“The Genocide Question and Indian Residential Schools in Canada”

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“What have you done? Listen! Your brother’s blood cries out to Me from the ground!”

Shoah Foundation Director Stephen Smith quotes Genesis 4:10 at the Truth and Reconciliation of Canada Forum, March 1, 2011

Introduction

Since 2009, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada has been investigating the staggering array of crimes committed against several generations of young Aboriginal children. At the TRC Forum in Vancouver (March, 2011), some TRC officials, including Commissioner Wilton Lonechild, and some invited speakers like Stephen Smith (quoted above), argued that genocide merited close attention as a descriptor for what happened to in residential schools. Speakers pointed to Section 2(e) of the UNGC which refers to the forced transfer of children from one group to another. They are not alone. A number of Canadian academics have also asserted that the UNGC does apply to Aboriginal experiences (Davis and Zannis, 1973: 175–76; Chrisjohn and Young 1994, 2-6; 33-35, Therrien and Neu 2003, Cardinal, 1999; Grant, 1996: 69; 270-271).

If the IRS system was genocidal, what legal instruments exist internationally and in Canada to bring about justice for Aboriginal peoples? And if not, can other descriptors,

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like “cultural genocide” be useful? We feel that Canada is only now approaching the point where we can adequately deliberate over what occurred, why it occurred, and what the long term implications might be for Aboriginal peoples and the rest of Canada. The 1996 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples was a useful beginning, but access to the testimony of Survivors remains controlled and much of RCAP has little to do with the IRS. Further, mainstream Canadians have little understanding of this lengthy era of our history and its continued impact on Aboriginal peoples (Regan, 2010, 11-12). As the crimes committed in the schools now gain a more robust public airing, questions about the legal and moral nature of the IRS system arise.

This paper is an attempt to deal with several research questions with important social, legal, and political implications: Did Canada commit genocide against First Nations, Métis, and Inuit peoples by attempting to forcibly assimilate them in Indian Residential Schools? If so, how do legal instruments like the UN Genocide Convention (hereafter the UNGC) help us interpret Aboriginal experiences and understand what truth, reconciliation, and justice should mean? If not, what other descriptors are more appropriate? What are the legal, political and social consequences of a finding of genocide, or not? These questions, which form the core of our paper, are being asked with increasing frequency.

Two caveats: It is beyond the scope of this paper to outline what remedies might be appropriate should the Canadian government be found to have committed genocide. It is also beyond the scope of this article to consider whether the lengthy and uneven process of colonialism, which deprived Aboriginal people of their crucial identity-defining relationships with their lands, constitutes genocide (Woolford, 2009, 88-9). What we do consider is whether existing international and domestic law on genocide can be applied to the crimes committed at the residential schools. We begin our article with a short history of the schools. After this background, we proceed to a larger theoretical discussion concerning the difficulty of defining genocide and applying that definition in a meaningful legal way in Canada. Our position might be described as “fence sitting”. We argue that the question of whether “genocide” was committed cannot be definitively
settled at this time. In part this has to do with polyvalent interpretations of the term and the increasing pool of evidence from survivors and documents. We make the following observation and arguments:

First, Raphael Lemkin’s original broad definition (1944) has been used by some indigenous scholars to interpret cultural, religious, linguistic, and other forms of collective suffering. The case may be made that a “Lemkinian” form of genocide did take place in Canada, due to demonstrable attempts to often violently assimilate indigenous people, exemplified by the many atrocities which took place in the schools. A Lemkinian definition includes cultural genocide as a form of genocide, which was later excluded from the final version of the UNGC.

Second, genocide is defined in international law through the UNGC and later interpretations at the ICTY and ICTR. The UNGC requires that prosecutors prove perpetrators had a specific intent to commit genocide (dolens specialis). This provision makes it difficult to argue that genocide occurred over the long history of the IRS system in Canada. Case law has helped redefine the UNGC and has created expanded definitions and legal precedents which are influential in setting international and domestic norms.

Third, genocide is more narrowly defined in Canadian domestic law, and in domestic legal proceedings. In a Canadian legal context, a finding of genocide is even more unlikely. Graham demonstrates this clearly in his later discussion of domestic case law and the domestic incorporation of international covenants and statutes. There were and are political and well as judicial implications here.

Fourth, our knowledge about the IRS system is evolving. Any claims about genocide based on “facts” take place on shifting sands. Schedule N of the “Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement” has tasked the TRC with documenting what occurred in the schools through oral and written statements by survivors and others. The TRC has also planned public events designed to stimulate discussion between Aboriginal peoples and other Canadians about the ongoing legacies of this history and how forms of justice
and reconciliation might be achieved. In addition to collecting and interpreting statements from survivors, and writing a final report, the TRC will also be investigating the issue of intent behind the IRS system. The “Missing Children Research Project”, created in 2007 as part of the TRC’s mandate, aims to find and name as many missing children as possible and to document how they died. Historian John Milloy is currently directing the investigation, which will continue until 2014. When the Project issues its report, academics and other interested parties will be in a more solid position to consider whether genocide applies, based on a larger body of evidence (Working Group on Missing Children / TRC). Since David is helping to contribute to the work of the TRC, it is hoped that our future work may draw conclusions from the TRC’s findings.

Fifth, we conclude that terms like “cultural genocide” and “ethnocide” convey the essence of what the IRS system was about: the attempted destruction of Aboriginal languages, religions, and cultures in Canada. Cultural genocide was excluded as a category of genocide in the UNGC, largely due to concerns by ratifying states that they might actually be committing breaches of the convention they were about to sign. The ratification process created a series of loopholes through which settler governments such as Canada, the USA, and Australia, have jumped. Cultural genocide is more accurate than “forcible assimilation”, we argue, because groups with clearly defined identities were targeted as groups, rather than as individuals. Forced assimilation does not convey the full extent of the loss of languages, traditions, and skills as a result of the IRS system. The term is a moral descriptor anchored in a legal historical process which did recognize the crimes to which Aboriginal peoples were being subjected. We also consider whether the UNGC should include cultural genocide and relax its strict emphasis on the dolens specialis.

