Beyond Boundaries: a holistic approach to comparative politics

Simarjit S. Bal
Introduction

The subfield of comparative politics is known for its broad scope and diversity. As a result, it can be viewed as being quite fragmented, finding the only factors that hold it together are the comparative method and the interest in politics. However, by looking at the interplay and the interconnectedness of differing concepts studied in comparative politics and their manifestation real world, it may be possible to increase the coherence of the subfield. This paper seeks to make this argument through the use of crosscutting concepts that demonstrate these linkages. The paper will delve into some of the traditionally utilized concepts in the subfield; more specifically, it will unpack the concepts of democracy and development. Though democracy has traditionally been linked to development, it is also necessary to understand its relation to the real world.

This paper will argue that the realization of democratic change and development requires understanding the role inequality plays in real world scenarios. Further, this inequality itself may be unpacked by applying concepts of race, gender, and ethnicity, to name a few. This may help to make sense of why democracy and development do not affect all individuals within states in the same manner and thus, may not affect states in a consistent manner. Next, an effort will be made to link these identity concepts to the concepts of citizenship, migration, and welfare. These concepts have particularly become important, as the process of globalization has helped create a resurgence of identity-driven politics. As a result of this process, the concerns over migration for example, have strongly affected state policies with respect to citizenship and welfare services. These policies also require further scrutiny due to the inequalities they hide which have historically reflected a gendered and racialized framework.

Having highlighted these linkages, the paper will finally move on to the concepts of nationalism, federalism, and legitimacy in order to understand how diversities manifest themselves
in the actual process of politics within states. It is hoped that by applying this type of integrated effort and through the use of crosscutting concepts like those highlighted above, comparative politics as a subfield can continue to provide more holistic and integrated insights into an ever changing world.

**Concept Construction**

Comparative politics, and the concepts used in its study over the past half century, has been criticized for their Western orientation. This was particularly problematic as these concepts were often matched to state policy, particularly that of the US, where there was and continues to be an attempt made to impose certain models of governance and development to areas with their own unique culture and history. As such, it is necessary here to address some of these concepts, why they have been considered problematic, why they may have to be re-evaluated. Additionally, it will be necessary to seek out alternatives to understand the current context of global developments. However, before we can proceed to this analysis, it is first necessary to address some of the problematic issues faced by comparativists when utilizing concepts in their study. Specifically, we need to address how the defining of concepts not only privileges particular understandings about the world, but also how it then shapes the research in terms of its scope, validity, and outcome. This understanding in part reflects a post-structuralist outlook as it gives preference to the power of discourse in shaping the world, irrespective of whether there exists and objective reality or not. Due to the power of words and classification, it necessitates a further discussion.

Concepts are central to comparative politics. Concepts are viewed to be more than just words, as concepts are seen to represent "a set of ideas associated with, or elicited by a given word"
but within the framework of logical rules, thus requiring precision (Sartori 1975, p. 12). This is particularly true for quantitative studies, which require concepts as variables for data, whereby “the better the concepts, the better the variables that can be derived from them” (Sartori 1984, p. 10). Concepts then make sense of what it is a comparativist seeks to understand, as Sartori argues concepts help to “distinguish A from whatever is not-A” (Sartori 1984, p. 74). Due to this, for Sartori, concept formation or classification is prioritized over comparison (Cribb 1991). Though giving definition to what it is studied, concepts often do not reflect a proper context. This is particularly true due to the fact that the world has changed drastically since the inception of the subfield, and the vocabulary utilized within the subfield may no longer be able to “travel” as well as it did in the past. What the subfield has done according to Sartori to deal with this problem is adopting a program of “conceptual stretching” which has been “conducive to indefiniteness, to undelimited and largely undefined conceptualizations” (Sartori 1970, p. 1034-5). This in turn has led to research that doesn’t have the explanatory power that would be available, had more stringent standards for conceptualization been used.

