Cosmopolitanism and Citizenship

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Cosmopolitanism is an idea extending far back in the Western political tradition, beginning, as many scholars have noted, with the Roman conception of universal reason, and captured in the famous quip by the Cynic Diogenes: “I am a citizen of the world”. By declaring that one is a “citizen of the world”, one is clearly proclaiming a political loyalty that extends beyond the foundational conception of politics in Plato and Aristotle. Socrates may have understood his primary loyalty to be to truth, rather than any contingent and particular notion of morality, but he chose death at the hands of Athenian democrats because of his stated commitment to the voice of his fellow citizens. And Aristotle, as we know, opens the Politics with the proclamation that man is by nature a being who lives in a polis, not a cosmopolis. The tension between polis and cosmopolis is an old one. But cosmopolitanism has taken on an invigorated defense in Western political thought recently, and it arguably has a stronger claim to loyalty in the modern world because of its attachment to human rights discourse, and because of the reality of modern communications, ease of travel, and the darker realities of massive numbers of refugees, cross border migrations, and populations displaced by civil war.

In this paper, I want to consider the roots of modern cosmopolitanism in Kant, the philosopher who conscientiously attempted to marry political citizenship with cosmopolitan sensibilities within a framework of right. Then I want to consider how these dual loyalties in Kant have been fractured by contemporary political theorists in such a way that political citizenship has been eclipsed by either the transcendence into a more universalistic cosmopolitanism than that imagined by Kant, or by an embeddedness in culture and identity.

I turn to Kant because Kant is, I believe, the most powerful exponent of right in the modern political tradition and it is Kant who formulates in the 18th century the enlightenment notion of cosmopolitanism. For Kant, rights are universal, they are true because they defend the fundamental autonomy of all human beings, and they can be known by all rational people. We have a duty to uphold right, once we recognize that our freedom has to be commensurate with the freedom of others. Like all theorists of right, Kant puts the emphasis upon protecting the space for people to make their own choices, and for people to be self-determining agents. This emphasis upon reasonable choice is central to Kant’s understanding of what is most important about human beings, and what is required to mount just political institutions. Right, he defines as “the sum total of those conditions within which the will of one person can be reconciled with the will of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom.” The protection of right relies upon the recognition of a universal law that tells us that in our external actions toward others, our free will must coexist with everyone else’s.

Because for Kant, “it is not our intention to teach virtue, but only to state what is right” (Met. 134), the emphasis is upon the political institutions that will guard external actions. There is no right without a state to guarantee it. The “natural condition”, Kant
affirms, is a condition “devoid of justice”, because if there is a dispute over right, there is no “competent judge” to resolve the argument. Any contract between individuals is provisional “until it has been sanctioned by a public law”. (Met., 138-139) The only legitimate form of state, for Kant, is the republican model in which there is a division of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches. The people who unite together in a state are citizens, and “the three rightful attributes which are inseparable from the nature of a citizen as such” are: 1) the lawful freedom to obey only those laws to which one has given consent; 2) the recognition of civil equality among all citizens; 3) independence of will that accords with one’s “rights and powers as a member of the commonwealth.” (Met. 139) These provisos from Kant are important to note, because they tie the protection of right irrevocably to the political institutions of the state. No state, no right. Kant is not a natural rights theorist, like John Locke, and right for Kant is the willed and institutionalized framework of citizenship. In citizenship, Kant remarks, people have not “sacrificed a part of their inborn external freedom for a specific purpose”; rather, they have “completely abandoned their wild and lawless freedom, in order to find their entire and undiminished freedom in a state of lawful dependence (i.e. in a state of right), for this dependence is created by their own legislative will.” (Met. 140)

