

*What's the Border For?*  
*Perceptions of Vulnerability from Across the Border Among Canadians and Americans*

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Abstract

Since the terrorist events of 9/11/2001, the Canadian-American border has experienced a significant process of securitization. Despite the hopes of some Canadians, the arrival of the Obama administration's secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano has done little to reverse the thickening of the border. While the most obvious objective of much of this border activity has been targeted at Islamic terrorists, there are also threats that emanate from the continental neighbor (illegal immigration or the importation of dangerous consumer products and food for example). This paper represents an exploratory analysis of the public opinion dimension of border security. Specifically, we use a pooled series of six years of parallel surveys of representative samples of American and Canadian citizens (conducted annually 2005-2010 by Nanos Research) to identify the segment of these countries who number the other country (Canada or the US, out of their top seven trading partners) among the most significant sources of threat (and hence in need of careful scrutiny by border officials). Pooling respondents over the period, we seek to profile these individuals who sense a proximate threat from either side of the Canadian-American border in terms of their demographic characteristics (age, education, region, gender). Secondly, we explore whether threat perceptions are related to more general sentiments of value proximity across the Canada-US border. Finally, binary and multinomial logistic regression with dummy variables for the year of the survey (to control for trends over the six year period) are used to estimate the relative impact of these factors on the perceptions of cross-border vulnerability. The results suggest (perhaps unsurprisingly) that Canadians are more likely to express a sense of vulnerability to US-sourced threats. These perceptions of Canadian respondents are more structured by socio-economic and demographic characteristics, and value-dispositions than is the case for Americans respondents.

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## **Introduction**

Canadian-American relations are driven by the national interests of both countries, but the relationship is managed within a context of public opinion that serves as a general constraint. Like most other aspects of the bilateral relationship, the public opinion environment for Canadian-American relations is inherently asymmetrical, with Canadians attending to the relationship far more intensely than Americans. This fact notwithstanding, the Canadian-American border has become politicized to an unprecedented degree since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The persistent myth that the terrorists entered the US through Canada began days after the tragic events and, according to the (then) Canadian Ambassador to the US Frank McKenna, “It took on a life of its own, like a viral infection” (quoted in Stuck, 2005). To the enduring frustration of Canadians, this myth continues to echo in American political discourse, reflecting and feeding a sense of vulnerability that is associated with the openness of the northern border. As a result, the Canadian-American border has assumed an uncharacteristic – and for the most part unwelcome - degree of salience for Americans.

As these developments play out, however, it is useful to inquire about how the border is being perceived by residents of Canada and the US. Using parallel surveys of representative samples of Canadians and Americans taken annually since 2005 (for details, see Eagles et al., 2005; 2009), we identify how many Americans express a sense of vulnerability posed by goods or people entering from their neighbor to the north, and *vice versa*, and see how stable these orientations are over time. To explore for the likely sources of perceptions of vulnerability from neighbors, we pool respondents to see if particular groups of Americans and Canadians are distinctive on this measure in terms of their socio-economic and demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, or region) or in terms of their perception of value proximity between the two countries.

## **Public Opinion and the Canada-US Border**

Forces of globalization have tended to open up borders to the flow of goods, people, and ideas. In North America, however, the ‘war on terror’ has refocused attention on the regulatory aspects of border security since borders are one of the regulatory sites through which a state can protect its citizens from external threats. In the US, for example, the growth of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and in particular of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within the DHS, reinforces the perception that borders are salient sites in this war. From the time of the terrorist attacks in September 2001 to 2004, the number of CBP personnel stationed on the northern border increased from approximately 350 to about 1,000 officers (US.CBP, 2004). The buildup has continued since that time.

