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In the following paper, pointing out similarities between the domestic and global spheres of justice, I consider how lessons from the debate over women’s rights and multiculturalism can be applied to global justice. In doing so, I focus on one strain of thinking on global justice, the emerging doctrine of rooted cosmopolitanism. Discussions of global justice tend to approach the question of gender equity in two distinct ways: through articulations a cosmopolitanism ethic (O’Neill 2000, 2004; Nussbaum 2000) or through the lens of Care Ethics (Held 2006; Robinson 2006; Kittay 2009). The former approach emphasizes a universal core shared by all human beings, the later the specific relationships we each are situated within. Recently, the discourse of global justice has moved away from this universal/particular dichotomy, with a range of theories, call them rooted cosmopolitanisms, combining the idea that all human beings are of equal moral worth with a sensitivity to the importance of local obligations and relationships. My goal in this paper is to consider rooted cosmopolitanism’s capacities and limitations in addressing questions regarding gender equity and women’s rights. 1) In pursuit of this aim, I first describe the emergent doctrine of rooted cosmopolitanism. 2) I then make the claim that there are significant similarities between rooted cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, similarities which allow us to translate insights gain in debates over multiculturalism into rooted cosmopolitanism. 3) Finally, acknowledging differences between multiculturalism and rooted cosmopolitanism, I offer an answer to my leading question.

1. A Genealogy Defining Rooted Cosmopolitanism

While questions about the relations between insiders and outsiders are as old as political theory itself, dating back to Ancient Greece and discernable in all the world’s major religions (Sullivan and Kymlicka, 2007), rooted cosmopolitanism is not merely a new name
for an old theory. Rather, it arises as a response to a set of historically specific conditions and ideas. Tracking this genealogy highlights what is distinct about rooted cosmopolitanism.

Rooted cosmopolitanism is emerging as a direct response to the late twentieth century revival of cosmopolitanism, a theory which holds that our obligations to distant others are of no lesser priority than those to our compatriots. Commenting on this revival, David Miller (2008, 23) claims “‘Cosmopolitan’ is probably now the preferred self-description of most political philosophers who write about global justice.” Given the increasing pressures of globalization—multinational trade, awareness of genocidal regimes, environmental concerns, refugees and migration, terrorism, and the growth of telecommunication networks—this return to cosmopolitanism, and the underlying recognition that we are in need of some global conception of humanity was not surprising, perhaps even inevitable. Increasing globalization demands some normative understanding of global community, responsibility and governance. It is in response to the pressures of globalization that theorists such as Martha Nussbaum (1996), Gillian Brock (2009), Luis Cabera (2004), Thomas Pogge (2002), and Charles Beitz (1999) argue the cosmopolitan position that we must take the needs of distant others seriously. That failing to do so is not only immoral, but politically misguided.

This resurgence of cosmopolitanism, was not only a reaction to globalization, but also built upon a wariness regarding the nation-state and its potential to enable justice, which began in the mid-twentieth century in the aftermath of the Second World War. It was commonly held that European nationalism, and an exclusionary logic thought to be inherent in nationalism itself were the causes of both world wars, this bloody history thereby affirming the position that the nation-state should be abandoned in favor of transnational or global forms of governance. It is in this historical and ideological context that we saw, for example, the creation of the League of Nations. In addition, this recent wave of cosmopolitan thinking sprang up in reaction to the conservative communitarianism of theorists such as Charles Taylor, Alistair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel. Emerging in the wake of John Rawls’s *Theory of Justice*, communitarianism criticizes this seminal text for relying on an overly abstract and individualized conception of the self, and argues for the priority of community, a priority that is variably articulated as ontological,
methodological, and normative. While this brand of political thinking may have important insights into the limitations of liberalism, its critics, nurturing a cosmopolitan sentiment, charge it with being conservative—in so far as it reifies culture and tradition, and exclusionary—because it assumes that membership in a given community is so deeply engrained that it is effectively impossible to move from community to community.