**A Brief Background to the Residential Schools.**
The IRS system was created within the broader context of the colonization of Canada. The history of Aboriginal-European relations can be broken down into several periods, beginning with the era of initial contact and the fur trade. From 1867 to 1945, Confederation resulted in a two-tiered system with federal and provincial governments, a
system which largely ignored the treaty rights of Aboriginal peoples and froze out any
attempts at self-government as a third branch.\(^4\) Aboriginal peoples lost their status and
were often treated as “wards, or guardians, of federal authority”, and consequently denied
the ability to represent themselves in provincial or federal legislatures, law courts, or land
markets.\(^5\) A series of thirteen numbered treaties between 1871 and 1929 laid the basis for
further European colonization. Aboriginal peoples surrendered land in return for
concessions such as reserve land allotted on a per capita basis, and a variety of privileges,
tax exemptions and government services. However in many cases, the treaty process
“was riddled with deceit” as Fleras and Elliot put it, being seen as vehicle to separate
Aboriginal peoples from their land and bring them further under government control.\(^6\)

Certainly there were periods of cooperation, even métissage, as Saul has discussed
(2008). However, the overall effects of European contact, treaty-making, and conquest
have been negative in terms of the health, sovereignty, and well being of indigenous
peoples. Aboriginal populations in many cases suffered dramatic population loss, the
theft of ancestral lands, the outlawing of their languages, customs, and religions, and
much else (Woolford, 2009, 82-4). The Department of Indian Affairs was created in
1880, in part motivated by a desire to manage Aboriginal peoples as the government
expanded the size of the country. Later, forms of social control and assimilation fell
within its ambit, including the IRS system (Friesen & Friesen, 2002, 102-5).

In 1879, a residential school was established in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, which served as a
model for the further 500 schools established in the United States, through which 100,000
Native Americans passed (Milloy, 1996: 13; Smith, 2006; Wallace, 1995). Strongly
influenced by the American system, Canadian residential schools were first established in
the mid-1880s and continued until the 1980s. Aboriginal children were to be assimilated
and made productive members of Canadian society, as workers and servants primarily,
and not as competitors for jobs with European populations (Friesen & Friesen, 2002, 110;
Deiter, 1999, 15-16). The school day consisted of a half day of studies, then a half day of
trades-related activities: blacksmithing, carpentry or auto mechanics for boys, sewing,
cooking and other domestic activities for girls. The federal government worked closely
with the Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian, and United Churches (see Milloy, 1996). Until the 1950s, attendance at these schools for children aged five to sixteen was compulsory.

At least 150,000 children passed through a network of some 125 schools. Of these there are approximately 80,000 Survivors alive today. Children were forced to attend and live at the schools for ten months a year. Beatings, verbal, physical, and sexual abuse were common. Indian languages were forbidden, as was the practice of traditional beliefs. As deputy minister of Indian Affairs Duncan Campbell Scott famously argued in 1920, epitomizing the attitude of the time: “I want to get rid of the Indian problem … Our object is to continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politics and there is no Indian question, and no Indian Department…”.

Indigenous cultures were destroyed and personal lives shattered, while children were given few skills to help them cope in white Canadian society. Problems of intergenerational trauma remain extremely serious. Survivors learned few parenting skills, were often deracinated from their languages and cultures, resulting in a myriad of social problems. As Woolford describes: “Continuing cycles of emotional, physical, and sexual abuse, as well as addiction, suicide, and other markers of intergenerational trauma, within Aboriginal communities are considered residual effects of the residential-school experience” (2009, 85). Was genocide committed here? A number of academics reviewed in the introduction argue that it was (Therrien and Neu 2003, Cardinal, 1999; Grant, 1996: 69; 270-271). Chrisjohn and Young hold little back when they argue that “the federal government of Canada bears primary responsibility for adopting and implementing an explicitly genocidal policy” (Chrisjohn & Young, 1994, p. 28).

Some academics have even framed the IRS system through a Holocaust template. Neu and Therrien (2003), and Chrisjohn and Young (1997) make overt comparisons with the Holocaust as a means of criticizing the Canadian government, the RCMP, and the churches involved in the residential schools. Historian Harold Cardinal argued in the
second edition to his *The Unjust Society* (1999) for similarities between the two cases, given that in many respects, “the horrors experienced by Indian Nations were no less than those experienced by others [European Jews].”12 This type of discourse is to some extent understandable as a strategy for gaining public attention. Aboriginal peoples continue to face a mainstream culture of indifference, and sometimes denial (Regan, 2010). However, while the Holocaust may seem to be a useful way of gaining attention and changing public perceptions (which *does* need to be done in Canada), we propose a more critical approach to this type of discourse.

Comparison might be made between Nazi goals towards Slavic populations during World War II and the colonization of Canada. And certainly at the level of individual abuse, trauma, and intergenerational trauma, there are important similarities which bear examination. The schools often produced what we might call genocidal outcomes; the parallels between IRS Survivors and genocide survivors in other contexts is often striking, a point David has documented elsewhere.13 However, there are also crucial differences, lying with the scale of atrocities, and the nature of the intent to destroy (Grant, 1996, 270-71).

Information about the crimes committed within the IRS system really came to light during the mandate of the RCAP, which began its work in 1991. Submissions such the Assembly of First Nations’ report *Breaking the Silence* (1994) offered unambiguous testimony about what children endured. The AFN interviewed 13 survivors, and recorded their often horrific experiences of verbal, physical, and sexual abuse. Children had their tongues pierced with needles for speaking their own language, lighter skinned children were favoured over darker ones, beatings were common, while others described how “the threat of being sexually violated loomed ‘like a dark cloud’ on the horizon” (AFN, 1994, 25; 30; 31).14 The five-volume RCAP report in 1996 highlighted four main types of harms committed during the colonization process. The first of these concerned the physical and sexual abuse in Residential Schools (as well as their goals of assimilation and cultural destruction).15 The report clearly stated problems of neglect, underfunding, and widespread abuse, not to mention the “very high death rate” from tuberculosis, as
well as “overcrowding, lack of care and cleanliness and poor sanitation.” Overall, the Report was a damning indictment of the government’s treatment of indigenous peoples (AINC-INAC, 1996).

