Weber’s Definition of the State as an Ethnographic Tool for Understanding the
Contemporary Political Science State of the Discipline

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Max Weber’s definition of the state as a human community that successfully
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory
(Weber 1946) is widely used in the contemporary political science; there is hardly a more
frequently used quotation. Authors that only use or fully belong to positivist and
hermeneutical epistemologies alike, and from quantitative to qualitative methodologies,
not to mention different theoretical backgrounds, from realist to liberal in the
international relations and from society-based to state-based in the comparative politics
may equally claim allegiance to it, each with an accent on particular element: force,
legitimacy, or monopoly. The quasi-universal use of this quotation reflects the new state
of political science as a discipline, a Weberian consensus.

In this paper I sketch the political science contemporary state of the discipline,
including the power distribution within it, by looking at the different ways of interpreting
the original Weberian definition. Methodologically, instead of providing quantifiable
data, I look at the power struggle to integrate the definition within one particular
theoretical paradigm. I claim that Weber has ceased to be uniquely a source of theoretical
inspiration and innovation; instead, he has become a charismatic and uncritical tool of
power distribution within the discipline. Ironically, I may say, using his words that any
theoretical domination from now on should successfully claims the monopoly of the
legitimate use of Weber within political science.

1. The political science - this undisciplined discipline

The political science is offered as a separate discipline in thousands of universities
around the world, mainly in the developed democratic countries but not only. Yet,
compared to other disciplines, natural as well as social, it is much less autonomous from
external theoretical influences. According to Belanger (2008), it did not produce a unique
theoretical and methodological apparatus. Being relatively undisciplined among the other
disciplines may be a cause for concern or a reason to celebrate, as does McFalls (2008).
The key concept of power has so many definitions as there is more than one possible
ontological and epistemological paradigm. It may be a quasi-material “thing”, an
intellectual “approach”, or a social “relation”; it may be objective or inter-subjective; it
may represent an epiphenomenon that hides another social reality, economic or moral,
or be relatively independent and conceptually separate. It may be quantifiable or not, and
this logically leads toward using quantitative or qualitative methods of analysis. It may put the social actors on horizontal or vertical positions; it may be a temporary historic phenomenon, on verge of being swallowed by others, right now the economy with its methodological individualism being the most obvious candidate, or bear universal extemporal truths, like the realism in the International relations claims since the World War II.

It the pre-Kuhnian vision of scientific development, each discipline had to have particular subject core, e.g. the physics focused on the matter in motion, the chemistry put the accent on the composition and properties of the matter, and biology studied life and living organisms. Each discipline organized a particular field of knowledge by testing hypotheses in predominantly experimental or analytical ways. The advancement of knowledge was gradual; the new pieces of knowledge like pieces of kids’ puzzles were added to the existing incomplete picture. Kuhn (1962) rejected this gradualist understanding of scientific progress. Instead, he offered another understanding, that of progress through paradigmatic revolutions. It was not that evolutionary approach did not work; for long periods each discipline could see its evolution as gradual; at some points, however, new paradigms could replace the old ones, thus making relative in hindsight the knowledge accumulated within the old paradigms. A classic example in physics would be the Einstein’s theory of relativity that puts into different context the Newtonian mechanics. Instead of claiming universal applicability, the Newtonian mechanics becomes applicable only within specific space-time environment. Both approaches to a progress of a particular discipline, pre-Kuhnian and Kuhnian, however, have a common denominator. They assume that any discipline represents a community of researchers that share common subject matter and methodological protocol. Without such an assumption the existence of particular discipline may be put in jeopardy. How a particular research could claim to represent advancement if the definition of the core concepts is different? How a discipline may undergo revolution if part of the community does not recognize the knowledge accumulated within the discipline?