Yet, this new cosmopolitanism could not exist for long without being chastised into the more nuanced, more progressive form of what I am calling rooted cosmopolitanism. Indeed Martha Nussbaum’s early contribution to this cosmopolitan revival (1996), was immediately met with a slew of objections calling for more moderation. As Nussbaum’s interlocutors emphasize, today as the legacy of colonialism continues to present challenges to the attainment of peace and security in many parts of the world, any defensible theory of a global humanity must recognize the distinctiveness of peoples, a right to self-determination and the dangers of ethnocentricism. “It must be a post-colonial cosmopolitanism” (Kymlicka and Walker, forthcoming).

Also relevant here, the late twentieth century has seen a revived faith in nationalism, as some states, such as Sweden and Canada, have proved themselves capable of supporting the wellbeing of their citizens while addressing international matters with an even hand. Hence, for example, Alison Brysk (2009) argues that states can effectively motivate their citizens towards cosmopolitan goals, thereby operating as an appropriate and effective vehicle towards global justice.

The anti-cosmopolitan position is further bolstered by two sets of concerns: criticisms regarding the desirability and feasibility of a global state and concerns regarding the moral universalism that subtends the cosmopolitan position. The first set is overcome by either pointing to global structures of governance which while not as thorough-going as a global state, nonetheless establish enough institutionalization to count as a context of justice, or limiting cosmopolitanism to moral articulations, abandoning political versions of the doctrine. However, the second category of objections, those pitted against moral universalism are more persistent. These objections fall into four categories: arguments regarding, (i) our moral orientation to others far and near; (ii) an affinity between universalism and imperialism; (iii) distributive versions of global justice; and (iv) the abstract individualism that subtends theories moral universalism.
Concerning our moral orientation, critics argue that moral universalism problematically ignores the special responsibility we properly owe to compatriots (Morgenthau 1952; Walzer 1996). More generally, on this point, anti-cosmopolitans argue that cosmopolitanism inverts the priority of our obligations by ignoring the significance of more particular memberships and attachments. The central idea here is that proximate relationships bear a unique obligation and operate as essential sources of our moral capacity. Detractors of cosmopolitanisms and globalism criticize moral universalism in a second way, arguing that moral universalism devolves into imperialism. As both Judith Butler (1996) and Sheldon Hackney (1996) argue every conception of universality is always, necessarily, culturally specific. This means that any effort to reify a single ideal as universal will involve at the very least a problematic undermining of important cultural difference. More perniciously, it will become a coercive quest for hegemony.

The third set of arguments against moral universalism expresses specific concern over distributive versions of global justice. Aiming for global equality, distributive global justice faces an insurmountable metric problem that applies both to efforts to equalize natural resources and to the goal of establishing an equality of opportunity. In both cases, there is no way to measure value that is not culturally specific because the value of natural resources is not set by nature but is defined by human decision. Here Miller offers the example of an oilfield, pointing out that the oilfield would be valuable only in a human society that allows the oil to be extracted and sold (2007, 59). Likewise, opportunity lacks objective measure in a culturally plural world where different societies define and rank goods in distinct ways. This metric problem means that any attempt to develop an equal distribution of goods and opportunities would be complicit in a denunciation of pluralism, ethnocentrically exporting one conception of value and thereby perpetrating a neo-imperialism. Furthermore, critics argue that distributive global justice problematically undermines national self-determination and political autonomy. Here Miller argues that a meaningful conception of national self-determination requires that nations be held responsible for the outcome of their choices. The sort of international intervention needed to establish global equality would mitigate the consequences of such choices, thereby rendering national responsibility effectively meaningless: what could national responsibility mean in a world where no matter what a nation does, the outcome is the same? A related
concern is that a distributive approach to global justice tends to understand persons in terms of production and distribution, resulting in a depoliticized perspective in which the significance of political participation and political autonomy are not recognized. This is problematic in so far as it belies the political agency of nations, a result which further impoverishes national responsibility.