Where does cosmopolitanism fit in here? Kant’s views on right set up something of a conundrum, because while he holds that rights are universal, and can be embraced by reason, they can be upheld only within the containment of state sovereign political institutions. The idea of right is universal, but the practical enforcement of right requires separate republican states regulated by law and backed up by force. We need particular states to enforce universal laws. Kant tells us that all the nations of the world “may unite for the purpose of creating universal laws to regulate the intercourse they have with one another”, and this he terms cosmopolitanism. (Met.172) Kant anticipates that, despite the great oceans that divide peoples, the world will open up to increased trade and mobility, and he declares that cosmopolitanism demands an attitude of hospitality, wherein the citizens of the world have rights to enter the communities of others, and to expect welcome from them. Cosmopolitanism does not extend to a right to settle on foreign land, Kant says, and the universal laws that he attaches to cosmopolitanism would seem to be limited to those governing hospitality.

Kant identifies cosmopolitan right as something entirely separate from international right. International right consists in the legally binding treaties among sovereign states, principally for regulating, and Kant hopes, eventually eliminating, war. “The idea of a world republic cannot be realized””, Kant wrote, both because independent states do not wish to forfeit their sovereignty, and because the extension of territorial dominion over the whole world according to Kant, is a practical problem, likely to induce tyranny, not right. Kant comments that “nature wisely separates the nations”, by linguistic and cultural differences, differences that Kant appears not to regard as intrinsically worthy in comparison to his principles of right, but which he regards as useful in containing the state within practically manageable borders. He hopes international agreements among states will generate a peace “created and guaranteed by equilibrium of forces and a most vigorous rivalry”, a balance he regards as much preferable to a “universal despotism which saps all man’s energies and ends in the graveyard of freedom.”(Per.Peace. 114)
With regard to perpetual peace, Kant warns that “we have a duty to act in accordance with such an end even if there is not the slightest probability of its realization, provided that there is no means of demonstrating that it cannot be realized either.” (Met. 174) Cosmopolitanism for Kant is an idea that is true, but not intended to be implemented in any formalistic manner (beyond the laws governing hospitality). And so Kant proclaims that “the peoples of the earth have entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere. The idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity.” (Per. Peace 107-108)

To summarize: this is the picture Kant gives us. Rights are universal, they are known by reason and they champion individual autonomy above all other ends for human beings. Rights are not “natural”, but rather, are the products of an enlightened consciousness on the part of a progressive species that has become capable of erecting self governing institutions that recognize right’s primacy. Republican institutions are the only just form of political organization because they protect the sovereignty of right. Citizenship in discrete states is preferable to a world constitution, despite the fact that rights are universal, because of the practical problems of monitoring external right, and because of the lively rivalry among states that keeps them ‘vigorous” in their defense of freedom. International federations of states are to be encouraged as a way of deflecting conflict and war. Cosmopolitan right is the unwritten code that is the complement to political and international right, the third tier in a rights structure that is the most universalistic, yet the most abstract.

Kant is really interesting to me, because it seems that he is trying to stay true to the distinction between philosophy and politics that has been a brake on tyranny since Socrates initially set up the tension between his loyalty to truth and his loyalty to the Athenian polis. In Socrates’ Apology, I see Socrates’ decision to accept the penalty inflicted upon him by his fellow citizens as an acknowledgement that while he finds the decision unjust, he accepts the necessity to live and die within the limits of the polis. He tells the assembly that he has always been a good citizen and he will not defy the democratic ethos that has nurtured him. This does not negate the higher claim that truth has on Socrates; it points to the paradox of “citizen of the world” (or citizen of “truth”) and citizen of Athens. I see Kant’s three tiers of right as conceived in a similar, although not parallel, mode. Cosmopolitan right is noble and true, and any reasonable rights-loyal human being can understand in the modern world that a violation of right anywhere on the globe is a violation at home. At the same time, we are all citizens of discrete states, living under laws of external right that bind us in contractual obligations to our fellow citizens, contractual obligations that protect not just formal right, but things like property, family relations, social policies, and sustaining of infrastructures and public goods. State-centered right and citizenship is the catalyst for cosmopolitan sentiment. It is important to understand this. Citizenship right keeps us grounded in the very real state contours of external right that make it possible at all for us to exercise our will and autonomy, and to comprehend our obligations toward the rights of others.