The political science is still in pre-paradigmatic stage, to use the Kuhnian vocabulary. It is rather not well-structured, a nebula where different ontological, epistemological and methodological approaches coexist in an uneasy marriage. The easy way for turning the political science into a “normal” one goes through the suppression or the cooptation of marginal paradigms. But why paradigms that have shown their utility should be eliminated? Realism, liberalism and constructivism in the International relations; institutionalism, rational choice and cultural approach in comparative politics have provided valuable research that cannot be reduced to simple nuances of other main paradigms. Political science is political not only as far as its focus is on the political; it is also political because it represents a field where different parts of community are putting accent on intra-disciplinary confrontation alongside the cooperation. The prize, it seems, is establishing a new paradigm, a grand theory, universally accepted methodological protocol, that would be universally accepted by most if not by all schools, leaving the rest the choice to accept and integrate or refuse to accept and leave the field once and for all.

The battle lines within the discipline are drawn and known. The techniques used to gain comparative edge are more difficult to discern. One obvious technique is to embrace particular part of political reality that fits better with particular way of explanation instead of others; the Cold War confrontation gave comparative edge to
different branches of realism; the international cooperation gave advantage to different branches of liberalism; the meeting of cultures may provide nutritive food for constructivists; and the world-system approach is still a breeding ground for globalists. When each among them points only to a particular reality to justify the research, chances are that political science would remain indefinitely an undisciplined discipline, unless the reality starts converging toward a unified model or unless the discipline sees establishment of a dominant paradigm. The wars, however, are not won by being deeply entrenched on someone’s own positions. The intra-disciplinarian paradigms must also attack. This research depicts a technique of normalization of political science as a discipline that acts by appropriation of concepts and imposition of common denominators. Instead of incessantly pointing at parts of reality that fit well with particular approach, the strategy here is to claim ownership of as many as possible conceptual tools, thus pretending to represent the entire discipline. Therefore, instead of claiming that the realism better suits the confrontation and liberalism cooperation, the claims may be made that confrontation represents a particular form of cooperation within a world of incomplete information, or that the cooperation represents a particular form of confrontation within asymmetric power relations.

2. Methodology.

Looking at discursive dynamic in search of intra-disciplinary power relations may follow different methodological avenues. A combination of positivist epistemology and quantitative methodology may look at the incidence of different theoretical paradigms, provided they are clearly identifiable. The results may claim to be representative provided the sample of research, such as books and periodicals represents true picture of the discipline. The intra-disciplinary dynamic will therefore represent quantifiable data where different theoretical paradigms, such as rational choice neo-institutionalism or historic institutionalism take increasing or decreasing portions of the whole.

The simplicity of this methodological approach is tempting. However, it creates much more puzzles than it is supposed to solve. The first problem comes from the fact that different theoretical approaches do not represent waterproof compartmental sections over time. On the contrary, like living organisms they may fuse and become part of other theoretical paradigms. Rational choice and historic neo-institutionalisms may have been conflicting paradigms at some point in time and may still be for some researchers; others, however, may use elements of both approaches to build new models. Furthermore, unitary paradigms may split on opposing schools, as witnesses the old institutionalism in the comparative politics or the realism in international relations; some parts may ultimately reunite.

Another complementary problem is linked with the fact that, contrary to the positivist claim of atomistic objective reality, the discursive reality represents a multiple layers complex phenomenon, integrating also an interpretative level. In other words, it would be of no surprise to have different rational choice paradigms as well as different historic neo-institutionalisms. The IR constructivism that accepts the liberal call for sub-disciplinary coalition would be qualitatively different from the constructivism that remains outside the positivist epistemological paradigm. A study that starts by coding
every research in a particular case, a necessary methodological step in any quantitative design, may significantly miss the target, based on false assumptions of paradigms’ one-dimensionality.

Finally, a significant problem rises from the fact that, actually, there is no correlation between the presence of particular theoretical paradigm and its relative discursive influence vis-à-vis the other paradigms that dispute the same research field. A true quantitative research would try to be as much representative as possible; the periodicals, however, may show mostly the entrepreneurial and managerial skills of particular university departments. The quantifiable fact that particular theory is claimed by majority of researchers may be due to the fact that periodicals with similar theoretical affiliation are more numerical, not that this theory has comparative edge over the competitors. Like in the focus group dynamic, the dominant discourse is hardly a function of whether it was the first option of most participants at the beginning of the séance. The force of arguments may tilt the balance against the original majority and completely wipe out its positions when the conflicting discourses are pitched against each other.

