreign-born because of the numerous illegal and undocumented migrants, principally from Mexico. According to a recent article in a Quebec-based magazine, the percentage of households in which English is spoken as the home language is higher in Toronto and Vancouver than it is in New York, Phoenix, or Los Angeles. The contrast between an allegedly diverse Canada and an allegedly homogeneous United States was perhaps most plausible between 1945 and 1965, when Europe was still exporting large numbers of its people and when it was much easier for Europeans to gain entry as landed immigrants into Canada than into the United States. Since foreign-born persons were a much smaller percentage of the population in the United States than in Canada, and since the typical foreign-born American had been in the country longer than the typical foreign-born Canadian had been in Canada, the United States appeared more homogenous, apart from the highly visible difference between African Americans and those of European ancestry. However, since 1965 the two countries have converged in this respect, as in some others.

Furthermore, despite Canada’s mantra of multiculturalism and “diversity”, Canadian attitudes towards immigrants and their cultures are not much different from those of Americans. Attitudes in both countries are much more liberal than in Europe, let alone Japan, where the idea that the ethnic nation-state is the norm, and ethnic diversity the anomaly or exception, remains deeply rooted. Japan virtually prohibits immigration, although its aging population would seem to provide an argument in favour of allowing more. Most European countries, and even Australia, have experienced anti-immigrant political parties and pressure groups in recent years, comparable to the Know-Nothing party that flourished briefly in the United States more than a century and a half ago. North America has been virtually free of such phenomena in recent times.

In various polls that have asked Canadians or Americans whether immigrants should retain their own cultures or conform to that of their new country, Canadians have at times shown more support for the “melting pot” philosophy than Americans, contrary to the persistent
stereotypes regarding both nations. As for the actual process of assimilation, it seems in both North American countries to take only two or at most three generations, except for immigrant groups that settle in isolated rural enclaves—which few do nowadays—and perhaps for some groups whose strong religious beliefs discourage exogamy. Schools, commercial advertising, and the mass media, as well as the fact that English is both ubiquitous in the modern world and one of the easiest languages to learn, perform the task of assimilation quite effectively, whatever politicians may say. Both North American countries are thus, to their benefit, closer to being successful melting pots than any European country. It should perhaps also be noted that in both Canada and the United States the most deeply rooted and persistent ethnic, social and political cleavages, involving aboriginal peoples, Francophone Canadians, and African-Americans, are those that result from a legacy of conquest or slavery, not from immigration. This should not be surprising since those who chose a country voluntarily, rather than having it imposed on them or on their ancestors, are likely to view the country favourably—perhaps even more favourably than those who were born in it and take it for granted.

Canada, Quebec, and the United States all seek immigrants—Quebec perhaps more than either of the federal governments because it has to try harder to attract and retain them in the quantities that it needs. All three have welcomed immigrants in large numbers with, in recent years, little or no difficulty or conflict between immigrants and the native-born. None discriminates nowadays in its immigration policies on the basis of race, ethnicity or religion, in contrast to what occurred prior to the 1960s. (Quebec does give some preference to those who can speak French, because of its determination to preserve the fragile status of that language in North America, but the ability to speak French is not a monopoly of any race or ethnic group.) Neither Canada, nor Quebec, nor the United States, forces immigrants to surrender their cultural attributes or identities when they cross the border or land at the airport, provided they obey the laws of their new country. Canada, Quebec, and the United States all have laws protecting ethnic and other minorities from discrimination at the hands of either governments or private persons. In all three places assimilation of immigrants or their descendants gradually takes place, but cultural diversity is constantly renewed as new arrivals replace those of the second or third generation who are absorbed into the cultural mainstream. Acquiring Canadian or American citizenship (Quebec has no jurisdiction over citizenship) is an easy process that requires only a fixed period of residence (three years in Canada, five in the United States) and a very minimal knowledge of the country. One is tempted to say therefore that Canada, Quebec, and the United States all practice “multiculturalism” in the minimal sense in which most Anglophone Canadians understand the term.

Despite these similarities between the North American neighbours, it remains true that the word “multiculturalism”, whatever it means, has gained widespread acceptance in Anglophone Canada, while it is still hotly contested in both Quebec and the United States. Furthermore, some critics of official multiculturalism in Anglophone Canada argue that it is purely superficial or symbolic and does not really go far enough. Critics in the United States (and in Quebec) are more likely to argue that the concept has been carried too far in practice, or that it should be discarded entirely.

This paper will argue that people in Anglophone Canada, Quebec, and the United States react to the M-word differently because they interpret it in different ways, and because they associate it with different experiences and different concerns, not because they (or their
governments) are significantly different from one another in their attitudes towards immigrants and minorities. The word means different things in the three societies, none of which appreciates or understands what it means to either of the others. Because of its different associations, the word “multiculturalism” is viewed by most, although not all, people in Anglophone Canada as something that reinforces their national identity. To Quebec nationalists and to most Americans, on the other hand, it appears as something that threatens their national identity. To understand why this is so, it is necessary to review some history, and particularly the contrasting circumstances in which the word first entered the discourse of the three societies.

**Anglophone Canada**

Anglophone Canadians enjoy talking about, and at times exaggerating, their cultural diversity, which they like to think exceeds that of the United States. In 1828 William Lyon Mackenzie, soon to be Toronto’s first mayor, described the young city’s population as “a mixed race, neither amalgamated in manners, customs, nor habits.” One hundred and seventy years later a widely reported study, commissioned by another Toronto mayor, predicted that “visible minorities”, meaning people of non-European ancestry other than aboriginal North Americans, would comprise 54 per cent of the city’s population within two years, in 2000. The prediction, which provoked large headlines in all of Toronto’s daily newspapers, was based on an arithmetical error. When the census data for 2001 were collected, “visible minorities” were actually just 42.8 per cent of Toronto’s population, and 37 per cent of the people in the metropolitan area as a whole.