For Kant, right begins with the protection of external right within the state, extends outward to a defense of federations at the international level, and culminates in
cosmopolitanism. The structure cannot be inverted. Cosmopolitanism is not the inspiration for the political protection of right. Cosmopolitanism, married to right, is not a modern day substitute for natural law. If states, committed to republican institutions that protect individual rights, do not fulfill their mandate, the entire structure of right collapses. No one is better on this than Hannah Arendt. As she famously declared: “The Rights of Man, supposedly unalienable, proved to be unenforceable — even in countries whose constitutions were based upon them — whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any sovereign state.” Of course, for Kant, rights are not “unalienable”; they are primarily political. Following Arendt’s logic, Kant would no doubt agree that a loss of state does indeed mean no right. “The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom of opinion — formulas which were designed to solve problems within given communities — but that they no longer belong to any community whatsoever.” (Origins, 295) What really expels a person from humanity under the modern rights-regime is the loss of a polity. (Origins, 297)

Cosmopolitan responsibilities, as Kant and Arendt would agree, do not help in the crisis of statelessness, expelled populations, or exterminated peoples. The “right to have rights”, Arendt says, should theoretically be guaranteed by being human, but it is not. Arendt hopes for firmer declarations and enforcement of human rights from international organizations, and she criticizes “the present sphere of international law which still operates in terms of reciprocal agreements and treaties between sovereign states” (Origins, 298), but like Kant, she backs off attaching any institutional prerogative to cosmopolitanism. World government, based on a common humanity that forgoes the traditional structure of state citizenship, is a possibility, writes Arendt, but one that by no means necessarily holds the promise of greater freedom. Just as likely would be an outcome of tyranny, what Kant terms a “graveyard” of freedom. At the end of Arendt’s discussion of the “rights of man”, and her considerations on world government, she cites Plato as having said: “Not man, but a god, must be the measure of all things.” (Origins, 299) This seems a cryptic close to her discussion, but I understand what she means. When the rights-protecting state collapses, all right implodes as there is nothing outside that rights-conferring framework that could be called up to redress the calamity. As Arendt says, rightly, I think: “If a human being loses his political status, he should, according to the implications of the inborn and unalienable rights of man, come under exactly the situation for which the declarations of rights provided. Actually, the opposite is the case. It seems that a man who is nothing but a man has lost the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellow-man.” (Origins, 300)

Seyla Benhabib is a contemporary champion of cosmopolitanism, and she takes her bearings from a revision of Hannah Arendt and Kant. Claiming that “we have entered a phase in the evolution of global civil society, which is characterized by a transition from international to cosmopolitan norms of justice.” Benhabib claims that this transition marks a leap over the sovereign state, recognizing the rights of individuals in a “worldwide civil society”. This is a significant departure from Arendt, whom Benhabib terms a “Kantian” who “remains committed to a civic republican vision of self-determination”. (Another Cosmo, 15) Benhabib’s prescriptions for a new cosmopolitanism include fostering transnational juridical institutions that will constitute an “international human rights regime”, and encouraging what she calls “democratic
iterations” that can disaggregate citizenship from state boundaries. She sees the possibility of “new political configurations and new forms of agency, inspired by the interdependence – never frictionless, but ever promising – of the local, the national and the global.” (Another Cosmo, 74)