Finally, fourth, though directly related to the concerns regarding moral universalism, there is a group of objections based on a challenge to the abstract individualism on which moral universalism depends. Cosmopolitan morality argues that the single individual is the primary unit of concern; this position requires that the single individual is itself a meaningful concept. However, critics argue, it is not. More specifically, they maintain that the attempt to conceptualize humankind as a collection of discreet individuals fails to appreciate the highly significant ways in which human beings are shaped by the specificities of their lives, by the particular places they live in and the particular people they live with. In other words, critics contend that cosmopolitanism fails to understand a defining situatedness of people. Moreover, this failure leads to further problems, such as an inability to recognize the patterned and systemic character of injustice, and the fact of pluralism (Sandel, 90). Kang’s discussion of this objection to cosmopolitanism offers a useful example: if we are to take a cosmopolitan perspective then the harms associated with labor conditions in garment production in the global south concern the injustices suffered by the discreet individual workers. The harm falls on a member of humankind, and as a corollary the responsibility to address this harm falls on all of humankind. The shortcoming of this approach is that it is too vague. In contrast, a perspective that appreciates the specific embeddedness of human beings is capable of offering a more powerful account of this injustice. In the recognition that it is specifically me who is wearing the shirt made by a specific garment worker Y, I come to understand myself as having a unique and strong obligation to address the harm in question.

What we learn from this genealogy is that we need some form of cosmopolitanism if we are going to respond to the normative demands of a globalized world, yet this cosmopolitanism, this rooted cosmopolitanism must recognize the significance of near
commitments and in so doing address concerns regarding moral universalism, neo-imperialism, and abstract individualism. It is here, in between the need for a normative response to globalization on the one hand and an anxiety regarding moral universalism, neo-imperialism and abstract individualism on the other, that theories of rooted cosmopolitanism emerge. [Some authors prefer slightly different terminology, such as “anchored cosmopolitanism” (Dallmayr 2003), “situated cosmopolitanism” (Baynes 2007), “embedded cosmopolitanism” (Erskine 2008), “vernacular cosmopolitanism” (Werbner 2006), or “republican cosmopolitanism” (Chung 2003), to express a similar idea].

2. We can draw an (albeit limited) analogy between the domestic and the global

When it comes to questions of socio-economic justice, there are significant parallels between domestic and global spheres, which allow us to identify similarities between theories of domestic and global justice. We see that on a global level, the defining principles of liberal democracy –principles of equality and liberty– are embodied in the cosmopolitan position that all human beings are of equal moral worth, entitled to liberty and equality of rights and resources. Similarly, where multiculturalism constitutes an attempt on the part of the liberal state to accommodate and incorporate diversity and the specific needs of different peoples, rooted cosmopolitanism, beginning with a cosmopolitan commitment to individual moral worth but simultaneously acknowledging the significance of particular ways of living, makes an analogous effort on the global scale. In other words, where the liberal state and cosmopolitanism are guided by a commitment to universal human rights, multiculturalism and rooted cosmopolitanism demand that within the work of upholding universal human rights it is necessary to prioritize respect of special group rights. These similarities between domestic and global spheres allow us to translated insights from one to another. Capitalizing on this potential, here I apply lessons learned in debates over multiculturalism and gender to theories of rooted cosmopolitanism. I first offer a brief account of the debate over multiculturalism and gender, and then apply insights developed in the debate to questions regarding gender and global justice.
In her 1999 essay, “Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women?” Susan Moller Okin raises the issue of the compatibility between multiculturalism and feminism, arguing that hitherto, multiculturalism has been pursued at the expense of women’s rights and the liberal principles of autonomy and equality. Observing (correctly or incorrectly) that most cultures are primarily concerned with the control of women, she contends that unless multiculturalism requires the liberalization of cultures, its defense of cultures is illiberal and contrary to feminist efforts to secure women’s rights. Her argument makes the additional claim that infringements on women’s rights typically occur in the private sphere, such that the ability of women to exercise their autonomy can be drastically curtailed even when their civil rights are formally protected in the public sphere. Therefore, she argues, it is necessary that we do more (here she specifically means, more than Will Kymlicka does) than assure that women have the same political and civic rights as men; in particular, we must also assure that women are not oppressed in the private sphere of family and religious life. In the final analysis, she leaves us with two recommendations, cultures that do not respect women’s rights either should be rendered extinct or cultures should be required to change in such a way as to accommodate the rights of women.

