Canadians’ Attitudes toward Immigration: Preliminary Results from an Online Experiment on the Impact of Economic and Cultural Cues

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Abstract: Past research suggests that citizens’ attitudes toward immigration are driven, in part, by attitudes toward racial diversity. In this study, we draw on a unique online survey experiment conducted with a representative sample of Canadians (n=1000) to directly test this assertion. The analysis is based on a 2X2 experimental design embedded in a series of immigrant vignettes that vary the racial background and social status of an individual applying for immigration to Canada. We examine the extent to which both racial and economic-status cues affect support for immigration. Results offer new and unique information on the structure of Canadians’ attitudes on diversity and immigration.

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Hostility has characterized debates surrounding immigration in many European countries, as well as in the US (Fetzer 2000; Lahav 2004; Rustenbach 2010). Attitudes toward immigration in Canada are viewed in contrast as somewhat more positive (IPSOS 2004; Hiebert 2006; Adams 2007; Harell 2009), with credit typically given to some combination of a more selective immigration system and Canada’s official policy of multiculturalism (Kymlicka 2003; Bloemraad 2006; Harell 2009). It is certainly true that economic-class immigrants bring with them relatively high levels of education and higher status job experience compared to other countries, where larger proportions of immigrants are drawn from family reunification and refugee streams (Bloemraad 2006). And multiculturalism policy may also have been relatively successful at promoting (or at least reflecting) a relatively tolerant political culture. (For a discussion, see, e.g., Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Banting, Johnston, and Soroka 2006; Banting et al. 2011).

In general, then, immigrants in Canada may be viewed as less threatening in terms of economic dependence. Culturally speaking, one might also expect racial attitudes to play a relatively small role in Canadian citizens’ evaluations of immigrants. In this paper, we examine both economic and cultural explanations for immigrant attitudes in Canada, drawing on a unique online survey experiment.

Our conclusions suggest that Canadians, like citizens in other countries, express a distinct preference for higher status immigrants. That said, neither the ethnicity (South Asian versus Middle-Eastern) nor complexion (light skin versus dark skin) of immigrants seems to matter to support for individual immigrants. Ethnocentric attitudes do have a direct negative effect on support for immigrants, but there is no evidence that this effect varies across treatments. But the direct impact of ethnicity on evaluations of immigrants is rather slight. We explore these results here, as well as some potential sources of heterogeneity in effects. Before moving to results, however, we review the related literatures below.

The State of the Literature

Comparative research provides a rich array of findings related to how citizens react toward immigration. (Which is to say that there this is a good deal of variance in both approaches and findings.) One point of convergence, however, is that with only a few exceptions publics across the Western world tend to express a desire for less immigration; moreover, anti-immigrant sentiment has been on the rise (Esses, Jackson,
and Armstrong 1998; Simon and Lynch 1999; Citrin and Sides 2008; Fetzer 2000; Kinder and Kam 2009; Segovia and Defever 2010; Rustenbach 2010).

In both the US and in Europe, evidence suggests that the underlying predictors of individual attitudes toward immigration are largely the same (e.g., Citrin and Sides 2008). The main explanatory factors are related to the threat that new immigrants pose to the host society, either economic (i.e. taking away jobs from natives or being an economic drain on the welfare system) or cultural (i.e. culturally, religiously, or ethnically distinct groups that threaten the identity of the dominant group).

Immigration and Economic Threat

The economic threat argument is prominent in the literature on immigration, but is related more generally to group conflict theories (Key 1949; Blumer 1958; LeVine and Campbell 1972). The basic idea is that negative outgroup attitudes – in this case, of natives toward newcomers – are typically the result of fear of increased competition for scarce resources like jobs and government benefits (Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong 1998).

Economic threat hypotheses have been investigated at both the macro and individual level. At the macro level, it is widely agreed that the state of the economy has an effect on immigration attitudes: when the economy is doing poorly, citizens are expected to be more hostile toward immigrants because competition for scarce resources like jobs is greater. This should be particularly true as the size of the immigrant community grows. It should be noted that beyond individual differences and comparative difference in macro-economic conditions, there is an important literature that points to the role of cross national institutional differences in public opinion toward immigration (e.g. Koopmans et al. 2005; Schain 2008; Bloemraad 2006). The debates on this front largely point to the role that the immigration system, policies toward multiculturalism, and the citizenship regime more generally play. The immigration regime is important because it determines the types of immigrants accepted into a country. While explicit entry requirements based on racial or ethnic background are a thing of the past, the emphasis that a regime puts on symbolic factors (especially language) and economic factors (education and work experience) can have a direct impact on not only the immigrants that are accepted, but also on how the media and institutions frame discourses about immigrants more generally. Citizenship regimes, as well as specific policies related to integration, are also viewed as important. In countries where citizenship is tied more closely to ethnicity, immigrants are likely to be viewed with greater hostility. For example, symbolic factors have been shown to play a greater role in explaining immigrant attitudes in Europe than in the United States (Citrin and Sides 2008). At the same time, there is substantial debate about the role that multicultural policies play in explaining attitudes toward immigrants (see, for example, Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Banting, Johnston, and Soroka 2006).
increases. Quillian (1995) tests and finds support for this argument in the European context. Other research finds similarly negative relationships between the state of the economy levels of immigration and anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe (Coenders et al. 2008; Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009; Aksoy 2011), in the United States (Lapinsky et al. 1997; Citrin et al. 1997; Lee and Ottati 2002), and in Canada (Palmer 1996; Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris 2008).