Benhabib’s relationship with Kant and Arendt is an ambivalent one. Like Arendt, Benhabib looks at human rights through the catastrophe of the Nazi state and the dispossession and genocide that that state inflicted on its citizens. Benhabib identifies Arendt’s “dilemma”, as her realization that the legal framework of rights within the sovereign state is inadequate to protect the people within its borders (as Arendt said, the Nazis showed it was possible to expel people from humanity); at the same time, Arendt thought that natural law doctrines were “obsolete”. Where does one turn to rescue individuals who are marginalized and expelled from rights protection within the state under such conditions? Benhabib thinks it is time to harness Kant’s notion of cosmopolitan right and confer upon it the legal status that it deserves. It is by turning to cosmopolitan right that we can secure the foundations for what Arendt called the “right to have rights”, and to ensure that we can punish “crimes against humanity”. These categories, Benhabib states, “are intended to provide not only precepts of individual conduct but also principles of public morality and institutional justice. They transcend the specific positive laws of any existing legal order by formulating binding norms which no promulgated legislation ought to violate.” (Another Cosmo, 25)

Benhabib seems puzzled that Arendt did not herself make this “leap” to cosmopolitan justice. In the postscript to Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt’s first hand account of the trial of Adolf Eichmann, Arendt ends on what Benhabib thinks a “surprising” note. Arendt says there that it is conceivable that one day, political responsibilities of nations might be adjudicated by an international court, but “it is inconceivable that such a court would be a criminal tribunal which pronounces on the guilt or innocence of individuals.” Arendt’s position is “baffling” to Benhabib, because “[Arendt’s] insistence on the juridical as opposed to the merely moral dimension of crimes against humanity suggests the need for a standing international body that would possess the jurisdiction to try such crimes committed by individuals.” (Another Cosmo, 15)

Advocating for a new cosmopolitan order, Benhabib writes that “the modern sovereign draws its legitimacy not merely from its act of constitution, but equally, significantly, from the conformity of this act to universal principles of human rights that are in some sense said to precede and antedate the will of the sovereign and in accordance with which the sovereign undertakes to bind itself.” (Another Cosmo, 32)

Arendt’s position is not baffling when we consider her (and Kant’s) position that rights have no substance that “antedates” the will of the sovereign. Consistently throughout her work on rights, Arendt speaks to the Kantian problem that rights are political artifacts. To repeat some of the fundamentals of Kantian logic here, for Kant, rights are things we grant to ourselves in the building of political institutions of republican representation. Rights are primarily external, that is they are understood in relation to the rights of others as we are all circumscribed by law in a sovereign state. Cosmopolitan right is derivative, first from republican citizenship, and second from international right in the agreement among states. Cosmopolitan right cannot stand on its own as a bellwether. Cosmopolitan right has no foundation in nature, no foundation in religion, and no foundation in philosophy independent of political sovereignty. On
Arendt’s (and Kant’s) ground, cosmopolitan right cannot address the calamities of statelessness, dispossession and genocide. Moreover, the transcendence of the state into the universal ether of cosmopolitan right may actually exacerbate these calamities. “The paradox involved in the loss of human rights”, Arendt warns, “is that such loss coincides with the instant when a person becomes a human being in general – without a profession, without citizenship, without an opinion, without a deed by which to identify and specify himself – and different in general, representing nothing but his own absolutely unique individuality which, deprived of expression within, and action upon, a common world, loses all significance.” (Origins, 302)

While the response of some to the crisis of right has been this call for a transcendence of conventional state citizenship into a broader cosmopolitan right, (Benhabib, Habermas), others have backed down from Kant’s formalistic conception of right, even within the context of the sovereign state, and made a strong claim for cultural and ethnic belonging. This movement too was forecast by Arendt. It makes sense to her that in a precarious world, people cling to their nationalities. Stateless people do not see themselves as cosmopolitans, but rather, are likely to “insist on their nationality, the last sign of their former citizenship, as their only remaining and recognized tie with humanity.” (Origins, 300) And so we have the obverse of cosmopolitanism: the assertion of particular cultural, or national, or ethnic identity and the insistence that this identity be afforded political recognition. If a place in the world is of central concern to people, a space in which it is possible to act together, make decisions as a community, and advance individual rights within a context that is meaningful, then cultural/national/ethnic belonging is an anchor. Theorists of multiculturalism have taken up the cause of these identities, attempting to graft them onto a preservation of Kantian individual autonomy.