Most recently, the securitization of the Canadian-American border has been complemented by the provisions of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) which since its implementation in June 2009 requires that all persons entering the US from Canada be able to produce secure identity documentation (such as a valid passport, enhanced drivers license, or other identity card). Peter Andreas (2005) has referred to these processes as the “Mexicanization” of the northern border, a view reinforced by the March 2009 comment of Janet Napolitano, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to the effect that northern and

southern border policy ought to be similar.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, a recent (February 2011) report by the US Government Accountability Office, undertaken at the request of the Senate committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs chaired by Connecticut Senator Joseph Lieberman, has raised the alarm about purported vulnerability on the northern border. Quoting the GAO findings, a press release from the Senate committee reported that "... the Border Patrol was aware of all illegal border crossings on only 25 percent of the border, or 1,007 out of 4,000 miles. The Border Patrol was aware of all illegal crossings and was able to make an immediate arrest on less than 1 percent or 32 miles of the 4,000 mile border. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) views the likelihood of terrorist crossing to be higher than they are at the southern border given the large expanse of area with limited law enforcement coverage and the presence of Islamist extremists in Canada" (US.Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 2011)

Canadian officials have responded to these American initiatives by reorganizing their own border security forces into the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), and the budget of this unit has also grown in recent years. All of these developments are likely to reinforce the association of borders and security in the minds of Canadians and Americans. It remains to be seen whether the bilateral discussions on a common security perimeter initiated by Stephen Harper and Barack Obama in February of this year will result in a relaxation of the border-related controls.

One result of all this activity is that unusually high levels of political – and to a lesser extent public - attention has been focused on the border and on Canada-US relations more generally. This is perhaps particularly true in the US, where Canada and Canadians have traditionally been either taken for granted or been benignly neglected. Our paper represents an attempt to establish whether there exists a segment of the public in each country for whom the "other" country is perceived to be a source of threat, and for whom presumably the border serves as an important line of defense. This is the task of our next section.

### **Perceptions of Threat From Across the Canada-US Border**

Canada has been characterized by a number of scholars as a 'borderlands' society (Gibbins 1989; New, 1998) in which the border serves as a fundamental and iconic representation of the country's identity as a distinctive North American society and polity. As the *New York Times* journalist Anthony DePalma (2001: 188) put it: "Much more so than in other countries, the border is part of Canada's genetic makeup: It determines what Canada is and contributes chromosomes to the nation's identity. As much as the heavy whiteness of the frozen north or the rugged majesty of the western mountains, the border tells Canadians who they are and clearly defines who they are not.

Clearly, for many Canadians the border serves as a signifier of Canada's independence. Yet the border is also a site for the regulation of the movement of goods and people, and this

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<sup>1</sup> Napolitano was quoted as saying: "One of the things that I think we need to be sensitive to is the very real feeling among southern border states and in Mexico that if things are being done on the Mexican border, they should also be done on the Canadian border," Napolitano said at a March conference in Washington on border issues...In other words, we shouldn't go light on one and heavy on the other."

raises the possibility that it is valued by some Canadians as a source of protection from more tangible or material threats emanating from the United States. Many Canadians are concerned about the relatively easy availability of guns in their neighbor to the south, and about the associated levels of violent crime. Drugs, guns, and gangs are all plausible threats that Canadians might associate with exposure to the US. And with more than three-quarters of all Canadians living within a couple hours drive of the US border, perceptions of vulnerability from this quarter may not be entirely without foundation.


To examine the level of perceived threat felt by Canadians, we look at responses from a question asking representative samples of Canadians to identify which two countries from which either a person or package entering Canada should receive close questioning or inspection by border officials.<sup>2</sup> Figure One suggests that a significant minority of Canadians respond by identifying the US as the source of greatest concern with respect to incoming goods and (especially) people. With respect to individuals entering Canada, between a third and four-tenths of Canadians suggest that people coming from the US are among the top two sources of possible threat. While the proportion mentioning the US as being the top or second choice of source countries from which people require close official scrutiny has declined since between 2005-2007, there is no trend after 2007. Concern about goods entering from the US is slightly lower, and it too drops over the time period, from just under forty percent of the population in 2005 to less than 30% since 2007. A somewhat smaller fragment of the Canadian population responds with a sense of vulnerability to *both* goods and people coming from the US. The “threat” line shown in Figure One represents this group over the time period, and it suggests that between one-quarter to just under a fifth of the Canadian population feels doubly vulnerable *vis-à-vis* the US.

