The Relative Success of Partition in Resolving
Longer Intrastate Wars

Alexander Hudson and
Veronica Kitchen
University of Waterloo

Paper prepared for presentation at the
Annual Meeting of the
Canadian Political Science Association
Wilfrid Laurier University
May 16-18, 2011

DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION
The Relative Success of Partition in Resolving Longer Intrastate Wars

Abstract

Long-term intrastate wars often involve a period of geographical division within the state. An insurgent group may control a portion of the country for a period of years. This happens most often in cases of regional ethnic struggle, but can happen in ideological wars as well. When such a situation occurs it may be said that there is a de facto partition of the state. Formal partition has often been proposed by outside actors as a peaceful solution to an intra-state conflict. This paper will study the outcomes that partition has created following peace settlements in this type of long-term intrastate conflict. Specifically, has partition proved to be a long-term solution to the conflict in cases where the war has more than at least two years? The study will analyze the success of partition in a peace settlement by testing the relative success of this strategy in several conflicts: Ethiopia, Somalia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Bosnia. The common denominator between these conflicts is a multi-year conflict during which the non-central government force occupies a part of the territory for an extended period. This paper draws on the existing scholarship to inform a new argument about the cases in which partition may be part of a lasting peace.

Introduction

The concept of partition has never been normatively appealing, but has come to prominence in academic and policy oriented debates at certain points, most notably in the late 1990s in response to the war in Bosnia. In one of the earlier papers on the subject of partition, Clive Christie noted that partition has always had a bad name. Chaim Kaufmann, a noted proponent of partition, even stated that partition is a “dirty word” among most western leaders and scholars. Partition was significantly challenged in 2000 by a quantitative study by Nicolas Sambanis. This study effectively demonstrated that partition does not increase the probability of lasting peace. Subsequent studies have argued the opposite, focusing mostly on partition arrangements in ethnically motivated conflicts. Chaim Kaufmann has been one of the foremost scholars in this area, focusing on ethnic wars. His 1996 paper “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars” and its successor “When All Else Fails,” published in 1998, are most often cited in any discussion of partition. These theoretical studies found that the best way to resolve ethnic conflicts is to separate the groups.

---

An area that seems to be inadequately addressed thus far in the academic debate on partition is qualitative case studies that seek to apply some of the theories generated and tested in large N quantitative studies to individual cases of partition. Such an approach will allow the researcher to accept or reject the validity of some of these theories, and to suggest new hypotheses for further research. In this study, five cases of partition that ended relatively longer intrastate wars will be evaluated in this manner. It is hypothesized that longer conflicts will more fully manifest the processes that have been proposed in the theoretical literature to aid in partition. Therefore, this study will begin with a review of the debate, introduce four hypotheses grounded in this literature, and then evaluate these hypotheses in the light of the evidence provided in five cases.

Kaufmann based his research on the data set created by Ted Gurr and published in his book *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*. Building on the idea of a security dilemma, Kaufmann argues very clearly in favour of permanent territorial separation of the conflict parties, ideally through the creation a new state. Partition to Kaufmann is separation of the ethnic groups into defensible enclaves. In contrast to Kaufmann, and partly in response to his work, James Fearon strongly opposed partition in his paper “Separatist Wars, Partition, and World Order.” Fearon suggested that partition in conflict would tend to give an incentive to other minority groups to begin a war for independence as well. The incentive argument is certainly strong, but may be difficult to prove empirically. Another argument against partition is that partition proposals may tend to increase the level of ethnic cleansing in a conflict, as seen in the Bosnian war.

Kaufmann’s work is mostly theoretical. He begins from the idea of the presence of an intractable security dilemma in cases of ethnically motivated civil war. Therefore, to Kaufmann the only viable solution to this problem is the separation of these warring groups into defensible enclaves, thus ameliorating the security dilemma. Kaufmann does acknowledge the immense challenges that such a course poses, and states that partitions should only be effected where the populations in question are already separated. Partitions where the populations are not unmixed will actually increase violence. Kaufmann’s work addressed many of the theoretical issues and normative concerns surrounding partition. However it did not take the next step and offer empirical evidence in favour of partition.

Carter Johnson’s 2008 paper “Partitioning to Peace,” picked up the missing pieces of Kaufmann’s theory by offering evidence for the success of partitions. As Kaufmann’s theory advocated the demographic separation of the warring ethnic groups, Johnson developed an index for measuring the level of ethnic homogeneity in a post conflict population. This Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index (PEHI) is useful for empirically evaluating Kaufmann’s contentions. The results of Johnson’s evaluation based on the PEHI were very much in line with the theory advanced by partition advocates. However, Johnson evaluated only cases of

---

5 Ibid., 137
8 Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” 137.
partition, giving the study too few cases to make predictive judgements about the success of partition.\textsuperscript{11} Echoing Kaufmann’s warning, Johnson stated that partitions should only be put in place to resolve conflicts where the populations have already separated.\textsuperscript{12}

A different explanation for the desirability of partitions was put forward by Thomas Chapman and Philip Roeder. Chapman and Roeder apply an institutional approach to the effects of partition, suggesting that domestic politics are likely to be more stable and peaceful following a de jure partition as opposed to any other peace settlement. The analysis conducted by these authors supported this theory, though based on a very small sample of cases.\textsuperscript{13} Responding to Chapman and Roeder’s study, Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl note that there were only seven de jure partitions in their data set, with one failure.\textsuperscript{14}

In a broader study of the causes of recurrent civil wars, Barbara Walter found that states that had been partitioned faced an increased likelihood of further wars.\textsuperscript{15} Echoing in some ways Fearon’s argument that partitions increase incentives for other groups to violently challenge the supremacy of the central state,\textsuperscript{16} Walter’s quantitative analysis found that partitioned states were more likely to face a new war, potentially unrelated to the war that ended in partition. This is a very different argument from those who argue that partition will only lead to an interstate war between the same conflict parties.