Individual-level evidence is somewhat more mixed. The expectation is that citizens who are in direct competition for jobs with immigrants will express greater hostility toward immigrants. Those with less education are often generally more hostile toward immigration (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007), for instance, and voting for anti-immigrant parties tends to be concentrated among the lower income classes (e.g., Lubbers, Gijbsberts, and Scheepers 2002). Palmer (1997) finds that unemployed Canadians are particularly likely to believe that immigrants take away jobs from other Canadians. Other experimental work shows that when competition for jobs is primed, respondents are more likely to attribute negative attitudes to immigrant groups (Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong 1998). That said, Wilkes et al. (2008) find that the impact of economic factors does not vary with economic status. Citizens tend to prefer higher-skilled immigrants, regardless of their personal situation (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; O’Connell 2011) — a finding at odds with the idea that direct competition is at play, since that would suggest that higher status individuals would be threatened by higher skilled immigrants. And there is a growing body of work suggesting that an individual’s personal economic situation is wholly unrelated to immigration attitudes (e.g. Citrin and Sides 2008; Citrin et al. 1997; Fetzer 2000; McLaren and Johnson 2007).

In short, the economic threat argument has received substantial support at the macro level, but rather varied support at the individual level. Regarding the latter, one’s personal position does not seem as important as the economic characteristics of the immigrants themselves.

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2 It should be noted that some research suggests that the negative effect that the size of the immigrant community has can be moderated through actual contact between natives and newcomers (McLaren 2003), although contrary evidence exists – in line with the group conflict approach, that contact can promote greater competition (Oliver and Wong 2003; Ha 2010).

3 Two multivariate crossnational studies, however, find inconsistent effects of the macro-economic context on immigrant attitudes. See, for example, Kessler and Freeman (2005) and Rustenbach (2010).
**Immigration and Cultural Threat**

A second approach to understanding attitudes toward immigration focuses on cultural threats posed by immigrants. Drawing on both the symbolic politics literature (Kinder and Sears 1981) and social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986), this approach focuses on cultural, ethnic and religious differences between the host society and immigrant communities. Immigration, from this perspective, is viewed as a policy domain that fosters citizens to think about “us” versus “them”. How the “us” and “them” is defined is vastly important for the support that immigrants receive because it activates psychological processes that lead one to valorize one’s community and negatively stereotype the outgroup (Sniderman et al. 2000). When differences are seen to be greater, so is outgroup hostility. When immigrant communities are viewed as more cultural similar, they are more likely to be accepted by the host society.

When it comes to immigration, new communities are often seen as culturally, ethnically and racially distinct, and so it should be no surprise that measures of ethnocentrism and racism are important predictors of immigration attitudes (Berry, Kalin, and Taylor 1977; Pettigrew 1998; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Jackson et al. 2001; Kinder and Kam 2009). Religion is another factor that influences popular conceptions of national identity as well as evaluations of the cultural proximity of immigrant communities, both of which are related to support for immigration (Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Green 2007; Green 2009). Indeed, there is some evidence that religious differences are becoming more salient in defining immigrant communities, specifically as it relates to the place of Islamic immigrants within historically Christian host societies (Poynting and Mason 2007).

In general, the more that immigrants are viewed as “symbolic threats” to the host society, the more hostile citizens are toward immigration (Breton 1999; McLaren and Johnson 2007). There is in addition evidence that priming racial, ethnic and religious differences between immigrants and host societies can make racial and ethnic considerations more important predictors of immigrant attitudes (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Ayers et al. 2009). And, importantly, prejudicial attitudes seem to be related to economic concerns. For instance, Burns and Gimpel (2000) argue that “[t]he effect of economic hardship is to activate prejudices that are latent, adding fuel to the fire of preexisting views.” In other words, the macro-economic factors that affect

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4 Note that the role of race and racial attitudes is not always consistent. For example, Sniderman et al (2000) find little difference in Italians’ attitudes toward African versus Eastern Europeans, suggesting that “other” status is more important than the actual difference among outgroups. Dustman and Preston (2007) find that racial prejudice only matters for ethnically different immigrant populations.
immigration attitudes seem to partly matter because they activate prejudicial attitudes that are not directly related to competition.\textsuperscript{5} Brader and colleagues (2008) provide further support by showing that when immigrants are portrayed as Hispanic instead of European, stories about the cost of immigration have a greater effect on opposition to immigration.