Foremost among these theorists is Will Kymlicka, who has defended a rights-based state that can accommodate cultural particularity. I do not know if Kymlicka sees himself lodged within a Kantian legacy, but certainly we find in his work the Kant-like effort to wed universal norms (rights based) with state sovereignty. Kymlicka writes that “within recent Anglo-American political philosophy, the predominant idea of political community and citizenship has two main features. The first concerns the underlying values which typically have been defined in liberal-democratic terms . . . . the second concerns the boundaries of citizenship which invariably have been defined in national terms.” vi Liberal commitments are universal and include the classic freedoms (speech, conscience, etc.) as well as the (very Kantian) commitment to autonomy, the “freedom of choice about how to live our lives.” (Lib. Nat. 128) The defense of the nation state rests rather upon the commitment to self rule: “political participation, self-government, and solidarity.” (Lib. Nat. 129) Kymlicka terms this marriage of liberal democratic norms, and commitment to self-rule within the nation state a model of “liberal nationhood”.

The model of liberal nationhood, according to Kymlicka, has been hugely successful in the modern world except for one glaring problem: the supposedly neutral and universalistic tenets of liberal nationhood exclude or marginalize many, including recent immigrants, historic substate groups (such as indigenous peoples) and neighbouring nation states perceived as hostile and threatening. Kymlicka’s formula for addressing these injustices, as is well known, is to adopt a multiculturalism that adapts to the model of liberal nationhood. States can, and ought to, move to adopt: 1) a “multicultural nationhood” more welcoming to immigrants; 2) “a more “multination”
conception of the state that recognizes the existence of substate nations and indigenous peoples, and accords them a significant degree of national autonomy”; 3) better international security arrangements that can diminish conflict among states. (Lib. Nat. 130)

Kymlicka calls his project one of “taming” liberal nationhood so that it is more accommodating of the very real differences that mark people’s identities, especially those of the relatively powerless. Examples he gives of successful “tamed liberal nations” are Australia, Canada, the United States and Britain (interestingly, all primarily English-speaking). Kymlicka does not see his project as an abandonment of cosmopolitanism, but rather as a different version of cosmopolitanism – one that brings together cosmopolitan ideals (universal notions of freedom and autonomy) with retention of the primacy of state citizenship, albeit expanded to include cultural identity. (Lib. Nat. 133)

I cannot help but think of Kant here again, and his comment that nature has acted wisely in populating the world with peoples of differing languages and cultures. Although Kant anticipates that trade, commerce and communications will open up the world in such a way that there is a great deal of cultural “cross-fertilization”, he nonetheless sees the entrenched differences among peoples as intrinsically linked to the modern sovereign state. Kant also sees these differences as a good thing because they mitigate against the drift toward ever larger units of political control, which he regarded as inherently dangerous. However, there is nothing as far as I know in Kant that would connect cultural identity to claims of a thick conception of justice. Justice for Kant is about freedom, autonomy and external right. I have never been clear on whether Will Kymlicka thinks that cultural identity is worth preserving because of its intrinsic worth, or whether he thinks that it is politically expedient, and humane, to acknowledge that people cling to their cultural identities, especially when they feel marginalized or excluded. Kant thought cultural identity was politically expedient; Arendt thought that cultural and national identities were likely to become more pronounced in contemporary world, as statelessness and migration increased. Kant did not see cultural identity as a threat to the spread of republican institutions. Arendt certainly did.