In 1998, the federal government released a “Statement of Reconciliation”, accompanied by a $350 million “Healing Fund”. Churches involved in the residential schools had submitted apologies much earlier. The first was the United Church of Canada, which gave its concise “Apology to First Nations” in 1986, followed by one by the Oblate Missionaries of Mary Immaculate in 1991. In 1993, Anglican Archbishop Michael Peers delivered his Church’s apology, followed a year later by the Presbyterian Church’s “Confession”.16

In 2008, the federal government formally apologized, and “common experience payments” soon followed, designed to compensate Survivors. Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms have also been introduced, and in 2010, the TRC began collecting statements around the country. We have already discussed some aspects of its mandate and several of its events. Within the ambit of the TRC are important nation-defining questions about the nature of restorative justice, indigenous sovereignty, self-government, and genocide.17 We now turn to the final point – how genocide has been defined and what these definitions might mean for Aboriginal peoples.

**Lemkin and the UNGC**

Raphael Lemkin’s original categories of political, social, cultural, economic, biological, religious, and moral genocide can in theory be used to interpret the history of Canada. Lemkin’s definition in *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (1944) was expansive, outlining “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves”. Yet killing was not crucial and as such: “The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging
to such groups”. His definition covers a variety of areas including political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral. Of these forms, only the third part of the physical form seems difficult to apply universally to indigenous peoples.

Central to Lemkin’s argument was that genocide represented a crime committed against groups as collective entities, not the individuals who comprised them. Lemkin emphasized collective rights above those of the individual. This attitude was clear in some of his unpublished papers, when he argued that there was a collective tragedy involved with the decimation of group identity – that something unique and precious was lost from the world. Lemkin outlined two ways that genocide occurs. The most obvious is the mass killing of a large proportion of the members of a group. The second method is the intentional destruction of the foundation or underlying structure that supports the group and distinguishes it from other groups. Either way, genocide would be the result of intentional, sustained, and purposeful action.

Lemkin provided a range of examples to illustrate his arguments: the persecution of Polish Catholic clergy by Nazi Germany (religious genocide); the promotion of alcohol and pornography during the same period (moral genocide), using an appeal to “cheap individual pleasure” to weaken national consciousness and resistance. In all cases, the issue of intent is crucial, because the destruction of the group has to be sought out in order for genocide to take place. This intentionality found its way into the UNGC in 1948, but many of the other aspects of Lemkin’s definition were substantially narrowed. The UNGC’s Article 2 defines genocide as follows:

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.\textsuperscript{20}

Yet, the UNGC was the product of a political process and subject to a certain degree of horse-trading. Cultural genocide and Lemkin’s other categories were rejected, although the forced transfer of children and the prevention of births were retained. Political, linguistic, and cultural groups were removed during bargaining sessions between the Soviet Union and various settler societies, including the US, Canada and Australia, leaving behind religious, national, and racial groups.\textsuperscript{21}

However, we must also be careful not to see the UNGC as a static document. Samantha Power (2002) and Peter Ronayne (2003) both tacitly focus on the weaknesses of the Convention, but offer little analysis of the case law that evolved from it. Indeed, we note, virtually every aspect of the UNGC is open to reinterpretation by the courts. In recent years, the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (ICTR and ICTY) have refined the UN definition. Among the contributions of recent case law, we have judicial interpretations of how large a “part” of the target group must be killed for an act to be considered genocide. In most cases the “part” should be significant, although the Srebrenica ruling is problematic on that count (since the “in part” were the Bosnian Moslems of Srebrenica not BiH as a whole).\textsuperscript{22} Other issues concern how clearly “intent” to commit genocide must be proven, and whether or not rape can be considered an act of genocide. It now can be.\textsuperscript{23}

Case law also firmed up the definitions of victims, perpetrators and a host of other aspects of the UNGC. Victim groups were quite narrowly demarcated under the 1955 Nottebohm Case, where nationality was defined as “the political and legal bond that links a person to a given state and binds him to it with ties of loyalty and fidelity, entitling him to diplomatic protection from that state”.\textsuperscript{24} Case law from the ICTR and ICTY has broadened the definition to include “a collection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties”.\textsuperscript{25} Here references to the state have been dropped, allowing for stateless persons or indigenous peoples without state-based claims to be considered victims of genocide. A racial group
has also been defined in the course of the ICTR as a group “based on the hereditary physical traits often identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors”, while an ethnic group is defined as one “whose members share a common language or culture”. It has been more precisely defined as a group whose members share a common language and culture or, “a group which distinguishes itself, as such (self identification); or, a group identified as such by others, including perpetrators of the crimes (identification by others)”.

One of the distinguishing features of genocide which case law continually reaffirms is the crucial importance of a specific intent or dolens specialis to “destroy, in whole or in part, an identifiable group of persons”. Although not identical, all of the acts prohibited by the UNGC, such as murder, assault, conspiracy, attempts, aiding and abetting, and forcible transfers, are already crimes under Canadian law. It is the added dimension of genocidal intent as towards a protected group that warrants the unparalleled stigma and punishment associated with the crime of genocide. With the slight exception of complicity, this requires prosecutors to prove, both, that the accused committed the underlying offence, and, that they did so with the specific intent to destroy a protected group. It should be recalled that, although a few courts have cautiously recognized the intent to destroy a group “as a social unit” to be culpable, the preponderance of jurisprudence is that the accused must have intended the physical and biological destruction of a group.

