Decades ago, analysts could complain that security and foreign aid policies were generally conceived as distinct spheres of activities (Spicer, 1966, p.14-22). Today, the opposite has become conventional wisdom. This is particularly true with regards to failed and failing states. The latter, we are often told, pose a grave danger to international security, as they provided sanctuaries for terrorism and intrastate conflicts (Hamre and Sullivan, 2002; Rotberg, 2002; Crocker, 2003; Lyman and Morrison, 2004; Krasner and Pascual, 2005). Indeed, in April 2001, months prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, an OECD ministerial statement read:

We reaffirm conflict prevention as an integral part of our efforts to help partner countries reduce poverty, promote economic growth and improve people’s lives. (…) We will strive to increase coherence among our policies – trade, finance and investment, foreign affairs and defense, and development co-operation – that impact on conflict prevention (OECD, 2001, p.13).

From this perspective, antiterrorist policies must include development assistance. “Terrorism is a form of violent conflict and conflict prevention is an integral part of the quest to reduce poverty” (OECD, 2003, p.11). The interdependence between security and development, further noted a recent United Nations (UN) Security Council declaration, is “key to attaining sustainable peace.” Given the fact that “humanitarian wars” have now become common (e.g. Somalia, Kosovo, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya), there is an urgent need “for a comprehensive and integrated approach that incorporates and strengthens coherence between political, security, development, human rights and rule of law activities, and addresses the underlying causes of each conflict.” Peacebuilding, in other words, should now be conceived as an integrated and coherent agenda involving mutually reinforcing development and security-related policies (UNSC, 2011; see also UNDP, 1994).
States have thus adapted their foreign policy to make development aid and security operations coherent tools aimed at similar politico-strategic goals. The “militarization of development aid” (Hook and Lebo, 2010), and the “securitization” of aid (Woods, 2005) and peacebuilding (Newman, 2010) have now become entrenched norms in Western-led peace initiatives. This is not only due to the broader meaning of “security,” but of security policies as well, now encompassing both “soft” and “hard” power strategies. In fact, the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have led to a surge of interest towards counterinsurgency, which is increasingly being confused with “robust peacebuilding” (Gilmore, 2011), thereby conceptually and operationally blending together two formerly very distinct state policies: war and aid.

While the interdependence between official development aid (ODA) and security is becoming a given in international relations – though a criticized one (Audet, Desrosiers, and Roussel, 2008; Gilmore, 2011) – it has not received sufficient attention in terms of foreign policy analysis. When have military operations and development assistance policies become integrated foreign policy tools? For what politico-strategic purposes? Despite a significant literature on human security, failed and failing states, peacebuilding, humanitarian wars, and even foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy, the relationship between ODA and the use of military force as converging tools of statecraft remains under-analyzed.

The purpose of this paper is to propose an integrated analytic framework for understanding the relationship between ODA policies and military interventions from a foreign policy perspective. Since we are interested in both the conceptual link and its application on the ground, we conduct our inquiry through the concept of “strategic culture.” The main hypothesis associated with this concept is that collectively held ideas have a significant impact on foreign policy, because they shape the way a group conceives and addresses issues related to the use of force as a means to settle international disputes. The strategic culture perspective allows us to highlight the “security purposes” of foreign aid programs, as well as the “developmental purposes” of military operations. Using a constructivist approach to strategic culture, which focuses on how national cultures and identities constitute national interests and the appropriate means to pursue them, we suggest three main foreign policy strategies on the security-development continuum: foreign aid as a means to prevent future military action or violence escalation, as a better-suited alternative to the use of force in the attainment of states’ national objectives, and as a complement to military action for similar political objectives.

After presenting the analytical framework, we apply it to Canadian foreign policy. Why Canada? That country has taken part in 53 peace operations since 1948 (including every UN peacekeeping missions during the Cold War), as well as five wars since 1945, in Korea, the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya. Yet it remains mostly perceived as a pacific country, reluctant to use force to settle international conflicts (Massie and Roussel, 2008). Another deeply held myth is that of Canada as a generous and active ODA contributor. Yet despite tales that Canadians love to tell themselves (see Noël, Thérien, and Dallaire, 2003), their government has never (or rarely and barely) reached the 0.7% objective of the GNI dedicated to foreign aid (Pratt, 1989, 1994). Finally, in the last decade, the Canadian government has adopted an integrated approach towards international conflicts, formalizing the security-development nexus. This approach, formerly called “3D” (for “defence”, “diplomacy”, and “development”) and now labeled “whole of government” approach, institutionalized a formal connection between security and certain development activities. Yet, a systematic and historical analysis reveals,
somewhat counter-intuitively, that a complementary approach to ODA and military interventions has been pursued well before the advent of the “3D” approach, meaning that Canada’s strategic culture predisposes the country to allocate significant ODA to the states where it deploys military troops.

I. Foreign aid and strategic culture

The concept of strategic culture has both cognitive and “contextual” constitutive elements (Haglund and Massie, 2010). The first refer to the “integrated system of symbols (i.e., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs” (Johnston, 1995, p.36-37). The second include state identities and habits of behavior; that is, how particular states have acted in the past, as well as how these actions are based on “the way they are” (Gray, 1999). The concept of strategic culture can thus be defined as a semi-permanent and consistent set of ideas (values, beliefs, symbols, memories) and practices regarding the use of force and military institutions, held by a group (usually, but not necessarily, a state).1

This definition rests on a constructivist understanding of two key concepts: culture and identity. Regarding the former, we follow Clifford Geertz, who regards culture as consisting in “socially established structures of meaning in terms of which people do ... things” (quoted in Kelly, 1979, p. 12; see also Wendt, 1999, p. 141; Badie and Smouts, 1999, p. 25). Geertz’s definition has the advantage of encompassing both cognitive and contextual dimensions of strategic culture, as well as the value of highlighting the fact that culture generates motivational and behavioral dispositions. It thus speaks directly to the notion of identity. Indeed, despite the definitional fuzziness surrounding it, the concept of identity can be said to refer to “images of individuality and distinctiveness (‘selfhood’) held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant ‘others’” (Jepperson et al., 1996, p.59). These self-understandings, according to Wendt, generate “motivational and behavioral dispositions” (Wendt, 1999, p.224), which lead states to adopt unique foreign policies.