Nevertheless, Sartori does allow for differing scope of conceptualization depending on the level of analysis. He highlights the existence of three types of concepts: universal conceptualizations that seek to study global theory, general conceptualizations that seek to study middle range theory, and configurative conceptualizations which seek to study narrow-gauge theory. Nevertheless, he gives preference to the medium level of conceptualization, which can better integrate the other two levels (Sartori 1970). As a result, in order to be able to utilize concepts in a heterogeneous grouping of states, we require the use of universal conceptualizations. However, recognizing the intersubjective nature of concepts, we also require the understanding of how the concepts fit with the domestic context of areas included in the study. It is possible to do so through the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods which help to better contextualize these
universal concepts, especially those concepts which due to language and cultural issues may be difficult to interchange (Chilcote 1984).

From these insights, it is possible to deduce two reasons as to why the use of concepts might be problematic. The first reflects the problem of precision, while the second reflects a problem of understanding. Nevertheless, these are problems reflecting a particular goal rather than general problems of the use of concepts itself. Lack of precision is only a problem if the goal is to understand a particular context in depth. Similarly, the problem of understanding is only valid if the goal is to seek findings that are universal. Nevertheless, the problem of precision disappears if the goal is to understand the development of the world broadly, while the problem of understanding is mitigated if efforts are made to include qualitative methods and the inclusion of other perspectives. As a result, both universal and precise studies are helpful in comparative politics. Studies that concentrate on the global North for example allow for precision, but they need to be situated into broader studies to better contextualize what they mean in the grand scope of things. Here, broader efforts can help as they reflect changing global currents. Additionally, as theory often builds on or reflects past theoretical work, a constant process of contextualizing theory in terms of wider global change may actually help to build stronger analysis of more precise research. As a result, the two can actually be considered mutually beneficial and build stronger insights into global developments.

There are other problems however as Alan Cribb argues, it is often believed to be the case that all the concepts used in political science are contested. Any effort to specify them, as Karl-Otto Apel and Peter Winch argue, is doomed to failure as it replaces a more open-ended neutral interpretation with a more specific interpretation with its own value biases (Cribb 1991). Due to the fact that comparative politics seeks to study social interactions, the concepts cannot be clearly defined as easily as they would in the natural sciences, as Alasdair MacIntyre argues, “the continuity
and identity of a planet or an atom is quite different from the continuity and identity of physics or of the Royal Society, of politics or of the Conservative Party” (Cribb 1991, p. 45). As a result, the role of the social science community is far more important to understanding these concepts as opposed to natural science. Due to these problems, it may be beneficial to specifically address two concepts currently used in comparative politics to demonstrate the diverse terrain faced by comparativists who would choose to use a more universal approach and how these concepts reflect value-laden qualities.

Two of the most problematic concepts that have been central to comparative politics are democracy and development. As highlighted earlier, these two concepts have not only been problematic due to their importance in application of research towards government policy, but also due to what they constitute in terms of conceptualization and the mismatch between theoretical work in the face of real world realities.

**Problematic Concepts**

**Democracy and Development**

The first question that comparativists have had to deal with in their research on democracy is the issue of defining the term. Reflecting the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1999), democracy became particularly important in the study of comparative politics following the collapse of communism (Landman 2008). With this change, countries all over the world began to transition into new models of democratic governance, often with diversity in the actual operationalization. As a result, the issue of defining democracy became central. As David Collier and Steven Levitsky argue, comparativists were forced to assess the problems associated with the desire to increase “analytical
differentiation” to deal with the diversity, but also to maintain some semblance of “conceptual validity” by dealing with the problem of conceptual stretching (Collier and Levitsky 2008, p. 164).