In “Mistresses of their own Destiny,” (2002) Okin develops and reasserts her position. Here she examines the defense of culture and of multicultural accommodation, which holds that cultures should be allowed to fully engage in their traditional practices even if these practices impinge on the freedoms of group members, because everyone in the group is permitted to leave the group should they choose. As Okin argues, this ‘right of exit’ is not equally accessible to all members of a given cultural group. Indeed, she points out, it is women, those who are most likely to be subjected to restrictions on their freedom, that find it most difficult to leave. Hence, Okin continues to press us to recognize the existence of internal minorities (i.e. minority groups within minority groups, here specifically women), and to develop strategies (she specifically suggests being far more judicious in our willingness to grant cultural accommodations and to respect cultural rights) that can reduce the infringements on the rights of these internal minorities.
Okin’s 1999 essay inaugurated a debate into the status of multiculturalism, some theorists siding with Okin, others arguing that her position is fatally flawed by western cultural imperialism and cultural intolerance. While, as her detractors point out, Okin’s question makes the odious suggestion that minority cultures are inherently backward with respect to women’s rights, the debate it stimulated and the responses it garnered teaches us (at least) two important things about multiculturalism: first, despite a shared commitment to liberation, multiculturalism and work for women’s rights do not necessarily go hand in hand; second, that the opposition –your culture or your rights– assumed by Okin’s analysis, should be replaced by a more nuanced understanding of culture and rights and the relationship between them. In its more recent articulations, contributions to this debate have focused on this second lesson, examining how to balance or negotiate between culture and rights (and therefore, the bulk of my analysis focuses on this issue/question).

Applying these insights to rooted cosmopolitanism, we learn, first that like multiculturalism, there is nothing in the doctrine of rooted cosmopolitanism itself that determines it as particularly invested in women’s rights or mandates work against sexism. A quick survey of the literature confirms this, very few rooted cosmopolitans even mentioning women’s rights or gender equality. There may be some cases where rooted cosmopolitanism supports the emancipation of women, but this is accidental, not the result of a defining aspect of the doctrine itself. This means that as we adopt rooted cosmopolitanism in the work of global justice, we must supplement it with vigilance regarding the oppression of women.

Second, translated to a global sphere, the lesson that we need not chose between culture and rights, becomes the idea that the opposition between local culture and universal human rights should be overcome. In other words, the roots and rights must be brought together. In this sense then, the multicultural lesson is a defining principle of the doctrine of rooted cosmopolitanism. Given this affinity, it is useful to consider the global significance of four ways in which responses to the debate over multiculturalism have

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2 See for example al-Hibri, “Is Western Patriarchal Feminism Good for Third World/Minority Women?”, 41-46.
theorized a path beyond the culture/rights opposition. In doing so, I hope to expand the toolbox of rooted cosmopolitanism and anticipate difficulties that may be encountered.

First, as exemplified in Okin’s position, taking a ‘limit principle’ solution, theorists posit a set of non-negotiables that determine how far cultural accommodations may go. So, for example, a given cultural practice can be accommodated only if it does not infringe on basic rights. In its liberal incarnations (i.e. Okin), this position offers a solution to the debate but in so far as it maintains that rights trump culture, ultimately it remains squarely within the oppositional terms of the debate. Yet, more recently this approach has been pushed beyond the culture and rights opposition. The key move here is to establish a limit-principle, which is capable of cultural sensitivity. In this regard, Monica Mookherjee’s contribution offers a more radical and visionary way to construe a limit-principle response, arguing for a conception of plural autonomy, understood as a “culturally variable family of skills” (2009, 63).

When Okin’s version of this approach is applied to the global level it translates into a traditional cosmopolitanism, prioritizing individual rights over local roots. Here, as on the domestic level, there is a concern that both the form and content of rights may involve ethnocentric assumptions and may operate as a form of neo-imperialism. However, when we adopt Mookherjee’s version to the global level, the importance of roots – be they in a state, a nation, or some sub-state community – takes on more significance. Indeed her insistence on cultural sensitivity is grounded in the understanding that culture is significant. Translated to a global level, this becomes the position that our roots matter. In this sense, Mookherjee’s solution squares with the basic mandate of rooted cosmopolitanism.