Thus, when citizens think of immigrants as culturally, ethnically or racially different (and when citizens themselves espouse more ethnocentric attitudes), we expect greater hostility toward immigration. We also see the potential for cultural differences to interact with economic factors.

The Experiment

We examine both the cultural and economic threat hypotheses in the Canadian context, using a pair of jointly-fielded online surveys. The surveys include a representative sample of 1000 Canadians, conducted by YouGov Polimetrix in June-July 2010. The first part of the survey focuses on political knowledge and media use; the second on immigration attitudes. Each was conducted in conjunction with a series of directly comparative surveys in other countries. The surveys are related to two separate projects, but in the Canadian case they were fielded together. We have as a consequence an entirely unique body of survey data, combining a full battery of data on media use and knowledge, alongside a lengthy series of questions on immigration attitudes.

We focus here on an experiment embedded in the immigration survey. To make the analysis of results somewhat simpler, we look at the impact on white respondents only (n=893).\textsuperscript{6} The experimental design is based on factorial analysis (Rossi and Nock 1982). Participants are exposed to two vignettes (short stories) that describe an individual immigrant’s circumstances. (These vignettes are included in Appendix A.) With each vignette, the participant sees a color photo of the individual described in the vignette. (Photos are included in Appendix B.) They are then asked a series of questions about their support for that immigrant’s work permit and citizenship, including:

\begin{quote}
Given what you know about [candidate], do you think his application for a work permit should be approved or rejected? Approve/Reject/Can’t Say
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{5} Others have argued that as economic concerns decline, so do economic threat, but the result is that new concerns about integration emerge (O’Connell 2005).

\textsuperscript{6} Using non-white respondents likely requires a number of additional interaction terms, since non-whites are likely to react differently to non-white immigrants than are whites.
Assume that [candidate] comes to Canada on a work permit and then he decides to apply for Canadian citizenship. Do you think his citizenship application should be approved or rejected? Approve/Reject/Can’t Say

Preliminary tests suggest that results based on these two questions are roughly similar, though effects tend to be weaker for work permits than for citizenship, as we might expect. We focus below on citizenship exclusively, with approval coded as 1, reject as 0, and can’t say as .5.

For the photos, we take advantage of morphed images — images of our two immigrants built by combining and then manipulating photos of one White and one African-American male. Using morphs allows us to control, in large part at least, for the effect that looks may have on support for immigration.7

There are four treatments in total, two within-respondent treatments (i.e. that vary across the two vignettes each respondent saw) and two across-respondent treatments (i.e. that did not vary in the two vignettes the respondent saw, but did vary across respondents). Within-respondent treatments are as follows: (1) the ethnicity of the immigrant, one from Sri Lanka and the other from Kuwait, and (2) the family status of the immigrant, one with a wife and kids and the other without. Across-respondent treatments are: (3) the complexion of immigrants, where some respondents see lighter-skinned versions of the Sri Lankan and Kuwaiti immigrant, and others see darker-skinned versions, and (4) the job status of immigrants, where some respondents see two skilled immigrants and others see two unskilled immigrants. The vignettes themselves are listed in full in Appendix B.

The job and family status of immigrants is straightforward enough. The former clearly speaks to the economic threat hypothesis; the latter likely does as well. The other manipulations require a little more discussion. First, the ethnic manipulation relies on just two of many possible ethnic groups. The objective in using these two groups was to select one South-Asian and one Middle Eastern country, in order to contrast support for an Arab/Muslim immigrant with support for another common immigrant group in

7 The photos used here were provided by Shanto Iyengar, PI for the comparable US survey and coordinator for the cross-national project of which ours was a part. Faces were drawn from Jennifer Eberhardt’s face database (Stanford University, Psychology Dept), which includes 100 Afro and Euro faces that rated by student judges for stereotypicality, attractiveness, and age.
Canada. Kuwait was used because it was a clearly Arab country, but not one directly involved in current military conflicts. Sri Lanka is a rough South-Asian equivalent — another small country and also a significant source of immigration. (Both countries have the added advantage of being important source countries for other countries taking part in the larger cross-national survey project as well.)

The complexion manipulation was used to test the possibility that either (a) darker immigrants may elicit lower levels of support, or (b) the impact of ethnicity may matter more when immigrants’ complexions are darker. There is a body of work suggesting that that not just race (i.e. white versus non-white) but also complexion matters to a wide range of social, political and policy attitudes, particularly in the US context. (There is a large of body of evidence, but see, e.g., Hunter 2005; Selzer and Smith 1991; Iyengar and Morin 2006; Iyengar et al. 2010; Terkildsen 1993; Maddox and Gray 2002; Weaver 2009; Gilliam et al. 1996; Gyimah-Bermpon and Price 2006.)

Respondents were randomly assigned to a pair of vignettes, and those vignettes were randomly ordered. Alongside the vignettes, the survey included a series of more direct questions on immigration. We explore some of these in the section that follows.