The definition of democracy in the past also demonstrates a changing conceptualization. For example Joseph Schumpeter’s definition concentrating on an elite driven procedure was reconfigured by Robert Dahl to take on normative tone, with democracy being "valued as a substantive good" requiring widespread citizen involvement (Munck 2007, p. 26-7). These two alternatives would re-emerge as the contrasting interpretations of “procedural” versus “substantive” democracy (Shapiro 1994). In order to do this scholars often moved up the level of abstraction to use wider concepts such as “civilian regime”, “competitive regime”, or “electoral regime” which would include a democratic regime, but also others which were not as clear-cut. They could also move down a level by further contextualizing the type of democracy and concentrate on subtypes like “limited-suffrage democracy” or “tutelary democracy” (Collier and Levitsky 2008, p. 168-9).

Nevertheless, the problem with the concept of democracy is so profound that Robert Dahl questioned whether there are any true democracies at all and instead preferred the concept of “polyarchy” to define states with limited citizen participation in political processes (Dahl 1971).

This problem of conceptualizing may be viewed to be a wider problem of concepts used in the subfield rather than a problem inherent with democracy itself. However, democracy remains an issue due to its unproblematized application. Without an adequate understanding of the domestic context and cleavages in individual countries, the value of a democratic transition is questionable. Peeler for example argues that the role of elites is central to democratic transition. Instead of the transition reflecting a more bottom up approach, leading to the establishment of stable democracies, Latin America shows democracy to be the result of "elite settlement" and the development of a convergence amongst this group resulting in its survival (Peeler 1992, p. 83). Juan Linz and Alfred
Stepan have demonstrated how even with the problems of democratic transition, expansion of study can provide benefits. Their research expanded study to incorporate countries with significantly different starting points, post-communist Central and Eastern European states, in addition to those of Latin America and Southern Europe which allowed for the addition of new variables which had previously been ignored, for example regime type (Landman 2008). Nevertheless, Thomas Carothers finds that the empirical reality has made the assumptions of democratic transition problematic. Out of 100 "transitional" countries, Thomas Carothers argues only twenty are in the process of potentially becoming successful democracies (Carothers 2002).

All the while with respect to development, criticisms have existed since the 1960s. Development was particularly attacked by scholars, including André Gunder Frank, who argued that underdevelopment was not a natural starting point for developing countries, as most scholarship failed to take into account the role of the political and economic expansion of Europe in creating this underdevelopment. Additionally, it failed to recognize the current context of underdevelopment with respect to the relations between these countries and the developed countries of the West. All the while there was a belief, that development theory was interconnected with American foreign policy and not necessarily an objective theory in itself (Chilcote 1984). Development was also attacked for its ethnocentrism, particularly in its linkages with political development, which was based on the models associated with America and Western Europe. In this interpretation, development generally was conceived as “industrialization, urbanization, and modernization or growth” (Chilcote 1984, p. 286-7).

As with the case of democracy, development too is a problematic concept and it missed out important areas. For example, it didn’t address the role of traditional institutions such as family, religion and tribe, which served as “glue” in keeping countries together, instead of fading away as
theory would suggest (Wiarda 1999, p. 58). Field research of development, often did not account for what was found on the ground, for example instead of processes of “interest aggregation” what field studies encountered was “caste, tribe, and clan politics and conflict, vast patronage networks, favoritism and special privileges” (Wiarda 1999, p. 56). Additionally, many of these criticisms including the ahistoricity, lack of acceptance of normative implication in the study of development still continue to plague the use of the concept.

However, development as a concept was not necessarily as a stand-alone concept. As early on as 1959, Seymour Lipset directly linked economic development with democracy, highlighting that economic development often is a necessary prerequisite for stable democratic institutions (Lipset 1994). Further research would corroborate this, Adam Przeworski et. al. found the existence of linkages between development and the consolidation of democracy (Adam Przeworski et. al. 1996). Though other research would highlight the importance of culture and religion in sustaining democracy (Stepan 2000, Inglehart and Wezel 2003). Lipset’s definition incorporated non-political elements, defining it as “an open class system, economic wealth, and a capitalist economy; the higher the level of industrialization, wealth, and education, the greater the prospects for democracy” (Chilcote 1984, p. 272-3).