The most noted empirical analyses of the effects of partition have been conducted by Nicholas Sambanis and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl. In perhaps the most significant quantitative study of partition, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War,” Sambanis conducted a comprehensive series of statistical tests of the performance of partition settlements in the context of the broader universe of intrastate wars. This study found that partition did not prevent war recurrence.\textsuperscript{17} This led Sambanis to make the opposite recommendation from Kaufmann, suggesting that if partitions were to be implemented, they should seek to combine the groups rather than separate them.\textsuperscript{18} As the Sambanis data was used by later researchers, with different results, he and Schulhofer-Wohl published a second study of the effects of partition in 2009 reiterating the findings of the first study. This article addressed many of the criticisms of the earlier work, and laid the groundwork for further research. Addressing the type of demographic separation proposed by Kaufmann and Johnson, Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl wrote, “In many ways, partition just takes the problem and calls it a solution.”\textsuperscript{19}

Thus, there is significant difference of opinion among scholars who have examined the effects of partitions. As is noted in the 2009 paper by Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl, much of the difference in empirical findings is attributable to differences in scope and coding rules, with the result that the outcomes of some very sound quantitative studies of partition differ greatly.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{11} Johnson, “Partitioning to Peace: Sovereignty, Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars,” 160.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 165.
\textsuperscript{17} Sambanis, "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature," 465-472.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 479.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 82-118.
Sambanis, Schulhofer-Wohl, and Walter all find that partition is not conducive to peace, while Johnson, and Chapman and Roeder find that partitions are in fact successful. The difference is primarily attributable to the construction of the question and the definitions of the variables used. Chapman and Roeder used a much more constrained definition of partition, examining de facto partition and de jure partition separately. Walter stressed the finding that partitions led to new wars, while glossing over the low level of war recurrence in cases of partition. Thus Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl stated: “The effect of partition depends on which cases are included, how partition is coded, and the level of violence that scholars want to explain.” Another difference is whether the universe of cases to be considered is all civil wars (as was Sambanis’ contention), or just the ones the involved an ethnic conflict (as was Kaufmann’s focus). Within the wars that have an element of ethnic conflict, there is the additional question of whether one should only include those that included a nationalist secessionist movement. The starting point for the present study has been Sambanis’ 2000 paper, which considered all civil wars. However, the five cases that were selected for this qualitative analysis are all considered to be ethnic conflicts.

For his paper "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War," Sambanis created a dataset of all civil wars since 1944. He was then able to evaluate the relative success of settlements that involved partition against those that did not involve partition. This study has a much narrower focus, only considering cases of intrastate war listed in Sambanis’ dataset that lasted more than 730 days according to the Correlates of War (COW) Intrastate War dataset and ended with a partition. This duration was chosen because it is a long enough period for the conditions hypothesized to increase partition success to occur.

Applying this criteria yields five cases: Ethiopia 1974-1991, Somalia 1982-1997,

---


22 Chapman and Roeder, “Partition as a Solution to Wars of Nationalism: The Importance of Institutions,” 678.


28 This comparison of datasets was necessary to establish specific duration as the conflicts are listed in the Sambanis study only by years. There is one exception to this case selection method. Sambanis lists the Vietnam conflict as lasting from 1960-1975. The COW Intrastate War dataset only lists the Vietnamese conflict as lasting from 1960-1965. The difference lies in the treatment of the American intervention in Vietnam. Formal partition between North and South Vietnam occurred in 1954. Since both datasets consider only the conflict after formal partition, Vietnam has been excluded from this study.

30 This is listed as two conflicts by Sambanis, but only one in Correlates of War. In this study both wars are covered.
Azerbaijan 1991-1994, Georgia 1991-1994, and Bosnia 1992-1995. Sambanis’s study also measured the relative success of the peace settlement by two measures: the end of war for two years; and the end of violence for two years. The coding rules for COW define an end to war as an armistice, or the cessation of armed conflict, coding whichever is later. Although the Sambanis study primarily uses a two-year benchmark, this study follows the common standard of using five years. Collier, Hoeffler, Soderbom have noted that the overall probability of war recurrence in all civil wars is 50% during this period. Thus it seems to be an appropriate measure of success for this study if the states in question remain at peace in the five years following a partition.

Partition signifies territorial division of the pre-war state. This process is not regional autonomy or federalism, but the creation of a new state. This study follows Sambanis’ definition, which is in line with the majority of the scholarship in this area. According to Sambanis, a partition is “both border adjustment and demographic changes.” Both de facto and de jure partition are included because “Civil war is fought by groups against a state and, as the governments of new entities created by de facto separation, they are states in the Weberian sense; accordingly they can face internal challenges and civil wars, much like juridically sovereign states.”

Theory

Most studies of partition have been larger-N, quantitative studies. Noting the limitations of that type of study, Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl wrote, “Thus to learn more about partition’s effects, it is necessary to supplement quantitative analysis with detailed attention to data issues, knowledge of historical and political context of the cases, and rigorous theory building.” This is the area in which this study seeks to make a contribution.

What is the effect of the duration of a conflict on the success of partition? This study hypothesizes that partition after a longer conflict will be more successful, on the grounds that factors which are conducive to success have longer to develop. Some of these factors include stable front lines, separation of ethnic groups, foreign support to one of the parties, and the development of a mutually hurting stalemate. These factors lead to the following hypotheses:

---

30 Reid Sarkees, “The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997.”
35 Ibid., 83.
H1 A peace settlement involving a partition will be successful when the partition is a recognition of a division of territory created by relatively stable front lines in a protracted conflict.

H2 Longer intrastate wars will allow greater separation of the ethnic groups, increasing the probability of lasting peace.

H3 Partitions are more likely to be successful when a neighbouring state supports the secessionist group.

H4 Partitions will be successful when the conflict has ended as a result of a mutually hurting stalemate.

The first hypothesis may be read as begging the question. However, this is really not the case. Not all intrastate wars result in a stable front line, nor do a majority of wars that have ended in partition. It is hypothesized that partition may be successful in the type of intractable conflict that does result in a stable front line. As in the case of Bosnia, where a conflict has been ended without a military victory for either side, a partition may be a useful part of a peace settlement. It is worth questioning whether a partition in such circumstances will be successful.