Classifying people into ethnic categories, and drawing conclusions from the data, are practices with deep roots in Canadian history. The British, who acquired Canada by the Treaty of Paris in 1763, inherited thereby the responsibility for two groups of people, the aboriginals and the French Canadian settlers, whose political traditions and practices were very different from their own, and from one another. The situation was not entirely unprecedented for the British, since the British state itself was a fairly recent and artificial combination of two previously independent kingdoms, England and Scotland, with different legal systems and different forms of Protestant Christianity, loosely associated with a third country, Ireland, that was even more distinctive in religion and culture, and that was not fully amalgamated into the “United Kingdom” until 1801. According to the prevailing British theory, most memorably expounded soon afterwards by the Anglo-Irish Whig politician Edmund Burke, constitutional arrangements should grow naturally out of the culture and history of a people rather than being imposed on them. Therefore native “Indians” and French Canadians could not possess “the rights of Englishmen” and could not be governed as though they did. They were distinct peoples with their own laws and customs under the protection of the British Crown, and their status as such was recognized, respectively, by the *Royal Proclamation* of 1763 and the *Quebec Act* of 1774. (Both of these enactments were resented by the English-speaking colonists further south as threats to their own English liberties, and both thus contributed inadvertently to the independence of what became the United States.)

As Canada evolved under direct British rule, and later as an autonomous federation within the British empire, an assortment of special privileges for distinct groups, defined by religion or ethnicity, accumulated: civil law on the Roman model for Quebec, linguistic rights for the people of Quebec but also for the Anglophone minority within Quebec, tax-supported separate schools for Catholics (and, in Quebec, for Protestants), specific treaty rights for various
bands of aboriginals, and so forth. When Canada became a federation every province, old or new, would benefit from special provisions in the constitution applying to itself alone, in contrast to the practices of other federations whose constitutions do not even mention the component states or provinces by name. In order to keep track of who was entitled to what, data about the ethnic and religious affiliations of the people, as well as where they came from and where they lived, were painstakingly collected and recorded at each decennial census. Even the dominion’s coat of arms incorporated the symbols of four different ethnic groups, the English, Scottish, Irish and French, much as the British flag with its crosses superimposed on one another honoured the patron saints of England, Scotland, and Ireland. Meanwhile, successive waves of immigration into Canada affected the relative and absolute sizes of the different categories of its people, leading at times to adjustments of their entitlements but not to radical departures from existing practice.

None of this was conducive to developing any sense of a single united Canadian people and in this fact, as well as in the powerful but clashing external influences emanating from the United Kingdom and the United States, can be found the roots of Canada’s perennial and celebrated identity crisis. However, a monarchical regime that emphasized the imposition of “peace, order and good government” on a relatively passive collection of subjects, rather than popular participation in governance, did not really require a united people to operate successfully. Indeed after the American and French revolutions the very idea of a united people, with its overtones of republicanism, began to appear dangerous, un-British, and potentially subversive. A more specific threat was that a united people might decide that they were simply North Americans, no different from their neighbours across the border. Far better to cultivate their ethnic and cultural distinctions, in accordance with the old principle of divide and rule. There were of course a few Canadians, such as the late nineteenth century movement known as Canada First, who disapproved of this approach and who aspired to a united homogeneous people. However, their ambitions always collided with the hard obstacle of French-speaking and Catholic Quebec, and thus they remained politically marginal and insignificant.

All of this paved the way for a metaphor that became popular in the first half of the twentieth century, the “Canadian mosaic”. A mosaic, according to the *Oxford Canadian Dictionary*, is “a picture or pattern produced by an arrangement of small variously coloured pieces of glass or stone etc.” The metaphor was probably suggested by the way in which groups of immigrant settlers of various ethnic and religious groups occupied different portions of the Canadian prairie after the railways opened it to settlement. Some of these groups were recruited by the Canadian government and some by the railway companies, while others were brought to Canada by clergy and other community leaders of varying reputation. (Immigrants who came as individuals on their own initiative were rarely in a position to establish a farm.) An ethnic map of the region between the Red River and the Rockies circa. 1914 would indeed have resembled a mosaic, with the ethnic or religious settlements serving as the “coloured pieces of glass or stone”. Although this was only one form of immigration to Canada, since most immigrants, even then, settled in the cities, it was the most distinctive and conspicuous, so that even casual visitors noticed it. Like the other M-word several decades later, the description of Canada as a “mosaic” was apparently invented by an American, in this case a travel writer named Victoria Hayward. Not long afterwards it was used in the titles of two books, including one by the director of public relations for the Canadian Pacific Railway. Soon even governors general were incorporating it
into their speeches.

Living and working in isolated rural areas and surrounded by people similar to themselves, the people who comprised the prairie mosaic could resist assimilation for longer than those who lived in urban areas. Farmers, unlike wage earners, could live and work in their own language rather than in English, for a generation at least. Religious groups with distinctive beliefs and customs, like the Mormons, Mennonites, and Hutterites, were viewed with suspicion and hostility by most Canadians and thus were socially isolated from the surrounding society, as much by necessity as by choice. It should be emphasized, however, that this type of situation was far from typical of the immigrant experience in Canada, even though it came to be used as a metaphor for the country as a whole.

While it permitted some degree of cultural survival, for better or for worse, the western Canadian “mosaic” certainly did not imply an equal distribution of influence or power among Canadians of different ancestries. In this it resembled the earlier arrangements among French, English, Irish, Scottish, and aboriginal Canadians upon which it was superimposed. That there might be a tradeoff between cultural preservation and socio-economic equality was an issue rarely discussed or confronted, at least until the sociologist John Porter published the first comprehensive scholarly analysis of Canadian society in 1965. The book’s title, The Vertical Mosaic, gave a fresh twist to what had become a familiar cliché, and hinted at what Porter’s research revealed: Canada’s different ethno-cultural groups, including the very large French group concentrated in Quebec, were highly unequal in terms of access to wealth, power, and status.