The foregoing suggests that the Canada-US border is of more than metaphorical significance for many Canadians and that significant minorities view people and goods entering from south of the border as potential sources of material threat. Figure Two reveals that while there are Americans who feel similarly threatened by goods or people entering from Canada, not surprisingly the size of this minority is quite a bit smaller. Since slightly less than 1/3rd of Americans live in states that border Canada, and since Canada is demographically and economically 1/10<sup>th</sup> the size of the US, most Americans do not routinely reflect on their relationship with their neighbor to the north. Canada is simply not that salient a topic for most Americans. That said, the relative ordering of the perceptions of vulnerability from Canada follows the same pattern observed among Canadians, with people being regarded more

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
<sup>2</sup> Respondents were asked to choose the first and second countries from a list of seven of Canada’s leading trading partners – the US, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, China. Respondents to the US survey were given the same list except for Canada replacing the US. The actual question posed on both surveys across all six years was: – “Thinking about when a package or a shipping container of goods enters Canada (the US) from one of the countries below, please rank the first and second country that Canadian (US) customs officials should thoroughly inspect the shipment?” and “Thinking about when a visitor from one of the countries below arrives at the Canadian (US) border, please rank the first and second country whose visitors Canadian (US) customs officials should question most thoroughly?”

**Figure One – Canadians’ Perceptions of Vulnerability from the US, 2005-2010**



suspiciously than shipments. However, the size of the population who is concerned is at least an order of magnitude lower. Only a small minority – well below 10% - feel that Canadian goods and people both represent threats and therefore require close scrutiny by border officials. While all these percentages register declines over the six year period, the drops on all three measures are relatively modest, and on the issue of questioning visitors from Canada, it is scarcely noticeable.

**Figure Two – Americans’ Perceptions of Vulnerability from Canada, 2005-2010**



Clearly, when Americans think of security at the border it is Mexico and not Canada that most quickly comes to mind. Typically it is the issue of illegal immigration that drives Americans' awareness of the US-Mexico border, but recently drug-related violence has also received widespread media coverage. In 2006 the Mexican government launched a crackdown on drug trafficking. Since that time, the US Department of State reported (in September 2010) that 22,700 people have been killed in narcotics-related violence. Unsurprisingly, against this backdrop, material security concerns posed by goods and people arriving in the US from Canada generally pale in comparison. This is the conclusion of recent research by Timothy Gravelle, who shows that Americans clearly differentiate between their northern and southern borders. Gravelle observed that in terms of the need for border security (2010: 12): "Very broadly, the majority of the American public feels that there ought to be more security on the U.S.–Mexico border, while a plurality feels that security on the Canada–U.S. border is currently at about the right level. Further, the American public perceives the U.S.–Mexico border as the greater threat."

### **Who Feels Vulnerable to Threats from Across the Border?**

The preceding section has established that while the Mexican-American border is of relatively greater concern, there are significant minorities of Americans and (especially) Canadians who feel some sense of vulnerability to goods and/or people crossing the Canada-US border. Unfortunately, we know relatively little about this group of people. Are those who feel this way somehow distinctive in terms of their gender, age, educational attainment, or region of residence? Does their concern over their safety reflect a sense of distinctiveness from the other country in terms of family or business values, or in terms of human rights? To address these questions, a series of cross-tabulations in which the perception of threat from the other side of the border was related to variations in these measures. The results for Canada are presented in Table One.

From the results presented in Table One it is clear that Canadians who feel that the border should be used to screen for threats from the US (as one of the top two potential country sources) are at least somewhat distinctive in terms of their socioeconomic or demographic characteristics. Women were on average about 9% more likely than men to prefer that visitors from the US be closely questioned, and in general were slightly more suspicious of packages coming from south of the border than men. Age was perhaps the strongest differentiator, with young Canadians being significantly more suspicious of people and goods coming north from the US than their older counterparts. Level of educational attainment was not a strong correlate of perceived threats from the US, but there is a tendency for those with higher educational levels to be less suspicious of goods and visitors arriving at the border from the US. And with the exception of residents of Canada's North, regional differences on the perceived threats from the US are minor. In this respect, most of Canada does resemble a "borderlands" society. The distinctiveness of the North in this respect is paradoxical since residents of that sprawling region are geographically the most remote from the border, and therefore might be expected to feel insulated by distance from US-sourced threats.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> This runs counter to an interesting finding regarding the impact of geographic distance from the border on the support levels of Americans for higher border security. Gravelle found that Americans living nearer the Canadian

Table One About Here

Do similar patterns arise among American respondents who are suspicious of people and/or goods arriving in their country from Canada? The results presented in Table Two confirm many of the patterns observed among Canadian respondents, but they do so in a much weaker and less consistent fashion. For example, in the US women and men are not significantly different in terms of their perception of possible threats from Canada. As in Canada, young Americans are more likely to perceive possible threats from Canada than their older counterparts, but the differences across age groups are less pronounced than in Canada. Similarly, more highly educated Americans perceive fewer threats from Canada than their less well-educated counterparts. Finally, there is no meaningful regional differentiation evident in the pooled survey responses. In sum, although there is some faint evidence of socio-economic and demographic structuring of Americans' sentiments of vulnerability to threats emanating from Canada, the patterns are substantially weaker than those observed among Canadian respondents.