The second hypothesis is grounded in the theory of group separation favoured by Kaufmann and Johnson.39 Both of these authors proposed that partitions would be successful when the warring populations have nearly completely separated. A longer war may give this process more opportunity to occur. This is perhaps one of the more controversial aspects of the partition literature, and establishing its validity in a qualitative analysis will be valuable. As normatively abhorrent as forced population movements are, their role in partition success or failure deserves further investigation.

The third hypothesis is based on the assertion made by Clive Christie that “the only factor operating in favour of partition and separatism is the random chance of foreign patronage.”40 A longer war is likely to give this type of foreign assistance a greater role. It is evident that foreign patronage is very often important in secessionist conflicts, but its role in creating successful partitions requires further research.

The fourth hypothesis is grounded in Zartman’s theory of negotiation in regional conflicts. Zartman’s theory of ripeness for resolution requires a mutually hurting stalemate.41 This type of ripeness for resolution is hypothesized to develop in longer wars. Thus part of the evaluation conducted in this study will determine whether or not partitions that come as a result of an inconclusive but costly conflict are likely to be successful.

These hypotheses are best tested through qualitative historical research in case studies. The contextual details that become clear through such analysis will also be useful in identifying other hypotheses for further research. Therefore this study will examine five cases to determine the extent to which these factors were influential in the outcome of the partition settlement.

---


Case Studies

Ethiopia 1974-1991

The civil war in Ethiopia is classed as a successful partition according to Sambanis, but the reality is more nuanced. Eritrea had been institutionally separated from Ethiopia during the period 1890 to 1962, first as an Italian colony and later as a British protectorate. In 1952 Eritrea was reintegrated with Ethiopia via United Nations (UN) Resolution 390 to create a new federation of Ethiopia. Under this federation, Eritrea was intended to have a degree of autonomy and self-rule within the Ethiopian state. This arrangement was not satisfactory to either party, and over the next decade the powers of the Eritrean assembly were gradually taken over by the imperial government in Addis Ababa. In 1962 the Eritrean assembly voted to dissolve itself and completely integrate Eritrea with Ethiopia.

While the independence movement started in Eritrea almost as soon as Eritrea was reintegrated with Ethiopia, violent conflict only started in 1974 following the revolution in Ethiopia. The revolution gave power to a council of military officers commonly known as the Derg. This revolution in Ethiopia created the conditions for a rise in violence in the ongoing confrontation between the Ethiopian government and independence movements in Eritrea. The new regime took a much harder line toward Eritrea, and made it clear that there would not be any political discussion of the dispute. While there had been a low-level conflict going on for several years, the conflict is classified as a war beginning in 1974.

The early years of the war in Eritrea were characterized by competition between the armed groups within Eritrea. The two main factions were the Eritrean Liberation Force – Revolutionary Council (ELF-RC) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front/Forces (EPLF). These two groups at times fought a second civil war between themselves, but they signed an agreement to co-operate in 1975, which enabled them to take the offensive and begin to challenge the Ethiopian military in more conventional warfare. Throughout 1975-1977 the Eritreans gained the upper hand in the conflict, now supported to some degree by an Ethiopian rebel group called the Tigrayan Popular Liberation Front (TPLF). Erlich states that, “By the middle of 1977, the Eritreans had almost every military advantage. They had captured almost 90 percent of Eritrea’s territory, including the strategic town of Keren.” If the war had ended at this point, the Eritrean movement’s territorial aspirations would have been largely satisfied.

These years also represented a period of change in Ethiopia’s military sponsorship. From the 1940s until 1975, the United States of America had provided varying degrees of support for...
the Ethiopian government often including significant military aid. In late 1977, the Ethiopian Derg began to receive military aid and training from the Soviet Union and an influx of soldiers from Cuba. This sponsorship was immediately tied to the Ethiopian war with Somalia, but had great effect on the war with Eritrea as well. These changes proved to be very costly for the Eritreans. By the end of 1978, almost all of Eritrea was again under Ethiopian control. While at this juncture Ethiopian victory would seem to be a matter of course, the Eritreans held on to a small mountainous territory and repulsed the Ethiopian attacks. The subsequent decade was dominated by the Ethiopian transition to a command economy, and the famines of the mid-1980s.

At the end of 1987, the EPLF began a new military campaign recapturing territory lost almost a decade earlier. Throughout the early months of 1988 the EPLF achieved several victories and captured equipment including tanks from the Ethiopian military. At this time the initiative was clearly on the Eritrean side, aided by renewed cooperation with the TPLF and increasing discord within the Ethiopian military. The next three years saw increasing territorial gains for the EPLF, with the last major battle occurring in May of 1991. This coincided with the military defeat of the Derg regime by another insurgent force, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The war in Eritrea ended with the rise of a new regime in Addis Ababa that recognized Eritrea’s right to self-determination. The end of the war in Eritrea depended to a great degree on the revolutionary war taking place in the rest of Ethiopia, and the end of the Derg. It has been suggested that if the war had not ended at this point, significant ethnic violence would have ensued. As it was, the way was cleared for Eritrea’s independence to be peacefully decided by a referendum in 1993.

While according to the measurement outlined for this study the Eritrean secession from Ethiopia can be considered a successful partition, once again the reality is more difficult. Eritrea’s separation from Ethiopia does not support the first hypothesis of partition advanced at the beginning of this study. Throughout the course of the war the Eritrean forces never occupied the full territory claimed. The EPLF only approached this goal for less than a year in 1977, and were successful only following the near collapse of the Ethiopian government in 1991. The second hypothesis is supported by the conflict in Ethiopia. The level of ethnic homogeneity following partition, as measured by Johnson’s PEHI, is very high. The third and fourth hypotheses are not supported by the Ethiopian case.

Additionally, while the Eritrean case passes the five-year measure of peace, seven years after the end of the war a new war broke out over the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Between 1998 and 2000 the two states fought a very costly war, with over 100,000 deaths. The partition of Eritrea and Ethiopia is technically a resumption of the conflict of 1974-1991.