Using plural autonomy to define a limit principle response to issues of global justice and women’s rights, would likely do a good deal of work in promoting women’s rights. If the status of women throughout the world, including western liberal societies, were required to meet the demands of even a circumscribed conception of autonomy, gains in the well being of women would likely be substantial. For example, given that as the National Organization for Women reports, in the United States, approximately 3 women
are killed everyday,’ if women were free from fear of death and physical abuse, this would already make an impact on women’s rights. While establishing what counts as autonomy is difficult –if not impossible– in any tradition, even the liberal tradition, the general tactic to approach questions of women’s rights in a way that endeavors to address cultural difference is necessary given that –especially in the work of global justice– we must take pluralism seriously.

A second response to the debate, offered in Ayelet Shachar’s theory of joint governance suggests dividing things up into different jurisdictions. This would involve identifying and demarcating distinct spheres of influence within which different principles hold sway. Certain regulatory powers would be delegated to minority groups, though others would be distributed in alternative jurisdictions, with the caveat that neither states nor communities hold exclusive control over any area of law. Shachar argues that an advantage of this approach is a type of market-place progressiveness, whereby groups and states would both be required to compete for the loyalty of women by offering increasingly favorable gender equality terms: a free-market competition approach to social justice.

On the domestic plane, there are two significant problems with this response to the debate. The first is that in dividing governance between various bodies, the distinctions between the various bodies become ossified. This both requires and fosters an overly rigid (and potentially essentialist) understanding of culture, a view that sees culture as thoroughly distinct from the public, political life of citizens within a state. The second worry concerns the suggestion that women’s loyalty will land in the sphere that offers the most favorable gender equality terms. This suggestion assumes that women will be able to choose one sphere over another, or in other words, the freedom and ability to exit. Yet, as Okin has pointed out (2002), it is especially difficult for women to abandon their cultural place given that as the traditionally appointed guardians of the family and the home, they are often more firmly situated in the private sphere.

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5 Also see Phillips and Dustin (2004: 541), Phillips (2007:137) and Mookherjee (2009: 87-89)
Applying the joint governance response to a global level is of questionable utility given the lack of global governance. On this point Anne-Marie Slaughter has pointed out that we are moving towards a complete paradigm shift in which we will see (and indeed in some respects are already seeing) the traditional tasks of governance disaggregate or separate from the state, to become overseen by new transnational networks. Indeed in some cases, for example the International Criminal Court, we already see substantive moves in this direction. However, while Slaughter is correct to point out that there are some global bodies that establish forms of global cooperation and interdependence and not unreasonable in her suggestion that this will become more frequent, because these transnational networks of disaggregated governance, do not exercise authority and because they lack powers of enforcement, the form of governance that they can offer is qualitatively different from that of the state.

Moreover, in applying this approach to global justice the analogy between the domestic and the global breaks down. As mentioned, the joint governance solution depends on a right to exit, thus making the assumption that if the governance established by one’s cultural group is unfavorable to its members they can elect to leave the group, entering the general citizenry rule by the state. While a right to exit is problematic at a domestic level, on the global level it is even more so: first it would require that one actually move, a highly demanding requirement; and second, there is no global state to which one would automatically become a citizen, rather one must immigrate to another state.

Given these breaks in the domestic/global analogy, the joint governance solution is ill suited to global justice; however, considered abstractly there is a distinct sense in which its core idea is useful. In particular, the idea that the work of justice can be spread about, parsed out into a variety of different communities and jurisdictions, corresponds to Toni Erskine’s conception of embedded cosmopolitanism. Erskine begins with the understanding that we are all situated in particular contexts, but then makes the critical point that these defining contexts are open way that allows us to move beyond our initial community of birth, as we adopt new commitments that can reach outwards towards geographically distant others. In this way, the cosmopolitan goal of leveling the moral difference between those close and near is achieved, though in a way which avoids concerns regarding abstract individualism.
A third solution is the deliberative democracy approach (eg. Benhabib, Deveaux and Song) which appeals to democracy and democratic deliberation with the goal of nurturing understanding between cultural groups, establishing areas of common ground, and moving towards mutually acceptable accommodations. This approach is specifically feminist in that it insists that such deliberations involve women and men equally. Moreover, it is capable of addressing other forms of oppression by further insisting that deliberations also include equal representation from the young and old, cultural dissenters and cultural conservatives, or any other hierarchical division of the relevant population.