I find Tariq Modood’s approach to multiculturalism a clearer one. Modood claims that there is a distinction between the public recognition of identities and the moral evaluation of them, and that the former is possible without the latter. “The identities and cultures of others are primarily not important for epistemological reasons . . . I can remain agnostic on the ethical and philosophical underpinnings of multiculturalism or whether it has any. For me, identities and cultures are important because they are important to the bearers of those identities, people who are members of our society, fellow citizens, and so have to be included into the polity in ways consistent with respect and equality.” For Modood, citizens are autonomous and rights bearing individuals, but they are “not uniform”, and “citizenship is not a monistic identity that is completely apart from or transcends other identities that are important to citizens.” (Multiculturalism, 126) Modood, like Kymlicka, supports a strong notion of liberal nationhood, and claims that “a sense of belonging to one’s country is necessary to make a success of a multicultural society.” (Multiculturalism, 150), but Modood is much more open than Kymlicka to the incorporation of all cultural identities, including religious ones, into policy structures.
The multiculturalists, despite their differences, agree that identity, often lodged in culture, ethnic belonging and nation, is important to people and has to be taken into account in contemporary formulations of liberal democratic citizenship. They hope, of course, that these “sub-state” identities can be made compatible with the principles of external right. As Tariq Modood warns, the real elephant in the room of multiculturalism is the fear of Muslims. “The emergence of Muslim political agency has thrown multiculturalism into theoretical and practical disarray. The fear of it has led to policy reversals in the Netherlands and elsewhere [Madood wrote this before the very recent punitive measures adopted in France for the wearing of the burka], and has strengthened intolerant, exclusive nationalism across Europe.” (Multiculturalism, 85)

In conclusion, this is how I see the principal debates on political theory and citizenship as they stand in Kant’s legacy. The Kantian tension among the three levels of right – republican, international, cosmopolitan – has proven unsustainable. I think this is the case, because the very foundations of right, as conceived by Kant, are not capable of bearing the weight of the edifice he constructs upon them (but this is the subject of another paper, where I have written of the contrast between the Aristotelian conception of politics and the Kantian conception of right). The Kantian project, held together by the absolutely primary commitment to republican government and the state guarantee of public right, has splintered off into the “universals” and the “particulars” that it was intended to contain. We have the cosmopolitans on the one hand, who take Kant’s sentiments on the global reach of right, and turn them into frameworks for law and justifications for the erosion of state sovereignty. And we have the multiculturalists who, fearful of the sterility and rootlessness of cosmopolitan autonomy, look for ways to defend cultural belonging within a fabric of democracy and rights. The loser here is civic republicanism.

Is it possible to defend a model of civic republicanism anymore? Seyla Benhabib argues that in a world ever increasingly characterized by the mobility of populations, statelessness, and refugee migration, the idea of strong republicanism can not work. “Wouldn’t a truly cosmopolitan politics”, she asks, “require that every human child receive a passport as a world citizen in addition to his/her local identification papers? Doesn’t the category of ‘crimes against humanity’ suggest that the human person ought to be given legal personhood?” Tariq Modood, commenting on the same set of circumstances (“the twenty-first century is going to be one of unprecedented ethnic and religious mix in the West”), cautions: “if we are to keep alive the prospect of a dynamic, internally differentiated multiculturalism within the context of democratic citizenship, then we must at least see that multiculturalism is not the cause of the present crisis but part of the solution.” (Multiculturalism, 154)

I find Modood’s judgments persuasive. The republican, rights based state is still the only workable model for political organization. It protects freedom, equality and autonomy, but it cannot remain the strong culture-neutral civic association that Kant advocated for. It is too much to ask of people that they abandon their particular identities completely, and to do so probably intensifies these particular loyalties. Jonathan Sacks writes: “We tend to think that the problems of multiculturalism have to do with minorities. In fact they have to do with everyone.” Sacks’ vision for the republic entails resurrecting notions that are not strictly rights-based (though these rights cannot be forfeited), but grounded in a shared sense of public space. People need a home, not just
rights, and as the world becomes more integrated, perhaps we need homes more than ever. In Sacks’ efforts to rehabilitate the commitment to public good, I am reminded of Arendt’s alarming, but still resonant, claim: “Whether we like it or not, we have really started to live in One World. Only with a completely organized humanity could the loss of home and political status become identical with the expulsion from humanity altogether.” (Origins, 297) Sacks says that “we must protect social space, by which I mean not only parks, public gardens, beaches and forests, but also universities, professional associations, NGOs, charities and churches.” (The Home, 235) Public spaces heal, as Sacks suggests. “Liberal democracy needs its own habits of the heart. If we seek space to be ourselves, we must respect the space others need to be themselves, even if they use it in ways we find objectionable. That requires humility and generosity.” (The Home, 240)