---

57 Ibid., 246
**Somalia 1982-1997**

The origin of the conflict in Somalia goes back to the colonial era. The areas inhabited by Somali people were divided among the colonial empires of Italy, France and Britain. The British later ceded the area of Ogaden to the Ethiopia, a decision that led to the war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977-1978. The era of modern Somalia began in 1960 when both Britain and Italy granted their colonies in Somalia independence. The former British colony in the north voluntarily joined the former Italian colony five days after becoming independent. The newly democratic state of Somalia lasted for only nine years before a coup enabled Mohamed Siyad Barre to establish autocratic rule. The new ruler’s support among the population suffered from the Ogaden war of 1977-1978, and some scholars point to this conflict with Ethiopia as the beginning of the civil war in Somalia.

The two most significant groups in the war for an independent Somaliland were the Somali National Movement (SNM), and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), both founded in 1981 and based in Ethiopia. The violence between 1981 and 1988 was sporadic, often involving clan warfare on a smaller scale, rather than being an organized war. Also during this period, Ethiopia and Somalia sponsored insurgent movements against each other, carrying on the Ogaden war by other means. When Ethiopia and Somalia signed a peace accord in 1988, the sanctuary the SNM had enjoyed in Ethiopia came to an end. The civil war really began in May 1988 when the SNM launched an offensive from their bases in Ethiopia against Siyad Barre’s army in northern Somalia.

The Siyad Barre regime was not very successful in prosecuting a war against the SNM. Instead the government forces targeted the civilian population. The atrocities committed by the Somali army during this time are innumerable. In addition to the thousands who were killed, at least 500,000 refugees fled the country. The Somali civil war was characterized by guerrilla warfare on the part of SNM and attacks on civilian target on the part of the government’s forces.

By the early months of 1991, the SNM had taken control of the northern part of Somalia and had consolidated its gains. The increasingly violent repression by the Siyad Barre government had spread to the southern part of Somalia, giving rise to more groups violently

---

63 Ali and Matthews, *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution*, 172.
64 Steve Kibble, "Somaliland: Surviving without Recognition; Somalia: Recognised but Failing?" *International Relations* 15, no. 5 (August 01, 2001), 12.
66 Ali and Matthews, *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution*, 175.
69 Ali and Matthews, *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution*, 178.
71 Ibid., 72.
opposed the regime. The excesses of violence had created a significant opposition movement that initially brought together many groups in Somalian society. By January 1991 Siyad Barre was forced to flee the capital as rebel armies took control. This relative anarchy in the capital, and the military defeat of the government forces created an opportunity for the SNM. In May 1991, Somaliland declared its independence. This is the point at which Somalia was unofficially partitioned. Somaliland is yet to be recognized as an independent state internationally. It has, however, been relatively successful in self-governance since that time.

While southern Somalia, hereafter referred to as Somalia, suffered even greater warfare and destruction in the years immediately following the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime, Somaliland has grown more stable and democratic. While both COW and the Sambanis study list a war in Somalia after 1991, these are references to the continued fighting in Somalia while Somaliland was not involved. Somaliland did experience its own civil war from 1994-1996, a period of infighting within the SNM. For the purposes of this study the conflict ended in 1991.

Somalia contradicts the expected outcome for partition in longer wars, returning to conflict within five years. It should be noted however, that this return to war was not a resumption of the earlier conflict. It was rather a new power struggle between factions within the separated region. The partition in Somalia does not follow the first hypothesis, as the non-central government forces only occupied their present territory at the end of the conflict. The de facto partition of Somalia resulted in a very negative score on Johnson’s PEHI measure of ethnic mixing. As Somalia is classed as a failure by the standard for this study, it supports the second hypothesis. The third and fourth hypotheses are not supported by the results of the conflicts in Somalia.

**Azerbaijan 1991-1994**

The war over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan began in the final years of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). As the individual Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR) began to understand that the USSR was coming to an end, an island of ethnic Armenians in Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) attempted to redraw boundaries before they became international borders. Ethnic Armenians had always been an overwhelming majority of the population in Nagorno-Karabakh, although the ratio had shifted somewhat in the 1970s and 1980s.

While the status of NKAO was never considered to be in question in Azerbaijan, Armenians had often been vocal about their desire for joining with their ethnic brethren. The Armenian nationalist sentiment grew and soon spread to Nagorno-Karabakh. In the late 1980s the Karabakh Armenian diaspora within the USSR began to form networks in the NKAO and

---

73 Ibid., 12
75 Ibid., 15
began shipping small arms to these fledgling insurgents.\footnote{De Waal, \textit{Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War}, 18.} Beginning in 1987, there were mass rallies in Armenia calling for unification.\footnote{Michael P. Croissant, \textit{The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications} (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 27.} In 1988, the government of the NKAO twice sent a petition to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to move the NKAO from the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian SSR.\footnote{De Waal, \textit{Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War}, 10.} These requests were unsuccessful due to opposition from the SSR of Azerbaijan.

Tensions between the Armenians and Azeris in the NKAO continued to intensify in the years 1988 to 1991. Nationalist groups formed on both sides, notable among these the Karabakh Committee in Armenia, and the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF). Low-level ethnic violence began in Sumgait, Azerbaijan in February 1988, and spread in similar incidents across Azerbaijan and Armenia.\footnote{Cheterian, \textit{War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia's Troubled Frontier}, 106.} During 1989 the minorities of Armenians in Azerbaijan and Azeris in Armenia were deported, eventually coming close to ethnically purging both states.\footnote{De Waal, \textit{Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War}, 62.} Actions such as these paved the way for the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which broke out in 1991. In late August and early September 1991, both Azerbaijan and Armenia declared their independence from the USSR. A “governing council” in the former NKAO voted to form an independent entity called the Nagorno Karabakh Republic on 2 September 1991.\footnote{Heiko Kruger, \textit{The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Legal Analysis} (New York: Springer, 2010), 21.}