Table Two Here

***Value Proximity and Threat Perceptions from Across the Border***

It is possible that perceived vulnerability to threats from across the Canada-US border are related to underlying sentiments of proximity and difference to the neighbor. If individuals recognize affinity with their counterparts across the border, they may be less likely to view them as a potential source of threat. In this section of the paper we explore for evidence of this by seeing whether individuals who feel that their neighbors across the border are closer to them in terms of human rights, business values, and family values than citizens of other major trading partners are less likely to see the border as a line of defense against threats emanating from that neighbor.

This scenario is clearly part of the explanation of the perception of potential threats from the US held by Canadians. The results presented in Table Three show that Canadians who felt that the US was one of the two closest countries on each of the value dimensions (family or business values or in terms of human rights) from the list of trading partners were significantly (between 10 – 12%) less likely to feel that individuals or packages should receive close inspection by border officials than others who felt that Canada was closer to other countries. And when the individual measures are summed to form an additive index (0-3) of sentiments of value proximity, the difference in perceptions of threat from visitors arriving from the US across the index scores is fully 20% (for packages, the range is 19% and for those wanting both visitors and packages inspected the range is 15% across the index categories). Clearly, Canadians who feel some affinity or proximity to Americans in terms of their underlying values are substantially less likely to feel vulnerable to material threats that could enter from the US. For some Canadians, therefore, feelings of vulnerability are part of a larger set of dispositions toward the US.

Table Three About Here

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border were significantly more likely to express support for greater border security on the northern border. Interestingly, the same was not true for the impact of distance from the southern border on US residents' security preferences regarding the Mexican border. See Gravelle, (2010).

Table Four tests this expectation with respect to American respondents. It shows some support for the proposition that those who feel most threatened by visitors or packages coming from Canada are also less likely to feel particularly close to Canada in value terms. Yet as with the findings of the preceding section, the pattern is much weaker (on the order of 1-4% difference on the visitor and package measures). Indeed, on the question of proximity to Canada in terms of business values, those sensing closeness are 3% more likely to want packages from Canada closely inspected. Moreover, those Americans who want both goods and people inspected do not significantly differ in terms of their sense of the US's value proximity to Canada. Here again, sentiments of vulnerability from across the northern border are less well structured among Americans than Canadians. For most Americans, it seems that the Canadian border is simply too remote - geographically and/or psychologically - to generate attitudes and orientations that are well-defined and sociologically grounded.

Table Four About Here

### **Multivariate Models of Perceptions of Threats Across the Canada-US Border**

This section of the paper examines whether the patterns observed in the preceding two sections regarding the impact on threat perceptions of socio-economic, demographic, or value proximity to this point hold in a multivariate test in which the effects of other variables are statistically controlled. Because the individual dependent variables for questioning individuals and inspecting packages are dichotomous (0-1), we present the results of binary logistic regression analysis for these two measures. Combining these two dummy variables (question individuals and inspect packages) to form the three-category (0-2) index makes multinomial logistic regression the more appropriate statistical test (for both countries we treat the "0" category, representing those not selecting either individuals or packages from the other country for close inspection, as the reference category). Because strong evidence of regional differences was not uncovered in the earlier analysis, these measures were not included in these multivariate models. However, to control for temporal shifts across the 6 year period, dummy variables for all years except 2005 (the first year of our surveys) were included in all models (but their coefficients are not reported here because they are not of central interest and to avoid further complicating the tables).

Table Five presents the results of the logit analysis for Canadian respondents. Inspecting the coefficients provides statistical confirmation of most of the bivariate relationships discussed in the earlier sections. Women respondents are more likely than men to want to have visitors and packages from the US inspected carefully by border officials, *ceteris paribus*. Older respondents are less likely to express this sentiment, as are college/university graduates and those with post-graduate degrees. Similarly, those recognizing the proximity of the two countries on any of the three value terms (human rights, business values, or family values) are also less likely to perceive threats from US-sourced visitors or shipments. All of these coefficients are statistically robust.