**Genocide in Canadian Law**

Lacking centralized institutions of enforcement, the effectiveness of international law is highly dependent on the cooperation of domestic legal, political, and social institutions. Unfortunately, nowhere in Canadian constitutional or statutory law are there clear rules governing the domestic legal status of international law. The judiciary has filled in this space by fashioning a hodge-podge of common law doctrines. How one approaches the UNGC and its role in Canada can be tempered through the lenses of monism, dualism, and a “persuasive authority” approach. The monist view holds that international law should be recognized in domestic courts, unless it is seen to be in irreconcilable conflict with domestic legislation. Dualism implies almost the reverse – that unless specifically
stated by parliament, international laws and treaties have no standing unless implemented by government through statute. The third “persuasive authority” approach holds that all international law, whether customary or conventional, binding or non-binding, can be used by Canadian judges to interpret Canadian law.

What is genocide in Canada? Canada did ratify the UNGC in 1952 after lengthy debate in Parliament. However, portions of the Convention were excluded from the Criminal Code, such that genocide means only “(a) killing members of the group; or (b) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction.” The official reasons given to Parliament by the Report of the Special Committee on Hate Crimes in Canada (also known as the Cohen Report) was that portions of the UNGC “intended to cover certain historical incidents in Europe that have little essential relevance to Canada” could safely be omitted. They even asserted that “mass transfers of children to another group are unknown … in Canada” (see Churchill, 2004, 9; 86). These deliberate and disingenuous omissions have important ramifications for what Aboriginal peoples can claim as genocide in Canadian courts.

In the pre-Charter era, the reception of international law was governed by the “presumption of conformity” doctrine. When so inclined, judges would interpret statutes so as to give effect to the binding international treaties these statutes implemented. They also interpreted ordinary law and policy so as to consist with binding, but unimplemented, international customary law. In either case, judges did not apply such international law as Parliament clearly intended to violate. Adding contour to this framework is the recent emergence of a parallel, “relevant and persuasive” doctrine. This doctrine initially authorized judges to treat international human rights law as a kind of comparative law or source of insight when interpreting the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It has since evolved beyond this strictly constitutional setting, authorizing the judicial use of general international law as well as foreign law as sources of critical insight into all manner of legal problems that have global and multicultural dimensions.
Parliament helped bring the full UNGC to Canada in 2000, when it enacted the *Crimes Against Humanities and War Crimes Act* (CAHWCA). The CAHWCA expressly implements the *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*. In general, the CAHWCA authorizes the Attorney General to criminally prosecute citizens and non-citizens in Canadian courts for the alleged commission of genocide, either at home or abroad. Importantly, s. 9(3) states that the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General must both consent to and conduct proceedings under this act.

Since the *Rome Statute* has incorporated the UNGC into its definition of genocide, it might appear that the UNGC has effectively been implemented into Canadian statutory law. However, a number of caveats are in order. First, whereas one may be prosecuted for crimes allegedly committed outside of Canada “either before or after the coming into force” of the CAHWCA and, indeed, the *Rome Statute*, no such phrasing attaches to international criminal acts committed within Canada. When dealing with genocidal acts committed within Canada, genocide is considered to have been a crime under international customary law only following the international adoption of the *Rome Statute* i.e. July 17, 1998. Parliament’s choice to expressly exclude a non-retroactivity principle for crimes committed outside of Canada, but not for international crimes committed within Canada, strongly suggests that it intended to bar the prosecution under this act of offences committed prior to July 17, 1998.

Second, the CAHWCA expressly recognizes genocide as falling across international treaty law, international customary law, and the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations. Judges are encouraged to engage with a wide range of normative frameworks when establishing the content, scope, and applicability of genocide within Canada. Parliament’s position is that genocide is a part of international customary law and, according to common law tradition, this law is automatically a part of Canadian common law. Although the Attorney General possesses unfettered discretion over the prosecution of international criminal law in Canada under the CAHWCA, this act may encourage judges to rely on bourgeoning international and foreign case law when adjudicating private law disputes.
The UNGC and the IRS System: Jurisprudential Trends

To date, Canadian courts have refused to give effect to the UNGC in private law settings and have had few occasions to consider it in criminal proceedings. In the 2005 private law case of *Malboeuf v. Saskatchewan*, for instance, the Government of Saskatchewan successfully applied to a court to strike out of a statement of claim references to the UNGC. Here, plaintiffs filed civil actions over abuses at residential schools that had occurred prior to 1948. Lawyers for the government argued that the events giving rise to the plaintiff’s claims pre-dated the UNGC and so the convention was “irrelevant”. The court agreed, striking out any reference to the UNGC or international law.

Lawyers’ failure to argue for the domestic legal status of international customary law on genocide has obstructed the recognition of claims of genocide in cases concerning abuses perpetrated even after 1948. In *Re Residential Schools*, Plaintiffs were seeking, among other things, a declaration that the residential school system and the conduct of the defendants in respect thereof contravened the UNGC. Importantly, the plaintiffs were not seeking damages or monetary awards, but simply a declaration that conduct carried out with respect to residential schools was inconsistent with the UNGC. The defendants countered by arguing that:

> [T]here is no independent cause of ‘genocide’. The only statutory reference to genocide, they submit, is at section 318 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits the promotion of genocide. However, they point out that that section was not in force at the time that the alleged events occurred and that ‘genocide’, as it appears in the Criminal Code refers only to the physical destruction of peoples and not “cultural genocide” which appears to be the subject of the United Nations Convention.

They then described arguments supported by reference to the UNGC as “political” and not justiciable, presumably because the convention had not been legislatively implemented. Unfortunately, the court ruled that it lacked “the jurisdiction to award a declaratory order on the basis of a non-legal or political code of conduct”. This judgment highlights a fairly common and highly contestable judicial attitude towards the
UNGC as a “political” or moral standard and not, absent legislation to the contrary, a legally binding document. It also ignores relevant and binding international customary law norms.

The UNGC has been invoked in a handful of other cases with colonial dimensions. In *Raubach et al. v. The Attorney General of Canada et al.*, the court ruled against a claim that the government was liable for breach of contract for instituting and operating residential school systems in contravention of the UNGC. It held that it is “doubtful that even if proven such an allegation could sustain a cause of action”. It did go on to rule, though, that the place of alleged assaults in “a program of cultural genocide” might be relevant to the assessment of punitive or aggravated damages for assaults perpetrated in residential schools. The UNGC has on occasion been cited in support of arguments that Canadian law is not applicable to members of First Nations, but in no case have these arguments been recognized as legally valid, much less compelling.