Soviet army units left Azerbaijan in the four months following its independence, leaving behind much of their equipment including armoured vehicles and vast quantities of ammunition. This materiel was quickly collected by both Azeri and Armenian militia groups.\footnote{De Waal, \textit{Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War}, 62.} Unified armies did not yet exist in either party, and were instead ad hoc groups of fighters.\footnote{Cheterian, \textit{War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia's Troubled Frontier}, 129.} While combat did not break out immediately after the Soviet forces left, all the pieces were in place. The tactical situation for both sides was untenable, as the prospective front lines involved many isolated pockets.\footnote{Ibid., 78}

The Azeris launched the first major offensive of the war in January 1992. The Azeris attempted to capture the former regional capital of Stepanakert, but their attacks were ill conceived and poorly coordinated.\footnote{Croissant, \textit{The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications} (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 27.} After beating back the Azeri offensive, the Armenian forces began an offensive of their own, quickly capturing several villages. One important outcome of this Armenian offensive was the capture of the airfield at Khojaly, enabling reinforcement from Armenia.\footnote{Cheterian, \textit{War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia's Troubled Frontier}, 128.} The capture of Khojaly also accompanied by atrocities against Azeri civilians, with several hundred killed.\footnote{Kruger, \textit{The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Legal Analysis}, 22.} In May 1992, amidst political turmoil in Azerbaijan, Armenian forces captured the town of Shusha, the last ethnically Azeri town in Nagorno-Karabakh.\footnote{Croissant, \textit{The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications} (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 27.} In one of the
most important strategic victories for the Karabakh Armenians, they captured Lachin and its environs later in the month. The capture of Lachin created a physical link between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. At this early point in the war, the Karabakh Armenian forces had effectively captured all of Nagorno-Karabakh and linked it to Armenia. Their territorial ambitions had been achieved.

During the summer of 1992, the government in Azerbaijan changed hands twice, eventually being consolidated and unified for a short time. The new government made winning back Nagorno-Karabakh a central goal, and launched a new offensive. In June, possibly with the aid of some Russian army units, the Azeris retook significant territory in the northern part of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Azeri offensive continued through the fall, at one point threatening the supply corridor the Armenians had created through the capture of Lachin. The Karabakh Armenians were able to push back the Azeri advance. In spite of a ceasefire agreement signed by both sides, the war continued to intensify.

In 1993 the conflict received increasing international attention. Military advisors and mercenaries came to support the Azeri cause from such diverse groups as the US and Turkish militaries, and Mujahideen from Afghanistan. At this time Iran and Turkey both threatened to involve themselves more directly in the conflict. Reflecting this increased international involvement, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for a cease-fire. The language used in this resolution gave both parties something to agree with, and led to an agreement brokered by Turkey, Russia and the United States. This agreement was rapidly followed by yet another political collapse in Azerbaijan, an opportunity the Karabakh Armenian forces were quick to exploit. Through the fall of 1993, the Armenian side was the stronger one, capturing additional territory. At the end of 1993, the Karabakh Armenians had once again captured all of Nagorno-Karabakh and solidified their positions.

The front lines moved back and forth to a smaller degree during the early months of 1994. This was also the bloodiest and most intense period of the war, with both sides suffering thousands of casualties in more traditional battles. By May, the Azeri side was exhausted while the Armenians appeared to be preparing a new offensive. On 12 May 1994 a cease-fire was agreed to by all parties, and has more or less held to the present day. While the cease-fire holds, the conflict is not settled. Nagorno-Karabakh Republic claims to be an independent entity, but is not internationally recognized and is highly dependant on Armenia.

The partition of Azerbaijan did not occur via a legal decision. It is, however, a seemingly permanent arrangement. In this case the partition line reflects the front lines through much of the war, supporting the contention of hypothesis one. This is perhaps simply a reflection of the fact

---

99 Ibid., 86
100 Cheterian, *War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia's Troubled Frontier*, 141.
102 Ibid., 89
that the partition is really just a fortified cease-fire line. The war did indeed end for a period exceeding five years, making the de facto partition a successful conclusion by the measures of this study. The level of ethnic separation measured by Johnson’s PEHI shows strong support for hypothesis two. The conflict in Azerbaijan also strongly supports hypothesis three, as Armenian involvement was instrumental at many points in the war. The peace settlement in this case shows some indications of a hurting stalemate, but it is more accurate to attribute peace to military success on the Armenian side. Thus hypothesis four is not supported by this case.

**Georgia 1991-1994**

There were actually several concurrent intrastate wars in Georgia in the period 1991-1994. Sambanis lists two, between the state and Abkhazia, and also against South Ossetia. Both of these wars ended in partition.\(^\text{108}\) COW lists Georgia against Gamsakhurdia and Abkhazia in the same entry.\(^\text{109}\) The German political scientist Christoph Zurcher states that there were three interconnected conflicts in this period. Zurcher lists wars between the Georgian state and the province of South Ossetia, the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, and the supporters of former Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia.\(^\text{110}\) This is the most accurate description. The conflicts of particular interest in this study are those in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, though the internal political struggle will also be addressed to a lesser degree.

The same factors that were responsible for the timing of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh were present in Georgia. Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia were autonomous federal units within Georgia under the Soviet system. The nationalist aspirations of various groups were enlivened by the impending collapse of the USSR. In Georgia, the nationalist movement among the Abkhaz had been growing since the 1950s. Abkhazians had requested to be moved from the Georgian SSR into the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic on three occasions in the Soviet era.\(^\text{111}\) Each time the request was denied. The USSR did try to address the concerns of the Abkhazians, giving aid to cultural and educational programs in 1978 especially.\(^\text{112}\) In contrast, there does not seem to have been any sort of nationalist movement in South Ossetia until 1989.\(^\text{113}\)

In 1989, nationalist movements in Georgia proper, Abkhazia and South Ossetia all became more active. In Abkhazia this took the form of demonstrations, one infamously ended by Soviet military units and the killing of 19 protesters.\(^\text{114}\) In South Ossetia there began what one scholar called a “war of laws.”\(^\text{115}\) A number of laws were passed on both sides, culminating in a decision in South Ossetia to upgrade its status within the Soviet system from Autonomous Oblast to Autonomous Republic. In response, the government of Georgia revoked South Ossetia’s original autonomous status.\(^\text{116}\) These incidents served to strengthen nationalist sentiment within

---


\(^\text{109}\) The conflict in South Ossetia may not have reached the 1000 casualty threshold, and is thus left out of the COW.