Table Five About Here

The results presented in Table Six also largely confirm the findings of the bivariate analyses presented earlier in the paper. Most generally, it is clear that the perceptions of threat from Canada held by American respondents are less well structured than is the case for Canadian



respondents. Unlike the case in Canada, gender is not a significant determinant of threat perceptions from the neighboring country. Parallel to the pattern in Canada, however, both advanced age and education are factors that diminish the probability that individuals perceive potential threats coming from Canada. Perceptions of closeness on value items seems generally to be associated with diminished perceptions of potential threats from across the northern border, but the coefficient for proximity on human rights is not statistically significant when the question concerns the inspection of shipments. Paradoxically, perceptions of proximity on business values *increases* the probability that an individual will want shipments from Canada inspected closely (and this factor has no statistically significant effect on the issue of questioning visitors from Canada). So once again the perceptions of potential threats from Canada are less well explained by the variables included in our multivariate models than is the case for our Canadian respondents.

#### Table Six About Here

Finally, it is helpful to assess the effects of these explanatory variables on the combined index (0-2) of perceived threats coming from across the Canada-US border. To do this we look at the impact of the socio-economic, demographic and value measures using a multinomial logit framework in which the impact is assessed separately for the different categories of the index. We use those who do not identify visitors or packages from either Canada or the US as requiring careful inspection at the border as our reference category (i.e. those who score “0” on the additive index). The coefficients presented in Table Seven should therefore be interpreted as the difference in the probability (log odds) associated with the variable in comparison to the reference category.

#### Table Seven About Here

The results of this analysis largely confirm the patterns uncovered by both the bivariate and binary logit analyses presented above. In the case of Canadian perceptions of potential US-sourced threats, only the coefficient associated with the factor of education (college/university graduates) in the category representing either individuals or packages from the US necessitate closer scrutiny at the border fails to achieve statistical significance (though the coefficient has the expected negative sign). All other coefficients, for both categories of the index, are comparable in sign and magnitude to the patterns described earlier. Women, young people, the less educated, and those perceiving value distance between Canada and the US, are all more likely than others to perceive potential threats from the United States.

Similarly, the analysis of American respondents also largely buttresses the conclusions of earlier analyses. However, the results add some nuance to our earlier findings. For example, among respondents who perceive potential threats from both Canadian visitors and packages (the second category of the index), women are less likely than men to express support for closer inspections by border officials (gender has no effect for the middle category). Both education and age are associated with the now familiar negative impacts on the probability that an individual would prefer that people and shipments originating in Canada be closely inspected. The impact of the measures of perceived value proximity between Canada and the US is less consistent. While perceived proximity on human rights and family values have the expected negative effects on the odds of an individual wanting close inspection for goods or people arriving from Canada, neither coefficient for these measures reaches statistical significance for

the second category (where individuals want both goods and people closely inspected). Also, for the perception of proximity between the two countries on business values, sentiments of closeness are paradoxically associated with an *increased* probability of an individual wanting both packages and individuals coming from Canada to undergo close inspections. The impression, once again, is that American respondents' perceptions of Canada-based threats are less well-explained by the factors in our model than is the case for their Canadian counterparts.

### **Conclusion**

The foregoing has explored the socio-economic, demographic, and value foundations of perceptions of threat by Canadians and Americans from across the Canada-US border in the 2005-10 period. In doing so, it provides a portrait of a relatively small but understudied minority in both countries. It has identified a general pattern that holds to some extent in both countries in which male, older, and better educated respondents are less likely than others to think that goods and people originating in the neighboring state require close inspection (relative to goods and individuals arriving from the same list of seven alternative countries). Similarly, it appears that individuals who perceive that the two countries are quite close in terms of their respect for human rights and their business and family values, are also less likely to think that goods and people arriving from the other country necessitate close scrutiny by border officials.