Given constructivism’s assumption that state identities shape states’ foreign policies, the concept must be further analyzed. Identity is composed of “intrinsic” elements, such as religion, ethnicity and language (Brass, 1974; Wendt, 1994, p. 385), as well as “social” elements, including national roles (Walker, 1987; Chafeetz et al., 1997). This means, for instance, that Canada’s unique ethnocultural background, such as the fact that it was founded by two nations (Great Britain and France), should significantly shape its foreign policy (Massie, forthcoming). Indeed, states seek domestic and international recognition of their collective individuality (Abdelal et al., 2006, p.697). The quest for status that follows means that states “strive to achieve a positively distinctive identity” (Larson and Schevchenko, 2010, p.66). For instance, Canada has traditionally sought to be recognized as a reliable ally to its traditional allies, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France (Holmes, 1968, p.300; Sokolsky, 1990, p.213-15; Welsh, 2004, p.152), as well as a “good international citizen” by the international community (Cooper et al., 1993, p.19; Sjolander and Trevenen, 2010).

1 For similar understandings of strategic culture, see Longhurst (2004), Sondhause (2006, Roussel and Morin (2007).
Identity can be further dissected as being composed of constitutive norms (rules defining group membership), social purposes (the group’s goals), relational comparisons (e.g. what the group is not), and cognitive models (worldviews and understandings of group interests) (Abdelal et al., 2006, p.696). The interaction of these identity elements will shape a state’s foreign policy in unique ways. More specifically, it provides meaning to national interests, allows the establishment of a hierarchy of state preferences, and helps define the optimal strategies to achieve them (Hudson, 2007, p.7-15). In other words, the concept of strategic culture assumes that state identity shapes foreign policy, particularly with regards to the use of military force. To paraphrase Geertz, nationally-held and practiced strategic cultures link state identity and foreign policy in a coherent and consistent structure of meaning in terms of which states act. This understanding of strategic culture implies that, if conceived broadly enough, it can also apply to those state policies that interact closely with the use of force, including development aid. It further implies that, to understand the nexus between these two tools of statecraft, one must analyze the identity-based and culturally-structured motivations and objectives of states’ foreign policies. Let us discuss these two implications in more detail.

Conceived as a tool of foreign policy (Palmer, Wohlander and Morgan, 2002), foreign assistance cannot but be influenced by the “motivational and behavioral dispositions” generated by state cultures and identities. After all, ODA remains a private good allocated on the basis of donor’s national interests and values, and is to achieve goals that may vary significantly from one donor to another. With regards to security policies, we see three types of development assistance strategies being pursued by states, depending on their strategic cultures. First, foreign aid was, for much of the Cold War period, treated as a preventive tool. The conventional wisdom was that the allocation of aid served to achieve security goals, such as the preservation of the West’s spheres of influence against the Soviet Union, or the prevention of conflict initiation and/or escalation (Spicer, 1966; Arnold, 1985; Gilpin, 1987; Berthelemy and Tichit, 2004; Boschini and Olofsgard, 2007). Western states were thus criticized for using ODA as an operational (immediate), rather than structural (long-term) preventive tool, and to combat communism rather than poverty (Schraeder, Taylor, and Hook, 1998; Marriott and Carment, 2006; Menkhaus, 2006). Notwithstanding the value of those criticisms, contemporary understandings of peacebuilding insist that development assistance is an essential tool to prevent conflicts and promote lasting and sustainable peace (Pugh, 2000; Jeong, 2005). As a policy statement from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) notes:

Where tensions have not escalated into violence, a great number of possible measures can be geared to help defuse the potential for violent conflict. These range from more traditional areas of assistance, such as economic growth and poverty reduction programmes, to democratization, good governance (including justice and security systems) and respect for human rights (DAC, 1997, p.3).

It should thus not be surprising if ODA continues to be used in the post-Cold War period as a conflict prevention measure, albeit aimed towards more liberal than realist policy goals.

2 This logic rests on the methodological necessity to establish concomitant variations, i.e. some consistent links between the reasoning of decision-makers and the actions undertaken by the state through time and space. See George and Bennett (2005, p. 205-232), Klotz and Lynch (2007, p.29-30), Lindemann (2008, p. 31). We follow that methodology by identifying consistencies (or lack thereof) between Canadian official statements on foreign policy, defence, and development aid, Canadian military interventions, as well as Canada’s top 10 ODA recipient countries.
again depending on the states’ strategic cultures. In other words, “softer,” rather than “harder” security policies are being pursued by states adopting a preventive security strategy.

A second strategy consists in resorting to foreign aid as an independent tool, geared towards goals unrelated to security. ODA, from this perspective, represents a substitute to military force, used according to its own logic, and aimed at other political, economic, or social objectives, such as alleviating poverty for its own sake (Belloni, 2007). If adopted, this strategy would mean that the security-development nexus has not been implemented, explicitly or tacitly, into states’ foreign policies. Hence, rather than “securitizing” aid, states would pursue substitute objectives, such as poverty reduction, gender equality or economic development. Only indirectly unintentionally would these objectives contribute to peace and security (Miller, 1992).

Finally, a third strategy entails the exact opposite of substitution: ODA is deliberately used simultaneously and in coordination with the use of military force in a (post-)conflict zone, towards the common political objectives. This complementary strategy is precisely what the DAC recommended in its 1997 policy statement: “Where organized armed violence has wound down but where it is still unclear if the situation will again deteriorate, it is important to move beyond saving lives to saving livelihoods, and at the same time help transform a fragile process into a sustainable, durable peace in which the causes of conflict are diminished and incentives for peace are strengthened” (DAC, 1997, p.3). This strategy, sometimes labeled “humanitarian war,” is today facing similar critiques to operational preventive strategies during the Cold War. Examining the case of US aid provided to Afghanistan, Mark Moyar (2011) observes for instance that “development spending has done little to increase popular support for the [Afghan] government, casting doubt on the counterinsurgency and development theories that have inspired this spending.”

According to our analytical framework, the choice between these three strategies is significantly shaped by a state’s identity-based strategic culture. Canadian development assistance has, according to many analysts, oscillated between the pursuit of material self-interests, altruistic goals, and identity promotion (Nossal, 1988; Thérien, 1989; Pratt 1994a, 1999; Morrison 1998; Noël et al. 2004). It is thus worth examining the state’s strategic culture, which is arguably associated with “liberal internationalism” (Roussel and Robichaud, 2004; Massie, 2007). Analysts have proposed variants and subcategories, such as “humane internationalism” (Pratt, 1989, 2000), offensive and defensive internationalism, and Western-oriented rather than universal internationalism, also known as Atlanticism (Massie, 2009). Yet all of these share some common ground, centered on five broad precepts: a sense of responsibility to actively take part in world affairs, the virtue of Western-led multilateralism, a will to commit significant domestic resources to international affairs, and faith in liberal international institutions, including international law and free market (Nossal, Roussel, and Paquin, 2011, p.136).