This perspective about development and democracy has carried on into present day. Amartya Sen, for example, links the two as he advocates that the democratic model is a universal ideal and is required for economic growth and development, although he reverses the direction of the connection from Lipset’s perspective. For Sen, democracy results in the success of development, whereas for Lipset, capitalist economic development was a key element in the success of a democracy (Sen 1999). He argues democracy is a universal value due to the plurality of its benefits and the desires of the benefits of democracy is not contradictory to other desires, such as economic
stability for the poor. Additionally, there is little evidence that the poor "given a choice, prefer to reject democracy" and this is even in light of perceived differences in cultural values (Sen 1999, p. 13-4), while Francis Fukuyama has argued the liberal democratic capitalist model to be the end point of political development (Fukuyama 1992).

Amy Chua however dismisses the unproblematized blending of democracy and development, particularly in states that reflect a different societal breakdown than in the West. This type of argument reflects the work of Samuel Huntington who argued that economic development often leads to increases in inequality, while political development, particularly in terms of social mobilization, can be seen to advance a logic advocating the illegitimacy of economic inequality. These divergent pressures then can lead to political and economic problems (Huntington 2006, p. 59). Specifically, Chua concentrates on the existence of “market-dominant minorities” or ethnic minorities in countries who are over-represented in their control of the local economy. This is seen to be the opposite of most developed countries in the West, where the minorities are also those at the margins in the economy. However, due to this over-representation, the prospects for democratic change to promote economic growth or development are not as wholesome as those outlined by Sen (Chua 2004, p. 6).

This is in large part due to the fact that once a democratic system is introduced, the disadvantaged minorities, fuelled by vote seeking politicians, may use the democratic system as a means to gain retribution against these economically powerful ethnic minorities (Chua 2004). The types of backlash the introduction of market democracy creates, first against the market, followed by minority interest supporters of the market against democracy, and finally even against the ethnic minorities directly, contradicts the perceived benefits democratization was supposed to bring in the first place (Chua 2004, p. 10-1). This may be the reason why “at no point in history did any Western
nation ever implement laissez-faire capitalism and overnight, universal suffrage at the same time—the precise formula of free market democracy currently being pressed on developing countries” (Chua 2004, p. 14). In totality, what Chua argues for is the need to understand global processes by looking at other concepts, for example ethnicity, in order to make sense of concepts including democracy and development. This then helps to deal with the problem of conceptual vagueness. By linking multiple concepts, it is then possible to give greater understanding of what is studied with respect to the concept through greater contextualization to what is studied.

**Alternative Concepts**

**Inequality and Political Violence/Revolution**

There are however alternative concepts that can be further discussed in addition to the concepts of democracy and development, which can help to unpack the actual implications of the transitions comparative politics seeks to study. Inequality, for example, opens up a large breadth of possible paths through which to view the impact of development. It also serves as a possible variable through which transitions to democracy or other types of political changes can be examined. In the past, the study of inequality was particularly important in terms of state development, with respect to the work of Raúl Prebisch, André Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein and Samir Amin. However, they lacked a more detailed understanding of internal processes within states, which may also help to explain these unequal relationships. Additionally, these theories did not help to explain the trend of periphery states transitioning into semi-periphery or core states, such as the newly industrialized countries (Sheppard et. al. 2009, p. 90-1). For example, it failed to predict that inter-
nation inequality would stabilize, with regards to purchasing parity figures, as has been the case in the past few decades (Firebaugh 1999).

While this has happened, the distribution of wealth within a country, which in the mid 1990's accounted for roughly thirty-percent of overall global inequality, has increased (Goesling 2001). In response to this, analysis of wealth in the developed and developing world is often measured through the use of the GINI coefficient, which measures intra-nation inequality (Chang and Ram 2000). This measure of inequality can then be used to conduct more nuanced research into democracy and development. Studies such as this demonstrate potential implications of global developments related to for example, globalization and the spread of neoliberal politics. For example, Reuveny and Li have found that although trade and democracy do in fact decrease inequality, foreign direct investment increases it (Reuveny and Li 2003).