The emergence of “multiculturalism” as part of Canada’s political discourse, almost simultaneously with the publication of The Vertical Mosaic, was facilitated because Canadians were already familiar with the metaphor of the “mosaic”. It was also, however, an accidental by-product of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, appointed in 1963 by Lester Pearson’s Liberal government to examine the crisis in Canada’s relations with Quebec that resulted from the latter’s so-called Quiet Revolution. The Commission found in its travels across Canada that many people who participated in its public hearings, particularly in the western provinces, resented the implicit assumption that there were only two significant ethno-cultural groups in Canada, the “English” and the French, who were referred to in its terms of reference as “the two founding races”. Pearson had anticipated this criticism to some extent by appointing a Ukrainian-Canadian and a Polish-Canadian to the Commission. In 1965 the Commission, which had acknowledged “the fact of multiculturalism” in one of its earliest working documents, noted in its preliminary report the complaints of “other ethnic groups”. It also noted that Ukrainian-Canadians were over-represented among those who appeared at the hearings. Eventually, and obviously as an afterthought, it devoted the last volume of its report to “The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups”, although the depth and quality of the research in that volume was distinctly inferior to that of the earlier volumes. Neither this gesture nor subsequent actions by the federal state were able to dispel the impression that the buzzwords “bilingualism” and “multiculturalism” made an awkward and perhaps illogical combination. However, the word “biculturalism” rather quickly disappeared from official discourse.

There were several reasons why Ukrainian-Canadians played such a prominent part in these developments. First, they had been successfully courted by Pearson’s Conservative predecessor, John Diefenbaker, who opposed the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism. Diefenbaker, who was sensitive about his German name, firmly believed that “ethnic” Canadians should be taken more seriously and as prime minister had appointed the first Ukrainian-Canadian cabinet minister and the first two Ukrainian-Canadian senators. Second, they had been an important component of western Canada’s population for almost three generations, and were becoming more educated, more urban, and more integrated into Canadian life. They understandably considered that their contribution to building the country deserved belated recognition. Third, their numbers had been reinforced after 1945 by a second wave of immigrants who were refugees from Soviet rule and were militantly nationalist and anti-communist. (The first wave had mainly come from the Austrian Empire and included a significant left-wing faction.) Fourth, since the prospect of Ukraine ever again becoming a sovereign state seemed unlikely at the time, the preservation of its heritage on Canadian soil was considered particularly important.

Pierre Trudeau, the Prime Minister with whose name multiculturalism would forever be associated, seems to have had no particular interest in the subject, and did not even mention it in his memoirs. However, in 1971 he needed to mend fences with western Canadians, who resented his *Official Languages Act*, his preoccupation with Quebec, and his regional development programs for the depressed areas east of Montreal. He also had problems with Ukrainian-Canadians, who disliked his government’s tendency towards quasi-neutralism in the cold war against the Soviets and had been particularly offended earlier in the year when he compared dissidents in Ukraine with the Front de Libération du Québec. The result was a parliamentary speech, delivered on the day before Trudeau was to address a Ukrainian gathering in Winnipeg, in which he announced a policy of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework.” The cabinet discussions prior to this initiative do not suggest a great deal of prime ministerial enthusiasm.

Although the coverage of the multiculturalism speech in *The Globe and Mail* had consisted of one sentence on page seven, the idea struck a responsive chord, except among Francophones. By the early 1970s Canadians outside of Quebec were growing weary of Quebec’s apparently insatiable nationalism and of a federal government that seemed excessively preoccupied with that province. People claiming some ethnic origin other than “British Isles” or French were increasing in numbers, and comprised almost half the population outside of the Atlantic provinces and Quebec. Nostalgia for the British connection, still significant in Diefenbaker’s time, had virtually disappeared with the fading of wartime memories, the rise of the “baby boom” generation, and Britain’s obvious preference for the European Community over the Commonwealth. There was also growing anti-Americanism in Canada, provoked by concerns about foreign direct investment, the continuing war in Vietnam, and the Watergate scandal involving President Richard Nixon. “Multiculturalism”, whatever it might mean, provided an inclusive post-colonial definition of Canadian identity that symbolically downgraded the importance of Quebec and the French language, and that appeared to differentiate Canada from the United States and its alleged “melting pot.” At the same time the government’s policy of multiculturalism, consisting mainly of modest subsidies for various cultural activities, cost Anglophone Canadians very little and did not threaten their interests in any way, whether or not they were personally interested in their ethnic heritages. Quebec nationalism, by contrast, appeared very threatening, particularly after the Parti Québécois formed the government in 1976.
Following the federal government’s example, most of the Anglophone provinces adopted multiculturalism policies of their own. Saskatchewan was the first to adopt a multiculturalism act, in 1974. Ontario, whose Premier John Robarts had stated in 1968 that he accepted bilingualism but rejected biculturalism, proclaimed its own policy of multiculturalism in 1977, followed by a statute in 1982. Similar initiatives came from Manitoba and Alberta in 1984, New Brunswick (the only officially bilingual province) in 1986, Prince Edward Island in 1988, Nova Scotia in 1989, and British Columbia in 1993.

The patriation of the constitution and adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, like the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism almost two decades earlier, provided an opportunity for ethnic and other interest groups to present their views, in this case before a special joint committee of Parliament. As a result of their interventions the government amended its proposal for a Charter of Rights and Freedoms between January and April 1981 by adding Section 27, which stated that the Charter should be “interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.” When the Charter came into force a year later the M-word was firmly entrenched in Canada’s self-definition and symbolic identity.

A federal multiculturalism statute was planned to follow, but had not yet been adopted by Parliament when the Liberals lost office in 1984. However, Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative government was no less committed than the Liberals to making gestures to ethnic groups. To impress Jewish voters it conferred “honorary citizenship” on a long-deceased Swedish diplomat who had saved some Jews from the Nazis. It also apologized to the Italian-Canadian community for the internment of about a hundred fascist sympathizers, mainly in Montreal, during World War II. An act for the preservation and enhancement of multiculturalism in Canada was duly adopted by Parliament in 1988, but its terms reflected a subtle shift since 1971 in the meaning of the expression. Immigration from Europe had long since tapered off, and most immigrants were now coming from Asia or the Caribbean. The absurd expression “visible minority”, which would later be condemned, somewhat ironically, by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, entered the Canadian lexicon during the Mulroney era. The focus of multiculturalism shifted from preserving languages and cultures to protecting the new arrivals from racism and ensuring their access to employment. As we will see below, this trend marked a slight convergence between the Canadian and American meanings of the expression.