Another way of providing answers would be to take one only periodical and try to discern the discursive dynamics within the time; given the difficulties linked to finding such impartial periodical that would give equal chances to all schools and methodologies, such approach, also very tempting, needs additional time in order to be set up. Using such approach, however, may be useful at some later point in time in order to triangulate, or to increase the level of confidence in the results provided in this paper.

Instead, I am offering alternative methodological approach. It is based on qualitative instead of quantitative research design. The qualitative methodology falls into two major groups: quasi-qualitative and interpretative. The first group is based on the same positivist epistemological principles as the quantitative research, save for the fact that it addresses social phenomena that is hardly quantifiable, e.g. the social revolutions, the federal political systems, the fascist political regimes, in other words, all phenomena that can hardly pass the test of sufficient population. Another way of using the qualitative methodology, the interpretative, is based on different epistemological foundation; it sees the social phenomena not as one-dimensional, but as representing multiple significance. Following this logic, many phenomena that appear to be similar in positivist way, such as voting as a behavior, may in fact represent very different significance, e.g. material interest, strategic choice, cultural preferences, social duty, group conformity, to mention just a few. Coding all of them into one group of behavioral phenomena would miss large part of the cultural richness.

The research that is presented here is not only qualitative, in the sense of being interpretative, but also ethnographic. Political ethnography starts from the holistic assumption that all social phenomena is somehow interrelated in circular way and not representing separated atoms that may be put into clear one-directional causal chains. Therefore, the answer to any research question may be found anywhere, not only within the circle of the literature’s usual suspects. Thus, to illustrate this way of making research, Tocqueville was looking at civil society organization in order to understand the functioning of the American democratic political system; Clifford Geertz was looking at the rooster’s fights in order to understand the power relations in Indonesia, Richard Pipes was looking at the climate and soil in order to understand the need of strong patrimonial
leadership in Russia throughout the time. These authors shared the holistic assumptions that eliminate the conventional dividing lines between political and not political.


I use Max Weber’s definition of state as an ethnographic tool for understanding the intra-disciplinary dynamics as discursive struggle for domination. The German economist, historian sociologist is widely credited as one of the founding fathers of the modern political science. McFalls (2006), one of the prominent contemporary Weberianists in the discipline, finds significant influence of Weber in schools of thought as diverse as historic sociology and institutionalism, methodological individualism and rations choice, and cultural approach and hermeneutics. This frankly puts almost the entire contemporary research within the political science within reach of those claiming being part of Max Weber’s intellectual heritage.

This research, for the obvious reasons linked to the time budget, cannot use the entire Weberian legacy as methodological tool for tracing the relative weight and dynamics of different intellectual streams within the political science. A tough choice, therefore, becomes necessary. Different rendezvous with Weber in different context, theoretical, epistemological and methodological have given me an idea of the relative weight of his own works within the contemporary political science. A good choice, although obviously not necessarily the only good choice, is the Weber’s definition of the state in his lecture “Politics as a Vocation” given at Munich University immediately after the end of the World War I. At the beginning of the lecture he defines the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”.

There are at least three main elements in this definition; each of them appeals to different understanding of what politics is about. These three elements in chronological order, following the English translation, are monopoly, legitimacy, and force. Other elements of secondary significance are human community; Weber uses the word Gemeinschaft, which in the vocabulary of the sociologist Ferdinand Toennies has a particular meaning as opposed to Gesellschaft. Finally, Weber includes the territory as basic characteristic of the state.

Weber’s definition of the state looks simple but in fact it is rich in significance and possible interpretations. Which makes it an ideal ethnographic tool for putting our hands on the pulse of the discipline. I will defend this claim in the remaining paragraphs of this section. Ontologically, monopoly, legitimacy, force, community, and territory are parts of different orders of reality, both material and symbolic, just as the long, green, and mean may define the crocodile, using constellation of different orders of reality: space, color, and character.