While these findings are statistically robust and quite consistent across the various analyses in the Canadian context, they are less so for the American respondents. This probably reflects a basic underlying asymmetry – Canadians are more likely to perceive threats from across the border than are Americans, and they are probably more sensitive to the presence of America than vice versa. For most Americans, Canada is simply not 'top of mind' and even in a time of heightened concern about borders and terrorism, relatively few are likely to form strong opinions about the Canada-US border. When questions of border security arise, US residents are understandably more likely to think of the southern border and the relatively obvious threats that individuals and goods crossing from that source present.

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**Table One – Socio-Economic and Demographic Correlates of Canadian Perceptions of Vulnerability to the US (% of category, Canadian respondents)**

		<b>% Question US Visitor</b>	<b>% Inspect US Package</b>	<b>% Both</b>
<b>Gender</b>	<b>Women</b>	42	31	22
	<b>Men</b>	31	27	17
<b>Age</b>	<b>18-24</b>	45	36	25
	<b>25-34</b>	45	38	27
	<b>35-44</b>	39	31	21
	<b>45-54</b>	37	29	21
	<b>55-64</b>	28	21	13
	<b>≥ 65</b>	23	17	10
<b>Education</b>	<b>≤ High School</b>	37	30	21
	<b>College</b>	37	30	20
	<b>University (3/4 yr)</b>	37	29	19
	<b>Post-Graduate</b>	33	24	15
<b>Region</b>	<b>Atlantic</b>	33	29	19
	<b>Quebec</b>	36	30	20
	<b>Ontario</b>	37	28	19
	<b>Prairies</b>	36	30	20
	<b>British Columbia</b>	40	29	20
	<b>North</b>	58	42	32

**Table Two – Socio-Economic and Demographic Correlates of US Residents’ Perceptions of Vulnerability to Canada (% of category, US Respondents)**

		<b>% Question Canadian Visitor</b>	<b>% Inspect Canadian Package</b>	<b>% Both</b>
<b>Gender</b>	<b>Women</b>	16	12	6
	<b>Men</b>	17	11	6
<b>Age</b>	<b>18-24</b>	22	14	7
	<b>25-34</b>	19	14	8
	<b>35-44</b>	17	12	8
	<b>45-54</b>	14	11	5
	<b>55-64</b>	15	9	5
	<b>≥ 65</b>	10	7	3
	<b>Education</b>	<b>≤ High School</b>	19	13
<b>College &amp; University (3/4 yr)</b>		16	11	6
<b>Post-Graduate</b>		14	9	5
<b>Region</b>	<b>Northeast</b>	17	11	6
	<b>South</b>	17	11	6
	<b>Mid-West</b>	16	12	6
	<b>West</b>	16	12	6

**Table Three – Value Proximity to US and Perceptions of Vulnerability to the US (% of category; Canadian respondents)**

		<b>% Question US Visitor</b>	<b>% Inspect US Package</b>	<b>% Both</b>
<b>US One of Closest 2 countries on Business Values</b>		34	27	18
<b>US <u>Not</u> One of Closest 2 countries on Business Values</b>		44	34	24
<b>US One of Closest 2 countries on Family Values</b>		33	27	18
<b>US <u>Not</u> One of Closest 2 countries on Family Values</b>		44	34	24
<b>US One of Closest 2 countries on Human Rights</b>		33	26	17
<b>US <u>Not</u> One of Closest 2 countries on Human Rights</b>		45	35	25
<b>Value Proximity Index Score</b>	<b>0</b>	50	44	32
<b>(additive index)</b>	<b>1</b>	45	32	22
	<b>2</b>	38	29	19
	<b>3</b>	30	25	17

**Table Four – Value Proximity to Canada and Perceptions of Vulnerability to the Canada  
(% of category, US Respondents)**

		<b>% Question Canadian Visitor</b>	<b>% Inspect Canadian Package</b>	<b>% Both</b>
<b>Canada One of Closest 2 countries on Business Values</b>		15	13	8
<b>Canada <u>Not</u> One of Closest 2 countries on Business Values</b>		17	10	5
<b>Canada One of Closest 2 countries on Family Values</b>		15	11	6
<b>Canada <u>Not</u> One of Closest 2 countries on Family Values</b>		19	13	6
<b>Canada One of Closest 2 countries on Human Rights</b>		14	11	6
<b>Canada <u>Not</u> One of Closest 2 countries on Human Rights</b>		18	12	6
<b>Value Proximity Index Score</b>	<b>0</b>	20	13	6
<b>(additive index)</b>	<b>1</b>	17	10	5
	<b>2</b>	15	11	6
	<b>3</b>	13	13	8