It was around this time that opposition to official multiculturalism began to be openly expressed, although it remained weak by American standards and never attained real political significance. Some of it came from the very people to whom the policy was supposed to appeal. Two months after the Multiculturalism Act received royal assent, Laura Sabia, Progressive Conservative activist and daughter of Italian immigrants, accused the government of patronizing ethnic Canadians and “fostering second-class citizenship.” She wrote that she did not want to be a hyphenated Canadian and called multiculturalism “a load of garbage.” John Nunziata and Maurizio Bevilacqua, two Italian-Canadian Liberal members of Parliament, also attacked the concept of multiculturalism, which Nunziata said was “insulting”. Well-known journalists like Jeffrey Simpson, Andrew Coyne, Richard Gwyn and Robert Fulford joined the chorus over the next few years, as did the former Commissioner of Official Languages, Keith Spicer. The Reform Party, which arose in Alberta in the late 1980s and became the main alternative to the federal
Liberals after the implosion of the Progressive Conservatives in 1993, demanded the abolition of official multiculturalism in its program.

In 1994 Neil Bissoondath, a distinguished Canadian novelist who had emigrated from Trinidad (and a nephew of the world-renowned novelist V.S. Naipaul) published a full-length book in which he approvingly quoted Laura Sabia’s views on multiculturalism and argued that “personal culture and ethnicity” should be considered a private matter and not a subject of public policy. He also warned that Canada had discarded its past and that “multiculturalism”, a concept which implied that Canada had no culture of its own, failed to fill the void that resulted. However, a poll conducted for the federal government in 1991 indicated that 61 per cent of Canadians supported multiculturalism and only 24 per cent were opposed.

Stephen Harper, who became Prime Minister after defeating the Liberals in the general election of 2006, had begun his political career in the Reform Party, which opposed official multiculturalism. However, Harper abandoned most of that party’s distinctive policies in the course of merging it with the Progressive Conservatives to form a new and inclusive Conservative Party. The Harper government, and particularly its energetic Minister of Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism, Jason Kenney, has been at least as enthusiastic about multiculturalism as the Liberals, if not more so. Although occasional grumbling is still heard in the media, there is no longer any politically significant opposition to the M-word in Anglophone Canada.

Quebec

The response to the word in Quebec has been entirely different, understandably so since the word “multiculturalism” first became prominent as an expression of opposition to biculturalism, and to the cherished concept of Canada as a partnership of “two founding races”. The day before his parliamentary speech introducing the multiculturalism policy, Prime Minister Trudeau sent a letter announcing the policy to Premier Robert Bourassa. The Premier’s reply, sent more than a month later, indicated “serious reservations” about the new policy, which he said “clearly contradicted” the mandate of the Royal Commission. Bourassa also noted that the federal policy statement seemed to disassociate language and culture, which he considered questionable. He went on to suggest that if the federal government assumed responsibility for all of the cultures in Canada, Quebec must assume the primary responsibility on its territory for the permanence of the French language and culture. Nonetheless, he pointed out that Quebec was already subsidizing various ethnic groups through programs analogous to those envisaged in Trudeau’s policy statement.

Bourassa’s comment about Quebec’s primary responsibility for the French language perhaps foreshadowed the Official Language Act introduced and adopted by his government in 1974, as well as the more comprehensive Charter of the French Language adopted by René Lévesque’s government in 1977. At the same time, both Quebec governments, as Bourassa had pointed out in his letter to Trudeau, pursued policies towards the province’s various ethnic and immigrant minorities that were not very different in substance from the federal policy of multiculturalism. Quebec was at this time making the gradual transition from French Canadian ethnic nationalism, based on la survivance of a beleaguered ethnic minority lacking a strong state of its own, to a more inclusive civic nationalism similar to the nationalism of Canada or the United States. Ethnic minorities, including Canadians of British ancestry, had always formed a large part of the Quebec Liberal Party’s clientele, and did so to an even greater extent after the
emergence of the sovereignty movement, but the Parti Québécois, after taking office in 1976, made serious efforts to gain their support also.

Quebec also began actively to seek immigrants, since the sharp decline in its birth rate made this the only alternative to accepting a rapid decline in its share of Canada’s total population. Beginning in 1971, a series of agreements with the federal government, based on the fact that immigration was a concurrent jurisdiction under Canada’s constitution, enabled the province to select its own immigrants and to take responsibility for welcoming and integrating them into Quebec society. This was in sharp contrast with previous years when Quebec governments had deplored immigration, or at least ignored it, and when the attitude of old-fashioned ethnic nationalists towards immigrants had virtually driven the latter into the arms of Quebec’s Anglophone minority, whatever their original language or ethnicity might be.

While the Bourassa government’s policy towards minorities had been *ad hoc* and largely based on the Quebec Liberal party’s traditional contacts with established ethnic groups like the Jews, Greeks, and Italians, the Lévesque government adopted a more systematic approach. In a white paper entitled *Autant de façons d’être québécois* the government outlined in 1981 a policy which it called “interculturalism”, the essence of which was that immigrants and minorities were welcome in Quebec, and were free to retain their own cultures and languages, provided they accepted the fact that French was the public (and, since 1974, the official) language of Quebec. It also renamed Quebec’s ministry of immigration, which became the ministry of “immigration and cultural communities”. Quebec’s Anglophones, still regarded as enjoying disproportionate power and influence because of their links with the Anglophone majority in Canada, were not considered a “cultural community” *comme les autres*, although ironically the white paper had been written by a British immigrant named David Payne, who was subsequently elected to the National Assembly in a mainly Francophone riding.