An internationalist strategic culture holds that Canada's internal character (e.g., multiculturalism, peacefulness, democracy, the rule of law) shapes its external identities as a "good international citizen" and "not America." The associated international security policy should thus be characterized by valuing certain universal moral principles, such as the protection of human rights and the promotion of democracy (Nossal, 1998-99; Roussel and Robichaud, 2004; Mackenzie, 2007). The use of military force should be of last resort, respectful of international law, and multilateral, ideally following a United Nations mandate. While serving
these “enlightened” national interests, an internationalist strategic culture also tends to reinforce the identities from which it stems, that is, Canada as a reliable Western ally, and an active, distinctive, cosmopolitan world player – implicitly referred to by the notion of middlepowerhood (Chapnick, 2000; Massie and Roussel, 2008; Massie, 2009).

In terms of ODA, internationalism implies that Canada shares a sense of responsibility to allocate a significant portion of its public resources to ODA, to support a liberal, Western-led international order, and to reflect Canada’s ethnocultural identity (Thérien, 1989). Foreign aid is thus often conceived as an expression of the generosity of a society, a belief in the welfare of others and social global justice, as well as a commitment to international stability and harmony. Canada’s foreign aid policy is thus expected to have followed the international ODA regime’s evolving norms, ranging from anti-communist preventive measures, to purely socio-economic development (of donors and/or beneficiaries), and now to an integrated “3D” policy vis-à-vis failed and failing states (Jacquet, 2002, p.123-39). It is furthermore expected to have strived to raise Canada’s status abroad as an active, distinctive, and reliable world actor. An historical examination of the security-development nexus in Canadian foreign policy broadly supports this expectation, but with a noteworthy caveat: a complementarity strategy has been significantly preferred over its two alternatives, decades before its official formalization, albeit in a non-linear fashion.

II. 1945-1960: Modest preventive tool

While not a proper white paper, the first comprehensive statement about Canadian foreign policy is the “Gray Lecture,” delivered in January 1947 by then Minister of Foreign Affairs (and Prime minister from 1948 to 1957) Louis St. Laurent. In this speech, St. Laurent exposed five basic principles of Canadian foreign policy: national unity, political liberty, the rule of law, the values of Christian civilization, and the acceptance of international responsibility (St. Laurent, 1947). He also recalled that Canadian foreign policy must be based on “values which lay emphasis on the importance of the individual, on the place of moral principles in the conduct of human relations, on standards of judgment which transcend mere material well-being” (Ibid. p.5). The Gray Lecture thus provided a first rationale for foreign aid: to create a favorable, stable environment for international trade, and hence for Canadians themselves: “the continued prosperity and well-being of our own people can best be served by the prosperity and well being of the whole world” (Ibid. p.10). In other words, as a trading nation, it is in Canada’s national interest to foster a stable political and economic international environment; foreign aid represents a means to achieve this end, while pursuing, at the same time, some moral humanitarian principles, based on Canada’s Christian and liberal values. In this spirit, Western Europe and China were the first countries to receive Canadian foreign aid. The primary objective was to prevent these countries from falling into the USSR’s growing sphere of influence (Bossuat, 1992, p.67-91; Cortright, 1997, p.293), while at the same time supporting Canada’s commercial interests. Indeed, the European Recovery Program (also called the Marshall Plan) allowed Canada to sell over a billion dollars worth of manufactured goods and raw materials in the first two years of operation (Bothwell, 1998, p.58).

3 Kim Richard Nossal (1988) adds bureaucratic interests and budget constraints to the list of determinants guiding Canada’s development assistance program. Our analytical framework allows for these factors to influence the level of ODA allocated, but neither its main politico-strategic purposes nor its primary recipient countries.
In the following years, it became clear that Canada privileged a preventive strategy rather than a purely substitutive one aimed at its own economic development. During the 1950s, Canadian aid was essentially directed toward South East Asian countries. The first concerted effort was the Colombo Plan. Established at the 1950 meeting of the Commonwealth foreign ministers (the U.S. and Japan were also part of the donors’ program), it sought to improve “the economic development and raising the standards of living of all the countries and territories in South and Southeast Asia” (Cermakian, 1968, p.226-27). Canadian aid focused on three Indian subcontinent countries: Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India, and Pakistan (Dobell, 1988, p.353). This emphasis reflected more a commitment to the “new Commonwealth” than any economic rationale. In the context of the Communist victory in China, the emergence of guerrillas in French Indonesia and, later, the Korean War, the purpose of this aid program was to promote stability in societies plagued with poverty and viewed as vulnerable to Communist influence.

In other words, foreign aid was conceived as a preventive means to regional or world conflicts, as well as the reflection of Canada’s British origins and anti-communist stance. Indeed, the former British Caribbean countries soon followed South East Asian states as primary beneficiaries of Canadian aid, beginning in 1958 (Thérien, 1989, p.330). Between 1950 and 1970, up to 85% of Canada’s ODA was targeted at former British colonies (Pelletier, 1971, p.42). And when, in the late 1950s, Ghana and other African Commonwealth states were added to Canada’s list of aid beneficiaries, the rationale was that Canada, because of its non-colonial past, was better positioned than the U.K. and the U.S. to ensure they remain within the Western sphere of influence (Matthews, 1976, p.89).

Yet Canada’s aid program remained modest, to say the least. In 1950, development assistance amounted to only 0.13% of Canada’s GNI (gross national income). Ten years later, it had risen only to 0.16%. These figures cast doubts on the level of strategic thought behind Canada’s apparent conflict prevention strategy. As Keith Spicer (1966, p.3) put it: “Canada launched her development aid programme in 1950 with virtually no policy aim beyond a lively anti-Communist instinct and an exhilarating vision of a free, multi-racial Commonwealth.” This highlights the fact that foreign aid was not considered an essential, if important tool at all, in the statecraft box. At best, foreign aid was seen as an instrument to prevent allies to fall in the opposite camp, as the Marshall plan did for Western Europe, and Canada could thus “free-ride” on Anglo-American foreign aid policies, while benefiting from the newly acquired status of allied aid donor, and projecting its multicultural, cosmopolitan identity abroad.

It is worth noting that, primarily aimed at conflict prevention, Canada’s ODA went hand-in-hand with its newly found international security role: peacekeeping. Ottawa agreed to take part in three United Nations’ military observation operations in the Middle East (the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization, UNTSO, in 1948), the Kashmir area (the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, UNMOGIP, in 1949), and Lebanon (the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon, UNOGIL, in 1958). Canada was also instrumental to the establishment of the United Nations’ first peacekeeping mission (the United Nations Emergency

---

4 For the period 1945-59, we rely on secondary sources for estimates of Canadian ODA due to the absence of statistical data from the OECD.