\(^\text{111}\) Ibid., 120

\(^\text{112}\) Cheterian, *War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia's Troubled Frontier*, 161.


Georgia, bringing Zviad Gamsakhurdia to prominence. Gamsakhurdia became chairman of the parliament in March 1990; and president of Georgia in May 1991, carrying the election by a wide margin.

The war in South Ossetia started slowly. It was also a relatively small war, lasting about a year and causing around 1000 deaths. Following a mass Georgian march on the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali led by Gamsakhurdia in November 1990, a low level conflict broke out between small, disorganized groups on the border of South Ossetia and Georgia. In January 1991, the Georgian government imposed a blockade on South Ossetia. This was closely followed by a harassing offensive by around 5,000 Georgian paramilitaries. The conflict stabilized at this low level of violence until Georgia launched a new offensive in September. This attack was highly ineffective. In a development that proved to be important for the course of the war in South Ossetia, Gamsakhurdia was removed from power by a coup in January 1992. Eduard Shevardnadze, formerly a high-ranking bureaucrat in the Soviet administration of Georgia and sometime foreign minister of the USSR, replaced him.

Shevardnadze was not interested in continuing the war with South Ossetia, and quickly made overtures to the South Ossetian leadership. Nevertheless, the new Georgian government continued to launch attacks on South Ossetia, particularly in June 1992. These new attacks prompted a firm response from Russia, which threatened a military intervention against Georgia. Realizing the danger of continued escalation, Shevardnadze entered into talks with Russia, signing a peace agreement on 24 June 1992. De Waal notes that this peace agreement was “an instance of a short-term fix that turned into a long-term arrangement.” The peace agreement provided for a regionally generated peace keeping force, largely comprised of Russian forces. The peace agreement did not outline the institutional relationships of South Ossetia, which Georgia still claimed as part of its territory. There was relative peace on this front until a clash in 2004, and a short war in 2008. The de facto partition of South Ossetia thus meets the five-year measure for successful partition used in this study, with the caveat that the partition is not officially recognized. The concept of a front line was not important in this conflict, and the peace agreement utilized the borders of the former Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia.

One month after the peace agreement with South Ossetia, Georgia was admitted to the United Nations. Two weeks after this, the war in Abkhazia began in earnest. The proximate cause of escalation to war in Abkhazia was the advance of a unit of the Georgian National Guard into the capital city of the Abkhazia, Sukhumi, on 14 August 1992. This attack was ostensibly in response to a series of kidnappings perpetrated by supporters of the deposed president
Gamsakhurdia who were operating from Abkhazia. This first military action killed several hundred people in the first month, and was followed by further casualties in an assault on the Abkhazian parliament buildings.

Abkhazian forces through much of the conflict were mobile and loosely organized and thus difficult for the Georgian military to successfully engage. The Abkhazians were able to collect arms and ammunition from former USSR military sources, including tanks and aircraft. They were also much strengthened by an influx of foreign fighters, especially Russians from the North Caucasus. It is understood that the Abkhazian side received significant, if unofficial, military assistance from Russia.

With this aid, the Abkhazians were able to go on the offensive. The most important victory of the war for the Abkhazians was the capture of the strategic town on Gagra. This allowed the Abkhazians to control all the territory from the Russian border up to Sukhumi. This strategic depth enabled the Abkhazians to take the initiative for the rest of the conflict. Nevertheless, territory did not change hands much for the rest of the conflict. One author likened it to siege warfare. The Abkhazians tried three times to recapture Sukhumi, before a final successful assault on 27 September 1993. By this point the war was almost over. Abkhazian forces captured all of the territory of the former Autonomous Oblast of Abkhazia, pushing 200,000 ethnic Georgian refugees out. The cease fire line was drawn at the limits of the old sub-national border in the peace agreement of April 1994, and guaranteed by peacekeepers from the Commonwealth of Independent States and a small UN observer mission. The war cost 8,000 lives, and devastated parts of Abkhazia.

Peace was essentially concluded in Abkhazia by December 1993, while war continued in Georgia between supporters of Gamsakhurdia and the new government of Shevardnadze. For the greater part of the war in Abkhazia, the Abkhaz side controlled the majority of the territory. However, as with South Ossetia, the cease-fire line was drawn in accordance with the boundaries of the former USSR administrative region. In this sense the front line was not important to the partition. Also like South Ossetia, the cease-fire did not lead to formalized institutional relations with Georgia. The partition may be counted as a success, with only minor clashes in the following years. The two secessionist conflicts in Georgia do not support the first hypothesis as the partitions were not the result of a stable front line. Both partitions in Georgia strongly

---

133 Coppieters, Contested Borders in the Caucasus, 49.
135 Collier and Sambanis, Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, 269.
136 Cheterian, War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia’s Troubled Frontier, 199.
140 Bahcheli, Bartmann and Srebrnik, De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty, 149.
141 Collier and Sambanis, Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, 269.
142 Cheterian, War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia's Troubled Frontier, 202.
144 Collier and Sambanis, Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, 270.
support hypothesis two, showing high scores on Johnson’s PEHI. The Georgian case also supports hypothesis three, as unofficial Russian support was instrumental in several instances. The fourth hypothesis is not supported by this case. The end of the war was accomplished through military victories for the secessionist elements.

**Bosnia 1992-1995**

The war in Bosnia was precipitated in part by the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Bosnia was the most multi-ethnic of the states of the former Yugoslavia, having populations of Croats, Serbs and Muslim Bosniaks. As war began in Croatia in 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina was remained mostly peaceful. According to Burg and Shoup: “Bosnia was a zone of relative quiet, surrounded on three sides by violence, ethnic cleansing, and destruction. The Bosnian media propagated the notion that Bosnia’s traditions of national tolerance would help it avoid war.” Nonetheless, preparations for war in Bosnia were being made as early as November 1991. In this arms build-up the Muslims were severely hampered by a UN arms embargo imposed in September, while the Serbs were supplied and assisted by the Yugoslav National Army (JNA).