Francophone Quebec insisted, then and ever since, that its “interculturalism” was entirely different from the federal government’s “multiculturalism”. The main argument used against the latter was that it allegedly treated the French culture as merely one among many, rather than acknowledging its traditional status as the culture of one of the two founding peoples of Canada. As Bourassa had suggested, this seemed to make it more imperative for Quebec to give priority to the French language and culture, which its policy of “interculturalism” explicitly did. Given Trudeau’s well-known hostility toward Quebec’s neo-nationalism, both before and after he became a federal politician, it was easy for Quebec nationalists to suspect him of harbouring nefarious designs, of which the multiculturalism policy was presumably a part. This was particularly so after he patriated and amended the Canadian constitution without the Quebec government’s consent, an event that followed a few months after the release of *Autant de façons d’être québécois*. The fact that Section 27 of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* was part of the much-resented patriation package helped to tar it with the same brush, and ensured that the M-word would never enjoy legitimacy in Quebec, at least in nationalist circles. A more recent concern, which I will discuss at length in another paper now being written, is that Section 27 may prevent Quebec from implementing the French republican model of *laïcité*, a model that has gained popularity in Quebec since the report of the Bouchard-Taylor commission.

Yet in spite of this, the similarities between Quebec’s “interculturalism” and Canada’s “multiculturalism” seem in practice to outweigh the differences. Both Quebec and Canada welcome immigrants with no distinctions based on race, colour, or creed. Both try to integrate the
new arrivals into the host society as smoothly as possible, but both permit immigrants to retain their original cultures to the degree that this is feasible—indeed it is hard to see how they could do otherwise. Both patronize and subsidize ethnic associations. In both Quebec and Anglophone Canada the children of immigrants are educated in the language of the majority: French in Quebec and English elsewhere. In both societies it can be predicted that most cultural distinctions will disappear after two or three generations, although by that time a fresh supply of immigrants, possibly from different sources, will have replaced those who came earlier. And, as will be argued below, neither Quebec nor Anglophone Canada is really very different from the United States in this regard.

Quebec rejects the word “multiculturalism” for historic reasons but its practices are not much different in substance from those elsewhere. What makes Quebec appear different from Anglophone Canada or the United States is that the requirement to adopt French as one’s new “public” language and to educate one’s children in that language is made explicit in Quebec, while elsewhere the adoption of English can simply be taken for granted. This difference, which continues to offend some Anglophones both within Quebec and elsewhere in Canada, is really a consequence of the numerical weakness of Francophones in North America. It is not unreasonable that Quebec should expect immigrants to adopt Quebec’s majority language in the same way that immigrants to Anglophone Canada or the United States adopt English, but Quebec’s circumstances oblige it to use a measure of compulsion to achieve a result that in other places occurs naturally. And it can be argued that Quebec’s policy of making the rules explicit is more honest than the attempt in Anglophone Canada to pretend that there are no rules at all, for Canada’s attachment to the word “multiculturalism” conceals more than it reveals. If any one truly expects to survive in Toronto without learning English or adapting to the North American lifestyle, he or she is certain to be disillusioned.

The United States

Michael Adams, a leading proponent of the view that Canada has something to teach the world about “multiculturalism”, has written that while some countries have either aboriginal populations, immigrant cultural communities, or a minority nation embedded within the state, Canada is the only country with all three of these attributes.30 This may be so, but the United States is the only country, apart from Brazil, with aboriginals, immigrant cultural communities, and a racial minority comprising more than a tenth of the population whose ancestors were brought to the country as slaves. The last of these attributes, in particular, has imposed a heavy burden on the violent and sometimes tragic history of the country, as Abraham Lincoln recognized in his second inaugural address. Furthermore, the United States shares a long border with a large developing country that has become its main source of immigrants, and the mother country for about another tenth of its population, and to which more than a quarter of the land comprising the United States previously belonged. Canadians like Adams, who are wont to congratulate themselves on Canada’s successful management of ethnic diversity, should remember that the United States faces comparable challenges and has also managed them with remarkable success.

If Canadians are inclined to overestimate, and even boast about, their diversity, Americans sometimes tend to do the opposite. In the second of the Federalist Papers, John Jay famously asserted that:
Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people—a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs...  

Even if one assumes, as Jay did, that aboriginals and slaves are not part of the “people”, this was a considerable exaggeration. A modern study based on counting surnames has estimated that in Jay’s own state of New York only 44.2 per cent of the white population was of English ancestry in 1790, and in Pennsylvania, Kentucky, North Carolina and South Carolina the percentage was even lower. New York had a large Dutch element, having been a Dutch colony until 1674. In Pennsylvania the Germans comprised a third of the white population, outnumbering the English. The southern states had large Irish and Scottish populations, not easily distinguished from one another in retrospect since Irish Protestants often have Scottish surnames. Only the New England states were overwhelmingly English.  

Perhaps the operative words, however, in Jay’s observation are “attached to the same principles of government”. The United States was the first civic nation, meaning that its identity was based neither on allegiance to a monarch nor on common ethnic and cultural roots, but on a political ideology. Americans like Jay have believed, and to some extent their history has demonstrated, that the ideology has the power to form a united people out of disparate ethnic and cultural elements, at least up to a point. Admittedly, for much of American history it was assumed, and by some Americans it probably still is, that the ideology could only work its magic on people of European ancestry. However, in principle the American creed is considered to be of universal relevance, which is what Lincoln meant when he called the republic “the last best hope of earth”.  

Canadians, whose identity, such as it is, was traditionally based on a combination of monarchical allegiance and ethnicity, have never appreciated or understood this fact about their neighbour. The so-called melting pot, which Canadians have viewed with a mixture of envy, disdain, and fascination, never meant, as Canadians are wont to assume, that people were forced to eat white bread, enjoy country music, or forget where their ancestors came from. It merely meant that they were expected to adhere to the American creed, represented by the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. Ethnic nations are tolerant of ideological diversity but intolerant of ethnic diversity. Civic nations, like the United States, are just the opposite. The former House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities appeared ridiculous to most people outside of the United States. A committee on un-Italian, un-Dutch, or un-Greek activities would indeed be absurd, since those nations are defined by ethnicity and culture, not by ideology. But, if nothing but ideology holds a nation together, preserving the ideology from those who reject it is likely to be a matter of concern. At the same time the United States has almost always been more accepting of immigrants (except for those who are deemed to be carriers of an ideology incompatible with the American creed), and has certainly absorbed far more of them, than any European country. In the nineteenth century 22 states even allowed aliens who had not yet acquired American citizenship to vote. Between 1880 and 1920 the United States absorbed about 23.5 million immigrants, of whom the vast majority arrived without speaking English, or almost half as many people as had lived in the country at the beginning of that period.  