There are three key objections to this approach: first, as Iris Marion Young (2000) argues, the realm of deliberation may inadvertently exclude people’s deepest convictions and identities. Public deliberation, or public reason, typically requires that participants are able to offer reasons that others will be able to understand, if only in a very limited way. However, the requirement that others must understand, despite the explicit goal of being inclusive to all, may in the end be inhospitable to certain forms of expression and to certain types of reasons. For example, how can faith in god, a driving rationale for religious peoples, make sense to those who do not believe in god? Given that secular people would not understand this reason some translation would be required if it were to be admitted to the sphere of public deliberation. Yet, this translation may be impossible, and if not impossible, perhaps just onerous. Which leads to the question: Is it fair that some are required to make such translations while others, especially those with a more secular orientation, need not? Arguably no.

Debates over public reason expose the inner logic of this concern, pointing out a blindspot in the structure of public deliberation. In particular, public deliberation is normatively structured –i.e. there are regulations and constraints that define what can count as public deliberation. Most significantly, there are rules that insure its very publicness. The problem, however, is that the terms of the debate are set out in advance, and this amounts to putting the cart before the horse as we could never know in advance of the debate itself what would be acceptable to citizens. In other words, we need to first have a

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6 On this issue see Simone Chambers 2007.
public debate over what can count as public, yet on the very terms of public reason, this first debate would fail to be public and therefore would be of questionable legitimacy.

A second worry regarding public or democratic deliberation is that women, especially those who belong to conservative communities (that is, particularly those over whom the original debate is concerned) are disproportionately disadvantaged when it comes to speaking in the public sphere (Mookherjee 2009: 61). On this point, one only need recall the tragedy of Sophocles’s Antigone, the blazen sister who speaks out on behalf of the family in the andocentric polis, a move both masculinizing and fatal. The very possibility of women engaging in democratic deliberation requires a certain minimum amount of power and autonomy, a minimum which may not be met in those communities where women’s rights are threatened. Of course, the threats, which might limit a woman’s capacity to engage in deliberation, are not only found in non-western or religious communities; the socio-economic inequities faced by western women in secular communities may also impede a woman’s capacity to engage in such deliberations. As with the case of the right to exit, it is critical to acknowledge that having a right in theory can be very different from being practically capable of exercising that right.

A third objection to the democratic deliberation solution concerns its requirement that the deliberative discourse be public. The issue here is that this condition of publicness assumes a public/private distinction, which is questionable. The difficulty with this distinction is that it posits the public as the realm of reason, law and progress, setting the private, i.e. the family, up as a pre-political substrate. Moreover, this public/private distinction has had a particularly pernicious role in the history of gender inequality, as it has been invoked as a way to excuse human rights violations that occur within the family, shielding women from the protections of the state.

The democratic deliberation approach to multiculturalism maintains that cultural integrity and individual rights can be mediated through a democratic conversation. Rooted cosmopolitanism, appreciating the importance of both roots and rights, aims for a similar goal. In this sense there is a significant correspondence between the two. However, translating the deliberative democracy approach to global justice meets with the objection that the domestic/global analogy breaks down because there is no global democracy. In response to this objection, first, as Daniel Weinstock argues, the difficulties associated with
adopting democracy to transnational or indeed global institutions are really no different from those experienced when establishing democracies within modern nation-states. This suggests that while currently there are no global or transnational democracies, they are possible. Second, there is deliberative democracy and democratic deliberation the former describes the deliberative process within an established democracy, the later a democratic form of deliberation, debate and contestation that can occur amongst any group of people. Hence, while deliberative democracy may not make sense on a global level, democratic deliberation does. Beyond this question of the democratic potential of global deliberation, in translating deliberative democracy to a global level, the concerns that apply at the domestic level, concerns over the capacity of women to enter the dialogue and concerns over exclusiveness and publicness of public reason, persist. In addition, as seen in the specific cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, on a global level, where diplomacy breaks down, the necessary discussions may be far more difficult to orchestrate. This draws attention to the fact that democratic deliberation is useful only to the extent that the various stakeholders are willing to engage in discussion.

However, as much as these concerns remain relevant, so too do the advantages of this approach. In particular, on both a domestic and a global level, this approach begins with a commitment to democracy and a concomitant valuation of equality; it hears the various and divergent voices within a given culture at the domestic level, within a given nation-state at the global level, thereby developing solutions that recognize the internal diversity of cultures and nation-states; on both levels, deliberation can help clarify the nature of conflicts, illuminating, for example, that some disputes are not in fact over deep differences in moral value, but rather based in the concrete interest of members and the distribution of power in the various communities; on both levels it can expose instances of hypocrisy and foster greater understanding between groups; and because it aims to develop policies and reach decisions that are based on listening to one another, it offers the hope that these policies and decisions will be readily accepted, receiving more enthusiastic support from both sides than those that are unilaterally imposed.

8 Some theorists will contest this arguing for an opposition between liberalism and democracy. MORE
The fourth set of responses to the culture or rights debate of Okin’s seminal question argues for a deconstruction of culture. Here theorists (Narayan, Volpp, Phillips, Song) argue that our conception of culture as monolithic and static is misguided. For example, Anne Phillips argues that we need to recognize the extent to which the debate in question relies on a problematic reification of culture, problematic in so far as it ossifies particular differences into essential features of a given culture, and thereby solidifies contingent disagreements into irresolvable oppositions. As she maintains, there is actually a good deal more inter-cultural understanding than the debates admit; and moreover, instances of inter-cultural misunderstanding are not the result of deep-value conflicts but of more contingent political and historical variations. Song furthers this position arguing that cultures are interactive and interdependent, and pointing out that what the debates have take as ‘cultures’ are better understood as discreet oppressive practices, i.e. as a practice that while existing in the context of a given culture does not define that culture and indeed may even be contested within the culture itself.

Potential problems for this approach are that, in the first place, it may too drastically reduce the significance of culture, thereby minimizing our understanding of the pressure exerted on people by their culture; in the second place, it may too heavily rely on individual agency. The first concern, the minimizing of culture, is worrisome in that it undercuts the basis for multiculturalism itself. It is further problematic in that it may assume a degree of ethnocentricism; in particular the assumption that we wear culture so lightly may characterize the experience of only some cultures. The second concern is related to the first: if culture is evacuated of significance, then individualism waxes and group rights wane. But this decline of group rights would leave too much on the shoulders of the individual, understating the cultural pressures operating on women it thereby understates the need for policies that protect women from cultural oppressions.

At a global level an extreme version of this approach, minimizing the differences between relevant groups would translate into a traditional cosmopolitanism that takes state borders to be meaningless. Here, as on a domestic level, the concern with this approach is that it may too drastically undermine the importance of local attachments and obligations, commitments rooted in a state, a nation or a sub-state community, a move which is at odds
with the core principle of rooted cosmopolitanism – i.e. that our roots are significant for global justice. However, a more mitigated version, one which emphasizes the material, as opposed to ideological, nature of states, may have great value to the work of global justice. On this view, states would be seen as functional units, distinguished not by their deep values and beliefs but by historically contingent factors. On a global sphere, in conformity with the general mandate of rooted cosmopolitanism, this understanding of states, would establish states as the manageable, and therefore necessary, political units that insure the democratic legitimacy of global justice.

3. Conclusion: Is Rooted Cosmopolitanism Bad For Women?

Returning to the central question of this inquiry, it is noteworthy that in some respects the question is, ill-framed and therefore quite unanswerable. There is a critical break in the analogy between the domestic and the global, between multiculturalism and rooted cosmopolitanism. In particular, where the multiculturalism of Okin’s attack is the relatively uniform position in favor of developing policies that support special group rights for ethnic, cultural, religious or national minorities, as Kymlicka and Walker (forthcoming) point out, there is a wide range of rooted cosmopolitanisms.

First, there are at least three ways to understand why roots are held to be significant to global justice. The weakest of these is the idea that the smaller more local relationships form political units, which are functionally required for cosmopolitan goals. Here it is argued that the achievement of any political goals, including those of cosmopolitanism, there must be cohesive and legitimate political units and such cohesion and legitimacy in turn requires building a sense of belonging something which is possible only through our more local attachments and relationships. A stronger argument for the priority of local relationships depends on the claim that such relationships are moral sources of cosmopolitan commitments. It is possible to identify at least two variations of this position. One version holds that local relationships and the attachments that come with them are epistemologically required to understand cosmopolitan goals. The idea here is that we can only come to understand the moral significance of ‘the other’ because we have first
experienced moral value and responsibility in a ‘thick’ or ‘deep’ sense through being immersed in particular communities. If we lacked these particularist attachments, and thereby saw the world only as a collection of abstract and undifferentiated human beings, we would lack the very concepts needed to truly understand why the lives of others matter. A stronger version of the idea that particularist attachments are a critical moral source of cosmopolitan commitments, is the view that such attachments motivate (Brysk 2009, 221) cosmopolitan goals. This view holds that these particularist attachments are the very seeds of more universalistic commitments. Hence, people are seen to pursue cosmopolitan goals because it is what their particularist attachments require of them. For example, Swedes view themselves as good citizens of the world and for this reason they pursue cosmopolitan goals.

In addition, rooted cosmopolitanisms vary in their understanding of which roots are significant. There are four possibilities: First there is the view that the state is the root that is significant to cosmopolitan justice. The key idea here is that the state offers a political manageable unit and is able to secure the democratic legitimacy and accountability consider important for justice. This variation dovetails with the view that local roots are important for primarily functional reasons. Second, others look to the nation, arguing that the sense of solidarity offered through national patriotism is necessary for democracy and social justice. A third variation suggests that some disaggregated form of the state, sub-state institutions or non-state communities are the proper roots for cosmopolitan justice. Finally, fourth, there is the position, explicitly hostile to the state, which holds that the state should be disrupted from below. Thus, to properly respond to this question would require going through all sixteen potential forms of rooted cosmopolitanism, considering extreme and moderate versions of each.

In addition, as shown in the above discussions of the four solutions to the multiculturalism debate, there are additional breaks in the domestic/global analogy: where there is a domestic state, there is no global state; where there is institutionalized forms of enforcement and coercion within a state, relations of this nature do not exist on a transnational or global level; where an individual who exercises her right to exit from a cultural group to a state does not necessarily need to physically move and automatically
assumes her citizenship within the state, at a global level the right to exit requires that one move and offers no automatic citizenship.

Acknowledging these limitations to the multiculturalism/rooted cosmopolitanism analogy, a study of the debate over multiculturalism and gender does offer insights to how rooted cosmopolitanism might approach issues of gender equality and women’s rights. In particular, we learn that like multiculturalism, rooted cosmopolitanism is not inherently concerned with women’s rights. This means that as we adopt rooted cosmopolitanism in the work of global justice, we must sustain explicit concern for women’s rights. In addition, we learn that being good for women, involves more than protection of universal human rights, but requires a negotiation between culture and rights. More specifically, on this second point, we learn that when applied globally, the four responses to the multiculturalism/gender debate, offer a range of benefits and shortcomings, thereby expanding the toolbox of rooted cosmopolitanism while alerting us to potential difficulties.

So, is rooted cosmopolitanism good for women? In and of itself, no; however, if it were to make use of the insights from the gender and multiculturalism debate, drawing on the four solutions to the mediation of cultural and rights --that is, the limit principle, joint governance, democratic deliberation and the deconstruction of culture solutions-- in its mandate to uphold the importance of both roots and rights, then it could be.
Works Cited


Michael Sandel, "The procedural republic and the unencumbered self," *Political Theory, 12* 1984), 81±96