Analysis using GINI measurements allows for a view of states such that it allows to not only see changes from an external vantage point (GDP growth), but also allows for the ability to peer internally to see how these changes affect internal dynamics at the individual level. Looking at both allows us to see the differences in the relative gains between the rich and the poor. The ability to do this is important because research has shown that relative income growth is a key factor in determining individual happiness, which then factors into social stability (Frey and Stutzer 2002). Even though externally developed and developing countries might be seen as growing in terms of GDP, if this growth is not distributed evenly throughout the population, this may create problems for governments as economic inequality may lead to social disharmony which can then lead to violence as highlighted by Chua in her studies.

Historically there have been many arguments for what are the determinants of political violence. Political violence is used as a concept as it allow for study of more than just “great
revolutions” and opens up study to "peasant revolts, riots, unsuccessful revolutions, and sometimes civil wars" (Goldstone 1982, p. 189). Some of these explanations have been broad and included an in-depth analysis of multiple variables. Theda Skocpol, for example, in her study of the revolutions in France, Russia, and China, elaborates international competitive pressures as a factor shaping political violence. According to Skocpol, the state was forced to raise taxes to pay for this, creating a backlash from various segments of society (Goldstone 1991).

An alternative and more specific variable for the potential for revolution has been inequality. Even in the days of antiquity, Aristotle pointed out inequality was the “universal and chief cause” of revolution, while James Madison in The Federalist No. 10 commented that inequality in terms of property distribution was the “most common and durable” cause behind political factions. Meanwhile, Freidrich Engels reflected on the discrepancies between political structures and socioeconomic conditions as being the cause of political violence (Sigelman and Simpson 1977, p. 106). Incorporating psychology into this explanation, Theodore Gurr highlighted how as the desires of members of society increased at a higher rate than the state could manage, revolutions were more likely (Gurr 1970). He argued that the primary cause for political violence was frustration and aggression, arguing that these are the "primary source of human capacity for violence" (Gurr 1970, p. 36). However, more importantly this aggression came from relative deprivation, which reflects the "perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities" (Gurr 1970, p. 37).

Other approaches looked at the societal level, whereby as long as there is a balance between the subsystems of society, including the political system, and a balance in the economy such that the prospects of those entering the labor force are balanced with opportunities, the government remained stable. However, if this balance breaks down, there is disorientation and this can lead radical ideologies and crisis. With these elements in the system any crisis can result in revolutionary change
(Galdstone 1982, p. 193). For Charles Tilly however, this discontent is not itself enough. He argues that these sentiments were a natural part of society and instead it was necessary to look at capability to do violence and the ability to make the violence count to explain violence (Goldstone 1982). It is due to the belief that economic inequality has been used in the past as a variable in efforts to explain revolution and transition, though with varied results. Lee Sigelman and Miles Simpson found little empirical evidence for the link (Sigelman and Simpson 1977), while Edward Muller found a positive correlation between inequality and political violence. Similarly, argued that a relationship does exist and that “either ‘going for growth’ or implementing policies that reduce inequality can help buy nations out of revolt” (MacCulloch 2005, p. 114).

**Gender/Race/Ethnicity**

Much of the classical work on inequality in comparative politics, both in terms of economic and political inequality has concentrated on the issue of class. This is in part due to the fact that class itself has reflected a Marxist definition, entrenched in economic conditions. As a result, class theory has generally been concerned with the issues of differences in "ownership, authority and control, material rewards, terms of employment, culture, and skill" (Kingston et. al. 2002, p. 371). Max Weber nevertheless, expanded Karl Marx’s definition of class to incorporate issues of education, skills, and the demand from the market as influences on life chances (Morrison 2006). In addition to this economic stratification, Weber also highlighted the existence of status group stratification within classes resulting from market pressures (Chilcote 1984). This in turn allows for a different type of inequality, of the social variety, one that can be based on social and legal segregation that can result from a caste oriented stratification (Morrison 2006, p. 310-1). What is particularly valuable about Weber’s insights is his recognition that factors such as nationalism,
religious beliefs, and ethnic loyalties factor in towards the creation of class-consciousness (Chilcote 1984), requiring a wider exploration of inequality.