Assessing Attitudes Toward South Asian and Middle Eastern Immigrants

The survey included separate batteries of questions asking about both South Asian and Middle Eastern immigrants. The first battery assessed the costs and benefits of immigrants from each region; the second was a standard stereotype battery. In each case, the order that respondents received the South Asian or Middle Eastern batteries was randomly assigned, controlling for order effects. The specific items are described in detail in Table 1, alongside their average scores. Response categories have been standardized from 0 to 1, where higher implies very likely / very well.9

[Table 1 about here]

8 Note that according to Statistics Canada (2007: 10), 58% of immigrants that arrived between 2001 and 2006 were from Asian countries, including the Middle East. While China is the most common source country (14% of recent immigrants), South Asian countries make the second, third and fourth most common source countries. The most common Middle-Eastern source country was Iran: it is the eight largest source country in the 2006 census (down from sixth in 2001).

9 For the effect of immigration items, the answer categories were a four-point scale from “very unlikely” to “very likely”. For the stereotype battery, responses were on seven-point scales from not “very well” at all to “very well”.

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In general, the size of the differences in evaluations of South Asian versus Middle Eastern immigrants is not large. (They vary in absolute magnitude from .018 to .165 on a 0-1 scale). That said, in every case but one South Asian immigrants are viewed more positively. (In the one case where Middle-Eastern immigrants receive a more favorable score, the difference is small, .018). The largest gap is for the label “religious fanatic” which is attributed to Middle-Eastern immigrants much more often than South Asian immigrants (for a mean of .599 as opposed to .434). South Asian immigrants are also less likely to be viewed as insisting on special privileges (difference of .127) and more eager to assimilate (difference of .079).

Interestingly, Table 1 also provides some evidence that South Asian immigrants are more associated with higher status professions. When asked whether each group helps Canada keep pace in engineering and scientific research, South Asians immigrants were evaluated more positively, with a mean of .559 compared to .485. The differences on the other economic items (focusing on the risk of low-income immigrants) show smaller differences, although Middle Eastern immigrants are more likely to be described as lazy (difference of .071).

Overall, then, Table 1 suggests that while Canadians do not vary widely in their evaluations of immigrants from South Asia versus the Middle East, there are small differences that consistently favour South Asians. This is reflected in the mean differences for each summary scale shown in the table.

These differences fit with the expectation that Middle Eastern immigrants are viewed more negatively in the contemporary political climate, where Islam is viewed as a cultural threat to the West, and where South Asian immigrants seem to be more associated with high-skilled jobs.

**Experimental Results**

The experiments embedded within the online survey allow us to test whether cultural and economic threat manipulations affect respondents’ evaluations of individual immigrants. The experiment has been described in some detail above. In Table 2, we present the mean levels of support for citizenship within each of three of the treatment conditions: complexion, ethnicity, and job status.

[Table 2 about here]

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10 The overall scales have Cronbach’s alpha scores between .62 to .67. As noted, negative items were reversed for the construction of the scales.
Clearly, higher status immigrants receive higher scores overall than lower status immigrants. In terms of complexion and ethnicity, the patterns are less consistent. Among high status immigrants, the darker South Asian immigrant receives the highest score, though the differences are small. In the low-status treatments, the lighter Middle Eastern immigrant has the highest mean, but here the differences across groups are even smaller. A simple look at the overall means suggests that job status is an important predictor of support for citizenship. No clear pattern emerges in terms of ethnicity or complexion.

We explore further results from the online experiment using relatively simple multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions, appropriate for this situation in which we capture the same measures for each respondent more than once; that is, twice, after each of two randomly-ordered immigrant vignettes. The models are equivalent to repeated-measures analysis of variance ANOVAS, also called a mixed-design or split-plot ANOVAs, with both between-subjects variables and within-subjects variables. The mixed-effects regression approach is somewhat more generalizable, however. It also has the advantage of producing coefficients that are readily interpretable. Below, we present both (a) standard multilevel mixed-effects results, which give us a sense for the magnitude and significance of each individual variable, and (b) estimated probabilities of support for citizenship, which give us a clearer sense of the combined impact of the direct and interactive effects.

Table 3 shows results from a mixed-effects linear regression capturing all four treatment effects. Recall that complexion and job status are between-respondent treatments only (i.e., respondents only saw either dark or light complexion, and only high- or low-status job treatments), while ethnicity and family status are within-respondent treatments. *Ethnicity* is coded 0 for South Asian and 1 for Middle Eastern, so the coefficient captures the difference moving from the former to the latter; *Complexion* is 0 for dark and 1 for light; *Job Status* is 0 for high status and 1 for low status; *Family Status* is 0 for single and 1 for family. Note that we allow here for interactions between the two economic threat variables, *Job Status* and *Family Status*, and the two cultural threat variables, *Ethnicity* and *Complexion*. We also include a variable capturing the order in which vignettes were shown (*Order*), scored 1 for the first candidate and 2 for the second, to capture the tendency for support to decrease for the second candidate.