5 All data pertaining to Canadian military operations in this article is drawn from Canada’s “Operation database” website (Canada, 2009), as well as www.canadiansoldiers.com.
Force in Egypt, UNEF I, 1956-67), mandated to secure peace following the Israeli and Franco-British military invasions, by commanding the mission and deploying a thousand troops in the region. While Canadian ODA policy did not target Lebanon or other Middle Eastern states during that period, Pakistan and India were Canada’s top two recipient countries. It is also worth noting that, despite actively taking part in the Korean War (1950-53), with 27,000 Canadians deployed overseas, South Korea only began receiving Canadian ODA in 1964. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that Canada’s aid policy was primarily aimed at conflict prevention, but the complementarity between its aid and military commitments in India and Pakistan remains noteworthy, as it indicates a predisposition towards an integrated security-development approach in Canadian foreign policy, despite any official statement to that effect.

**III. 1961-1967: Expansion, status enhancement, and conflict prevention**

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Canadian aid programs grew significantly. Decolonization in Africa and in the Caribbean exacerbated concerns pertaining to Communist influence in these newly independent countries. Targeted first to new Commonwealth members (e.g., Ghana, Nigeria, Malaysia), Canadian development assistance was extended to French-speaking countries in Africa in 1961, and was mostly motivated by conflict prevention and status enhancement rationales.

Under Pearson’s liberal government (elected in 1963), the level of ODA dedicated to French-speaking Africa area significantly increased. Budgets for Francophone countries in Africa were raised from $300 000 to $4 millions. Whereas Canadian bilateral aid to India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka amounted to 95% of Canadian ODA in 1962-63, French-speaking African states received 8% of Canadian aid by the mid-1960s, in contrast to 5% for Latin American countries. “It was a logical step to take in view of Canada's bilingual and bicultural character,” noted Canada’s External Aid Office in 1967 (Cermakian, 1968, p.231). The most important incentive was, after 1965, to counter French-speaking province of Quebec’s growing activity in the region, and thus reaffirm Canada’s status as a sovereign and bicultural state. National unity was Pearson’s central concern (Sabourin, 1976; Carty and Smith, 1981, p.59-60; Morrisson, 1998, p.75-76; Gendron, 2006). Foreign aid was conceived by the new Prime Minister as an important tool for nation-building in the sense that it was aimed at showing French-speaking Canadians that their country’s (and not Quebec’s) foreign policy was serving and representing their specific (French) interests by establishing strong relationships with French-speaking countries. In fact, Canada and France began coordinating their aid programmes to French-speaking Africa in 1966 (Cermakian, 1968, p.231).

The expansion of Canada’s development assistance programs to French-speaking Africa took place alongside greater peacekeeping commitments. In addition to ongoing participation in three UN operations in the Kashmir area (UNMOGIP) and the Middle-East (UNTSO and UNEF), Ottawa committed troops to six new peacekeeping missions. It maintained its significant military presence in Great Britain’s sphere of influence with participation in the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM, 1963-64), the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNIFCYP, 1964-present), and the United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM, 1965-66). Canada also committed token troops to United Nations Temporary Executive Authority/United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (1962-63) and the Mission of the Representative of the UN Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (1965-66).
More significantly, Canada deployed military troops for the first time in French-speaking Africa, with up to 500 servicemen operating in the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC, 1960-64). Two key factors contributed to Canada’s military involvement in the first “second-generation” peacekeeping operation: Canada’s bilingualism and reliable ally status. As Kevin Spooner argues: “Because some peacekeepers were bilingual, the cabinet also recognized that they were uniquely suited to UN service in the Congo” (Spooner, 2009, p.60). The second factor relates to the mission’s mandate. On France’s recommendation, Canada was asked to provide bilingual troops to a UN force which would help restore order in Congo, notably vis-à-vis the separatist threat of the Belgium-supported Province of Katanga. But as Sean Maloney observes, Canada’s military contribution was also aimed at preventing NATO split, Soviet infiltration and American involvement in the region. Canada thus acted “as a Western surrogate in the Congo matter” (Maloney, 2002, p.116). Furthermore, ODA followed a similar logic. Canadian officials agreed that “any aid money from North America would be funneled through the UN to maintain the appearance of impartiality ... [and] highlight Soviet machinations when they provided aid to the Congo” (Ibid. p.115).

Nevertheless, it is not clear that foreign aid acquired a new status as a complementary instrument to the use of force in the 1960s. From 0.16% of the GNI in 1960, the sums dedicated to these programs were raised to only 0.19% in 1965, 0.41% in 1970, and to an historical record of 0.54% in 1975 (OECD, 2010a). Yet this substantial increase was made according to a conflict prevention security policy, despite growing contributions to UN peacekeeping missions. Indeed, according to the 1964 White paper on Defense:

Communist pressure, including the active fomenting and support of so-called “wars of liberation” in less-developed areas may well continue to intensify. In such areas, instability will probably continue in the decade ahead and call for containment measures which do not lend themselves to Great Powers of Alliance action. The peacekeeping responsibilities devolving upon the United Nations can expected to grow correspondingly (Canada, 1964, p.80).

This implies that the Canadian government was ready to contribute to peacekeeping missions in order to avoid direct involvement from great powers. It would thus contribute to preventing the escalation of regional tensions into world-wide conflicts, through its security and ODA policies. Indeed, despite Canadian military involvement in Yemen, West New Guinea, and the Dominican Republic, none of these regions received Canadian ODA. However, while Canadian troops were deployed in the Middle East and Kashmir areas, India and Pakistan remained Canada’s top two ODA recipients, with over a billion dollars worth of aid allocated to India and $617 millions to Pakistan (between 1961-67); Israel received $15 millions in 1963-64. But ODA to Israel ceased in the following years, and development aid allocated to India and Pakistan was part of the 1950 Western Colombo plan aimed at preventing Soviet expansionism. Therefore, while we must note the correlation between Canadian military involvement in the Kashmir area and ODA to India and Pakistan, the nature of the former (UN military observation),

6 The top 10 recipients in 1960 were India, Pakistan, the West Indies, Sri Lanka, Chile, Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Cambodia. In 1965, as the top 10 recipients were India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Mexico, Nigeria, Malaysia, Ghana, Chile, the West Indies, and Brazil (OECD, 2010b).
7 These statistics are in constant 2009 USD. See OECD (2010b).
the continued aid to these two countries (both received substantial Canadian ODA from 1950 to 2009), the nature of the Colombo plan, as well as the absence of any Canadian strategic thought specifically linking peacekeeping to ODA tend to indicate the prevalence of a conflict prevention strategy in the 1960s.

Canadian aid to French-speaking Africa also tends to support this conclusion. Congo (Kinshasa) received token aid in 1960, and none until 1965, that is, after the withdrawal of Canadian Forces from the country. Moreover, with Ottawa’s need to project its bicultural status internationally in the face of Quebec’s “paradiplomacy” (Nossal, Roussel, and Paquin, 2007, p.553-600), former French colonies (e.g., Morocco, Tunisia, Cameroun, Congo-Brazzaville, Senegal, Togo, etc.) began receiving Canadian foreign assistance. This expanded ODA policy remained part of Canada’s overall anti-Communist, internationalist foreign policy (Gendron, 2006). It meant Ottawa was now willing to expand both geographically and financially its ODA “concentration areas” (Thérien, 1989, p.329) outside Anglo-American spheres of influence.

