Clientelism and the Personal Vote in Indonesia

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Introduction

An established literature connects the personalism of electoral competition to post-election partisan and policy outcomes. When a politician’s pathway to power is dependent upon securing a personal vote, he or she must build a personal appeal among voters that goes beyond the platform and record of the candidate’s party label. Existing work has identified variance in the incentives to cultivate a personal appeal across electoral systems (Carey and Shugart, 1995). A system’s relative degree of personalism has been linked to partisan outcomes such as legislative cohesion and, to a lesser extent, party system nationalization (Carey, 2007; Morgenstern and Vazquez-D’Elia, 2007). At the level of the individual legislator, candidate-centered electoral rules tend to increase the legislative presence of locally rooted candidates with experience in sub-national politics (Shugart et al., 2005; Tavits, 2010). These legislative outcomes have knock-on effects on the formulation and implementation of public policy. For instance, the personalism of the electoral system correlates with the effectiveness of social service spending (Hicken and Simmonds, 2008), perceived levels of corruption (Golden and Chang, 2006; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Persson et al., 2003), particularism of transfers (Rickard, 2009), tariff barriers (Nielson, 2003), and even foreign direct investment flows (Garland and Biglaiser, 2009).

The current literature proceeds from the assumption that personalism has an independent effect on policy outcomes. Institutions appear as exogenous variables that structure incentives for personalism, and the personalism of electoral competition effects legislator behavior once in office. In this paper I argue that existing state spending and prevailing patterns of policy implementation can have an independent effect on the personalism of political competition. When political fortunes depend on the personal vote and candidates can promise to deliver clientelistic benefits to voters, both voters and candidates have an incentive to enter an enduring patron-client relationship. The clientelistic appeal, however, is only credible if voters expect the winning candidate will have goods to deliver once in office. The argument offered here, then, suggests that existing policy environments determine electoral personalism.

The evidence for the argument leverages cross-district variation in electoral personalism from the Indonesian case. In 2004, Indonesia introduced a flexible list-system that allowed voters the option of casting a preference vote for a candidate on a party’s list. Preference voting rates varied widely by electoral district, with the percentage of the electorate choosing to cast a preference vote ranging from a high of 82% to a low of 33%. I connect preference voting rates to pre-existing patterns of sub-national state spending. In electoral districts where the state played a dominant role in the economy, voters and candidates tended to form the type of patron-client bonds that resulted in high levels of preference voting. Patterns of state spending were not caused by personalism; rather, electoral personalism was itself driven by pre-existing state spending.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section II defines the personal vote and reviews the current literature on the consequences of electoral personalism. Section III provides a theoretical account as to how and why clientelism can increase electoral personalism. I argue that the credibility of a clientelistic appeal depends upon pre-existing patterns of spending and policy implementation, which I refer to as rent opportunities. Section IV justifies the selection of the Indonesian case and provides background on the country’s institutions and campaign process. In Section V, I provide a statistical test of my argument connecting rent opportunities and preference voting. Section VI discusses the findings and broader implication for issues including party system evolution and legislative representation.

The personal vote and its consequences

Defining the personal vote

Definitions of the personal vote range from more narrow conceptions emphasizing the support a politician gains through personal efforts (Cain et al., 1987; Kitschelt, 2000) to a broader understanding which encompass all
support attracted through either efforts or reputation (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Marsh, 2007). For this study I adopt the latter, more expansive definition that contains both a credit-claiming portion and an attributional portion. To tweak Kitschel’ s (2000: 852) definition, the personal vote is defined as the effect of a candidate’s attributes and actions on his or her electoral success, net of aggregate partisan trends that affect partisans as members of their parties.

**Institutions, the personal vote, and policy outcomes**

Electoral institutions directly link personal appeals to successful electoral outcomes. There have been several attempts to measure the ‘personalism’ of electoral systems (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Johnson and Wallack, 2008). In general, plurality systems provide a strong motivation for personal appeals because winners are determined by the individual candidate’s total vote share. Incentives for personal appeals within proportional systems can vary widely depending on their specific features. In open-list electoral systems there is a strong incentive to pursue a personal vote as a candidate’s victory is determined by the preference vote count (Carey and Shugart, 1995). This is especially true in high magnitude electoral districts; however, even when lists are closed there can be incentives for personal appeals if the district magnitudes is low (Shugart et al., 2006).

Electoral institutions have an independent effect on policy outcomes. A range of institutional variables have been used to capture the underlying concept of a candidate-centered electoral institution, including district magnitude, electoral formula dummies, and various ‘personalism’ indexes. The choice of variables reflects underlying assumptions about the causal process that leads from personalism to outcomes. In some versions of the causal story, personalism is a consequence of electoral district size. In the small-district story, electoral districts with low district magnitudes increase the visibility of the sitting legislator(s). High visibility provides a strong incentive for politicians to engage in pork-barrel spending which they can credibly claim credit for. Small districts are also thought to make sitting legislators susceptible to lobbying by concentrated interest groups. One optimistic account of small districts suggests high visibility also facilitates the public’s ability to punish inefficient and/or corrupt public officials (Persson et al., 2003). The common theme, however, holds that a legislator’s dependence on a geographically defined constituency affects the policies they choose to pursue.