This did not mean, of course, that everything always went smoothly, any more than it
does in any country. Aboriginals were on the whole treated worse in the United States than in Canada, although Canada also has little to be proud of in this regard. Virulent anti-African racism long outlasted the slavery with which it had been associated, particularly but not only in the southern states where plantation agriculture based on slave labour had flourished. Hostility to Irish Catholic immigrants in the mid-nineteenth century spawned a short-lived political party, usually known as the Know Nothings, that included a former president of the United States, controlled the government of Massachusetts, and for a time held the balance of power in both houses of Congress. Hostility to Chinese and Japanese immigrants was rampant for many decades, especially on the Pacific coast, as was also true in Canada. Japanese-Americans, like their Japanese-Canadian counterparts, were forced to leave the coast during the Pacific war and were incarcerated in the interior. From 1924 until 1965 immigration was severely restricted in an effort to stabilize the relative size of different ethnic origins in the population—although immigration from the western hemisphere was rather oddly exempted from these restrictions.

Perhaps the most striking contrast between Canada and the United States in their approaches to diversity has been Canada’s much greater acceptance of Catholicism. This of course reflects the wise decision of the British authorities to reach an accommodation with what was then the dominant religious organization in their new colony, a decision that led to the Quebec Act of 1774. Tax-supported systems of Catholic “separate” schools, which would be unthinkable in the United States, have existed in every province except Nova Scotia and British Columbia, and still exist today in Ontario, Saskatchewan and Alberta. Nine of Canada’s twenty-two prime ministers, beginning with John Thompson in 1892, have been Catholics, only four of whom were Francophones. Seven of the ten governors general since 1952, when Canadians began to be appointed to this office, have also been Catholics. The United States has had only one Catholic president, John F. Kennedy, and only one other Catholic, Al Smith, has been the presidential candidate of a major party. Smith’s religion doomed him to overwhelming defeat in the election, and Kennedy was elected by a very narrow margin. This contrast between Canada and the United States reflects the ideological, rather than ethnic, nature of American nationalism, and the roots of American political thought in the religious controversies of seventeenth century England. The Dutch ancestry of Van Buren and the two Roosevelts, and the German ancestry of Hoover and Eisenhower, was not an issue when they were elected as presidents, nor was the Jewish ancestry of Joe Lieberman, the Democratic candidate for vice-president in 2000 and an aspirant for the presidential nomination in 2004. Barack Obama’s successful candidacy was controversial not because of the colour of his skin, but because of false allegations that he was not a native-born American. The lack of controversy about Ronald Reagan, who was descended from Irish Catholic immigrants but not a Catholic himself, confirms that the concern about Kennedy’s background that still existed in 1960 was ideological rather than ethnic in character.

The republican ideal of a single American people, united by a common ideology, has usually been considered consistent with a level of ethnic diversity that few other nations have ever approached. The “melting pot” was originally the title of a play, first performed in 1909, the plot of which revolved around a romance and eventual marriage between a Jewish immigrant and a native-born Christian. The author, Israel Zangwill, was a Jewish immigrant himself, and the play reflected the hope that people, or at least Europeans, of diverse origins could become Americans, with the nation evolving as a synthesis of their different cultural attributes. Theodore
Roosevelt, a descendant of the Dutch founders of New York as his name suggests, was particularly enamoured of the play and of its message. Implicit in the idea of the melting pot is that people of different origins and cultures can become Americans, and that their cultural attributes will contribute to a synthesis which gradually evolves.

This is not to deny that outright xenophobia can emerge, especially in times of crisis. During the First World War, which the United States formally entered in April 1917, Americans who used the German language or showed other overt evidence of cultural ties with the enemy were harassed and persecuted. The rich ethnic heritage of German-Americans was almost totally destroyed. President Woodrow Wilson, a southerner not renowned for broad-mindedness (and the grandson of a Canadian) even alleged, falsely, that “A man who thinks of himself as belonging to a particular national group in American has not yet become an American.” It was soon after this war that immigration quotas were imposed in an effort to stabilize the ethnic composition of the American people, or even to return it to that of an earlier time. Yet this measure reflected less the melting pot ideal in its original form than a temporary lack of faith that the process of “melting” could create a united people from diverse elements.

Yet at the same time other Americans, such as Horace Kallen and Randolph Bourne, were developing a philosophy of “cultural pluralism” remarkably similar to what Canadians would refer to as “multiculturalism” several decade later. Both noted that the “melting pot” had failed and that Americans of British ancestry had demonstrated this by their enthusiasm for the British cause during the war. Other ethnic groups, like the Irish, Germans, or Italians, were similarly attached to their homelands, although Kallen, who was Jewish, noted that the Jews were the most attached to America because they had no other homeland and had been a minority even in the places from which they came. Both Bourne and Kallen asserted that the United States was enriched by having a multiplicity of cultures, a view that most Americans endorse today. According to Bourne, “The failure of the melting pot, far from closing the great American democratic experiment, means that it has only just begun....America is already the world federation in miniature.” It might be noted that this was a decade or so before Canadians were first being taught to appreciate their “mosaic”.

To understand why Americans have reacted unfavourably to the word “multiculturalism”, one must examine the circumstances in which the word was first brought to their attention. The decade of the 1960s was an exceptionally turbulent time in the United States, with an unpopular and unsuccessful war in Vietnam, a sudden surge of nihilism and radicalism among students at the nation’s colleges and universities, and a probably unprecedented level of social and cultural change within a very short period of time. Most significantly, it was the time of the civil rights revolution, when African-Americans at last mobilized successfully to claim the rights that were supposedly guaranteed by the Constitution, but had in practice been denied them since the withdrawal of federal troops from the conquered southern states in 1877. Although almost entirely peaceful in its methods, the civil rights movement provoked a violent reaction from many southern whites, often aided and abetted by law enforcement agencies and by state and local governments.