The monopoly represents the Weberian concept of concentration of a particular phenomenon, the political power, within particular community living on particular territory. The legitimacy represents the type of cultural acceptance of the phenomenon within the human community. The physical force represents the main technique of

1 The specific punctuation is part of the original text. In German: „als eine Gemeinschaft, welche innerhalb eines bestimmten Gebietes das Monopol legitimer physischer Gewaltsamkeit für sich (mit Erfolg) in Anspruch nimmt“.
governance within this particular community. The elements are either material, such as force and territory, or symbolic, such as legitimacy and community, or may represent a comparative level, irrespectively of the nature of phenomenon, such as monopoly.

The material elements, such as force, territory and, to certain extent, monopoly, as part of a positive reality, are appropriate for coding and, thus, for using within the framework of quantitative methods of analysis. The symbolic elements, such as community and legitimacy, can easily switch between aggregate subjective attitudes, which allow for use of both quantitative methods, and hermeneutic approaches, the latter feeling more comfortable with qualitative methods of analysis.

The elements of human community, which is a horizontal grouping, and monopoly, which represents vertical power relations, allow for complete freedom in situating the political actors on the scale from authoritarian to democratic regimes; the monopoly can be exercised in the name of many or few or only one, to use the classic age differentiation of types of government. Furthermore, the element of legitimacy also allows for freedom in working with very different political systems. All religions and secular ideologies become easily accommodated within this definition; the Islamic theocracy, communism, nazism, sultanism, and military juntas alike become different forms of political legitimacy, linking the institutions with civic obedience. Finally, the physical force accommodates all types of political systems as far as this element is openly present without exceptions. The discussion may always exist as to the level of readiness to use it as first technique of governance; there is no discussion, however, as to the fact that the physical force may be used as a technique of last resort whenever more civilized options, which are different and unevenly spread around the globe, prove to be inefficient.

To sum up, the Weber’s definition of the state, a key concept in the political science literature, is large enough to accommodate very different types of analysis, based on institutional, strategic and cultural ontology, on quantitative and qualitative methods, and on positivist and hermeneutic approaches to reality. It is ideal for becoming a common denominator of the discipline; a tool that everybody may claim to possess. Weber’s definition of the state therefore may become one of the possible crossing point of different schools, a vehicle of choice for crossing from one into another paradigm, theoretical or methodological, without appearing losing face and making unnecessary concessions. What is more important within the framework of this paper is that the Weber’s definition of the state allows for shifting the balance of power within the discipline by appropriating this common denominator. If everybody can claim possession over Weber, then nobody can claim monopoly over him. Weber becomes from a common cross point an apple of discord. Claiming monopoly over Weber becomes necessary to win the intra-disciplinary struggle; not winning becomes tantamount of losing. Weber loses its analytical value and becomes the ultimate prize within the discipline. He has ceased to be a source of theoretical inspiration and innovation; instead, he has become a charismatic and uncritical tool of power redistribution within the discipline. Ironically, using the spirit of his own vocabulary, any theoretical domination from now on should successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of Weber within political science.

Max Weber is indeed a very popular figure in the contemporary social science literature. To illustrate this popularity, his name, according to Google Scholar, was mentioned almost 2 million times in the digitalized books and periodicals that appear in English, the main language to make social science nowadays. The same source says that Karl Marx, another emblematic figure for the modern social science was mentioned approximately 1 million times; Emile Durkheim less than 160,000 times, Tocqueville – 100,000 times, and Machiavel less than 25,000 times. Among the most prominent researchers after the World War II, Michel Foucault was mentioned 500,000 times, Habermas – 300,000 times, Robert Putnam - 156,000 times, Samuel Huntington less than 80,000 times, Barrington Moore, Charles Tilly and Robert Keohane less than 40,000 times each, Seymour Lipset and Hans Morgenthau less than 20,000 times each. This short statistic shows that Weber is indisputably the most referred among the authors, both classics and contemporary. What this statistic does not say is why Weber has become so popular, which for the purpose of this paper is rephrased to the question why contemporary authors find necessary to put themselves within long historic links to an early 20th century author.

The Weber’s definition of state, verbatim or with certain important nuances, for example, by omitting the word legitimate or by replacing the physical force with violence or coercion, is also very popular. The same source gives at least 100,000 hits when a combination of “monopoly of legitimate use of force” is searched. In comparison, the Karl Marx vision of the state as “executive committee” of the ruling class is much less popular with less than 20,000 hits.

Unlike the other classics with strong influence over the modern social and political science, Max Weber has become as an indispensable point of reference relatively more recently, after the World War II; he has become a common denominator in the discipline later yet, more precisely in the 1970s. In comparison, Tocqueville was translated into English almost immediately at the end of the 1830s and discussed ever since; Machiavel was first translated at the end of the 16th century; Karl Marx enjoyed the English version of his works since 1850. Max Weber, therefore, not only came later than the other founding fathers of the modern political science; he was left in obscurity long after his death in 1920. From the very beginning his popularity represented less of a source of theoretical inspiration and innovation; instead, he has become a charismatic and uncritical tool of power redistribution within the discipline.

The fact that it was Talcott Parsons who initially popularized Max Weber within the English-speaking research community by claiming to be his only true follower, determined the initial image of Weber as an anti-Marx, despite the Weber’s own acknowledgement of being profoundly influenced by Marx. The Parsons’ sociology that puts an accent on the harmonious alignment of different social spheres: political, economic, and cultural sharply contrasted with the Marx vision of conflicts ultimately based on different class relations toward the means of production, leading to qualitative changes through social revolutions. Parsons eliminated the paramount importance of the economic sphere and also eliminated the need of social revolutions in order to make certain spheres align to one another. The political action significances of Marx and Weber were as different as the radicalism, liberalism and conservatism. The use of Weber immediately after the World War II, especially in the countries with strong communist parties, such as France, was to give the political right the necessary intellectual tools for
balancing the intellectual dominance of Marxism (Aron 1963). With such active political engagement of Weber in the political struggle, there was hardly any chance of turning him into universally accepted social scientist. Up to the 1980s most French left radicals would refuse to acknowledge the analytical usefulness of Weber; Michel Foucault is particularly emblematic in his stand against any identification with the works of Weber because of the obvious similarities in their complex models, incorporating material, cultural and sociological elements.

The renaissance of the interests toward the state and the critique of instrumental rationality of the modern industrial world, both of which occurred at the end of the 1960s and at early 1970s in the works of Jurgen Habermas and Nicos Poulantzas, are among a few topics that help thawing the ice between Weber and the Marxists. The complexity of the modern capitalist society that defies the easy dichotomies and economic reductionism asks for more complex explanations that, however, do not eliminate the possibility of radical social changes. The Weber’s “iron cages” that include elements of different orders, material, cultural and sociological, provide the necessary bridge between the political engaged research premises and reality that is much more stable than that predicted by Marx. In the 1990s the large political divide within the discipline was eliminated thanks to the use of Weber as common denominator; political events outside the academic circles, such as the end of communism as world system, also contributed to this result. Those who remain outside the new Weberian consensus are now situated at the margins of the discipline. Weber, who at the beginning was used as party identification and a divider has become a unifier. As frequently happens in asymmetric power relations, what was property of one party becomes common property; the difference with Weber is that he initially was property of the weaker party before becoming universally accepted. His complex model won the war against the simpler and much easier for falsification model of Marx. Usually, in asymmetrical power relations it is the stronger party, according to Gramsci, that offers the common mutually acceptable denominators in order to keep its hegemony. In the case with the political science as an undiscovered discipline the roles were reversed. This was a reversal of hegemony in the Gramscian sense. The political science as a community, because of its pre-paradigmatic stage, still allowed for intra-disciplinary political action. The present hegemony of Weber, therefore, should not be regarded as a result of purely academic accumulation of knowledge, but rather as a result of political actions aimed at producing dominance within the discipline.

Indirect proof that Weber has become a cross point within the discipline without necessarily imposing mandatory interpretation of his main concepts is the way he is used and interpreted; this use and interpretation reveals still the undiscovered nature of the political science. This case study that takes the Weber’s definition of the state as ethnographic tool shows the extreme diversity of interpretations.

In the following paragraphs I make a brief overlook of the use of Weber’s definition of the state, by looking at about 30 randomly chosen books and articles that were published after the World War II, most of which in the last 30 years. This sample is put together randomly in order to eliminate any possible subjective interference with the choice of examples. This is part of an inductive methodological approach. It is potentially infinite, and therefore it does not aim quantitative or qualitative representation and generalization. These paragraphs are followed by a brief discussion of the findings, which
is also inductive, i.e. potentially infinite pending additional cases and possible links between them.

One way of tilting the balance toward one of the main elements in the definition is by putting the accent on the “legitimacy”, i.e. on the cultural aspect of state authority. The authors that make such voluntary reductionism fall within the neo-institutional framework, like Jachtenfuchs (2005) who is interested in institutionalized legitimating ideas that shape the use of physical force; Stoker (1998) and Baird (2001) who appeal for redirection of interest from formal structures toward ideas that help maintaining the legitimate image of government; Brysk (1993) who links the lack of legitimacy with the window of opportunity for the international actors to press the governments to improve their human rights records; and Thomas and Meyer (1984) who link the genesis of the modern state with the legitimacy of the power as a cultural project.

Others put forward “monopoly”, i.e. the level of concentration of power within a particular system. The authors that make such reductionism may fall within liberal alternatives in international relations, like Milner (1991) who calls for less anarchical and more structured understanding of international relations; or, on the contrary, like Bull (1979), Waltz (1988) and Taylor (2008) who maintain the realist assumption about the states as the only actors possessing monopoly on use of force; Rubin (2006) and Wulf (2005; 2006) who investigates the sovereignty building process in failed states; Leander (2005) who establishes correlation between lack of monopoly and public security deficit; Allen (1972) who links the political modernization with the suppression of traditional non monopolistic political practices; Eriksen (1991) who links the need of state de-monopolization and the multicultural reality in many countries; and Strange (1999) who discusses the erosion of monopoly in the context of globalization challenges.

Predictably, third group would put an accent on “force”, i.e. the technique of governance as opposed to other, less intrusive techniques. The authors that prefer this truncated vision of the state are either post-positivists, like O’Malley (1997) who is concerned with the rise of the role of the police in the post-modern social context; Loader and Walker (2001), who are concerned with the image of policing as public good; Steihm (1982) who looks at the force through the feminist lenses; Volkov (1999) and Krahmann (2009) who investigate it in the context of non-state actors behavior; Westely (1953) who links the use of force with the social acceptance of important groups of reference; and Thomson (1995) who use it as preferable methodological unit in empirical research.

Of course, putting an author into one of these three groups has only analytical purposes. These are ideal types, not compartmentalized divisions. The accent on one or another element within the Weber’s definition does not require negligence of other elements. This means that the discursive battles that rage within political science should not be confined only to the use of one or another element within the definition; they may also cross from one into another element. It is possible, however, to imagine these elements as compartmentalized waterproof sections; in this case the intra-disciplinary struggle would rage over the definition of the core of the state as economic (monopoly), cultural (legitimacy) or physically repressive (force) mechanism. Instead of discussing this obvious and well-known distinction that makes the heart of the comparative politics debates since the late 1990s over the relative importance of structures, cultures and strategic action, I will present hereafter some possible conflicting points that illustrate the political nature of the political science, an undisciplined discipline; these conflicting
points will arise not from the battle over the relative importance of different elements, but rather over possible different interpretation of a particular element within different schools of thought.

As it should be expected, the most unstructured element within the definition of the state is the “legitimacy”, or the cultural dimension of modern political system. This stream within the political science, despite some prominent fireworks, such as the Almond and Verba (1963) and Geertz (1973), has been largely relegated to a secondary position within the discipline; the most important assets on the balance of political culture in the 1990s, such as Huntington (1996) and Putnam (1995) used the culture as epiphenomena for neorealist and strategic theories, far away from the Geertz’ call for interpretative richness of social phenomena. The authors in the sample, therefore, not surprisingly, despite their divergence of interests and sub-disciplines, act as if they are natural allies against a common enemy, the common distrust toward interpretative research that lacks the usual claims of universal objectivity. Those who put the accent on “legitimacy” are ready to accept the divergence of interpretations in the name of the right to be able to offer multiple interpretations, not to be stuck into the positivist ontological and epistemological paradigm, a paradigm that gives unfair advantage to quantitative methods of analysis.

Far more structured are the debates that put at the center the element of “monopoly”. As the sample provided shows, these debates rage for decades both in the sub-fields of international relations and of the comparative politics; they may propel both realist and liberal theories in the former, and society-centered and state-centered theories in the latter. Looking at the state as a political monopoly, an economic concept that enters the political science through the backdoor of lateral thinking by analogy, reifies the states as social facts. Using the Manichean way of thinking in dichotomies, the researchers think the state in oppositions, either to the international system, which is less or more structured, depending on the realist-liberal identification of the authors, or to the social forces, which are more or less conceptually important, depending too on the researchers’ identification on the state-back-in – social-forces-first scale. The Weber’s definition as far as the monopoly is concerned is consensually accepted in either of these conflicting paradigms. Unless they all decide simultaneously to quit the Weber’s boat, e.g. by linking the state with other analogies that have nothing to do with concentration of important resources, here of power, their debates would never produce a new unifying paradigm. Instead, they try to take possession on the monopolistic use of Weber for political (intra-disciplinary) purposes. Like family couples that remain emotionally tense toward each other despite their physical proximity, these opposing schools of thought need their nemeses in order to claim their intellectual raison d’etre and possible superiority.

More structured than the streams that put an accent on legitimacy but less so compared to the highly structured, even stuck, debates that put at the center monopoly, the debates around the third element, the force, are intermediate in their intensity. This is understandable; the investigations of the force as bread and butter of the modern political system is rather of marginal importance; the mainstream political science takes the force (coercion, violence) as evident, almost quintessential matter that does not need any special attention. That is why the debates, as far as they rage, are marginal; they come mainly from authors that would defend rather social-based, anarchical, and egalitarian views, parts of the radical left, but not only left, schools that had loose links with the
orthodox and reformist Marxism and that had never accepted the indisputable dominance of Weber within the discipline. That is why when they investigate the force, they do it more critically than apologetically; the force is what causes the social problem instead of just confirming the proximity of the state to its Weber’s ideal type.

The presented debates around the key elements of the Weber’s definition of the state are just the first sketches of inductive research that is potentially infinite. They show that using Max Weber as a common cross point or a discipline common denominator or a mandatory reference is either analytically confining and politically purposeful. For the second time in its life, after being conceptually separated from the law, the political science has the real chance of becoming more structured and disciplined discipline. The first time, when Marx was indisputably the most quoted author, for ideological reasons this could not be achieved. Now, when Weber is largely accepted, even from most of the former “enemies”, it becomes possible to contemplate a moment when the discipline may start to gravitate around its proper axe, and being less influenced by other social and humanitarian disciplines, such as sociology, psychology or economics. This opportunity obviously has a cost; the imposition of particular interpretation of the key concepts that does not allow those who do not accept this domination to work within the discipline. So far the political science was a loose church built upon the principle of congregation of conflicting paradigms rather than hierarchical church that periodically purifies itself through hunts of heretics. The dominance of Weber as analytical and political tool can reverse this rather benign situation of the discipline as a heretics’ paradise and turn it into a heretics’ nightmare. Given the quasi dominance of Weber, the only hope for heretics may come from the mainstream split on Manichean opposing schools, such as the realists and the liberals in the international relations. Like in a real state, when despite the political monopoly, the freedom is preserved because of the unresolved conflict of interests within the ruling elite, in the political science the freedom may still be preserved as far as the dominant schools remain split despite their mutual allegiance to the Weber’s teaching.
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