The election in Bosnia and Herzegovina that took place in 1990 brought nationalist parties representing the three ethnic groups to prominence. The Muslim population was represented by the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA); the Serbs by the Serb Democratic Party (SDS); and the Croats by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). Divisions between the parties were inevitable and immediate. In late 1991, while maintaining its representation in the Bosnian parliament, the SDS declared the independence of the “Serbian Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina.” Partially in response to this, in January 1992 the Muslim and Croat factions in the Bosnian parliament proposed a referendum on the secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia. The UN administration of the peacekeeping mission in Croatia (UNPROFOR) was concerned that such a referendum might lead to war. In an attempt to preserve peace, the European Community (EC) sponsored talks in Lisbon producing one of the first plans to partition Bosnia. While outright partition was not proposed, this plan suggested an ethno-federal arrangement of ethnic cantons. These cantons would be grouped into ethnic districts. The Lisbon agreement did not last long.

In March 1992, a referendum was held in Bosnia and Herzegovina on secession from what was then still the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). This referendum yielded a majority in favour of secession, reflecting the will of the Muslim portion of the population.

---

151 Haskin, Bosnia and Beyond: The Quiet Revolution that Wouldn’t Go Quietly, 58.
154 Kumar, Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition, 52.
The Serb population boycotted the referendum to a large extent. Although there had been some violence before the referendum, it escalated rapidly after. Shortly after the referendum, fighting broke out between Croatian militias in the north and elements of the JNA. The first massacre of the war took place on 3 April when Serbian paramilitaries led by Raznjatovic, commonly known as Arkan, killed a number of Muslim civilians in the town of Bijeljina.

The war is commonly considered to have started on 6 April 1992, following the recognition of Bosnian independence by the EC. When Bosnia and Herzegovina thus became independent from Yugoslavia, the JNA’s status became that of a foreign occupation. Yugoslavia agreed to withdraw the majority of its forces from Bosnian soil, but left a contingent of around 80,000 under the command of Ratko Mladic. Burg and Shoup outline the expansion of the conflict very succinctly: “On April 6 the Serbs began shelling Sarajevo. On April 7 and 8, following international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serb forces crossed the Drina [river] from Serbia proper and lay siege to the Muslim cities of Zvornik, Visegrad, and Foca. By mid-April all of Bosnia was engulfed in war.” The level of violence continued to escalate in May 1992, as artillery on both sides shelled civilian targets.

Throughout 1992, both sides captured and lost territory. At this point the Croats and Bosniaks still pursued a common cause against the Serbs, and were able to recapture some territory. However the UN imposed an arms embargo, indirectly aided the Serbs who were still supplied by the JNA and the already independent state of Serbia. The beginning of armed conflict between Bosniaks and Croats was a serious blow to the Bosniaks. It has been suggested that the breakdown in relations between these groups was caused by numerous disputes over power and resources. Other scholars link the breakdown in relations between the Croats and Bosniaks to the release of the Vance-Owen Plan in January 1993.

The Vance-Owen plan was the second attempt by the international community to take a step in the direction of ethnic partition. It was similar to the EC plan in creating ethnic cantons under a weak federal structure. This incomplete partition would have necessitated population movements toward ethnic domination of some cantons, and may have led to an increase in ethnic

---

155 Collier and Sambanis, Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, 193.
158 Ibid., 119
159 Haskin, Bosnia and Beyond: The Quiet Revolution that Wouldn't Go Quietly, 64.
162 Haskin, Bosnia and Beyond: The Quiet Revolution that Wouldn't Go Quietly, 72.
165 Kumar, Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition, 59.
cleansing. Various states exerted influence on the conflict parties to accept the plan, and while several of the key actors came to support the plan, it was never implemented.

The Serb offensive that took place in the spring and summer of 1993 was quite successful. The Serbs captured territory in several regions, isolating pockets of Muslim resistance. It was during this time that the infamous siege of Srebrenica took place. In an attempt to protect the civilian population and at the same time limit the population movements caused by the war, the UN designated five municipalities as “safe zones” in May 1993 guaranteeing the security of civilians in these areas. Nevertheless the first tragedy of Srebrenica was shortly followed by the similar “strangulation” of Sarajevo in July and August. The war continued through 1994 and into the fall of 1995, with additional ethnic cleansing and artillery targeting of civilians. The relative distribution of territory created in the summer of 1993 was substantially maintained until the summer of 1995. One of the few positive developments in this period was a peace agreement between the Croats and Bosniaks in February 1994, creating the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The push toward peace suffered a serious setback in the spring and summer of 1995 as the Serb forces attacked the UN safe zones, perpetrating a massacre in Srebrenica.

As the war continued in 1993 and 1994, additional proposals for partitioning Bosnia and Herzegovina were in circulation. In addition to maps created by the conflict parties themselves, the international community contributed the Carrington-Cutileiro plan of June 1993, the Owen-Stoltenberg plan of August 1993, and the HMS Invincible proposal of September 1993. All of these were ultimately unsuccessful in gaining the support of all parties.

The war was ultimately concluded, or at least put on hold, by the Dayton agreement. The three conflict parties met in Dayton Ohio for three weeks in November 1995. In his critique of partition in Bosnia, Kumar states, “…the agreements were a rehash of plans which had been on the table since the days of Vance and Owen, and what was eventually signed was drafted by US and UN lawyers well before the talks began…” Expanding on this fact, Burg and Shoup conclude that the timing and substance of the Dayton agreement was more a reflection of the US government’s determination to end the conflict than any new willingness to negotiate on the part of the conflict parties. The Dayton agreement created a de facto partition of Bosnia, recognizing the Republica Srpska as a semi-autonomous region within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Highly relevant to this study is the fact that the border, in this case the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, closely follows the front lines at the time of the peace settlement.