The civil rights movement of southern African-Americans had of course begun as early as 1954, with the Montgomery bus boycott in Alabama, and it retained its original character for more than a decade under the leadership of Martin Luther King Junior. King and his followers emphasized that African-Americans wanted to be integrated fully into the mainstream of
American society, from which white racism had excluded them. Separating themselves from the mainstream, seeking special privileges as a collectivity (as opposed to constitutional rights), and protecting a distinct cultural heritage, if any existed, were not part of their agenda. Far more than their white opponents in the southern states, they conformed to the principles of the American creed, both in theory and in practice. They were fully in tune with the civic nationalism that most Americans professed.

Yet even before King’s death in 1968, and gaining strength afterwards, an alternative movement emerged among African Americans, particularly the urban proletariat in the northern states and in California. Reacting against economic deprivation, the frequently appalling conditions of life in decayed inner cities, and the disproportionate share of casualties in Vietnam that were suffered by African-Americans, this movement emphasized a racial and cultural identity separate from that of white Americans. It viewed African-Americans as a distinct collectivity, or even a nation, that should enjoy collective rights rather than the individual civil rights enumerated in the Constitution. Rather than seeking integration into the American mainstream, it emphasized cultural separateness by cultivating a distinct dialect, names, hairstyles, and costumes, and inventing an entirely fictitious “African” holiday known as “Kwanzaa” as an alternative to Christmas. It also demanded schools that would teach an African-influenced curriculum, rather than the (still not fully achieved) integration into the existing public school system that had been a major goal of the civil rights movement. At times it embellished its rhetoric with absurd allegations, such as that Black Africans had built the Egyptian pyramids, that the HIV virus was the result of a genocidal plot to reduce the African-American population, or even that Karl Marx was of African ancestry.

The word “multiculturalism”, as it gradually entered the American consciousness, came to be attached to this radical movement for “Black Power”, although not to the original movement for civil rights.. General de Gaulle’s visit to Montreal in 1967, and the October Crisis of 1970, had brought Quebec nationalism to the attention of many Americans. The parallel between the separatism of “Black Power” and the separatism of Quebec seemed obvious. Learning that “multiculturalism” was a Canadian word, and that it had been proclaimed as official doctrine by a Francophone Prime Minister from Quebec, some Americans jumped to the completely erroneous conclusion that multiculturalism and Quebec nationalism were closely related. They were in an indirect way, but certainly not in the way that these Americans imagined.

Ironically a movement that really was similar to Canadian multiculturalism arose in the United States in the 1970s, about a decade after its Canadian counterpart, but it arose largely in opposition to “multiculturalism”, American-style. This was the movement of the “white ethnics” or, as it was sometimes called, the ethnic revival. Its bible was a book by Michael Novak, an American of Slovakian descent, published in the same year that Trudeau proclaimed the policy of official multiculturalism in Canada. Americans of southern and eastern European ancestry, the descendants of the vast wave of immigration between 1880 and 1914, comprised most of the working class in the industrial states of the northeast and the midwest. Many felt economically deprived by the beginnings of the shift to a knowledge-based service economy, as well as stigmatized by their Catholic religion. They resented radical students, mainly Protestant or Jewish, who derided patriotism and American values and who refused to fight in Vietnam. They also resented the increasing attention given to the problems of African-Americans by an upper
and upper middle class “liberal” elite that still consisted mainly of Anglo-Saxon Protestants. (It was at this time that “liberal” suddenly became a term of abuse in American political discourse.) The working class white ethnic Americans also suspected with good reason that measures to give African Americans access to better schools, jobs and housing would probably come at their expense, not at that of the Anglo-Saxon elites who called for such measures.

The “ethnic revival” was dismissed or derided by some academics such as Richard Alba and Herbert J. Gans, who claimed that the “ethnics” were already fully assimilated and could at most aspire to “symbolic ethnicity”. However, it forced some politicians to pay attention. Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter all had staff persons in the White House who were responsible for liaison with white ethnic groups. In 1972 Congress adopted, and President Nixon signed, the Ethnic Heritage Studies Act. The purpose of this measure was to develop curricular material related to the history and culture of ethnic groups and their contribution to the American heritage, to provide training for persons to teach these subjects, and to assist ethnic organizations in developing programs or other activities related to their history, culture and traditions. (In fact it had little practical effect, since little funding was provided, and it was eventually repealed during the Reagan administration.) Finally, in 1980 the United States census included for the first time an ethnic origin question similar to that which the Canadian census introduced in 1871. Previously the U.S. census had only enumerated people by race and by place of birth. The 1980 census question, which was repeated in 1990 and 2000, allowed people to specify more than one ethnic origin and also to list their ethnic origin as “American”, a choice that proved to be popular mainly among whites in the southern states. (By way of comparison, Canada allowed multiple origins beginning in 1986, and recognized “Canadian” as an option beginning in 1996.)

The different place of “multiculturalism” in Canadian and American discourse is thus completely understandable. Both countries, beginning in the 1960s, faced radical demands for change from previously disadvantaged groups: Francophone Quebeckers and African Americans respectively. In both cases the demand for change initially took a form that did not threaten Canadian and American unity and identity, the Quiet Revolution and the civil rights movement respectively. In both cases the initial movement for change was challenged, and then partly replaced by more radical and threatening movements: the sovereignty movement in Quebec and the various forms of Afro-American nationalism. In both cases the mobilization of the largest disadvantaged group produced a response by “ethnics” who felt that their own demands for recognition were being overshadowed and threatened. In neither country was this “ethnic” response considered threatening to national unity or identity, although some dismissed its importance. In Canada this ethnic response acquired the label of “multiculturalism” while in the United States the same word was applied to the more radical and threatening demands of the large disadvantaged group that had begun the whole sequence of events.

Early American critics of “multiculturalism” (in the American sense of the term) thus devoted most of their critique to African-American separatism and nationalism, even if they had supported the movement for civil rights. However, by the 1990s African American nationalism and separatism had apparently passed its peak, and a situation that many considered a more serious threat to American unity and identity had appeared in the most rapidly growing region of the country. By the 1980s Mexico had become the largest source of immigration to the United States, and most of the Mexican immigrants, legal or otherwise, settled in California, Texas and Arizona, states that bordered on Mexico and had once been part of that country. In the words of
political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, “Mexican immigration is leading toward the demographic reconquista of areas Americans took from Mexico by force in the 1830s and 1840s.”