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11 The vignettes, therefore, are the cases, which are essentially clustered within individuals.

12 In STATA, *xtmixed* also converges much more quickly than *anova* when using large sample sizes and interactions.
Perhaps the greatest surprise (to us) in our data is that neither ethnicity nor complexion appears to matter greatly to Canadians’ support for citizenship. There is no significant impact of complexion; ethnicity has a small negative effect, suggesting that our Middle Eastern candidates receive slightly less support for citizenship than do our South Asians. The interaction between the two is significant, but that significance captures the fact that in the light manipulation there is somewhat greater support for the South Asian while in the dark manipulation there is somewhat greater support for the Arab. We have no particular explanation for this minor difference, but the impact is very small. And note (based on the ANOVA equivalent of this regression) that the direct and indirect effects of ethnicity and complexion combined account for less than .2% of the total variance in support for citizenship.

[Figure 1 about here]

Figure 1 makes more readily interpretable the combined effects of ethnicity and complexion. The figure shows predicted mean levels of support for citizenship across the two manipulations. While we do get small significant effects in Table 3, Figure 1 makes clear that there are virtually no substantive differences in support overall.

Why are the effects of ethnicity and complexion negligible? We can think of two possibilities thus far: (1) the ethnic identities we selected may have been too similar to elicit strong effects, and/or (2) showing pictures of people may produce a person-positivity bias (the tendency for respondents to be more positive about specific individuals than about more abstract groups) that minimizes the impact of ethnicity. (As we saw in Table 1, there is some evidence of a slight preference for South Asians when evaluated as a group. But the experimental results point to small and inconsistent differences at the individual level.) There may be other possible explanations as well. For the time being, however, it seems clear that ethnicity and complexion did not matter much in this experiment.

[Figure 2 about here]

Job status, though, matters as great deal. The significant direct impact of each is evident in Table 3, and the these results are made clearer in Figure 2, which shows predicted mean levels of support across the economic threat manipulations. What we find is that Canadians have a strong preference for engineers and programmers over
construction workers and landscapers. Moving from skilled to unskilled, support shifts downward by roughly .1 (on a 0 to 1 scale). Somewhat surprisingly, family (slightly) increases rather than decreases support. We originally thought that the presence of a family would be seen as an additional economic threat, particularly for unskilled immigrants. The interaction points in this direction, but it is insignificant. Overall, the direct effect for having children is positive and significant. We suspect this may be because having family suggests a degree of stability or responsibility that is viewed as desirable, but this is purely conjecture at this stage.

**Sources of Heterogeneity**

The experimental manipulations point to the importance of status (and to a lesser extent the presence of children), but we find very little evidence for substantive differences across ethnic groups or complexion. Driven in part by our surprise at finding such minor effects for complexion and ethnicity, we add to our basic mixed-effects models tests for the possibility that there is heterogeneity in the impact of the various manipulations. In particular, we examine whether respondents who are more likely to be culturally or economically threatened by immigrants are more susceptible to our experimental treatments. To do this, we examine respondents’ level of ethnocentrism and their socio-economic position.

Our measure of ethnocentrism is based on the distance between both in-group and out-group feelings. The measure is similar to the one used in Kinder and Kam (2009), although they use stereotype variables while we use thermometer scores. Essentially, we take the gap between respondent’s thermometer score for (a) Whites, and (b) the average of their thermometer scores for Blacks, South Asians, Asians and Arabs. The resulting measure ranges in our sample from -64 (a strong preference for non-Whites over Whites) to +100 (a very strong preference for Whites), with an average score of 16.4, suggesting a small bias towards Whites overall among our White respondents. We do not use the continuous version of the variable, but rather use it to divide our sample into terciles — low, medium, and high levels of ethnocentrism.

We see two possibilities for the effect of ethnocentrism on evaluations of our immigration candidates. The first is that the impact of the various treatments will increase (linearly) alongside levels of ethnocentrism. The second is that treatments will matter most for those who show middling degrees of ethnocentrism. In short: low-ethnocentric respondents should be overwhelmingly accepting of immigrants, so ethnicity and

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13 And note that we have tested but found no evidence for significant interactions between job status and ethnicity or complexion.
complexion will not matter; high-ethnocentric respondents should be overwhelmingly negative towards all immigrants, so ethnicity and complexion will also not matter; but medium-ethnocentric respondents will vary in their opinion more, so ethnicity and complexion could matter. We have no a priori reason to expect one possibility over the other, but we test for each below.

In additional to individual levels of ethnocentrism, we also test whether individual income levels mediate the effects of the treatments. The income variable is a ten-point scale for monthly household income from $1000 or less to $12,001 or more. Again, we use the variable to divide our sample in terciles. And as with ethnocentrism, we see two possibilities: 1) low(high)-status individuals will be more threatened by status-sharing immigrants or 2) that only low-status individuals will be more threatened by the low-status immigrants.