IV. 1968-1976: The articulation of Canada’s first security-development policy

While the early 1960s witnessed a significant increase in the budget dedicated to development assistance – which continued through the 1970s to reach its peak in 1975 – it is not before the end of the decade that a clear vision of its function as a security instrument was finally articulated. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was created in 1968, and the first white paper published two years later. Among the latter’s central themes was that communism could not be defeated by the sole virtue of hard power; soft power was also needed. This was first expressed in 1969 in a CIDA memorandum exposing one of the central goals of Canadian foreign aid program: “to establish within recipient countries those political attitudes or commitments, military alliances or military bases that would assist Canada or Canada’s western allies to maintain reasonably stable and secure international political system” (Pratt, 1994, p.340, note 28). The idea was hardly new, but it nevertheless represented a major strategic change, formally and officially articulating a security-development policy focused on an integrated conflict prevention strategy.

Soon after his election in 1968, Prime Minister Trudeau exposed his foreign policy objectives. The main objective of foreign aid was to encourage the economic and social development of developing countries (Canada, 1970, p.11), an international projection of Canada’s social justice system (Noël and Thérien, 1995). As liberal-internationalists, Canadians perceived themselves as “good international citizens,” with interests similar to those of the international community, both in terms of security and prosperity. “The values of Canadian society, as well as the future prosperity and security of Canadians, are closely and inextricably linked to the future of the wider world community of which we are a part.” In addition, the Trudeau government sought to allocate equal ODA to French-speaking and English-speaking African states, and reiterated Canada’s longstanding motivation in this regard: enhancing “our sense of internal unity and purpose” (Canada, 1970, 9-11). Given the substantial increases of Canadian ODA, notably towards least developed countries, the 1970s have thus been labeled the “Golden Age” of Canadian development assistance (Brown, 2008).

Nevertheless, ODA’s relationship with security remained crucial. According to the booklet on development, a reduction in the development effort would have “tragic consequences for
peace and global order” (Ibid, p.8). The 1971 White paper on Defense added that Canadian Forces “can also give support to foreign policy objectives through increased assistance in economic aid programs” through their capabilities in “such fields as engineering and construction, logistic policies, trades and technical training, advisory services, project analysis and air transport” (Canada, 1971, p.14). This statement is, \textit{a posteriori}, crucial. The defense assets are now conceived as supplementing the development programs. Thus, during that period, Canadian foreign aid kept its conflict prevention orientation in Canadian strategic thinking, but the first step toward a complementary approach was laid, conceptually, albeit without any reference to Canada aid and military commitments in India, Pakistan, and the Middle East.

Canada not only maintained its UN military commitments in Cyprus (UNICYP) and the Kashmir area (UNMOGIP), it significantly increased its presence in the Middle East, through participation in three new peacekeeping operations (in addition to UNTSO): the UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force), established in 1974 to preserve peace between Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights; the UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon), mandated in 1978 to secure peace following Israel’s withdrawal of Lebanon and support the Lebanese government; and, mostly notably, the UNEFME (United Nations Emergency Force, Middle East), through which more than a thousand Canadians helped preserve the cease-fire following the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Yet besides budget increases, Canadian ODA policy remained relatively stable. It continued to oscillate between a preventive and complementary strategy vis-à-vis conflict resolution. Ottawa did not allocate development aid to Middle Eastern countries until 1976, when Egypt was added to Canada’s beneficiaries’ list (as well as others, including Mozambique and Sudan). In 1981, so did Lebanon and Jordan. The Indian subcontinent remained Canada’s primary ODA concentration area, with India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (following its independence in 1972) among Canada’s top aid recipients. French-speaking African states continued to rank among Canada’s top 10 ODA beneficiaries. French-speaking African states continued to rank among Canada’s top 10 ODA beneficiaries. \footnote{The top ten ODA recipients were, in 1970: India, Pakistan, Turkey, Ghana, Nigeria, Tunisia, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Guinea, and Algeria. In 1975, they were: India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Ghana, Niger, Tunisia, East African Community, and Malawi (OECD, 2010b).} And most notably, Indonesia was added to Canada’s ODA concentration areas in 1972, mostly in order to prevent communist influence in the region, and to maintain stability following the United States’ withdrawal from the country (Nossal, 1980, p.226-27). In other words, in spite of the complementary approach invoked in the 1971 defense white paper, and the fact that its aid and military policies were increasingly working in parallel on the Indian subcontinent and in the Middle East, Canada’s ODA policy continued to focus on conflict prevention, while emphasizing the country’s reliable Western ally and bicultural status.

\textbf{IV. 1977-1992: Trade and human rights as substitutes}

Brian Mulroney’s Conservative government (1984-1993) upset the country’s security-development emerging policy. Among the government’s top ODA objectives during that period was to open new markets for Canadian business. While the discourse made some reference to the altruistic values of the Canadian society, foreign aid was increasingly conceived as a tool to
promote global and Canadian prosperity, and as a secondary tool (after the promotion of human rights) to prevent conflict initiation and escalation.

In fact, the move towards economic goals began with the arrival of Michel Dupuy at CIDA in 1977. The new president marked a significant shift from the Agency’s previous official ODA strategy, which officially focused on three traditional development goals: to assist least developed states, to focus on basic needs, and to concentrate aid on fewer recipients (CIDA, 1975). Dupuy added to these priorities yet another substitute development goal: economic prosperity (Economic Council of Canada, 1978; Freeman, 1980, p.808-9; Pratt, 1994b, p.5-6). But in 1980, Canada’s top 10 ODA recipients remained for the most part the same as in the 1970s. The Mulroney government thus maintained the pressure on CIDA to accelerate its shift towards economic prosperity. The Agency’s 1984 policy statement responded by emphasizing the fact that, as trading competitors were growing in number, Canada’s ODA programs needed to foster greater Canadian access to new international markets (CIDA, 1984, p.3; 1987, p.14-15).

A substitution strategy thus often took precedence over its security-related alternatives. And in addition to trade interests, the Mulroney government added a new concern: human rights. CIDA’s 1987 strategy exposed four rationales for development assistance programs:

1. Economic and social progress are creating essential condition for peace and global stability on the long run;
2. Foreign aid contributes to the respect of human rights, broadly defined;
3. Foreign aid is reinforcing international cooperation and social cohesion;
4. Prosperity and welfare in Canada are deeply linked with global prosperity (CIDA, 1987).