In sum, courts have found the UNGC to be inapplicable owing to the principle of non-retroactivity and to its “political” nature. Because the UNGC became treaty law only in 1948, and the alleged abuses occurred prior to this point, the UNGC has been held to be inapplicable. Missing from judges’ reasoning, and claimants’ arguments, is the fact that the UNGC codifies customary law and, as such, residential abuses could have been “genocide” under international law well before 1948. Indeed, in *Mugesera v. Canada (Ministare of Citizenship and Immigration)*, the Supreme Court cited a 1951 ICJ advisory judgment in support of the claim that the UNGC codified, but did not displace, pre-existing international customary law on genocide. The CAHWCA also signaled this well before some of these lower court decisions were issued. Recognition of this fact would have permitted the judicial reliance of international law on genocide in a private law context, consistent with common law doctrine.

**Mapping Future Trajectories: Specific Intent**

Although existing case law is hardly encouraging, changes in the legislative framework ushered in by the CAHWCA, as well as developments in international and foreign
jurisdictions, suggest that judicial attitudes may change, particularly if advocates construct more sophisticated legal arguments. For instance, the question of forcible transfer will be of primary concern in any future legal deliberations. What does forcible mean and might that definition change over time? This is open to interpretation by the courts and has not yet been considered in Canada. However, the Supreme Court made clear (in October, 2005) that removing Aboriginal children and forcing them to attend residential schools was not grounds for suing the government. Specific “wrongful abusive acts” would have to be proven by individuals to justify legal action. While the court conceded that safety measures were “clearly inadequate”, the “foreseeable risk of sexual assault to the children was not established” according to the standards of the time. While the decision is negative insofar as claims of genocide have not been supported, the decision laid the basis for further compensation, based on individual suffering.52

These weighty requirements for dolens specialis have been a persistent obstacle to successful genocide claims in general, but especially in the context of colonial injustices. This is a particular problem with the UNGC, and in some respects predictable, since states who ratified the UNGC were also concerned about the potential for being judged under its provisions themselves. Those accused of genocide will, hypothetically, argue that even if they are guilty of underlying offences such as assault or homicide, they intended to help Aboriginals adapt to Canadian society, or, less benignly, that they directed their criminal actions towards individuals, not groups. The former is precisely what was argued in Kruger v Commonwealth (The “Stolen Generations Case”), which was concerned with the Australian government’s 19th and 20th century policy of forcibly removing Aboriginal children from their homes, transferring them to non-Aboriginal families and residential schools, and preventing their return home. While these actions were demonstrably part of an official plan, the High Court of Australia accepted the government’s rationale that this policy was aimed at helping Aboriginal children escape poverty and neglect.53

In Canada, evidence is coming to light of deliberate spread of disease, withholding of vaccinations, forced sterilization, and systematic discrimination against Aboriginal
peoples. Is there a dolens specialis that we can isolate? A collection of documents? Speeches? At the present time, we are not aware of any “smoking guns” although one or more may come to light as we stressed in our introduction. Nevertheless, a number of prominent genocide scholars argue that even if there was no overarching and provable intent to destroy indigenous peoples as a group in whole or in part in a given area, if the end result had genocidal consequences that was or even could have been foreseen, then genocide can be understood to have occurred. This approach would require that the standard of fault be lowered from intent to destroy a group to either: a) knowledge that one’s acts probably will destroy a group, b) recklessness or willful blindness to the realistic possibility of this effect, or 3) negligence.

**Mapping Future Trajectories: Underlying Offences**

Leaving these issues aside, how might jurisprudence on underlying genocidal offences be applicable to residential schools? One plausible avenue might be to claim serious bodily or mental harm inflicted in residential schools as genocidal acts. Elements of this offence were defined as early as 1961, when the District Court of Jerusalem tried Adolf Eichman. It stated that serious bodily and mental harm could be inflicted on Jewish victims of genocide “by [their] enslavement, starvation, deportation and persecution….and by their detention in Ghettos, transit camps and concentration camps in conditions which were designed to cause their degradation, deprivation of their rights as human beings, and to suppress them and cause them inhumane suffering and torture.”

Citing this passage, the ICTR Trial Chamber deciding the Akayesu case held that the harm need not be “permanent or irremediable”, a finding upheld in all subsequent cases. It then outlined a non-exhaustive list of acts that constitute serious bodily and mental harm, which include “acts of torture, be they bodily or mental, inhumane or degrading treatment, persecution”, as well as acts of sexual violence, rape, mutilations and interrogations combined with beatings, and/or threats of death as acts that amount to serious bodily harm.

This was the first time rape was regarded as a potentially genocidal act. One year later, the Trial Chamber in Kayishema held that the phrases “serious bodily harm” and “serious
mental harm” should both be defined contextually and on a case-by-case-basis. A Tribunal for the ICTY further specified that the harm must be such as “to contribute, or tend to contribute, to the destruction of the group or part thereof”. Given that intent to destroy a protected group, in whole or in part, is a prerequisite of all acts of genocide, it can be inferred that Trial Chambers for the ICTR did not feel the need to specify this element in their judgments. Alternatively, this qualification may represent an attempt to impose an added, material element to the offence, requiring that harms that meet the above-stated definitions also tend towards the physical and biological destruction of the group. It is not, however, a qualification endorsed by many tribunals, suggesting that intent to destroy a group, when combined with acts that cause serious bodily and mental harm, constitutes a genocidal act regardless of how effective the act is at actually destroying a group.