Does the impact of economic or cultural manipulations vary across individuals with different levels of ethnocentrism or different incomes? Tables 4 and 5 show results from mixed effects linear regressions using ethnocentrism and then income terciles as mediating variables. Since the other coefficients change little, we do not present the full models here; rather, we show just the interaction between ethnocentrism/income and each treatment. Each interaction is estimated in a separate model, though we present them all together here; and while we tested more saturated interactive effects as well, those yielded no significant results and so are not shown.

[Table 4 and 5 about here]

Even the relatively simple interactions investigated here revealed few effects, however. Ethnocentrism has a clear direct (negative) effect on support for our immigrants. With the exception of the heightened impact of family status for medium-ethnocentric respondents (a results for which we have no explanation), however, the interactions reveal no significant effects. Income matters not at all, either directly or indirectly.

In one final test, we explore one of the long-standing cleavages within Canadian politics, namely, the linguistic divide between Anglophones and Francophones. Past work contrasting French and English Canadians has tended to find less favourable attitudes towards immigrants among Francophones (Berry and Kalin 1995; Lambert and Curtis 2008; although see Gidengil et al. 2003). There are several possible explanations for this finding. Given that Francophones are a minority within Canada, they may feel that their identity requires more protection. Relatedly, there may be a critical tension between cultural diversity and at least some forms of ethnic Quebec nationalism. Moreover, particularly since the creation of the Bouchard-Taylor commission on
reasonable accommodation in 2006, issues around immigration within Quebec have been especially salient – especially as they relate to Muslim immigrants where hostilities seem to be heightened compared to the rest of Canada (Bouchard and Taylor 2008). We might accordingly expect some Quebecois Francophones to be particularly sensitive to cultural (and possibly economic) threats posed by immigrants generally; and to exhibit a particular bias against the Middle-Eastern immigrants in our experiment.

Table 6 thus shows one additional test where we introduce language (1=French) as a mediating variable. To be clear, the expectation is that Francophones may be less supportive of individual immigrants, but also that they might be more likely to distinguish based on our cultural and economic threat manipulations. Results from just two models are shown, the two in which we find significant results. First, we find no direct effect for language. However, we do find that the ethnic manipulation matters more for French-speaking respondents. French-speakers distinguish between South Asian and Middle-Eastern immigrants, and the difference is in the expected direction: namely, there is less support for Middle-Eastern immigrants. Indeed, introducing the language interaction reduces the main effect of Ethnicity to essentially zero, suggesting not just that Francophone respondents distinguish more between the two ethnic groups, but that English-speaking respondents seem to make no such distinction at all.

We also find an interaction between language and job status. In this case, everyone (English- and French-speaking) expresses a preference for higher-status applicants, consistent with our initial results. But the preference is nearly three times the magnitude among Francophones.

Discussion and Conclusions

What do these results tell us about the role of economic and cultural threat on Canadians’ attitudes towards individual immigrants? If ethnicity and skin complexion matter, they do so only marginally; indeed, in this experiment they do not matter at all. This is not to say that Canadians are immune to cultural differences. Indeed, as Table 1 makes clear, there is rather consistent evidence that when asked about ethnic immigrant groups more generally, Canadians do express more positive attitudes toward South Asian immigrants compared to Middle Eastern immigrants. But when confronted with individual immigrant citizenship demands, most respondents do not make any meaningful distinctions. The exception is for Francophones, for whom the distinction between Middle Eastern and South Asian immigrants appears to be a meaningful one.
Preliminary analysis of directly comparable surveys elsewhere suggests that such distinctions can be meaningful in some other countries, which leads us to believe that the relative absence of such effects in the Canadian context is not simply a result of a flawed tool, but rather reflects what the larger comparative literature seems to suggest: Canadians tend to be somewhat more tolerant. This is not to say that ethnocentrism does not exist in Canada, for it certainly does. Indeed, our measure of ethnocentrism had substantial variation, and indicated an overall ingroup preference among Whites. Furthermore, this was related to support for citizenship. But our experiment provides little evidence that Canadians are making subtle distinctions across “more” or “less” desirable immigrant communities based on ethnicity or skin complexion.

A more stringent test of the impact of ethnicity on support for immigrants (and one we will carry out in future iterations of this study) is to examine whether Canadians do show a preference when presented not just with racial outgroups, but also with a racial ingroup member (i.e. a White immigrant). When asked about racial groups, Canadians do show evidence of ingroup favoritism. It remains to be seen if judgments of individuals mirror this pattern.

What the experiment does make clear is that economic factors make a significant difference in citizens’ evaluation of potential immigrants. In this experiment, support for individual candidates’ Canadian citizenship drops by roughly 10 percentage points when we move from a relatively high to a relatively low job status. This preference, as other recent comparative literature has suggested (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; O’Connell 2011), is immune to a respondent’s personal economic situation. This is also in line with larger macro-economic results that suggest that what worries citizens are the economic costs of unemployment and dependence on the welfare state, more so than direct competition from immigrants for jobs.