**Table Five**  
**Multivariate Models of Canadians' Perceptions of Potential Threats from the US\***  
**(Binary logit coefficients, (sig.))**

		<b>% Question US Visitor</b>	<b>% Inspect US Package</b>
<b>Gender</b>	<b>Female</b>	.53 (.000)	.24 (.000)
<b>Age</b>	<b>45 years &gt;</b>	-.49 (.000)	-.51 (.000)
<b>Education</b>	<b>Degree &amp; Post-grad</b>	-.13 (.03)	-.20 (.001)
<b>Value Proximity to US</b>	<b>Human Rights</b>	-.45 (.000)	-.37 (.000)
	<b>Business Values</b>	-.26 (.000)	-.20 (.002)
	<b>Family Values</b>	-.29 (.000)	-.19 (.002)
<b>Intercept</b>		.38 (.000)	.18
<b>-2 x Log-likelihood</b>		8462.4	7822.3
<b>Cox &amp; Snell R-sq.</b>		.06	.044

\*dummy variables for 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 included in models but coefficients not reported.

**Table Six**  
**Multivariate Models of Americans' Perceptions of Potential Threats from Canada\***  
**(Binary logit coefficients, (sig.))**

		<b>% Question US Visitor</b>	<b>% Inspect US Package</b>
<b>Gender</b>	<b>Female</b>	-.06 (.341)	.002 (.981)
<b>Age</b>	<b>45 years &gt;</b>	-.45 (.000)	-.50 (.000)
<b>Education</b>	<b>Degree &amp; Post-grad</b>	-.24 (.002)	-.21 (.014)
<b>Value Proximity to US</b>	<b>Human Rights</b>	-.27 (.000)	-.01 (.87)
	<b>Business Values</b>	.08 (.03)	.42 (.000)
	<b>Family Values</b>	-.23 (.002)	-.29 (.001)
<b>Intercept</b>		-.92 (.000)	-1.35 (.000)
<b>-2 x Log-likelihood</b>		5813.9	4638.5
<b>Cox &amp; Snell R-sq.</b>		.013	.014

\*dummy variables for 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 included in models but coefficients not reported.



**Table Seven**

**Models of Perceptions of Potential Threats from the Across the Canada-US Border\***

**Multinomial logit coefficients (sig.)**

		<b>US Perceived as Source of Potential Threat by Canadians</b>	<b>Canadians Perceived as Source of Potential Threat by Americans</b>
<i>For Respondents who feel threat from visitors <b>OR</b> packages</i>			
<b>Gender</b>	<b>Female</b>	.45 (.000)	-.05 (.45)
<b>Age</b>	<b>45 years &gt;</b>	-.44 (.000)	-.29 (.000)
<b>Education</b>	<b>Degree &amp; Post-grad</b>	-.09 (.188)	-.23 (.003)
<b>Value Proximity to US</b>	<b>Human Rights</b>	-.40 (.000)	-.20 (.005)
	<b>Business Values</b>	-.24 (.001)	-.12 (.132)
	<b>Family Values</b>	-.33 (.000)	-.41 (.000)
<b>Constant</b>		.18 (.101)	-.78 (.000)
<i>For Respondents who feel threat from visitors <b>AND</b> packages</i>			
<b>Gender</b>	<b>Female</b>	.51 (.001)	-.03 (.796)
<b>Age</b>	<b>45 years &gt;</b>	-.69 (.000)	-.76 (.000)
<b>Education</b>	<b>Degree &amp; Post-grad</b>	-.25 (.001)	-.27 (.018)
<b>Value Proximity to US</b>	<b>Human Rights</b>	-.56 (.000)	-.14 (0.18)
	<b>Business Values</b>	-.32 (.000)	.60 (.000)
	<b>Family Values</b>	-.30 (.000)	-.12 (.329)
<b>Constant</b>		.39 (.001)	-1.87 (.000)
<b>-2 x Log-likelihood</b>		2540.7	2066.9
<b>Cox &amp; Snell R-sq.</b>		.073	.026

\*Reference category is respondents who do not regard either visitors or packages from neighbor as requiring close inspection by border officials. Dummy variables for 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 are included in models to control for temporal effects but coefficients not reported.