These four rationales echoed the classical liberal internationalism in Canadian foreign policy, revamped under the so-called “New internationalism” of the Conservatives. While the fourth rationale reflected the emphasis on trade as a substitute to security-related aid purposes, the first directly addressed the conflict prevention strategy. The 1987 policy statement notably added in this regard that poverty reduction is a prerequisite to peace and, hence, development must be understood as a necessary condition for greater international security (CIDA, 1987, p.90).

The second rationale is an indication of new strategic thinking. Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, human rights gained in importance in Canadian foreign policy. Among others, promoting human rights was gradually perceived as a means to achieve strategic goals while avoiding direct military confrontation – hence a preventive tool (in its own right) to the use of force, and a substitute to ODA. The idea emerged gradually during the negotiations over the “third basket” (cooperation on human dimensions) at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, 1973-75) and its follow-up meetings in Belgrade (1977-78), Madrid (1980-83) and Vienna (1986-89). Considered modest in the early stages, Soviet concessions on human rights were perceived in the early 1980s as a “Trojan horse” that would change the Soviet political and social regime from the inside. Thus by the mid-1980s, human

---

9 In 1980, the top 10 recipients were: Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, India, Tanzania, Egypt, Cameroun, Sahel, Turkey, and Indonesia (OECD, 2010b). Cameroun, Sahel, and Turkey were thus new top beneficiaries.
rights had become a central piece of the Mulroney government’s foreign policy, in particular the “crusade” against the Apartheid in South Africa (Black, 2001). Promoting human rights was then a substitute to ODA as a conflict prevention tool aimed at fostering peace and stability.

If, in terms of official policy statements, substitution took precedence over conflict prevention, the latter remained relevant at the operational level. African and Caribbean Commonwealth states as well as French-speaking African countries remained Canada’s top ODA beneficiaries, in addition to Indonesia. Illustrating the growing trade concerns, China began receiving Canadian ODA in 1981, and was the 5th top recipient in 1989. On the other hand, exemplifying the continued anti-communist security concerns, El Salvador – the third largest recipient of U.S. ODA in 1985 – saw its aid substantially increase from 1980 to 1988, as well as Grenada, following the U.S. 1983 invasion (OECD, 2010b). Canada’s ODA policy thus remained a soft power tool helping sustain the liberal politico-military order defended by the West against the Soviet Union (Thérien, 1989, p.319). As a Parliamentary committee report put it regarding Central America: “Programs of international economic assistance and the peace process should move together in tandem and reinforce one another at every step along the way” (House of Commons, 1988, p.22).

A security-development complementary approach continued as well, although still under-conceptualized. Numerous examples illustrating this include the following:

- Lebanon was targeted by CIDA following Canada’s military involvement in the country in 1978, and throughout (and after) the 1982-84 Western multinational force.
- Canadian ODA to Afghanistan resumed following the USSR’s withdrawal from the country in 1988, as Canadian military personnel took part in the 1988-90 United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP).
- Canada’s participation in the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in 1989 coincided with a significant increase of ODA allocated to Namibia that year, from $150 000 to $2 million (2009 constant USD).


---

10 The top ten ODA recipients in 1985 were: Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Niger, Tanzania, Senegal, and Kenya. In 1990, they were: Bangladesh, Indonesia, SADCC, Pakistan, China, Jamaica, Cameroun, Ghana, Tanzania, and Morocco (OECD, 2010b).

In other words, despite a conceptual shift from preventive to substitutive rationales in Canadian official statements, Canada’s actual aid and military policies indicate an undeniable preference over complementary and, to a lesser extent, preventive strategies. This noteworthy trend, it must be reminded, began years before its official conceptualization as “human security,” and coincided with Canada’s increasing military troop deployment in ever more post-Cold War peace operations.

VI. 1993-2000: Formalizing the peacebuilding complementary approach

The 1990s witnessed two significant changes. First, after a brief period of euphoria following the end of the Cold War (due not only to the changes in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, but also to the victory of the multinational coalition that liberated Kuwait), the war in Yugoslavia and the multiplication of sources of tension in Europe and elsewhere raised new concerns. “Crisis prevention and management” became the new international priority. Canada was thus asked to contribute to numerous newly created UN and NATO peace operations. The second change was purely domestic: the fight against public debt and deficit became a major issue in Canada. The impact on development programs was immediate and drastic. Between 1992 and 2001, the percentage of GNI allocated to ODA was cut by more than half, from 0.46% to 0.22% (OECD, 2010a).

These changes set up the conditions for a reassessment of the nature of the relationship between security and foreign aid. In the 1991-1992 foreign policy review, the Mulroney government reaffirmed the security-development nexus. “The search for security underpins our foreign policy. Security is not an end but a means; without peace, order and stability, prosperity and development cannot occur” (Canada, 1993, p.87). In this context, the function of foreign aid was to “alleviate poverty as one of the root causes of political instability” (Ibid, p.92). At the end of Mulroney’s mandate, the conflict prevention strategy had thus reemerged conceptually. And the complementary approach still seemed to explain the choice of many top 10 ODA recipients, including ex-Yugoslavia, Egypt, and Mozambique (OECD, 2010b). Regarding the latter, Canadian troops took part in the 1992-94 United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), which sought to monitor to cease-fire in the country.

In its 1995 White paper of foreign affairs, the newly elected Chrétien government reaffirmed the now classical conflict prevention strategy. “Economic disparities within and among countries, if unchecked, will continue to be a powerful source of political, security and humanitarian crises” (Canada, 1995, p.2). But the most important conceptual step was to make a direct, immediate connection between security and development as complementary tools of statecraft.

More and more, the concept of security is focusing on economic, social and political needs of the individual. In tackling these issues, we will require clarity in our thinking
about the sources of each threat and problem, and about which combination of instruments – including development cooperation, trade liberalization and, if needs be, preventive diplomacy and peacemaking – is best available to address them. (...) The evidence is sadly clear, however, that development assistance is not enough to forestall conflict (Canada, 1995, p.3 and 26).

The 1995 policy statement paved the way to a very important concept, which was officially integrated in the Canadian official discourse in the months following the publication of the white paper: human security (see Gervais and Roussel, 1998). This concept focused on the security of individuals rather than that of states and encompassed various dimensions, including freedom from wants and from fears, as well as sustainable development. It is clearly related to liberal internationalism, since it rests on the rule of law, international responsibility and (Western) multilateral and institutional approaches (Axworthy, 1997; Nossal, Roussel, and Paquin, 2011, p.143-45).

While promoted by Lloyd Axworthy (appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1996) and mentioned in almost all foreign affairs publications from 1996 to 2000, the concept remained ill-defined, in the sense that it was never clear what was not related to human security. It attracted much criticism and generated many debates. Two of them are noteworthy. The first was about where development fit in this new conception of security. Many authors criticized the Canadian policy for being overly ambiguous and even contradictory on this issue (Pratt, 1999; Bumsumtwi-Sam, 2002). In fact, Canadian human security policy never focused on “freedom from wants,” as did countries like Japan. Instead, it was largely oriented toward “freedom from fears” (Paris, 2001, p. 90-91; Canada, 2002). Hence, the relationship between development and security was not clearly articulated as a complementary strategy towards specific common goals.