We believe these findings have implications for public policy. The Canadian immigration system has been both praised and criticized for its emphasis on the economic potential of immigrants. In the period from 2001-2006, over half of new immigrants had a university degree, which is two and a half times greater than among the Canadian-born population (Statistics Canada, 2008: 6).\textsuperscript{14} Policymakers interested in boosting (the already relatively high) levels of support for immigration in Canada would be wise to emphasize this fact. Individual immigrants who come to Canada with degrees in hand and contribute to the economy are the norm, not the exception, and when faced with

\textsuperscript{14} Though note that while immigrants come in with high levels of education and job skills, these economic advantages do no always translate into economic success in Canada. See, for example, a recent report by Statistics Canada (2007) that suggests that recent immigrants are more likely to work in jobs that require lower levels of education than they possess than other Canadians.
such immigrants, our research confirms that Canadians are overwhelmingly positive (even among those who express ethnocentric attitudes).

That said, we see these results as just a beginning. More research needs to be done at the individual level to see what “typical immigrants” are in Canadians’ minds, as well as how immigrants are portrayed in the media. The actual composition of the immigrant community, as well as media portrayals of that communication, are likely to be important factors in explaining cross-country differences in support for immigration. Our work suggests that when judging individual candidates, the economic make-up of immigrants is a more powerful predictor of support in Canada than are differences in the ethnic background of immigrants from (non-white) source countries.
Bibliography


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Appendix A. Vignettes

HIGH STATUS – COMPUTER PROGRAMMER

[Rajan Sivamurthy/Rashid Siddiqui] is a native of [Sri Lanka/Kuwait]. He wants to come to Canada and find a job as a computer programmer. Eventually, he would like to settle in Canada and become a Canadian citizen. He is 30 years old and live in [Jaffna/Kuwait City]. His father is in poor health and is no longer able to work. Rajan helps pay for his parents’ living expenses and for the education of his two younger brothers and one sister.

Rajan completed his undergraduate degree in computer science at the [University of Colombo/Kuwait University]. After graduating, he has worked at Polywell Computers as a quality assurance technician. He recently enrolled in an online language institute to learn [English/French].

HIGH STATUS - ENGINEER

[Rajan Sivamurthy/Rashid Siddiqui] comes from [Sri Lanka/Kuwait]. He would like to come to Canada to be an engineer. He would like to bring his young family to live with him and for them to become Canadian citizens. He is 28 years old and currently lives in [Jaffna/Kuwait City]. [Rajan/Rashid] and his wife have two sons and one daughter. His parents are elderly and depend on him for financial support.

[Rajan/Rashid] received his undergraduate degree in structural engineering at [University of Colombo/Kuwait University]. After graduating, he was hired by [Ceylon Contractors/Gulf Contractors]. Following an apprenticeship, he has been working in their design department on large scale infrastructure projects. He is taking classes to learn [English/French].

LOW STATUS – CONSTRUCTION WORKER

[Rajan Sivamurthy/Rashid Siddiqui] is a native of [Sri Lanka/Kuwait]. He wants to come to Canada and find a job as a construction worker. Eventually, he would like to settle in Canada and become a Canadian citizen. He is 30 years old and live in [Jaffna/Kuwait City]. His father is in poor health and is no longer able to work. Rajan helps pay for his parents’ living expenses and for the education of his two younger brothers and one sister.
[Rajan/Rashid] is a graduate of [Srimurugam Vidyalayam/ Khalifa School] – a vocational high school in [Jaffna/Kuwait City]. After graduating, he has held various part-time jobs including construction worker, taxi driver, and house painter. He is learning [English/French].

LOW STATUS – LANDSCAPING

[Rajan Sivamurthy/Rashid Siddiqui] comes from [Sri Lanka/Kuwait]. He would like to come to Canada to find work in landscaping. He would like to bring his young family to live with him and for them to become Canadian citizens. He is 28 years old and currently lives in [Jaffna/Kuwait City]. [Rajan/Rashid] and his wife have two sons and one daughter. His parents are elderly and depend on him for financial support.