---

169 Bose, Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention, 168.
172 Ibid., 135
173 Kumar, Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition, 62.
174 Collier and Sambanis, Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, 193.
176 Kumar, Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition, 99.
178 Collier and Sambanis, Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, 194.
179 Kumar, Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition, 100.
181 Kumar, Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition, 104.
182 Bose, Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention, 23.
The partition of Bosnia was followed by five years without a return to war, and thus meets the conditions for success in this study. It should be made clear however that this success is qualified by the fact that peace in Bosnia remains dependent on the presence of an international peacekeeping force. With regard to the first hypothesis in this study, the partition line in Bosnia and Herzegovina closely conforms to the line formed by the armed conflict. The cease-fire line does not follow any pre-existing boundary. The PEHI for Bosnia supports the second hypothesis, though this may not be significant in this case as the international community established the boundary line with regard to the ethnic distributions. The third hypothesis is supported by this case, showing a high level of involvement from neighbouring states. The fourth hypothesis, addressing conditions of a hurting stalemate is also difficult to evaluate in this case. It seems that the peace agreement was more a result of intense international pressure than a ripeness for negotiation.

Evaluation

The central hypothesis of this study held that longer intrastate wars would be more likely to produce successful partitions. The results of the quantitative analysis conducted by Sambanis in 2000 between partition settlements and all civil wars did not show a significant relationship between partition and lasting peace. To better represent the comparison between the results of that study and this, it is useful to express the success rate as fraction or percentage. In Sambanis' larger study, 14/19 cases of partition did not see a return to war within five years. This can be expressed as a 74% success rate. In this study of only five cases, the success rate was 4/5, or 80%. However, this is certainly far too small a number of cases to make a predictive judgment. The sole exception was Somalia, though the war that broke out was a new war within the partitioned territory. It should also be noted that while Ethiopia meets the five-year measure, it suffered a return to war with Eritrea in 1998, seven years after the end of the secessionist war.

The first hypothesis posited that a partition would be successful when it was based on the front line created by a protracted conflict. This type of partition line was found in Azerbaijan and Bosnia, but not in the other three cases. These two conflict settlements may be considered successes by the criteria used in this study. However, the peace in both cases is somewhat fragile. In the other three cases, the partition line was based on a pre-existing territorial boundary. Even in Azerbaijan, the partition line follows to a great degree the former boundary of the Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast. In the cases of Ethiopia and Somalia, colonial boundaries formed the partition line. In Georgia the partitions followed the divisions of the Soviet federal system. In the context of these five cases, we cannot fully affirm the first hypothesis.

The second hypothesis evaluated in this study held that longer wars would result in a higher degree of separation of ethnic groups. This is a condition that Kaufmann and Johnson found to increase the probability of partition success. This hypothesis can be evaluated through the data collected by Johnson and expressed in his Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index (PEHI). Johnson calculated a PEHI for 17 cases of partition. Five of these cases actually had a negative score, indicating a lower level of ethnic homogeneity after the partition. If we

---

184 Johnson, “Partitioning to Peace: Sovereignty, Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars,” 158.
average the PEHI for all cases, the score is 18.53. Excluding the negative cases the average score is 78.75. The average PEHI for the six partitions included in this study is 64.15, with a negative outlier in the case of Somalia. Excluding Somalia, the average score is 95.68. Thus we can state that in the case of the longer wars, the level of ethnic separation is usually higher. Somalia is also the only case included in this study that was not counted a success, giving added support to this hypothesis. The analysis confirms the contention of this hypothesis.

A third hypothesis to be evaluated posited that partitions were likely to be successful in cases where a neighbouring state supported the secessionist group. All five of the cases examined in this study witnessed foreign intervention to varying degrees. However, support from neighbouring states was only truly significant in the cases of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Bosnia. In these cases it is difficult to propose that support from neighbouring states made the partitions more successful. This type of assistance to the secessionist groups certainly made the conflicts longer, and possibly more violent. In the cases of Azerbaijan and Georgia it is highly unlikely that partition would have occurred in the absence of military support from the neighbouring state. We must conclude that the evidence for this hypothesis is mixed.

The fourth hypothesis held that partitions would be more successful when they are the result of peace negotiations motivated by a mutually hurting stalemate. This hypothesis does not apply to the cases examined in this study. In Ethiopia, Somalia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the partition was a result of military success on the part of the secessionist groups. In Bosnia there were some conditions indicating a stalemate, but most scholars consider the Dayton agreement to be a result of intense international pressure, rather than ripeness for negotiation.\footnote{Kumar, *Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition*, 100; Burg and Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 318.}

**Conclusion**

This study attempted to determine whether or not the prospects for successful partition were higher in longer intrastate wars. Four possible explanations for such an outcome were also tested. The finding of this study is that longer wars, here defined as lasting more than two years, do indeed have a good success rate for partition. However, several of these partitions remain subject to dispute. The results for the evaluation of the possible explanations of this relative success were not as conclusive. Only the second hypothesis was strongly supported by the evidence. While this study was limited to an evaluation of the war and its settlement and did not consider the significant effects such partitions have on the populace, it has contributed to our understanding of how partitions may be different in the context of longer conflicts.

The rejection of two of the hypotheses in this study uncovers several new avenues of research. The most normatively compelling hypotheses were not supported by these cases. The idea that a protracted conflict would produce a stable front line, or a mutually hurting stalemate is reasonable. The contention that such a conflict could be settled by a partition seems to be a humane path to resolution. However, this description does not apply to the successful partitions addressed in this study. With the exception of the case of Bosnia, they were the result of a military victory for the secessionist group, and borders were established on the basis of pre-existing territorial divisions.

Further research should focus on secessionist or irredentist conflicts. A new research hypothesis might hold that partition is only likely to be successful following a military victory for the secessionist group. The threshold for success should also be higher, incorporating the idea
of a positive peace. This would enable greater insight into whether partitions that are dependent on foreign military force, such as Korea or Bosnia, should really be coded as successes. Such research will enable better judgements to be made about when a partition should be part of the resolution to an intrastate conflict.
Bibliography