Chambers have distinguished between bodily harm and mental harm. As a general indicator, the Trial Chamber in Kayishema held that serious bodily harm includes “harm that seriously injures the health, causes disfigurement or causes any serious injury to the external, internal organs or senses”. It defined mental harm as that which is more than a minor or temporary impairment of mental faculties. Chambers have consistently ruled that there need not be any correlation between bodily harm and mental harm. In Rutaganda, for instance, a Trial Chamber held that serious mental harm includes mental torture and inhumane or degrading treatment that may be inflicted independently of physical abuse or harm. This approach has been endorsed in a number of subsequent cases handled by the ICTR. Trial Chambers for the ICTY similarly held that, while serious harm “must involve harm that goes beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation”, it includes “harm that results in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life”.

Canadian courts have adopted these approaches to serious bodily and mental harm, agreeing that the determination of this offence should be made on a case-by-case basis. Citing Kajelijeli, the Quebec Superior Court held that “the following principles emerge from the (international) jurisprudence: “(a) the harm may be physical or mental; (b) the
physical harm need not be permanent or irreversible, but must be likely to prevent the victim from living a normal life over a relatively long period; (c) the mental harm must go beyond slight or temporary deterioration of mental faculties; (d) the harm must be so serious that it threatens to destroy the targeted group in whole or in part."

It would be reasonable to hold that this genocidal act is directly applicable to the case of Aboriginal residential schools. Many of the acts that constitute serious bodily and mental harm are known to have been performed by governmental officials and private parties during the operation of these schools. These acts include: sexual assault, threats of death, severe beatings and assault, resultant disfigurements, inhuman and degrading treatment (including systematic assaults on Aboriginal self-identity), disfigurement, and serious injuries to health as a result of the forced cohabitation of healthy children with children infected with communicable diseases.

When dealing with the UNGC, namely “deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to destroy the group” we also need to consider how jurisprudence might apply in Canada. The Trial Chamber in *Akayesu* construed this term as the “methods of destruction by which the perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group, but which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction”. It then provided a non-exhaustive list of acts which meet this definition, including: subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes, and the reduction of essential medical services below minimum requirements. A year later, another Trial Chamber provided more detail, holding that the term “includes circumstances which will lead to a slow death, for example, lack of proper housing, clothing, hygiene and medical care or excessive work or physical exertion”. Lack of proper housing, coupled with reduction of medical services below minimum requirements as well as lack of clothing and hygiene, seem to allow for negligence or acts of omission to qualify as genocidal. These two sets of lists are non-exhaustive and not mutually exclusive, evidenced by subsequent Trial Chambers’ regular use of both.
As regards *mens rea*, Trial Chambers have required proof that an accused have, both, intended to inflict through acts of commission or omission proscribed conditions of life, and, that these conditions be among the primary mechanisms used to physically and biologically destroy a group. The conditions, in other words, cannot be incidental to other possibly genocidal acts; they must be one of the principal measures through which an alleged perpetrator carries out a plan to physically and biologically destroy a protected group. As a result of this weighty requirement, there have been no convictions regarding the horrific living conditions in Bosnian detention camps.

There is, though, evidence to suggest that some of the actions of those who participated in the administration of Aboriginal residential schools fall under the concept of “deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to destroy the group”. But, looming again is special intention and distinctions among physical, biological, and cultural genocide. All acts must have been “calculated” to destroy a group and this has been uniformly interpreted to mean that the conditions must be one of the primary means of physically and biologically destroying a group; the case law is clear on this corporal component. Now, such acts as placing healthy children within close proximity to those with infectious diseases, and in these and other circumstances refusing to provide basic medical services to those in need, would perhaps be the best candidates. Provided genocidal intent is proven, such acts could reasonably be interpreted as calculated to cause physical and biological destruction.

What of forcible transfer of children, the category of the UNGC on which the Australian stolen generations was found to be victims of genocide? In some ways, the elements of this category of genocidal acts are clear. The *actus reus* consists in the physical, forcible transfer of children from a protected group to another group. The *mens rea* consists in the specific intent to forcibly remove children from one group to another group. However, the real problem is genocidal intent. All of the other categories of genocidal acts relate to physical and biological destruction of the group, and so the attribution of intent is directed to material destruction. In the case of forcible transfers of children, the result would be, on its own, long-term, cultural destruction of the group. Physical and
biological destruction would only occur simultaneously if acts falling under any of the other categories of genocidal acts were also performed. But in this case, culpability would arise from those acts alone. At root, culpability for the forcible transfer of children on its own would seem to require that alleged perpetrators have intended the cultural extinguishment of a protected group. It is for this reason, more than any other, that there is so little international jurisprudence concerning this genocidal act. It has been left to national courts to progressively expand the scope of genocide to include cultural acts, using in many instances this very category as justification.

**Reworking Dolens Specialis?**

Overall, as we have shown, the corpus of international and domestic law built up around the UNGC is unlikely to support a judicial finding of genocide in Canada. This does not mean that acts we might consider genocidal will not be recognized as such in the future. In the present political environment, and within the criminal law context, courts lack the discretion and, apparently, the will to consider such claims. Criminal prosecutions require the Attorney General’s written consent; an event that is unlikely to occur. More broadly, there exists a persistent judicial tendency to misrecognize the domestic legal status of relevant international law under cover of principles of non-retroactivity. This has impeded sustained engagement with relevant law in even private law settings, where the judiciary does possess the discretion to consider international and foreign law on genocide.

Clearly some activities committed during the residential school era may credibly be subsumed within underlying genocidal offences, and maybe even within progressive interpretations of special intent. But the slow trend towards relaxing the Dolens specialis requirement is nowhere near a tipping point. Strict readings have been upheld in international law, particularly by the ICTR and ICTY; the individual committing the act must clearly intend to physically and biologically destroy a group.

There is a strong dissonance between many genocide scholars and jurists over dolens specialis and how central a role it should play in the UNGC. In the American context,
Bischoping and Fingerhut focus on “relations of destruction” – the outcome on colonization for the victims rather than the ideology or the specific intent.\textsuperscript{73} From Australia, Tony Barta asserts that a lack of intent need not detract from the reality of genocide. He argues for “a conception of genocide which embraces relations of destruction and removes from the word the emphasis on policy and intention which brought it into being.”\textsuperscript{74} For Helen Fein, genocide can be the result of “sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly.”\textsuperscript{75} To this Roger Smith adds that even if there is no genocidal intent at the beginning, once a colonial government recognizes that its policies are genocidal, and does nothing, genocidal intent can be proven to exist. After all, “to persist is to intend the death of a people”.\textsuperscript{76} Here – it is the system, but not any specific policies or actors, which brings about genocide.