At the same time other Spanish speaking countries of the western hemisphere, particularly the Dominican Republic and the American-controlled island of Puerto Rico, were also sending many immigrants to the United States, with New York as their principal destination, Anti-communist refugees from Cuba had established a strong position in south Florida by 1970, comprising more than half the population of Miami. As early as 1970 Spanish was the principal non-English mother tongue among residents of the United States, and by 2000 it was estimated to be the language spoken at home for 28 million persons, or about one-tenth of the population. A few years later “Hispanics”, the term used in the United States for all people with cultural roots in a Spanish speaking country, surpassed African-Americans in numbers. Although “Hispanics” are an artificial category comprising many ethnic groups with little in common, Mexican-Americans, including the second and third generations, comprise well over half the total number of American residents included in that category. Although much Mexican immigration is undocumented and “illegal”, it has been estimated that one out every ten Mexican-born persons still living is living in the United States. (The proportion would be considerably higher for the Dominican Republic, which of course is a much smaller country.)

Recent American critics of “multiculturalism”, like Samuel P. Huntington and Patrick J. Buchanan, have expressed much more concern about the rapidly growing Hispanic, and particularly Mexican, population than about African-American nationalism, which appears to have abated considerably. Apart from the rapidly growing numbers, one reason for this is that the visible presence of a second language is a new and unwelcome experience for many Americans, while the African-American minority has existed for longer than the republic itself. The proximity and large size of Mexico itself, as well as the unhappy history of relations between the two countries, may also contribute to anxiety.

In any event, an early expression of this concern was the movement to make English the official language of the United States, begun in 1981 by former senator S.I. Hayakawa of Hawaii. Although the movement to amend the federal constitution failed to get off the ground, by 1988 the states of Arizona, California, Colorado and Florida, all with large Spanish-speaking populations, had amended their state constitutions to make English the only official language. Several other states have adopted legislation to the same effect, but without amending their constitutions. There have also been efforts to restrict immigration from Mexico, a subject too complex to be considered here, but, since Mexican immigration has been declining since 2005, that issue may eventually die a natural death.

The analogy with Canada and Quebec has once again been pressed into service by those who worry about the Hispanization of the United States. Indeed some of the most articulate critics of that trend, including the late S.I. Hayakawa, Peter Brimelow, and Alvin Schmidt, have actually lived in Canada. However, that experience has not prevented them from conflating bilingualism and multiculturalism into what they perceive as a single threat, with Canada being presented as an example of what they fear will happen to their adopted country.

American opponents of multiculturalism, as they understand the term, are concerned that their country, which has proudly cherished the motto E pluribus unum, is degenerating into a collection of warring tribes whose members identify as African Americans, Hispanics, Native
Americans and so forth, rather than simply as Americans. They blame this phenomenon not so much on the minorities themselves, but on an ideology of multiculturalism that encourages them to think in this way. But those who share these fears are not entirely united in their views on what should be done about it. Samuel P. Huntington asserted that “The principal theme of this book is the continuing centrality of Anglo-Protestant culture to American national identity.” He argued that national unity was preserved, at least until recently, because most immigrants and minorities were close enough to this culture to adapt to it. Michael Lind, on the other hand, favours a more universalistic interpretation of the American creed and denies that the ethnicity or religion of the original settlers is still relevant.

The concern about multiculturalism expressed by these people is not entirely absent in Canada, and appears in the writings of people like Neil Bissoondath and Rudyard Griffiths. However, since Canada’s original settlers were French and since the country lacks both a revolutionary myth and a clear ideological identity, it is harder in Anglophone Canada to specify a plausible alternative to multiculturalism. Perhaps even more significantly, most Canadians appear to have concluded that the “multiculturalism” proclaimed by their federal and provincial governments is harmless and means very little in practice. Indeed “multiculturalism” may, in the long term, prove to be Anglophone Canada’s term for the melting pot.

To conclude, the M-word has come to mean very different things to Canadians and Americans, with the allegedly Canadian origins of the word often causing Americans to confuse it with what, in Canadian terms, is really its opposite. Just as many Canadians like the word because they consider it a symbol of what distinguishes Canada from the United States, some Americans reject it because they consider it a symbol of what they dislike and fear about Canada. The final irony is that while Americans believe the M-word represents a threat to their national identity, Quebec nationalists believe that the same word threatens the national identity of Quebec! Quebec uses “interculturalism” to distinguish itself from Canada, just as Canada uses “multiculturalism” to distinguish itself from the United States.

Despite the semantic confusion, the similarities between Quebec, Canada, and the United States continue to outweigh their differences. All of them will continue to attract large numbers of immigrants, who within a couple of generations will probably melt into the surrounding population. All will experience a gradual evolution in their cultures as the new arrivals and their progeny are absorbed into the mixture. And all will probably benefit from the experience.

ENDNOTES

1. Quoted in Franca Iacovetta, Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada (Toronto: Between the Lines 2006), 34.


5. E.g. a Decima poll reported in *Maclean’s*, July 3, 1989. 47% of Americans and only 34% of Canadians agreed that immigrants should be encouraged to maintain their distinct cultures.


19. An excellent discussion of this subject is José E. Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution*


34. Leon E. Aylesworth, “The Passing of Alien Suffrage”, American Political Science Review 25
(1931), 114-116.


37. Kennedy confronted the religious issue during the campaign in a speech to a group of Protestant clergy. For the text of his speech, see Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President 1960* (New York: Atheneum 1961), 391-393.


47. Samuel P. Huntington, *Who are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity* (New York: Simon and Schuster 2004), 221.

49. Huntington, op. cit., 221-256; Patrick J. Buchanan, *The Death of the West* (New York: St. Martin’s 2002), 123-146.


51. Alvin J. Schmidt, by his own account, was an officer in the RCMP before moving to the United States. His parents were German immigrants in Manitoba. He is the author of *The Menace of Multiculturalism: Trojan Horse in America* (Westport CT: Praeger 1997)

52. Huntington, op. cit., 30.