A second mechanism proposes that legislator behavior in candidate-centered systems is shaped by the anticipation of intra-party competition. Legislative candidates competing against co-partisans are restricted in the policy positioning that can distinguish them to the voters. To build and maintain a personal base that can set them apart from co-partisans, candidates focus their activities on particularistic distribution. This may involve gifts and bribes, either provided directly before an election or between election periods. Beyond the simple distribution of patronage, legislators also abuse their office to raise funds to distribute to their base. As Golden and Chang note, “corruption and the search for the personal vote go hand in hand” (2006: 134). Fundraising activities include contract rigging, salary padding, and the looting of state funds. For instance, Hicken and Simmons (2008) find that the pursuit of the personal vote has a negative impact the implementation of state policies. Systems with a high degree of personalism do not spend less on service delivery, but the manipulation of funds by vote-seeking politicians do cause states to get less ‘bang for their buck’ in such areas as health and education.

The unifying theme for both strands of the personal vote argument holds that institutions shape incentives which impact policy outcomes. Still, gaps remain in our knowledge. Theorizing typically takes place at the level of the politician. While we have a solid grasp on when and why candidates pursue the personal vote, we have less knowledge about the strategies of voters. Why express support for a particular candidate? The question has implicitly been taken on by authors studying personal vote earning attributes [PVEA] (Shugart et al., 2005; Tavits, 2010). Voters seem to have a diffuse preference for familiar faces and experienced politicians. While PVEA can help explain what type of politicians on a ballot will succeed, we get less leverage from individual level characteristics when trying to explain widely varying preference voting rates within a similar institutional context. Below, I argue that it is essential to take into account the given political-economic context when explaining the propensity to cast a personal vote. In shining a light on context, I focus closely on the issue of cause and effect as it applies to personalism and policies.
Theory

Clientelism and voting

Politicians and political parties can earn support through the direct provision of gifts and favours. The terminology used to describe exchange relationships is dependent upon the expectations actors have about the endurance of the relationship. The term *bribery* refers to the exchange of goods for political support in a onetime interaction, whereas *clientelism* refers to an enduring exchange relationship between patron and client (Hicken, 2011). Below I will use the term *clientelistic goods* to refer to the material gifts and/or favours a patron provides his/her client in exchange for political support.

The provision of material goods before an election allows candidates to rally their base and ingratiate themselves with voters who may be indifferent or mildly opposed to their partisan identity or policy positions. Models of exchange relationships have focused largely on pre-electoral bribery (Stokes, 2005; Nichter, 2008). Yet paying for support at election time is only one aspect of the exchange relationship. Candidates not only provide gifts at election time, they offer promises of future support (Chandra, 2004; Remmer, 2007). Jobs, government favours, and other direct forms of post-election assistance are implied in many exchange relationship. Delivery of post-election clientelistic goods serves as a method of repaying supporters and maintaining ties to the base. Promises of clientelistic goods, however, can only be credible when voters anticipate elected officials can manipulate state resources after an election.

Personal voting behaviour can be partially explained by the opportunities to provide post-election favours. It is useful to think about the sequence of an exchange relationship. In the first place, candidates provide voters with material inducements to increase their chance of winning. Voters, for their part, may agree to sell their support because they value the direct material gain more than they value supporting their preferred political contender. Even so, what prevents a voter from defecting and casting a vote for an alternative political option? By taking a gift and defecting, voters can have their cake and eat it too. Knowing this, politicians should not offer gifts and favours.

Recent research on the issue focuses on monitoring and time horizons (Chandra, 2004; Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005). Political actors, especially those in the developing democracies, develop mechanisms to monitor voting behaviour. Ostensibly secret ballots can still be discerned. Clever political operators can tamper with counting methods such that voters’ choices are revealed, tweak voting machines to broadcast polling booth decisions, and design ballots in ways making them easy to manipulate. Close monitoring allows political actors to sort out who has been loyal and who has reneged on their past promises.

Revealed defection only becomes a problem for voters if they expect consequences. In most democracies, however, elections are repeated interactions. Stokes (2005), for instance, argues parties are less likely to bribe known defectors in future elections. In her model, receiving a bribe from Party A and supporting Party B can earn a voter a reputation for defection, which costs the possibility of receiving a bribe from a political contender. The costs of defection go beyond simply forfeiting the possibility of receiving a bribe during a future electoral cycle though. A reputation for defection can also cost a voter between elections, and I argue below that these perceived costs can vary by district.

Rent opportunities and clientelistic exchange

An elected legislator’s ability to reward supporters and punish defectors depends on the resources at hand after the election. I will use the term *rent opportunities* to refer to the ability to manipulate state resources. Rent opportunities are determined by two factors: 1) state resources available for manipulation; 2) constraints against rent seeking behaviour. Constraints are low where law enforcement officials are lax and societal norms encourage politicians to use state resources to support their political networks. Resources are high when politicians have a large budget to skim from, plenty of government services to pass out as favours, and a large number of jobs to distribute to supporters. A combination of low constraints and extensive state resources make for high rent opportunities.

In electoral districts with plenty of rent opportunities, the probability of receiving a government favour from a politician is comparatively high. The opposite is true in areas with fewer government jobs and stronger anti-corruption norms. The candidate in the high rent area, then, can credibly commit to providing clientelistic goods
(and withholding clientelistic goods from defectors), whereas the candidate in the low rent area has a problem making the same promise.

Given that the cost of defection is high in some districts and low in others, we should see different patterns of campaigning and voting depending on the social context. When plenty of rent opportunities exist, voters have an incentive to loyally attach themselves to a patron. Knowing this, candidates use gifts and favours to build a relationship with voting blocs. This pattern is reversed in areas with fewer rent opportunities. Where the future costs of defection are low, voters have little incentive to stay loyal and candidates have little incentive to provide clientelistic goods. This leads to Hypothesis 1:

\[ H1: \text{A high percentage of voters casting optional preference votes is positively associated with a high level of rent opportunities} \]

The Hypothesis put forward is in line with previous research on preference voting in Italy that finds preference voting highest in areas with a high degree of “traditionalism” and/or low social capital (Katz and Bardi, 1980; Putnam, 1994). The focus of the Italian case work, then, has been on the social ‘constraints’ (or lax thereof) placed on a politician with regard to the direct distribution of state resources. I build on this research by narrowing in on the relationship between preference voting and the stock of sub-national resources that can be plausibly exchanged for votes.

The Indonesian case

Why Indonesia?

Indonesia makes a particularly compelling personal vote case study for two reasons. First, Indonesia is the largest democracy to use a ballot with an optional preference vote. India and the United State, the two democracies larger than Indonesia, both use single-member plurality systems. Though SMP is candidate-centered, it is methodologically difficult to parse the ‘personal’ and ‘partisan’ components of the vote. The optional preference vote provides a tangible measure of personalism; purely partisan decisions can be separated from those that involved at least enough personalism to motivate a preference vote for a candidate. Past work in optional preference vote systems like Brazil (Samuels, 1999) and Italy (Katz and Bardi, 1980) has leveraged this variation to explore the partisan and demographic roots of personalism. The Indonesian case, on the other hand, has been relatively unexplored.

Second, the ‘newness’ of Indonesia’s democracy is methodologically useful. By focusing on the election that introduced optional preference voting in a recently democratized country, we gain confidence in treating personalism as a dependent rather than independent variable. In 2004, cross-regional variation in bureaucratic size and state transfers were largely a product of the former authoritarian regime. Electoral personalism had yet to have an effect. The 2004 elections, then, were an important moment of transition. Political outcomes after this point were increasingly shaped by politicians’ awareness of changing institutional context.

There are valid concerns about generalizability. Political strategies within Indonesia are affected by the country’s peculiar combination of institutions: decentralized authority, simultaneous multi-level elections, a reverse honeymoon electoral cycle, a fragmented but ideologically diffuse party system, and a collusive pattern of governance that typically results in vastly oversized legislative coalitions. It is possible that the specific relationship between rent opportunities and personal voting uncovered in Indonesia do not play out the same way in other cases. The central thrust of the paper, however, is to underline the importance of the policy environment to personal vote seeking. A finding in Indonesia establishes the complexity of the relationship between personal voting and policy outcomes. Even if it is not universal, it remains theoretically important.

Electoral institutions and parties

Like most propotional systems, Indonesia is broken into multiple electoral districts. In 2004 there 69 national districts that varied in size between 3 and 12 seats. Starting in 2004 voters has had the choice of marking a preference for a specific candidate on their district list. In order to ‘disturb’ the order of the list, however, lower ranking candidates had to gather enough preference votes to reach quota within the district, quota being total number of votes divided by total number of seats.
All legislative elections occur simultaneously and precede the presidential election by approximately two months. In 2004, voters had the opportunity to mark four ballots: the national legislature known as the People’s Representative Council [Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR], two Regional People’s Representative Councils [Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD], one at the provincial level [DPRDI] and one at the municipal level [DPRDII] iv, and one non-partisan national-level legislative body known as the Regional Representative Council [Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD]. There is a considerable amount of overlap in the campaigns for the national and sub-national levels and, as a consequence, straight-ticket voting is the norm.

All legislative candidates in Indonesia must be nominated by a political party. Party registration rules in Indonesia are onerous. For the 2004 election, in order to gain access to the ballot, parties were required to prove an ability to organize branches in 2/3 of all regencies in 2/3 of all provinces. Only parties that passed this organizational requirement nationally were allowed to field candidates at lower levels of governance. Indonesia’s stringent organizational requirement effectively eliminated both regional and ethnic parties from competing, as regionally concentrated movements face difficulties organizing outside their bases. Despite these requirements, 24 parties still competed in the 2004 elections.

**Campaigns in Indonesia**

Candidates use multiple campaign methods to get their message out. A considerable portion of a candidate’s funds are directed towards advertising. The majority of advertising is financed by only one candidate; however, a sizable minority promote multiple candidates from the same party running for different levels of governance. Gift giving is also ubiquitous. Among other things, candidates set up stalls providing discounted food, they repair community infrastructure, and they supply simple consumer goods. While gift giving can take many forms, it is by design geographically targeted. Candidates know where they have repaired religious buildings and set up food stalls. Even smaller gift-giving often follows a geographic logic.

In addition to advertising and gift giving, a third major campaign cost candidates face is poll monitoring. Each candidate employs a team of poll monitors, known as witnesses (‘saksi’). The size of the team varies by the candidate’s resources. Witnesses, most often young men, are typically provided with some compensation for their efforts. vi Their job involves monitoring the process and tabulating the results at the various polling stations. On an individual level, each voter’s ballot choice remains private. However, the small-scale nature of tabulation processes allows candidates to monitor their campaign investments. Witnesses are able to gather several important pieces of information. First, they have an idea of who showed up to cast a ballot and who chose to abstain. Candidates, then, have an idea of turnout both at the local and individual level. Second, candidates know which areas they were strong in.

The consequences of defection and loyalty are difficult to pinpoint. We know that legislators hand out favours between elections. It is widely acknowledged that securing state employment requires a bribe, and a powerful patron can arrange a more modest price in a practice Aragon has usefully termed “unequal opportunity buying” (2007, 41). Support can come in more direct forms as well. As one sitting legislator once griped, “whenever I visit my constituency, everybody wants attention and, of course, money: the local party cadres, Islamic clerics, sport clubs, schools, youth groups and even the thugs” (Mietzner, 2007: 255). Politicians must recoup these costs through corruption or influence peddling, and it is common to find accused legislators claiming that their payoffs were directed toward constituency support.

Distribution of gifts and jobs demonstrate that clientelistic exchange does not end with the vote counting, but it still does not prove punishment. Nonetheless, anecdotes suggest punishment does occur. In one such story from Pematang Siantar, a candidate from the 2004 election helps fund the repair of water facilities within a small community. Despite this support, the community in question returns a dismal number of votes for the candidate. Feeling spurned, the candidate returns and takes back the equipment he had previously gifted to the community.

The particular story itself is potentially apocryphal and told mainly for humorous effect. Similar stories appear in the press though. In one incident a candidate returned to a village in West Java to request the return of his 50,000 Rupiah (approximately $5 US) gifts. Villagers had accepted his gifts prior to the election, yet the candidate managed to obtain only one vote from the area (Jakarta Post April 16, 2009). vii These stories hint at several processes that are taken as given. First, material inducements are geographically concentrated. Second, campaign investments are monitored. Third, gifts do not guarantee support. Fourth, spurned politicians carry a grudge. viii
Decentralization and clientelism

Prior to the 2004, Indonesia enacted a series of decentralization laws that substantially expanded the political, fiscal, and administrative autonomy of sub-national units. Whereas during the Suharto years the national executive had leeway to pick and choose provincial governors (and, by extension, municipal executives), after decentralization local executives were made accountable to newly empowered local legislatures. Control over many local rent opportunities (jobs, transfers, etc) shifted from the national to the local level. This paper, however, focuses on national level voting trends. Which raises the question: why would voters expect national politicians to pass out sub-national goods?

Two potential answers exist. First, voters may simply not know how to match up levels of governance with jurisdiction over things they want. National level politicians may in fact have little power of local state activity. Nonetheless, voters expect national politicians to hand out local goods because they are unsure of the new jurisdictional boundaries.

A second answer suggests that voters may correctly surmise that national level politicians retain significant influence and expect their national patron to intervene in their favour. On the one hand, there are signs that national legislators use their influence to directly channel regional transfer funds to preferred projects and uses. Perhaps more importantly, national level candidates frequently exist as part of a broader network that connects all the way down to the sub-national level. Indeed, given the expense of national-level candidacies, national level politicians are often among the most prominent members of a network. Take, for instance, Mudaffar Syah (aka the Sultan of Ternate). In 2004 he ran as a national candidate in North Maluku for the United Democratic Nationhood Party (Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan, PDK), a minor upstart. His party may not have been destined for national greatness, but voters knew that a vote for the Sultan and PDK would connect them to a network that would control substantial local resources. Likewise, Maluku candidate Mirati Dewaningsih’s strength in 2009 was certainly not because of her affiliation with the locally insignificant National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB). Rather, voters understood that her marriage to the local Bupati (municipal executive) meant that a vote for her was vote for her husband’s broader network. The vertical integration of political networks is strengthened by the simultaneous legislative election cycle.

This study will not resolve which of the two mechanisms – voter confusion or multi-level influence – is at play in Indonesia. Both are plausible. The most pertinent point is that voter behavior in electoral districts with a high level of rent opportunities is conditioned by sub-national dependence on the state sector. The political-economic environment leads to distinct patterns of interaction between voters and candidates.

Empirics

Dependent variable: personal voting rates

Having described the Indonesian context, I move on to statistical testing of my hypothesis. My dependent variable is the percentage of voters who cast a preference vote by party by district. An example helps illustrate. In District 1, Party A receives 5000 party symbol votes. Each of the three candidates on the party list receives 1000 preference votes. Thus in District 1, 60% (3000/5000) of voters casting a preference vote for Party A in District 1. The percentage serves as the key dependent variable.

Data for the 2004 Indonesian election was gathered from the website of the Indonesian electoral authorities and checked against Kevin Evan’s Pemilu Asia website. I focus on the national elections primarily because the data is available. There are 1656 observations, one for each party in all 69 electoral districts.

Independent variable: local rent opportunities

Measuring the rent opportunities concept is tricky. Both the prevailing constraints on behavior and the resources available for manipulation are difficult to pin down. In this paper, I focus only on the resources available to the sitting (or prospective) legislator. This decision is due to data limitations. While some areas of Indonesia have reputations for being less corrupt than others, it is easier to attain measures of budgets and bureaucratic size than perceptions of corruption. Despite the fact that social norms and law enforcement practices do vary across electoral districts, it is safe to assume that, in general, a low level of constraints exist throughout the country. Even Indonesia’s cleanest regional governments would be considered systematically corrupt by the standards of the
established developed democracies. Given the weakness of constraints, measurements that capture the stock of local resources for manipulation serve as a workable proxy of the rent opportunities concept.

I construct two distinct measures of local resources. First, I focus on the relative proportion of civil service jobs in the modern sector, defined here as the non-agricultural economy. The use of this measure follows similar practice in both the comparative and Indonesian literatures on patronage (Chandra, 2004; van Klinken, 2007). A high proportion of modern sector state workers indicates the extent of state involvement in the overall economy. In Indonesia, some provinces like Central Java and Bali have few state jobs. In outlying provinces such as Papua and Bengkulu the state is a very significant employer.

Data on employment sectors is drawn from the Indonesian Statistical Yearbook series. I use two different years: 2005 and 1999. The year 2005 is chosen due to its proximity to the 2004 election. While the 2005 data reflect civil service size slightly after the 2004 elections, it is unlikely that the result of the election itself caused any change in the variable in the short period between election and data collection. The 1999 data, generated around the time of the democratic transition, provides a further test of my claim that the patterns of state employment shaping political competition pre-dated democracy in Indonesia.

Provincial aggregates visually demonstrate the striking correlation between civil service size and preference voting. Figure 1 presents a two-way with public sector size (2005) on the X-axis and preference voting on the Y-axis. There is a strong, positive relationship between public sector size and preference voting rates. The independent variable alone explains just over 50% of the variation in aggregate preference voting rates across provinces.

Figure 1

A second variable measures an electoral district’s inflow of state transfers. In most sub-national units, transfers from the central government constitute the vast majority of revenues. Transfers are not, however, equal across the country. On a per-capita basis, some areas receive more transfers than others. I thus use per-capita transfers as a variable to capture the resources available to politicians.

To construct the variable I use transfer data from 2004. Two streams of transfers are included: General Allocation Funds (Dana Alokasi Umum, DAU) and Special Allocation Funds (Dana Alokasi Khasus, DAK). I aggregate the total DAK and DAU funds transferred to the municipal units within each electoral district. To this total I add an electoral districts share of transfers made to the provincial unit. I then use the 2000 Census data to create a per-capita measure of transfers.
Control variables

I add a range of control variables to the statistical model. First, I add district magnitude. Carey and Shugart (1995) have suggested that personal vote-seeking incentives in open-list systems will increase as district magnitude increases. In the 2004 elections in Indonesia, district magnitude ranged from 3-12, with the size being dependent on both the size of the population and the legacy of traditional political boundaries.

To account for economic conditions I add a variable capturing poverty rates. Voters with low economic security are more willing to ‘sell’ their political support in order to attain immediate material benefits (Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005). The benefit of having a powerful patron that can dispense favours is likely of more importance to the destitute. As such, high levels of relative poverty should be associated with higher levels of personal voting. I used data from Suryadinata et al. (2004). The measure in Suryadinata et al. captures poverty by municipality which I used to reconstruct district-level poverty for 2004.

An additional social variable to consider is the level of urbanization. There are two potential stories that can be told. The ‘friends and neighbours’ style of politics associated with rural districts could increase the importance of personal appeals. Alternatively, media markets in urban centres could provide voters with increased information about candidates, leading to higher levels of personal voting. Urbanization data was gathered from Suryadinata et al. (2004).

Ethnic diversity could produce higher rates of preference voting regardless of the existence of rents. If competitive dynamics in diverse societies lead voters to disregard policy concerns, voters may attach themselves to friendly co-ethnic candidates. Such a dynamic could be particularly pronounced in a country that effectively bars ethnic parties. To control for ethnic context, I use 2000 census data to construct a 0-1 ethnic fractionalization measure for each electoral district.

Three party-level variables are also added. The first accounts for the number of candidates on a party’s slate. Higher numbers of candidates mean a higher number of personalized campaigns and more opportunities to forge candidate-voters connections. To construct the measure I divide the raw number of candidates run on a list by the district magnitude. Given that district magnitude tends to follow population levels, the measure roughly captures the number of candidates to voters. When the measure is low, the party has few local agents pursuing preferences votes; when the measure is high there are a large number of candidates appealing for support relative to the population.

The second party-level variable accounts for the potential affect of gender on personal voting. There is some evidence that women candidates are at a disadvantage when competing for intra-party preference votes (Valdini, 2006). Low-information voters use gender as a short-cut to infer qualities about a candidate. Popularly held stereotypes about men are associated with characteristics that people desire in a politician (e.g. courageous, rational, strong) while female cues tend to be associated with less desirable traits (e.g. emotional, frivolous, weak). When a large percentage of a party’s candidates are women, voters could feel less connected to an individual candidate on the party’s list, despite being favourably disposed to the party’s message. Thus a high proportion of women candidates could produce a lower personal voting rate. To construct this measure I simply divide the number of women by the overall number of candidates.

The third party-level variable takes into account the existence of local roots. Candidates with local roots tend to perform better than parachute candidates in electoral systems with preference voting (Shugart et al., 2005; Tavits, 2010). The logic of the variable, then, is similar to the gender variable above: if a list has more local candidates, it should have a higher aggregate personal vote. To measure the concept of local roots I relied on a candidates stated place of residence. Candidates were coded as ‘local’ if they resided in the district they sought to represent. To construct the ‘local’ measure, the number of local candidates was divided by the total number of candidates.

Results

The model is run using a simple OLS regression. I use robust standard errors clustered by party. Parties vary in nomination procedures, resources, ideology, and national campaign style. While I expect all parties to be affected by the variables discussed, the effects are likely mediated by partisan factors. Assuming that standard errors are correlated within parties is a more plausible position than assuming the existence of complete independence for each branch of each party.
Results are presented on Table 1. Models 1, 2, and 3 include a different operationalization of the key rent opportunities variable. In all three models, the rent opportunities variable is positive and statistically significant at the P < 0.01 level. In Models 1 and 2, an increase of modern sector civil service size by 1% correlates with a just over a 1% increase in preference voting rates. Using Clarify to generate predictions, an increase of one standard deviation from the mean produces a 6.9% increase in preference voting using the 2005 data and a 6.1% increase using the 1999 data. The transfer variable yields qualitatively similar results. Starting from the mean, a one standard deviation increase in transfer funds results in an approximately 4.6% increase in preference voting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Rent Opportunities and Preference Voting (OLS)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimate (std. err)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service Size (2005)</td>
<td>1.04*** (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service Size (1999)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Transfers(logged)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Magnitude</td>
<td>0.74*** (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>0.09*** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>-0.04* (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>5.51*** (0.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate List Size</td>
<td>0.21*** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Candidates</td>
<td>0.04** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women Candidates</td>
<td>0.005 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>10.91*** (3.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.5110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01

The magnitude of the rents variable can be demonstrated through statistical simulations. Using Model 1 as a baseline, I generate predicted values on the dependent variable while adjusting the public sector size. Results are displayed on Table 2. Five predictions are presented, with public sector size set to actual minimum, maximum, and quartile values. All other variables are set to the mean. Quartile values on civil service size are presented along with the corresponding province that matches that value. Predicted values indicate that moving from the minimum to the maximum public sector size results in a 60% higher preference voting rate.
Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rent Opportunity</th>
<th>Public Sector Size</th>
<th>Province Name</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>Banten</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Quartile</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>Nusa Tenggara</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>West Kalimantan</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Quartile</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>Papua</td>
<td>66.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Returning to Table 1, the district-level control variables are all statistically significant, though the poverty variable slips below significance in Model 2 and changes signs from Models 1/2 to Model 3. District magnitude is signed in the expected positive direction and significant at the .01 level. An increase of district magnitude by one seat correlates with a 0.7% increase in preference voting. Urbanization correlates with increased rates of preference voting, though the effect is modest. An increase of one standard deviation in urbanization correlates with a 2% increase in preference voting. Surprisingly, poverty levels are correlated with lower personal voting rates in Model 1, though the effect is slight; an increase of one standard deviation in the poverty level correlates decreases preference voting by 0.5%. There also tends to be more preference voting in ethnically diverse electoral districts. A one standard deviation increase in ethnic fractionalization produces a predicted 1.9% increase in preference voting.

Two of the three party-level variables – candidate list size and percentage of local roots - consistently correlate with higher preference voting rates. Candidate list size has the largest impact on personal voting rates. In a district magnitude of 10, increasing the number of candidates on a party’s list from 5 to 10 would be expected to increase personal voting rates 10.5%. This is a substantial change, and demonstrates that exposure to candidate campaigns increases the propensity to cast a preference vote. Local roots have a small but statistically significant impact. A list where 50% of the candidates have local roots is predicted to have 2.1% fewer preference votes than a list where 100% of the candidates have local roots. On the other hand, the relative proportion of women candidates has no effect on preference voting rates.

In sum: Even when adding a range of district and party level control variables to the model, rent opportunities have a significant effect on preference voting rates. The result is consistent across multiple operationalizations of the rent opportunities concept.

Robustness checks

To check the robustness of the results I tested for the possibility that results were driven by party type, population size, or separatism. First, the results could plausibly be driven by the dominance of particular parties in particular areas. I re-ran Model 1 for each individual party. In every party the rents variable reached statistical significance of at least P<.05; in fact, it is the only variable to consistently reach statistical significance across parties.\(^\text{XV}\) Coefficient sizes range from a low of 0.7 (Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat, PBSD) to a high of 1.7 (Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia, PPDI), such that one percentage increase in civil service size increased preference voting rates in by 0.7% in PBSD and 1.7% in PPDI. There is a noticeable trend in which the nationally small ‘chicken flea’ (gurem) parties tend to be those that are most affected by rent opportunities. The gurem parties have relatively low average personal voting rates, a consequence that stems from the low number of candidates these parties run in most districts. They have organizational and electoral breakthroughs in high rent areas. Despite the fact that the effect of the rents variable was largest for the gurem, it also had a significant impact on the larger and more established parties. We can safely conclude that the relationship between rent opportunities and preference voting was not driven by a small number of factionalized parties performing well in particular areas.

Second, I investigated the possibility that an omitted variable may be shaping both rent opportunities and preference voting. This raises a key question: why do rent opportunities vary? The simple answer is that rent opportunities tend to correlate with population size. The centre-periphery conflicts and bargains that characterized the Indonesian state building process produced small sub-national units in certain areas. In
contemporary Indonesia, small units receive more per capita transfers and thus have a relatively large pool of resources for politicians to manipulate. However, small population size could also facilitate a ‘friends-and-neighbours’ style of politics that brings candidates into direct contact with constituents, thereby increasing the propensity to preference vote. It is thus possible that small population size rather than resource availability drives the correlation between transfers and preference votes.

To check for the possibility of a population effect, I added several permutations of population size to the statistical model. The first captured population of the electoral districts, the second captured the population of the province. Neither of the population variables demonstrated a consistent relationship with preference voting. More importantly, the addition of the variables did not substantially alter the relationship between the rents measures and preference voting.

Third, I investigated the potential effect of separatism. In order to reward local allies and mitigate local grievances, the Indonesian state transfers relatively large sums of money to regions with separatist movements; namely, Papua and Aceh. Areas with separatist movements, then, have high rent opportunities. The problematic centre-periphery relationship that affects state policy also affects internal party dynamics. Across the country, favored local candidate tend to receive undesirable list positions. Yet the sting of Jakartan insensitivity is keenly felt in restive regions. It is possible that voters in regions with active separatist movements are more motivated to cast a preference vote in order to support a regional voice and spite the national parties.

To test the possibility that separatism drove results, I dropped electoral districts in Aceh and Papua. Dropping the separatist districts from the sample, however, does not substantially change the correlation between the rents variable and preference voting. While voters in separatist areas may use their preference vote to register their protest with the national system, this dynamic itself cannot explain the relationship between rents and preference voting.

**Discussion and conclusions**

I have argued that preference voting rates in Indonesia are directly tied to the post-election resources available to politicians. In areas where the state plays a dominant role in the lives of the electorate, a voter has an incentive to form a personal bond with a candidate and his broader political network. The voter expects that the expression of support will increase the chances of receiving clientelistic goods from the politician in the future. As such, Indonesian voters in electoral districts with large civil services and high per capita transfer payments are significantly more likely to cast an optional preference vote. The situation is different in areas where the state less of a role in the economic sphere. Where there are fewer jobs to distribute and less transfer money to manipulate, voters and candidates are less likely to form the kind of connection that results in personalized expressions of support. In these areas, voters are more willing to cast a pure symbol vote for a particular party. This indicates that voters in areas with few rent opportunities are less motivated by the promise of clientelistic goods delivery and more likely to be swayed by such issues as national leadership and socio-economic platform.

The results from this paper demonstrate that pre-existing patterns of state spending and governance have a strong effect on personal voting. The patterns of state spending that had an impact on Indonesia’s 2004 election existed long before the electoral reforms of 2004, and even pre-dated the transition to democracy. We can be confident, then, that the electoral personalism was determined by the electorate’s dependence on the state and not vice versa. The causal story is distinct from the strictly institutional story that posits governance outcomes as the consequence of a struggle for personal votes.

This is not to deny that personalist electoral institutions have an effect on campaigns and policy outcomes. Indonesia’s move to an open-list system in 2009 prompted changes in behavior. The campaign became increasingly candidate centered, and a higher proportion of voters used their preference vote option. Institutional changes have also prompted legislators to craft policies conducive to clientelistic exchange. Recently Golkar, the legislature’s second largest party, has fought hard for the implementation of a scheme that would allegedly grant each legislator approximately $1.6 million USD in ‘aspiration funds’ to devote to ‘development.’ The ‘aspiration fund’ was such transparently poor policy it was shut down due to criticism from an otherwise cooperative opposition. Yet it was a sign of increasing legislator demand for credit-claiming opportunities to be integrated into key policy areas. The institutionalist argument has explanatory force.

Rather than supplanting an institutional argument account of personal voting, I seek to supplement it through a focus on informal practices such as clientelism. Future work should investigate the relationship between
clientelistic campaigns and legislative behavior. We have some evidence that clientelistic ties affect party switching and affiliation behavior patterns of legislators. We may also explore how the ability to run clientelistic campaigns affects committee assignment and corrupt behavior. The recent breakup of Indonesia’s “Budget Mafia” revealed a suggestive correlation between regional dependence on state transfers, legislator committee assignment, and the propensity to loot state funds. viii Analysts should maintain sensitivity to the non-virtuous cycle of clientelistic representation, in which rent opportunities create the conditions for clientelistic campaigns, which then creates conditions for legislative rent-seeking.

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i Stoke’s (2005: 319-320) models this interaction as a prisoner’s dilemma, finding that competitors should not bribe in the absence of monitoring and repeated interaction.

ii Laws to regulate the size of electoral districts came in after 1999. In the country’s inaugural election district magnitude ranged between 4 and 82 seats.

iii The system in 1999 was also proportional but used an unusual method of seat allocation. Candidates on the district party lists were assigned to specific regencies. Seats were allocated to parties by district based on proportion of votes. Parties were then supposed to allocate seats to candidates depending on municipal-level electoral performance, such that the regencies where the party was strong should return their assigned candidate. Unfortunately the electoral rules did not define performance; in some cases it was taken to be highest proportion of votes, in other places highest number of votes. Party officials were able to manipulate this confusion to ensure allocation to the party favourites.

iv The sub-provincial levels of government are referred to as kabupaten and kota in Indonesian. They are sometimes translated as ‘district’ or ‘regency.’ I use ‘municipality’ simply to separate discussion of electoral districts from discussion of sub-national governance.

v The one exception is for the DPD, which is strictly non-partisan.

vi Saksi also hope their efforts will put them first in line for distribution of clientelistic goods. During a candidate’s organizational meeting on the eve of the 2009 election, the assembled young men openly shared with me that they hoped their service would land them post-election employment.

vii In a less direct, though more tragic, form of punishment one legislative candidate took her life after recording a dismal vote within her own village (Jakarta Post April 15, 2009). In the immediate aftermath of elections mental health facilities swell with an intake of depressed candidates. According to one mental health professional, “several patients frequently talked in their sleep, asking for their money back because of their failure to gain a significant number of votes” (Jakarta Post April 16, 2009).

viii The story carries one additional sub-text that falls outside of the prior theoretical discussion; namely, even losing candidates may have the means and motivation to punish defectors. This is a particularly important point in Indonesia, where the wealthy citizens who run for office tend to be the same wealthy citizens the poor turn to for jobs, loans and other forms of assistance.

ix Though there is little case work written on this practice, the issue appears repeatedly in the Indonesian press. See: Jakarta Press, “Agus Condro Ungkap Kebobrokan DAU” [Agus Condro Reveals the Depravity of General Allocation Funds], October 10 2008; Media Indonesia, “Wah, Elite Daerah Ramai-Ramai Bajak Anggaran [Wow, Regional Elites are Busy Looting the Budget”], January 22 2012.

x Indeed, PDK, which squeaked out 2% nationally, ended up winning a plurality of the vote in the municipality of Ternate.

xi Notably, despite Dewaningsih’s affiliation with PKB her husband has been a powerful player in Partai Golkar and recently ran for Governor with the endorsement of PKS. A politician’s party identification is often more fluid than his/her commitment to a loosely connected political network.

xii To calculate provincial transfer share, I multiplied the total provincial transfers by the electoral districts share of the province’s population size.

xiii The model is robust to alternative specifications, including fixed effects and clustering by electoral district.
xi Due to space limitations, results from robustness checks do not appear in the text. Supplementary tables and replication material are available upon request.


Bibliography