These scholars call for revisions to the definition of genocide under international law which would seek to overturn the emphasis on the dolens specialis and other restrictive elements. We recognize the merit and the persuasiveness of these arguments. Unfortunately, the UNGC and associated jurisprudence is clear that intent to commit genocide must be proven and that intention must relate to physical and biological destruction. This maintains the dominant view that relaxations in weighty fault elements would debase genocide, collapsing its distinguishing feature into the underlying offences which are by and large already ordinary crimes; genocide is, and should be maintained as, “the crime of crimes”.\textsuperscript{77} It seems unlikely international law will change to reflect these concerns, and equally unlikely that the more restrictive Canadian version of genocide will adopt an even more progressive stance.

**Cultural Genocide**

We have argued that “cultural genocide” or “ethnocide” may be appropriate to describe much of Canada’s treatment of Aboriginal peoples, and is often used by genocide scholars. This is employed in cases where mass death did not accompany colonization, but active attempts to destroy culture, language, and religion, while stealing land and outlawing customs did occur.\textsuperscript{78} As Israel Cherny has argued, ethnocide aims at the,
‘intentional destruction of another people’, but crucially, ‘[does] not necessarily include destruction of actual lives.’79 James Miller and other historians of the IRS system do use this term in interpreting history, and the Assembly of First Nations has used the term on several occasions with reference to residential schools.80

The original May 1947 draft of the UNGC, authored by Lemkin and two others for the UN Secretariat, included cultural genocide as one of its three aspects of genocide, together with physical and biological forms. The cultural form enumerated five methods of attempting to destroy the specific characteristics of the group:

(a) forcible transfer of children to another human group; or
(b) forced and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of a group; or
(c) prohibition of the use of the national language even in private intercourse; or
(d) systematic destruction of books printed in the national language or of religious works or prohibition of new publications; or
(e) systematic destruction of historical or religious monuments or their diversion to alien uses, destruction or dispersion of documents and objects of historical, artistic, or religious value and of objects used in religious worship.81

Of these only (a) survived the vote of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly. Another aspect of genocide, forcing people to abandon their homes, was also voted down (see Schabas, 2008).82 Calls for a more inclusive definition of genocide are hardly new. In 1973, Davis and Zannis called for a wider definition of genocide to include not just “mass homicide” but cultural destruction as well, “warping and mutilating the lives of groups of people” (Davis and Zannis, 1973: 175–76). Chrisjohn and Young (1997) as well as Therrien and Neu (2003) see the differences between “genocide” and “cultural genocide” as being purely semantic. Their lack of distinction stems from the original 1947 draft and their advocacy of this over the current incarnation of the UNGC (MacDonald 2008 1006).

Despite his controversial nature (which we discuss below), Ward Churchill’s 1997 proposal for a revised UNGC seems the most appropriate for covering the concerns of
Aboriginal people. His revised UNGC has three types of genocide: physical, biological, and cultural, consonant with Lemkin’s original 1947 formulation. Adopting American criminal legal norms on murder, Churchill proposes assessing genocide according to four “degrees”. The first concerns premeditation; the second, “reckless disregard” for the outcome; the third, situations where genocide inadvertently results from “other violations of international law”; and the fourth, where there was no “evidence of premeditation” but the perpetrators showed a “depraved indifference” to the potentially genocidal outcomes of their actions. This is clearly an alternative to the rigid dolens specialis provision, which would clearly apply to the “first degree” but not the remaining three (1997 431-36). Arguably, changes in the UNGC to “restore” cultural genocide, while reducing the impact of dolens specialis would have a marked impact on how Aboriginal history in Canada would be reinterpreted, both legally, and morally. These changes would provide wider legal scope for reassessing the IRS system in Canada.

**Conclusion: Aboriginal Peoples, the Canadian Government, and International Law**

Have Aboriginal groups attempted to take the Canadian government to court at international bodies for genocide? To date no such attempts have been made. Aboriginal groups are not states, so they cannot take Canada to the International Court of Justice, as did Bosnia to Serbia. They cannot petition the UN Security Council for the same reason, and any crime to be tried by the ICC must have occurred after July, 2002. This of course does not preclude Aboriginal peoples seeking redress under other international agreements or covenants. When opportunities arise, Aboriginal peoples have pursued them.

During the 1970s, Canada’s ratification of the human right covenants and its efforts to repatriate the constitution opened a window of opportunity for Aboriginal groups to petition the UN. Through a series of cases during the 1970s and 80s, including Lovelace v. Canada, Mikmaq Tribal Society (Denny) v. Canada, and Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada.

† The authors recognize the sometimes problematic nature of Ward Churchill as an academic source (see MacDonald 2008, 87), but we have double-checked his references and they are sound. His proposed revised UNGC is also, in our opinion, a useful synthesis of existing genocide legislation, and a solution which could help Aboriginal peoples in western settler countries.
Canada, Aboriginal groups used the Optional Protocol to bring cases of human rights violations to the UN’s Commission of Human Rights. The above cases demonstrate some notable successes and failures in changing Canadian law. Lovelace led to changes in the Indian Act to allow women to retain their tribal status after marrying, after a finding that Canada was in violation of Article 23(I) of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant. The Mikmaq case, however, did not succeed in allowing the Mi’kmaq Grand Council to participate in constitutional negotiations. The Lubicon case also failed to produce the outcome the Lubicon Lake Band desired. The upshot of these cases, as Henderson explains, is that while “[t]hese decisions affirmed that First Nations have specific human rights under the Human Rights Covenants, but those rights could be disregarded by Canada and ignored by the provinces. The covenants gave little protection” (Henderson, 2007, p. 40).