On the cosmopolitan spin-out that I have tried to formulate, drawing upon Benhabib’s vision of a global order, I am far less enthusiastic. For all the reasons given by Kant and Arendt, which I believe still hold true, global transcendence of the state, movements toward a human rights regime, and international law are misconceived because they reach too far, too wide, and ultimately cannot provide the security or the harbour that citizenship can. There is a great danger in bypassing the political for the cosmopolitical. I do not think that the cosmopolitan advocates understand this danger, specifically, the danger of closing the gap between the ideal (if not utopian) and the actual. Arendt always reminded that “God, not man, is the measure of all things”. Even if one does not want to invoke God for this measure, it is possible to understand the importance of leaving the space between what we imagine is possible and what we think we can implement in the world.

I end this paper with Derrida’s idea of “unconditional hospitality”. Derrida mounts a surprisingly strong defense of the state. “I believe that everything must be done to extend the privilege of citizenship in the world: too many men and women are deprived of citizenship in so many ways.”(Philosophy in a Time of Terror, 131) People do not normally associate Derrida with Kant, but I think Derrida grasped something fundamental (as did Kant) about the cosmopolitan thesis, and Kant’s idea of hospitality. “An unconditional hospitality”, Derrida said, “is practically impossible to live; one cannot, in any case, and by definition, organize it. . . . no state can write it into its laws.” And yet, Derrida continues, without the idea of unconditional hospitality, we would not even have the idea of living together, of being open toward alterity. Derrida rejects contemporary theories of cosmopolitanism, because he sees these as presupposing something like a “world state, whose concept can be theologico-political or secular” (Philosophy in a Time of Terror, 131) Hospitality and universal obligation are Derrida’s “measures” for how we judge our political actions. If we bear these in mind, we are likely to be better citizens, and better human beings.

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1 Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, H.S. Reiss, ed, Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge University Press, 1991) 43
2 Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, H. S. Reiss, ed., Kant’s Political Writings (Cambridge University Press, 1991) 105
shares this position. In his essay, “Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of Two Hundred Years’ Hindsight”, Habermas advocates for the establishment of a cosmopolitan order that would mean that “violations of human rights are no longer condemned and fought from the moral point of view in an unmediated way, but are rather prosecuted as criminal actions within the framework of a state-organized legal order according to institutionalized legal procedures.” James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, eds, perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal (Cambridge, Mass and London, England, MIT Press, 1997) 140

Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (N.Y., Penguin, 1963;1994) 298; cited in Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, 15

Will Kymlicka, “Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice”, Robert Post, ed, Another Cosmopolitanism, 128-129

Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism (Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 2007) 66 Modood castigates Kymlicka for a multiculturalism that preferences entrenched communities over immigrant populations. He writes: “In his [Kymlicka’s] theory, multicultural rights flow out of the fact that individual autonomy depends upon membership in a ‘societal culture’. But migrants do not have a distinctive societal culture in the relevant sense . . . Kymlicka’s theory, besides having a secularist bias, also suffers from what I call a multinational bias.” 34

Leah Bradshaw, “Empire and Eclipse of Politics”, David Tabachnick and Toivo Koivukoski, eds, Enduring Empire (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2009)

Jonathan Sacks, The Home We Build Together (London and New York, Continuum Press, 2007) 5