Second, Axworthy and his advisers were apparently very reluctant to address the issue of the use of force as a means to implement human security. The result was that the Canadian military never really integrated the concept since its place was never made clear within its strategic thought (Dewitt, 2004). It is only during the Kosovo war, when the use of force was instrumental to put a stop to massive ethnic cleansing, that the relationship was finally formally addressed, but it remained unclear and subject to criticism by those who pointed out the contradictions in the Canadian humanitarian and military agendas (Nelles, 2002). Indeed, according to the Minister, human security referred to, in 1996, “human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity” (Axworthy, 1996). But only three years later, the Canadian government believed that the basis for such understanding of human security, the 1994 UN Development Report (UNDP, 1994), was too broad and “made it unwieldy as a policy instrument” (DFAIT, 1999, p.3). Ottawa stressed that “in emphasizing the threats associated with underdevelopment, the [UNDP] report [had] largely ignored the continuing human insecurity resulting from violent conflict.” Distinct from human development, human security was now conceived as potentially involving “the use of coercive measures, including sanctions and military force, as in Bosnia and Kosovo” (DFAIT, 1999, p.4, and 7-8). In other words, “hard” security policies and “soft” development aid were now distinct but complementary parts of a post-conflict peace-building agenda (see Hynek and Bosold, 2009).
It is thus not surprising if Canada’s newly-crafted complementary strategy materialized on the ground. Throughout the period, Canadian Forces actively took part in several UN and NATO-led peace operations, concentrating the bulk of its troops in Rwanda, ex-Yugoslavia, Haiti, East Timor, and Ethiopia/Eritrea, in addition to the 1999 Kosovo war. But no obvious ODA policy shift was discernible in the mid-1990s. Ex-Yugoslavian states, Ethiopia and Rwanda, continued to receive steady development aid, ODA to Haiti slightly increased, and Timor-Leste was added to Canada’s list of aid recipients in 2000. But in 1995, none of them figured among Canada’s top-10 beneficiaries. This contrasts sharply with the major recipient countries in 2000. Ex-Yugoslavian states ranked first and Haiti fifth. The substantial development assistance increase allocated to the latter thus tends to illustrate the growingly complementary strategy adopted by the Chrétien government. Contrary to previous historical periods, Canadian authorities thus seemed, by the end of the 1990s, to have implemented a more coherent and consistent post-conflict peacebuilding strategy, effectively linking aid and military policies both conceptually and operationally. The broadening meaning of security and of peace operations had therefore contributed to making aid a central component of Canada’s conflict resolution policy.

**VII. 2001-present: The institutionalization of a complementary approach**

Many have argued that the attacks of 9/11 marked a shift towards the securitization of peacebuilding (Jacquet, 2002; Marclay, 2008). But the preceding analysis demonstrates that a development-security complementary approach had been at work in Canadian foreign policy years before 9/11, either conceptually, operationally, or both. Nevertheless, 9/11 did have an impact on Canada’s security-development strategy. First, having put an end to its public finance deficit, the Canadian government resumed its ODA budget to pre-austerity levels. Foreign aid amounted to 0.38% of Canada’s GNI in 1995, 0.25% in 2000, 0.34% in 2005, and 0.33% in 2010 (OECD, 2010a).

Second, the Canadian government was quick to react after 9/11, even if the relations between the Chrétien government and the Bush Administration were, to say the least, strained (Roussel, 2004). At home, Ottawa adopted new anti-terrorist legislations, reorganized its security apparatus, and increased its surveillance of the U.S.-Canada border. Abroad, it joined the coalition of the willing in Afghanistan, first through special operations and combat missions, then

---


12 In 1995, they were: Egypt, China, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Peru, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, India, the Philippines, and Zambia. In 2000, they were: Ex-Yugoslavia, China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, Haiti, Vietnam, the Philippines, Mali, and Pakistan (OECD, 2010b; CIDA, 2002, p.49).
in the Kabul area in 2003 for a peacekeeping operation, and later taking charge of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar while combating the Taliban insurgency in that province.

Third, the attacks of 9/11 marked a landmark in the conceptualization of the interdependence of security and development, around two broad assumptions: Poverty, and the frustration it creates, is among the major sources of terrorism; and failed and failing (i.e. impoverished) states provide a sanctuary and a recruitment ground for terrorism (Marclay, 2008). This conceptualization reinforced the coherence of the security-development nexus, and the complementary strategy that it entails. Indeed, Canada’s first major post-9/11 foreign policy review, the 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS), identified three purposes for foreign aid: (1) to prevent, at the socio-political level, conflicts from emerging, notably through the “responsibility to protect” rationale; (2) to complement military initiatives, according to the “three block war” or “3D” approaches; and (3) to allow Canada to make a distinctive and notable contribution to international peace and security. In other words, both conflict prevention and complementary strategies can further Canada’s status as an active, reliable, distinctive, and cosmopolitan world actor.

Thus while invoking Canadians’ belief in “helping those less fortunate than ourselves,” the IPS states: “Development has to be the first line of defense for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously. Combating poverty will not only save millions of lives but also strengthen States' capacity to combat terrorism, organized crime and proliferation. Development makes everyone more secure” (Canada, 2005, p.1). On the other hand, it reaffirms the soundness of a complementary approach to peacebuilding: “While development cooperation contributes to prosperity and security through long-term development which reduces poverty, it also provides support directly aimed at immediate needs for peace and security. As it has done in Haiti, Afghanistan and elsewhere, development cooperation will continue to be an integral part of the Government's response to crisis situations” (Canada, 2005, p.10).