A stronger footing may be found in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was reluctantly approved by Canada in November 2010. Article 7 does discuss genocide in Section 2, insofar as “Indigenous peoples … shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or any other act of violence, including forcibly removing children of the group to another group.”83 This is an obvious reference to the UNGC and makes particular mention of this provision. The 1994 draft made reference to both “ethnocide and cultural genocide” but defined neither term. It also laid out in Article 7 that signatory states would be responsible for “prevention of and redress for” a series of acts as follows:

(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities;
(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources;
(c) Any form of population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights;
(d) Any form of assimilation or integration by other cultures or ways of life imposed on them by legislative, administrative or other measures;
(e) Any form of propaganda directed against them.84

Like the 1947 UNGC draft which lost much on the road to ratification, the 1994 UNDRIP draft lost some of its teeth as well.
Certainly some Aboriginal groups in Canada will pursue legal remedies internationally and domestically. Sakej Henderson wisely observes however, that international law and domestic treaties are but “one wing of Indigenous diplomacy”. “The other,” he asserts, “is political action and strategy.” He concludes: “The legal documents and the courts play a limited role, but the ultimate answer is political. The courts cannot do the political work of self-determining peoples” (Henderson, 2007, p. 92) As such, while the courts may play a role in recognizing genocide or not, indigenous activism and the quest for political rather than legal solutions, is generally seen as a more realistic pursuit. What Henderson and many other Aboriginal scholars seek is the full and fair recognition of existing treaty rights, as affirmed under the Constitution. Thus a legal finding of genocide might not necessarily change the constitutional status of Aboriginal Canadians nor promote the sort of treaty federalism that Henderson (1994) and Ladner (2003) have consistently argued for.85

We might also learn from the Australian example. In Australia, the forcible removal of Aboriginal and “half-caste” children was labeled genocide in 1997 by the “Bringing Them Home” report drafted by the Australian Human Rights Commission. Somewhere between 20,000 and 25,000 Aboriginal children, known as the “stolen generations” were forcibly separated from their parents between 1910 and 1970 (Bartrop, 2001: 77; Tatz, 2001: 18–19). The report argued as follows: “[t]he policy of forcible removal of children from Indigenous Australians to other groups for the purpose of raising them separately from and ignorant of their culture and people could properly be labeled ‘genocidal’ in breach of binding international law” (quoted in Mundorff, 2000, 62).

The report was commissioned by the Labor government in 1995, and its deliberations were released during the premiership of Howard’s right of centre coalition. Rather than accept the findings, the label genocide provoked a “history war” over those who saw the term as appropriate, versus those who felt that such “black armband” history denigrated the positive legacies of Australian history and exaggerated the harms done to Aboriginal peoples (Curthoys and Docker, 2001: 11; MacDonald, 2007). And while an official agency, commissioned by the federal government of Australia, did find that the UNGC
had been breached, there has been no mention of genocide in the formal apology which the Rudd government gave in 2008, nor was there any mention of compensation, or a TRC (Rudd 2008).86

Certainly, a finding of “genocide” (whether Lemkinian, UNGC, or a revised version of the UNGC) will have social and political ramifications in Canada. It would arguably make a stronger moral and legal case for treaty rights to be upheld, for forms of Aboriginal self-determination, and for other forms of representation as suggested by RCAP. It might promote a second apology, greater reparations, and a stronger sense of national responsibility for what occurred. It might also help promote real attempts at conciliation on the part of many Canadians. It might, alternatively, prompt a backlash by right of centre social commentators, and the promotion of a Canadian version of the “black armband history”. Or it might simply be dismissed by a largely passive and indifferent mainstream population (Regan, 2010). As we have outlined in this essay, the term genocide connotes different interpretations amongst academics, domestic courts, international tribunals, and victimized people. Whether or not the IRS system will be proven to be genocidal, Canada still has a very long way to go before any form of reconciliation can be achieved.

References:

1 One of the authors was privileged to attend the TRC Forum and speak with attendees and speakers.


17 For a useful discussion see Aboriginal Healing Foundation, *Reconciliation: A Work in Progress* (Ottawa, ON: Aboriginal Healing Foundation Research Series, 2010)


27. *Kayishema, supra* note 53 at para. 98.
41. 273 Sask. R. 265.
42. *Ibid.* at para.11.
45. *Ibid.* at paras. 70-71. These arguments were made before the CAHWCA entered into force.
46. *Ibid.* at para. 73.
47. 185 Man. R. (2d) 195
Rutaganda, supra note 50 at para. 51.

Musema, supra note 50 at para. 156; Bagilishema, supra note 50 at para. 932-933 (inhumane or degrading treatment and sexual violence including rape); Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic (Case No. ) Judgment, at para. 671, 690 (forcible displacement and death threats); Semanza, supra note 52 at para. 320; Prosecutor v. Seromba (Case No. ICTR-2001-66-T), Judgment, 13 December 2006 at para. 317;

Kayishema, supra note 53 at paras. 108, 110; for a similar ruling in the context of the ICTY, see Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 93 at para. 243


Ibid. at para. 110. Although the Trial Chamber was only citing the definition of mental harm argued for by the prosecutor, this passage has been cited as authority by subsequent Chambers; see Semanza, supra note 52 at para. 321; Ntagerura, supra note 108 at para. 664.

Rutaganda, supra note 50 at para. 51.

Musema, supra note 50 at para. 156; Bagilishema, supra note 56 at para. 59; Seromba, supra note 105 at para. 317

Kristic, supra note 53 at para. 513; Krajisnik, supra note 107 at para. 862.

Munyaneza, supra note 38 at para. 87.

Ibid. at para. 87.

Akayesu, supra note 50 at para. 505.

Ibid. at para. 506; Rutaganda, supra note 50 at para. 52; Musema, supra note 50 at para. 157.

Kayishema, supra note 53 at para.115.

Stakic, supra note 90 at para. 517; Brdjanin, supra note 52 at para. 691.

Brdanin, supra note 52 at para. 989.


Ibid. p. 49.