[Rajan/Rashid] graduated from [Srimurugam Vidyalayam / Khalifa School] – a vocational highschool in [Jaffna/Kuwait City]. He has worked as a street cleaner, a farm worker, and in various construction jobs. He is learning [English/French] by talking regularly with his friends who speak the language.
Appendix B. Photos

South Asian, dark  South Asian, light

Middle Eastern, dark  Middle Eastern, light
Table 1. Group Assessments: South-Asian and Middle Eastern Immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thinking about [ethnic group] immigrants, how likely is it that the growing number of [ethnic group] immigrants will:</th>
<th>South Asian</th>
<th>Middle Eastern</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enrich Canadian culture with new ideas and customs</td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td>0.516</td>
<td>0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cause taxes to be increased because of increased demands for public services*</td>
<td>0.532</td>
<td>0.555</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take jobs away from Canadian workers*</td>
<td>0.559</td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep prices down by providing low-cost labour</td>
<td>0.440</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the amount of violent crime*</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help Canada keep pace in engineering and scientific research.</td>
<td>0.559</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Mean (with negative items reversed)</strong></td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the scale shown below, how well would you say the terms shown below apply to [ethnic group] immigrants:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>South Asian</th>
<th>Middle Eastern</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eager to assimilate</td>
<td>0.536</td>
<td>0.457</td>
<td>0.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazy*</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insist on special privileges*</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willing to learn English/French</td>
<td>0.566</td>
<td>0.537</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law-abiding</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>0.548</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious fanatics*</td>
<td>0.434</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Mean (with negative items reversed)</strong></td>
<td>0.573</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that * indicates items that are negative. These items were reversed in the overall mean scales.
Table 2. Mean Levels of Support for Citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Job Status</th>
<th>Low Job Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>Middle Eastern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dark</td>
<td>0.708</td>
<td>0.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>0.649</td>
<td>0.679</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= ~222 per cell; Standard Error of the Mean= ~.025.
Table 3. Mixed-Effects Regression Results, All Treatment Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DV: Support for Citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexion</td>
<td>-.039 (.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>-.023* (.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexion * Ethnicity</td>
<td>.053*** (.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Status</td>
<td>-.092*** (.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Status</td>
<td>.033** (.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Status * Family Status</td>
<td>-.024 (.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order</td>
<td>-.043*** (.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.698*** (.023)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Random Effects**             |                             |
| Respondent (StDev)            | .326 (.009)                 |
| N                              | 1783 / 893                  |

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. Cells show coefficients from a mixed-effects regression, with standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4. Mixed-Effects Regression Results, Ethnocentrism as a Mediating Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DV: Support for Citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medium Ethnocentrism</td>
<td>-0.095** (.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Ethnocentrism</td>
<td>-0.256*** (.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexion</td>
<td>-0.037 (.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Ethnocentrism * Complexion</td>
<td>0.016 (.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Ethnocentrism * Complexion</td>
<td>-0.039 (.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Ethnocentrism</td>
<td>-0.086*** (.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Ethnocentrism</td>
<td>-0.262*** (.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>-0.012 (.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Ethnocentrism * Ethnicity</td>
<td>-0.003 (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Ethnocentrism * Ethnicity</td>
<td>-0.027 (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Ethnocentrism</td>
<td>-0.106*** (.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Ethnocentrism</td>
<td>-0.260*** (.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Status</td>
<td>-0.101*** (.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Ethnocentrism * Job Status</td>
<td>0.035 (.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Ethnocentrism * Job Status</td>
<td>-0.033 (.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Ethnocentrism</td>
<td>-0.112*** (.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Ethnocentrism</td>
<td>-0.290*** (.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Status</td>
<td>0.011 (.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Ethnocentrism * Family Status</td>
<td>0.049** (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Ethnocentrism * Family Status</td>
<td>0.028 (.024)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. Cells show selected coefficients from mixed-effects regressions, as in Table 1, with standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5. Mixed-Effects Regression Results, Income as a Mediating Variable

|                | Medium Tercile | High Tercile | Complexion | Medium Tercile * Complexion | High Tercile * Complexion | Medium Tercile | High Tercile | Ethnicity | Medium Tercile * Ethnicity | High Tercile * Ethnicity | Medium Tercile | High Tercile | Job Status | Medium Tercile * Job Status | High Tercile * Job Status | Medium Tercile | High Tercile | Family Status | Medium Tercile * Family Status | High Tercile * Family Status |
|----------------|----------------|--------------|------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|-------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|-------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| DV: Support for Citizenship | .047 (.045) | .062 (.050) | -.025 (.050) | -.048 (.063) | -.040 (.068) | .014 (.034) | .047 (.037) | -.018 (.022) | .020 (.025) | -.012 (.028) | .013 (.046) | .054 (.048) | -.101** (.050) | .019 (.063) | -.027 (.068) | .034 (.034) | .033 (.036) | .036 (.022) | -.021 (.025) | .014 (.027) |

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. Cells show selected coefficients from mixed-effects regressions, as in Table 1, with standard errors in parentheses.
Table 6. Mixed-Effects Regression Results, Language as a Mediating Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DV: Support for Citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>.007(.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>-.007(.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French * Ethnicity</td>
<td>-.079***(.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>.038(.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Status</td>
<td>-.067**(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French * Job Status</td>
<td>-.136**(.061)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. Cells show selected coefficients from mixed-effects regressions, as in Table 1, with standard errors in parentheses.
Figure 1. The Impact of Complexion and Ethnicity
Figure 2. The Impact of Job and Family Status