It is thus not surprising that Afghanistan was Canada’s primary ODA recipient country as early as 2002.13 It was soon replaced, ranking second to Iraq in 2003, following the U.S.-U.K. invasion (CIDA, 2005, p.33). While Canada did not officially take part in this war, it contributed to the American war effort and supported the United States against Iraq. As former US Ambassador to Canada Paul Cellucci famously said: “Ironically, the Canadians indirectly provide more support for us in Iraq than most of the 46 countries that are fully supporting us.” Indeed, Canada’s indirect military contribution exceeded all but three members of the coalition of the willing (Engler, 2009, p.45). Other major Canadian military interventions also coincided with increased ODA allocation. They include the 1999-present MONUC/MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo/United Nations Stabilization Mission for the Democratic Republic of Congo); DRC was for the first time amongst Canada’s primary aid recipient countries soon after the deployment of military troops, in 2000, ranking 30th. In 2002, it ranked 8th, but was soon relegated to the 18th position in 2004 (CIDA, 2002, p.34; 2004, p.33; 2006, p.33). That same year, Canada took part in the 2004 Multinational Interim Force (MIF) and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Incidentally, Haiti was Canada’s primary ODA recipient country in 2004, as well as 2010 (following the 2010

---

13 It was followed by Bangladesh, Ethiopia, China, Vietnam, Tanzania, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, and Mali (CIDA, 2004, p. 33).
earthquake), and remained among the top four major beneficiaries in-between.\textsuperscript{14} The Canadian Forces are also active in Sudan since 2005. They provided support to the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), which is mandated to monitor the implementation of the 2005 peace agreement, as well as to the NATO-led logistical support mission to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Further demonstrating the prevalence of the complementary strategy, ODA allocated to Sudan suddenly increased that year, making the country Canada’s $5^{th}$ most important development assistance beneficiary (CIDA, 2008, p.39).

The Canadian Forces are also active in Sudan since 2005. They provided support to the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), which is mandated to monitor the implementation of the 2005 peace agreement, as well as to the NATO-led logistical support mission to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Further demonstrating the prevalence of the complementary strategy, ODA allocated to Sudan suddenly increased that year, making the country Canada’s $5^{th}$ most important development assistance beneficiary (CIDA, 2008, p.39).

The main example of the institutionalization of Canada’s complementary strategy remains Afghanistan (see Holland, 2010). Following the deployment of Canadian troops in the country in the fall of 2001, ODA to Afghanistan doubled every year from 2001-03, and again in 2005-07, following Canada’s return to Kandahar. To further illustrate this point, ODA increased from $6.66 million in 2000 to $345.39 million in 2007 (in 2009 constant USD); not among Canada’s 30 major recipient countries in 2001, in ranked 3$^{rd}$ in 2002, 2$^{nd}$ in 2004-6 and 2010, and 1$^{st}$ in 2003 and 2007-9 (OECD, 2010b). Throughout that period, Afghanistan remained by far Canada’s principal military operation overseas; it was Canada’s longest and most demanding war effort since Korea (1950-53).

The institutionalization of Canada’s security-development complementary strategy is mostly conceptualized in the country’s first (and only) 2008 counterinsurgency manual.\textsuperscript{15} The document states plainly:

As the deployment and manoeuvre of military forces cause insurgent activity and presence to be pre-empted, dislocated and disrupted in a new area, other agencies (but possibly the military initially) must undertake activities to relieve suffering, provide aid and essential services, address grievances and generally gain support for the campaign. Thus together, this will involve full-spectrum operations—simultaneous offensive, defensive and stability operations (Canada, 2008, p.5-22).

The document justifies the military’s role in providing not only humanitarian assistance, such as “emergency medical care, medical clinics in villages or neighbourhoods, repairs to schools or orphanages,” but also the “delivery of aid.” Indeed, in makes clear the distinction between humanitarian and development assistance, and instructs Canadian military personnel that “Quick-impact projects and humanitarian aid should address short-term needs and gain quick support for the campaign. Long-term development and its measured progress will have to be well advertised to local populations. In order to avoid initial delays in development, the campaign plan from the outset must include details for the sustainable development” (Ibid. 5-24 and 28). The likely military tasks within these domains include, among others, the provision of water, fuel and power, the restoration of health and public buildings and services, as well as interim governance of commercial support and economic institutions, education institutions and infrastructure, public

\textsuperscript{14} In 2004, Haiti was followed by Afghanistan, Indonesia, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Mozambique, Mali, Ghana, Tanzania, and Sri Lanka. In 2010, Canada’s top 10 recipient countries were: Haiti, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Ghana, Pakistan, Mali, Sudan, Mozambique, and Bangladesh (CIDA, 2006, p.33; 2011, p.3).

\textsuperscript{15} Yet the document states that Canada has been involved in at least six counterinsurgency missions, three of which took place in the 20$^{th}$ century: Siberia (1918-19), Haiti (2004), and Afghanistan (2001-present) (Canada, 2008, p.1-13).
civil service institutions (e.g. health, customs, media), as well as humanitarian assistance and aid distribution (Ibid. 5-24).

**Conclusion**

Canadian security-development policy broadly followed the evolving international norms and analytical expectations of conflict prevention during the Cold War and post-9/11 “3D” approach to “robust peacekeeping” (UN, 2009). However, in part because of its unique strategic cultural internationalist predisposition, it concentrated most of its conflict prevention strategy in the U.S., U.K. and France’s spheres of influence, and actively took part in many UN-led and NATO-led peace operations. It furthermore developed and applied a complementary approach to post-conflict peacebuilding decades before the attacks of 9/11, albeit in conjunction with a conflict prevention strategy, and only considered it secondary and ambiguously. Indeed, Canada’s complementary strategy unofficially began on the Indian subcontinent in 1948, but became both operationally and conceptually fully institutionalized during Canada’s war in Afghanistan.

This research thus showed that the interdependence between security and development was stronger, before 9/11, than conventional wisdom would have it. For only a brief period, more or less between 1977 and 1990, did Canadian authorities officially conceive and practiced development assistance as a substitutive tool towards goals unrelated to security concerns. The systematic, historical examination of the concomitant variations between ODA and military policies therefore demonstrates its added analytical value, as well as that of strategic cultural analysis of foreign policy. Indeed, Canada’s strategic culture predisposed it to adopt mostly conflict prevention ODA strategies during the Cold War and complementary ones towards contemporary peace operations. This, at a minimum, implies that the Canadian government is likely to allocate future ODA to states where it deploys military troops (currently, Afghanistan and Libya), unless it finds alternative ways to secure its status as a reliable cosmopolitan world actor. According to this conceptualization of Canadian foreign policy, international security and ODA are part of the same continuum. They represent different tools, complementing each other to reach the same goal: global stability through the promotion, enforcement, and maintenance of a Western-led liberal order.

The conceptualization of aid as a complement to military force is clearly a problem for those who are recalling the original, humanitarian purpose of development assistance. Foreign aid thus seems to have been deprived of its substance and literally “hi-jacked” from its original and traditional raison d’être. While we have not addressed the obvious ethical questions that this observation raises, it is clear that this trend will reinforce the defiance of those who claim that foreign aid is in fact serving first and foremost the strategic interests of the donors.
References


Axworthy, Lloyd, 1996, “Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy to a Meeting of the National Forum on Foreign Policy ‘Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World’,” Winnipeg, Manitoba, December 13.


Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 1987, To Benefit a Better World, Ottawa: Supply and Services.


Myths of good international citizens, protectors and the war in Afghanistan,” *Canadian foreign*


Turenne Sjolander, Claire and Kathryn Trevenen. 2010. “Constructing Canadian foreign policy:


