

URBAN PLANNERS AND PLANNING POLICY OUTCOME IN CANADA

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"In so far as one can ever locate a source of ideas, probably Maurice Rotival was as much the ultimate fount as any living person," so Robert Dahl (1961, 128) describes the head of the planning firm employed by Richard Lee during his tenure as Mayor of New Haven, Connecticut. Rotival had previously devised a master plan for the city during the previous administration and became instrumental to the city's revitalization. In spite of his role as visionary, Dahl suggests Rotival was often disappointed with the execution of his ideas, and was not the one to set his ideas in motion, a task left to the Development Administrator, Edward Logue. Nevertheless, he was one of a handful of individuals to influence the substantial redevelopment of the city's core. By Dahl's account, professional urban planners, though in this instance not a direct employee of the city, played an important role in shaping urban development. Dahl is not alone in highlighting the important contribution of urban planners to planning policy. In the *Contested City*, Mollenkopf's (1983) portrays them in a negative light, linking them to the displacement of the poor and the process of stigmatizing impoverished neighbourhoods, something Rotival, himself, could be accused of (see Rae 2003). However, since the *Contested City*, urban planners, particularly those in the employ of municipalities, have faded from the minds of political scientists. This is especially true for authors writing within the local political economy framework that dominates the study of the politics of urban development. Neither urban regime nor growth machine theory pays much attention to the role of planners in policy-making. They are also absent from much of the governance literature when it focuses on development. Planners' themselves have lamented their inability to influence policy for decades (see Altshuler 1965; Forester 1982; 1993).

Much of the local political economy literature, especially that originating in the United States, includes a set of assumptions regarding the institutions of municipal government and urban planning, assumptions that need not apply universally. Notably, the local political economy literature tends to assume that municipal politicians are the final decision-makers when it comes to urban development. They do not, however, always enjoy such authority. For instance, the State of Massachusetts removed most of the authority over planning from Boston's city council, investing it, instead, in two appointed bodies (Frug and Barron 2008). In Ontario, the right to appeal to the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) effectively removes final decision-making from local politicians. Such institutional variation may well allow for an expanded role for urban planners. In fact, while investigating whether the OMB's presence influenced the politics of urban development in Toronto, it became apparent that the City's planners played a pivotal role in said politics, as the Board seemingly shifts some of the influence on urban development policy-making away from city councillors and toward the City's planning department (Moore 2009). Unfortunately, establishing to what degree the Board effected such a shift is difficult without any current accounts of planners' roles in other jurisdictions. While I believe that the OMB does have an appreciable effect on the politics of urban development in Toronto in general, and on the role of the City's urban planners specifically, I've begun to question the assumption that urban planners would have no role in the politics of urban development in absence of the Board.

This paper is the beginning of what I hope to be a larger project aimed at determining what role urban planners, specifically those in the employ of municipalities, play in determining urban development policy in Canadian cities. I intend to look beyond their visionary role and their role as gatekeeper of by-laws and official plans by focusing on their actual influence on policy outcome. Urban planners are integral to planning in any reasonably sized town or city, and it is highly unlikely that they bear no influence on the built form of our communities. This paper

quantitatively examines three datasets for Vancouver, Calgary, and Ottawa. Each dataset examines city planning departments' recommendations to their respective councils, councils' decisions, and a number of other factors that help shape a picture of the role city planners¹ play in each city. This is only a preliminary analysis, intended to provide a backdrop for future qualitative data. However, it suggests that city planners' role is more important than the local political economy literature suggests, and that it deserves greater scrutiny.

Case Selection

This paper exams decision-making on issues of urban development in three Canadian cities: Vancouver, Calgary, and Ottawa.² All cities are major urban centres with significant ongoing development. Calgary and Ottawa's metros are roughly the same size in population, 1 million and 1.1 million people respectively (Statscan 2007a, 2007b), while Vancouver's exceeds 2 million (Statscan 2007c). Aside from these similarities, the cities differ significantly in their mixture of urban and rural land, governmental institutions (both at the municipal and provincial level), geographic area, and, arguably, political culture. The variations between these cities offer the potential to compare the role of city planners in different settings.

Vancouver

Though Vancouver's metro has twice the population of either Ottawa or Calgary's, the City of Vancouver, itself, has the smallest population and geographic area of the three. As of the 2006 census, Vancouver had a population of 578,041 and a land area of 114.71 km². Vancouver is largely built out, with only brownfield areas remaining for large development projects. The city only accounts for a little over a quarter of its metro's population, and four percent of its geographic area (Statscan 2007d). Not surprisingly, the City places significant emphasis on infill development, particularly in response to expected increases in its residential population (Vancouver 2009). This lack of open area (or greenfield) for development differs significantly with both Calgary and Ottawa. In contrast to Calgary and Ottawa, Vancouver's municipal borders have remained fixed for an extended period of time.

The City is governed by a 10 member council (1 mayor and 9 councillors) elected at large (Sancton 2011). Unlike Calgary and Ottawa, the City's Planning Department directs reports on planning amendments directly to Council as a whole. The Vancouver City Planning Commission does act as an advisory body for council, but only on issues of long term planning (VCPC 2011).³ Thus, the pathway from city planning to council is shorter in Vancouver. This analysis examines Vancouver City Council decisions on zoning

¹ I use the term 'city planner' as oppose to the more common 'urban planner' to denote my focus on planners in the employ of municipalities, as oppose to the private sector. This distinction can be fuzzy in municipalities that lack their own planning staff, but each of these three cities have their own variation of a planning department staffed by professional planners and related professionals.

² I initially intended to include Toronto in my analysis, but time, setbacks in compiling data, and some remaining questions regarding its appropriateness for comparison, led me to omit it from this paper. I plan to reassess its inclusion in this study once I receive some feedback on this initial analysis.

³ The City also employs an urban design panel. However, as the panel focuses mostly on the aesthetics of proposed developments, I did not include it in my analysis.

by-law amendments (ZBLA), secondary plan amendments (SPA), textual amendments (TA), and heritage revitalization agreements.

British Columbia is the only province that lacks an appeals body for planning decisions made by municipalities (Moore 2009). Thus, Vancouver City Council is, effectively, the final decisions-maker on issues of urban development. Vancouver is also one of the few cities in Canada that has a form of party system (Sancton 2011). Institutionally, the city bears the closest resemblance to cities in American local political economy literature. However, Vancouver's greater focus on design aesthetics does make it somewhat unique, and suggests a different cultural attitude may exist in the city than elsewhere in Canada. Were it not for perceived difference in attitude, one would expect the City's planners to have limited influence on planning policy, at least according to existing local political economy literature.

Calgary

Calgary differs from both Vancouver and Ottawa as the city proper encompasses almost all of metropolitan Calgary's population. In 2006, the metro's population stood at 1,079,310, while the City of Calgary had a population of 988,193, or over ninety percent of the metro population. In contrast, at 726.5 km², the city only accounts for fourteen percent of the metro's land area (Statscan 2007e). While the city lacks the huge swaths of undeveloped greenfield that Ottawa encompasses, the City of Calgary has significant room for outward growth, and the ability to annex more land in the future. Much of Calgary's growth in the past has come through the annexation and development of surrounding unincorporated areas (Foran 2009). Though the City is increasingly encouraging infill and high-rise development, much of the development in the city remains low-rise greenfield development.

Currently, the city elects 14 Alderman, each from an individual ward, and one Mayor elected at large (Calgary 2011a). Calgary employs a Planning Commission comprised of two citizens-at-large, four citizens with backgrounds relating to planning and development and chosen by an assortment of local organizations, the general managers of Transportation and Planning, Development, and Assessment, and two council members (Calgary 2011). The Commission has review and approval authority for minor planning issues, and reviews and makes recommendation on major planning issues to council as a whole. City Council reviews the planning department and Planning Commission's recommendations on land use redesignation (roughly equivalent to ZBLAs in other jurisdictions), secondary planning amendments, and textual amendments, the three foci of this analysis.

Alberta has an appeal body for municipal and planning issues called the Municipal Appeals Commission; however, it is the weakest body of its kind in Canada, and is unlikely to influence planning decision-making in Calgary (Moore 2009). Calgary's City Council, therefore, enjoys similar authority to Vancouver. According to Max Foran's (2009) account of Calgary's development from 1945 to 1978, the City also has a history of pro-development governments consistent with the pro-growth politicians depicted in the local political economy literature. If any large Canadian city fits the local political economy model, it is Calgary, given its past history, continued high demand for development (though tempered by the recent recession), and City Council's relatively

unfettered ability to determine planning policy.

Ottawa

I chose to include Ottawa, in part, because of my previous research on the influence of the OMB in Toronto. Ottawa offers some means for re-examining my findings from my previous study. Since the City's forced amalgamation with its surrounding regions in 2001, the City of Ottawa proper now encompasses a geographical area (2,778.13 km²) slightly smaller than Vancouver's entire metro area (Statscan 2007f). Despite this, the City of Ottawa does not encompass its entire metropolitan area, part of which includes the Gatineau region of Quebec. Ottawa's population of 812,129 accounts for seventy-two percent of its metro's population, and roughly half of the metro's geographic area (Statscan 2007b). Although large in geographic area, development in Ottawa is concentrated in only twenty percent of its territory, the remaining eighty being predominantly rural (Ottawa 2010). Despite the excess territory, Ottawa encourages significant infill development as well as traditional single-family residential subdivisions.

Ottawa City Council comprises 23 councillors elected by ward, and one Mayor elected at-large. In 2003, the Ontario Municipal Board forced the City to ensure representation of its rural areas in its ward system, resulting in a council comprised of both urban and rural councillors (Sancton 2011). This division is also present in the City's planning institutions. The City employs two committees to review and make recommendations on planning to City Council. The Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee is currently comprised of the four councillors representing the rural wards, one councillor from a fringe ward that also sits on the Planning Committee, and the Mayor. It focuses predominantly on greenfield development in forested and agricultural lands. The Planning Committee is comprised of eleven councillors, ten from predominantly urban wards, and the mayor, and focuses on infill and brownfield development (Ottawa 2011a, 2011b). Because of their composition, Ottawa's City Council almost never disagrees with the committees' advice. Both committees review planning reports and make recommendations to council on ZBLAs, SPAs, and Official Plan Amendments (OPA).

Along with the urban/rural divide in the city, Ottawa's position as Canada's capital, the existence of the OMB, and provincial law makes Ottawa's process of planning policy-making far more complex than either Calgary or Vancouver's. As part of the National Capital Region, the Federal government enjoys powers over planning in Ottawa it lacks elsewhere, such as implementing and maintaining the substantial greenbelt that surrounds the former city of Ottawa (Sancton 2011). The right to appeal to the OMB undermines the authority of City Council, and the Province's current focus on increased intensity of development may hinder the City's ability to implement its own planning policy. Much like Toronto, the institutions of planning that exist in Ottawa differentiate it from cities the local political economy literature typically portrays. The rural/urban divide in the city also distinguishes it from Toronto. What similarities Ottawa has with Toronto suggests that councillors will avoid entangling themselves in development issues unless significant citizen opposition exists. As a result, the City's planners will be the foci of developers, and will gain an increased level of autonomy from council (Moore 2009).

Method of Analysis

The purpose of this analysis, in part, is to provide a broad sense of the patterns of pertinent actors' behaviour and decisions-making to aid in the selection of individual case studies for qualitative analysis at a later date. To truly understand what role and influence city planners' have in determining policy outcome in cities, one must look at individual case studies that are representative of the type of cases that occur regularly (and irregularly) in cities. Without such a broader understanding, one cannot determine whether any individual case is representative of the whole. Such quantitative analysis also provides some interesting insights of its own, however, and this paper outlines such insights.

This analysis examines the behaviour and decision-making of three actor groups in each city. These groups include city planners, city councillors, and residents. The only important actors absent from this analysis are the developers. Unfortunately, the source material for these datasets lacks the information necessary for any real insight into developers' behaviour, though some sense of their intentions can be extrapolated. The datasets do provide a very interesting account of decision-making in the three cities. This account questions certain assumptions made by the local political economy literature concerning the policy and politics of urban development in major cities.

The datasets focus on major amendments to planning by-laws and official/secondary plans. The terminology for such amendments varies between jurisdictions, but the intent of such amendments is the same, to accommodate development that significantly differs from the density, height, or use permitted under existing by-laws and plans. These types of amendments are usually at the root of politically charged development issues, and exclude the minor issues that municipalities must deal with on a regular basis, such as disputes over fences between neighbouring houses. The datasets omit other important scenarios where planning politics arises, notably the politics surrounding the creation of new official and secondary plans. However, such scenarios are better left to qualitative analysis, as the focus on amendments provides ample evidence of actors' behaviour on their own.

The dataset for each city includes from nine to twelve variables.⁴ For this analysis, however, I focus on the same five variables for each city: city planners' recommendations to council (acceptance, acceptance with conditions, and refusal); council's reaction to city planners' recommendation (agrees with planners, disagrees);⁵ division in council (whether council votes unanimously or is divided); whether council amends city planners' recommendations; and residents' stance toward the proposed amendment (support/no objection, oppose/mixed attitude, no submission/not applicable).

I gathered the data for each dataset from three main sources: the agendas for and minutes from city council meetings;⁶ the agendas for and minutes of both Ottawa sub-committees and Calgary's Planning Commission, and, lastly, city planners' reports and

⁴ They differ in number because of the inclusion of the intermediary bodies in Calgary and Ottawa.

⁵ For Ottawa and Calgary, this variable, and council amendments, consider the recommendations of the intermediaries to council. Where the intermediaries amend planners' recommendations, and council supports the intermediaries' recommendation, the outcome is registered as amendment by council. The same goes for any decision to disagree with city planners. Were city council as a whole to decide in favour of the city planners, and ignore the advice of the intermediaries, it would register simply as support for planners.

⁶ For Vancouver, these comprised public hearings for the most part, for Calgary, combined meetings of council, and for Ottawa, regular council meetings.

recommendations to council and intermediaries. City governments seem to be at the forefront of increasing transparency, made evidence by the increasing inclusion and availability of vote breakdowns by councillor in council minutes. The planning departments all provide a thorough account of residents' involvement and opinion on proposed developments, including the number of correspondents supporting and opposing a development (something Toronto planners have yet to do in their reports). This transparency made categorising each case much simpler, and limited the need for too much 'interpretation' on my part.

Each dataset includes one hundred cases. The cases include every decision made by council during the period of analysis,⁷ so these datasets are not samples, but the entirety of available data. The period of analysis varies for each city, largely because of variation in volume of proposed amendments making their way to council.⁸ Calgary had the largest volume of proposed amendments. Its dataset covers twelve council meetings from 12 April 2010 to 11 April 2011. Vancouver's dataset covers the largest period of time, including twenty-six public hearings and council meetings from 10 June 2008 to 15 March 2011. Lastly, Ottawa's dataset covers nineteen council meetings from 13 January 2010 to 13 April 2011.

Given the nature of the data I compiled, I've coded and treated each variable as nominal in character, limiting the type of analysis I could employ. Nevertheless, the frequencies and bivariate correlations I do employ provide a simple, but informative, examination of planning policy and decision-making in three of Canada's most prominent cities.

A Tale of Three Cities (In Frequency Charts and Correlation Tables)


City Planners and City Councils

Chart 1 examines city planners' recommendations to council. Each set of bars reflects the number of times city planners recommend: acceptance of a proposed amendment without conditions, acceptance with conditions, and refusal. The most striking finding from this chart is how rarely planners recommend refusal to council. Calgary's city planners were most likely to refuse a proposal, but only did so on four occasions in one year. Vancouver and Ottawa's planners only recommended refusal once each. Such a finding could lead credence to the notion that pro-growth councils and developers have co-opted or undermined the professionalism of planners. However, the datasets I have compiled offer no insight into the behaviour of city planners, or any other actors, during the period prior to city planners' recommendation to council. My previous research on Toronto suggests that planners' role can be significant early on, as developers, hoping to avoid an OMB hearing, or to bolster their chance of winning an appeal, will do their best

⁷ I did omit a few cases because they involved 'housecleaning' amendments to by-laws. They are usually omnibus amendments to implement decisions already made by council, etc.

⁸ The volume of amendments coming before council does not necessarily reflect the amount of development occurring, as significant development could be occurring compatible with existing zoning by-laws and plans. Unfortunately, all three cities measure development by units and square footage, as oppose to applications for development, making comparison difficult.


I am considering extending the datasets for all three cities, but cost is a factor, as I may have to physically visit certain cities (especially Calgary) to obtain earlier data.



to address the concerns of the City's planning department (Moore 2009). Were this the case in Vancouver, Calgary, or Ottawa, it would provide evidence supporting city planners' influence on the politics of urban development, if not on policy outcomes. Further qualitative analysis is necessary in this study, precisely because the process of city planners' decision-making in preparing their recommendation for council is unknown.

Aside from the low refusal rates, the other interesting finding in chart 1 is the significant variation in planners' conditional support among the three cities. Ottawa's city planners recommended conditional acceptance only four percent of the time, while Calgary and Vancouver's recommended conditional acceptance twenty-eight and fifty-six percent of the time respectively. For Vancouver, the high percentage of conditional acceptances reflects city planners' habit of appending a standard set of conditions to many proposed amendments. In fact, it was often difficult to distinguish cases with specific conditions and those that bore more general ones. However, as Table 4 suggest below, Vancouver city planners' choice to append conditions is not inconsequential. The distinction between Ottawa and Calgary is perplexing and an additional reason to pursue more in-depth research into planners' decision-making and reasoning.

Chart 2 also offers ambiguous--though striking--findings. In each city, city council accepted city planners' recommendations over ninety percent of the time (the first set of columns). In fact, Ottawa's City Council never once disagreed with its planning department. For a pro-growth council, this finding may not be surprising, given the city



planners' overwhelming approval of proposed amendments to planning laws. Based on the relative unanimity of each council when voting (third set of columns), one could make assumptions about the relative strength of the pro-growth forces in each city. However, again Toronto offers a different perspective. In Toronto, councillors' willingness to adhere to planners' opinion (at least with regard to proposed amendments leading to OMB appeals) seemed to reflect most councillors' disinterest in the matters of planning. For many councillors, issues of planning only became salient when neighbourhood residents became engaged, usually in opposition to development proposal. Table 6 offers some insight into this possibility.

Both Charts 1 and 2 suggest that a traditional local political economy account of city planners' role (or lack thereof) could reflect the realities of urban development politics and decisions-making in all three cities. However, the general ambiguity of the findings could also support alternative explanations. The following three correlation tables attempt to glean a more precise picture of the relationship between city planners and city council.⁹

Table 1 examines the relationship between city planners' recommendations and council's decision to reject their recommendations. Because Ottawa's city council never disagrees with its planners, there is nothing to report. In Vancouver, there is no correlation between the recommendations of planners and councils' rejection. However, in Calgary, the correlation between city planners' recommendations of refusal and city council's rejection of planners' recommendation (the bottom number of the Calgary column) is substantial. In fact, the link between these two variables is the strongest finding of this

⁹ Technically, because my datasets are not samples, but the whole of available data, including the significance of each correlation is not necessary as there is a direct relation between strength of a correlation and significance. I included significance tests, however, to further illustrate the strength of my findings, and for individuals, like myself, who expect a plethora of asterisks in their statistical tables.

Table 1: Council Rejection of Planners' Recommendations

N=100 (for each city)	Value of ϕ		
	Calgary [†]	Vancouver	Ottawa [†]
Planners' Recommend Acceptance of Proposed Amendment	-.278**	-.087	. ^a
Planners' Recommend Acceptance with Conditions	-.064	-.089	. ^a
Planners' Recommend Refusal of Proposed Amendment	.808***	-.010	. ^a

***. Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

^a. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant.

[†]. Council rejection includes support of sub-committee rejection of planners' recommendations.

analysis. This finding supports the perception of Calgary as a quintessential pro-growth city in Canada, suggesting that Calgary's city planners may have limited influence on planning outcomes and decision-making.

Table 2 looks beyond the outcome of council decisions by examining the decisions themselves. The table accounts for any correlation between division in council and planners' recommendations. Once again, city planners' recommendation of refusal appears to influence city council, in all three cities in this instance. The positive relationship between the two variables in each city is more muted than the relationship between refusal and rejection in Calgary, but in all three cities, the relationship is significant. Whether it is the subject of the proposed amendment that divides council or city planners' recommendations is difficult to determine, although it is likely that the two are related. What is clear, however, is that the spectre of planners' recommendation of refusal is enough to split council, even in Ottawa. In fact, in Ottawa the relationship is the strongest.

Table 2: Divided Council and Planners' Recommendations

N=100 (for each city)	Value of ϕ		
	Calgary	Vancouver	Ottawa
Planners' Recommend Acceptance of Proposed Amendment	-.193	-.159	-.066
Planners' Recommend Acceptance with Conditions	.107	.112	-.072
Planners' Recommend Refusal of Proposed Amendment	.214*	.230*	.286**

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Aside from rejecting the recommendations of city planners, city councils' decisions to amend planners' recommendations is the only other indicator of division between city planning and city council, as indicated in Table 3. In all three cities there is a weak to moderate correlation between the decision of council to amend the recommendations of planners and division in council. This correlation is strongest and most significant in Vancouver. As depicted in the final row of columns in Chart 2, council amendments to planners' recommendations occur far more frequently than rejections. Unlike a rejection of planners' refusal recommendation, council's decision to make amendments is not an indicator of pro or anti-growth sentiment. However, it does offer additional evidence that a division between city planners and city council leads to discord in council. Given that there was no correlation between council's decision to amend planners' recommendation and any of the other variables I examined (including resident sentiment, the main reason for the amendment, and the type of proposed development), it is

Table 3: Council Amendments to Planners' Recommendations and Division in Council

N=100 (for each city)	Value of ϕ		
	Calgary [†]	Vancouver	Ottawa [†]
Divided Council (Council decisions not unanimous)	.311**	.403***	.276**

***. Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).


[†]. Council amendments include support of sub-committee amendments to planners' recommendations

possible that the cause for the discord in council is the decision to amend city planners' recommendations itself. If so, such a finding suggests that city planners influence the behaviour and decision-making of city councillors on planning issues.

City Planners and Residents

Local political economy literature has devoted increasing attention to residents' role in the politics of urban development, particularly when residents organise into neighbourhood associations or their equivalents. Specifically, authors (see, for instance, Purcell 2000; DeLeon and Powell 1989; DeLeon 1992) have focused on the increasing opposition of upper middleclass residents to new development, and their role as foil to the pro-growth coalition. Such literature tends to focus on the ability of residents to mobilise and influence local politicians. Not surprisingly, the literature does not substantially address the relationship between residents and city planners. Chart 3 provides a brief account of residents' behaviour in the three cities.

The three sets of columns in Chart 3 reflect residents' level of engagement in planning issues and attitude toward development. The final set of columns reflects cases where residents



either did not submit any opinions or questions to city planners or council, or instances where their involvement was not applicable (the latter is far more rare). Vancouver residents appear to be the least engaged of the three cities, as they are not involved in seventy percent of the cases, while Ottawa residents are the most engaged, as they were involved in just over fifty percent of the cases. Both Vancouverites and Ottawans are more likely to oppose or express mixed attitudes regarding a development proposal (both oppose or express mixed attitudes in close to three quarters of the cases they are engaged in) than support or express no objection. Calgarians are split almost fifty/fifty in their support and opposition to development.

These findings suggest that the possibility for an anti-growth coalition exists in each city, but especially in Ottawa, where residents are most engaged and where significant opposition to development exists. Given the number of cases where residents oppose development versus the few cases where city planners recommend refusal of a development application, in each city there is potential for conflict between city planning and city residents. However, there also exists the potential for cooperation between residents, city planners, and developers.¹⁰ Tables 4 and 5 examine this possibility.

Table 4: Residents Opposed to Development and Planners' Recommendations

N=100 (for each city)	Value of ϕ		
	Calgary	Vancouver	Ottawa
Planners' Recommend Acceptance of Proposed Amendment	-.348***	-.315***	.081
Planners' Recommend Acceptance with Conditions	.346***	.276**	-.021
Planners' Recommend Refusal of Proposed Amendment	.037	.189	-.077

***. Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 4 examines the relationship between planners' recommendations and residents' opposition to development. Residents' opposition does not correlate with city planners' recommendation of refusal in any of the three cities. However, in Calgary and Vancouver there is a weak, but significant, positive correlation between city planners' imposition of conditions on a proposed amendment and residents' opposition or mixed attitude toward development (the second row). City planners in both cities may be reacting to residents' concerns by proposing conditions to mitigate those concerns. The weak, but significant, negative correlation between the lack of residents' involvement and city planners' imposition of conditions, as depicted in the second row of Table 5, only strengthens such a finding.

Table 5: Residents Not Involved and Planners' Recommendations

N=100 (for each city)	Value of ϕ		
	Calgary	Vancouver	Ottawa
Planners' Recommend Acceptance of Proposed Amendment	.277**	.304**	-.050
Planners' Recommend Acceptance with Conditions	-.211*	-.273**	.004
Planners' Recommend Refusal of Proposed Amendment	.177	-.154	.103

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

¹⁰ As I write this paper, I realise the importance of distinguishing between resident opposition prior to city planning's recommendation to council, and residents' opposition after the fact, something I neglected to include in my datasets, but which is possible to distinguish in the source material.

Ottawa's city planners are decidedly different. Neither residents' opposition, nor their lack of involvement appears to have any bearing on planners in Ottawa. The finding is particularly interesting given the findings of my research on Toronto and the influence of the OMB.

Torontonians opposed to development have a horrendous record of success at OMB hearings, largely as a result of their lack of planning expertise. Toronto City Council's decision to support residents despite city planners' recommendations to the contrary has a decidedly negative impact on the City's chances before the OMB. In Toronto, city planners are generally more concerned with assuring that the rationale behind their recommendations on planning issues will withstand the scrutiny of their peers and the Ontario Municipal Board, than simply trying to assuage the fears of city residents (Moore 2009). Ottawa's city planners may be acting in a similar fashion, suggesting the Board's influence on the politics of urban development extends beyond Toronto.

More importantly for this study, it suggests institutional differences between jurisdictions may significantly influence the role city planners play in shaping planning policy and the politics of urban development. At the very least, this finding should encourage further investigation. The findings for Calgary and Vancouver could indicate that their city planners' are more susceptible to the influence of residents in the cities. Why they would be susceptible to the influence of city residents is another question, however. City planners in Calgary and Vancouver may simply be more open to public input. The residents in both cities may be more informed on issues of planning than elsewhere. Alternatively, if city councillors are more likely to become engaged in planning issues when residents are involved and opposed to development, they could be influencing city planners by encouraging the latter to address residents' concerns. City planners may also be reacting in anticipation of city councillors' response to resident pressure.

In Calgary, there was a weak, but significant, correlation between city council decisions to ignore city planning's recommendations and residents' opposition to development. In total, Calgary's City Council chose to reject city planning's recommendations six times. Four of those occasions were instances where city planners' recommended rejection, thus the strong correlation evidenced in Table 1. In the two other instances where council rejected the advice of city planners, the planners had recommended approval or conditional approval and residents opposed the development. Given in how few cases Calgary City Council rejected the recommendation of city planners, extrapolating from them a general sense of the politics of urban development in Calgary may not be entirely justified, but the City does seem to corroborate some of the assumptions about city politics made by the local political economy literature.

Resident sentiment does not appear to have any influence on council's decisions in either Vancouver or Ottawa. However, as Table 6 depicts, there is a moderate and significant correlation between residents' opposition to development and division within Vancouver's City Council (first row, second column). Although the correlation is weaker, it is also significant in

Table 6: Divided Council and Resident Sentiment

N=100 (for each city)	Value of ϕ		
	Calgary	Vancouver	Ottawa
Residents Oppose Proposed Amendment	.114	.427***	.326***
Residents Not Involved/Presence Not Applicable	-.211*	-.310**	.281**

***. Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Ottawa. These findings, along with both city councils' strong tendency to agree their city planners, suggests that, like Toronto, resident mobilisation may be a determining factor in making planning issues salient for city councillors in the two cities.

Conclusion

This limited analysis of Vancouver, Calgary, and Ottawa provides few definitive answers, but does suggest that the role of city planners in shaping both the politics and policy of urban development deserves a closer look. Both the similarities of and differences between the three cities also reinforces my belief that contextual factors, including but not exclusive to the institutions of planning in each jurisdiction, can shape and alter outcomes. Given the institutions, composition, and past history of Calgary, that it bears the closest resemblance to cities in the local political economy literature should come as no surprise. However, its city council still adopted city planners' recommendations, without amendment, seventy-eight percent of the time. City planners in Calgary may have accepted their role in the growth machine as authors like Mollenkopf (1983) suggest, or succumbed to their ennui, as some planners themselves suggest. Alternatively, they may play a substantial role in determining planning outcomes in the city, well before recommending a course of action to council. That they play *a* role should not be overlooked, however.

In Vancouver, city planners may be more open to working with residents than in either Calgary or Ottawa. They seem to be much more willing and able to impose conditions on development amendments, and Vancouver's council is the least likely to make any amendments to city planners' recommendations. Vancouver's City Council accepted city planners' recommendations, without amendment, ninety-six percent of the time, despite city planners' recommending the imposition of conditions on development over fifty percent of the time. Again, these findings are tentative, but they suggest that a fairly robust relationship exists between city planners, city council, and residents in Vancouver, and that the City's planners play an integral role in shaping the city.

Lastly, after years investigating the Ontario Municipal Board's influence on Toronto, it is comforting to see some similar results in Ottawa. As in Calgary, it is impossible to determine whether city planners in Ottawa are shaping policy or responding to council expectations. Although city council did not reject one recommendation from city planners, it did amend city planners' recommendation twenty-two percent of the time. Whether such amendments are substantial in nature or not might be telling. Regardless of their relationship with city council, city planners in Ottawa seem less beholden to residents' opposition or opinion in general, an attitude they share with Toronto planners. Unlike Toronto, Ottawa's City Council also seems less beholden to its citizens. Although resident opposition to development did correlate with divisions in council, it seems to have had little influence on the final outcome of council's decision. The much smaller number of appeals to the OMB of council's decision in Ottawa, compared to Toronto, may reflect this as well. The main difference between Ottawa and Toronto could be a greater reliance on city planners, or a city council dominated by pro-growth interests.

This paper is only a preliminary analysis in what I hope to be a larger project. Though it offers few definitive findings, I believe what findings it offers reinforce the need to re-examine the place of city planners in policy-making and the politics of urban development. As with Maurice Rotival in New Haven, city planners remain an important influence in envisioning the development of major cities. However, they may also play a significant and important role in

shaping the actual decision-making of city councils, and maintain important relationships with both residents and developers. The potential for such a role, and the possibility that external factors such as state/provincial law, institutions of planning, and political culture, might shape the role of planners and their relationship to other actors, should make us rethink the basic models and assumptions regarding the politics of urban development present in the local political economy literature.

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