Inequality, particularly when viewed in terms of not only economic inequality but also social inequality, may in fact be better understood in terms of intersectionality. Chantal Mouffe for example has challenged the traditional Marxist class reductionism, which privileges class automatically and urges instead the exploration of role of discourses to create a more nuanced analysis (Mouffe 1988). Building on this perspective, there is now ample evidence that these inequalities also reflect "the power of the dominant gender, race and class groups to organize social institutions to their benefit" (Browne and Misra 2005, p. 165). As a result, inequality cannot simply be understood in terms of economic factors, but factors in terms of gender, race, and ethnicity. These concepts are linked in that the meanings attached to these categories are "mutually constitutive". As a result, "gender is 'racialized' and 'classed' and race is 'gendered' and 'classed' to create dominant and subordinate social positions" (Browne and Misra 2005, p. 166).

The interlinking of these attributes is then supported by four domains of control within the realm of private and public interactions. First there is the structural domain in which social institutions "organize oppression". These regulate the disciplinary domain that works through the means of "techniques of surveillance" of everyday life. These inequalities are then justified through the hegemonic domain of ideology, which then finally bleeds into the interpersonal domain where these inequalities manifest themselves (Browne and Misra 2005, p. 166). Through the subordination of the "other", stratification is possible through multiple scales ranging from those nations-states, all the way down to individual identity (Browne and Misra 2005, p. 166). Nevertheless, in this paper each attribute will be looked at individually, although with the acknowledgement that in reality, conducting a separate analysis such as this may not be possible.
A good starting point in understanding inequality in terms of gender is the “feminization of poverty” thesis. This argument was built on evidence in the US that there was an observed “increase of women among the poor” and “an increase of female head households among the poor households” since the 1950s through the mid 1970s. Further studies altered the absolutist nature of this definition to reflect a more relative understanding, measuring instead the poverty of women in comparison to men (Medeiros and Costa 2007, p. 116). This measure however can even be further extended to include the processes of gender discrimination as being a determinant of poverty. However, empirical research in the Global South and the Global North has demonstrated the complexities in this relationship.

Rather than the correlation of poverty and female-headed households, an important correlation was found between the presence of children and "other characteristics of family members”(Medeiros and Costa 2008, p. 118). Additionally, Steven Pressman in his study of the 24 Luxembourg Income Study countries, found that social capital alone could not adequately account for gender inequality and as such, age and education was not the overriding explanation for gender inequality. Rather, he highlights how government intervention was far better at accounting for discrepancies (Pressman 2002). Nevertheless, if these studies accounted for intra-household inequalities, which would not reflect an equal split of the aggregated income between members of the family group, the inequality between women and men would be more obvious. This reflects that the split of aggregated income is determined by sex, age, and human capital among other factors. Due to this, gender inequality in these terms may be underestimated (Medeiros and Costa 2007).

Nevertheless, this may not reflect wider inequalities in terms of uneven opportunity. There has also been literature that demonstrates there is a gendered nature to private employment, particularly with respect to the processes of globalization and economic integration. Many of these
insights reflect the understanding that women have played a very important role in the growth of export driven economies. Due to lack of educational opportunities, women are also left out of the job market for high skilled work. Instead, women are generally overrepresented in clerical, sales, and service work, through the sex-typing of occupations in both industrialized and developing economies (Meyer 2003).

These processes then creates inequality, as service sector and low-skilled jobs do pay as well as the jobs offered to men. All the while, with respect to globalization the theory of global economic restructuring and its impact on women in the labor market is seen to have both “inclusionary” and “exclusionary” attributes. Although integration “expands opportunities for women in the workplace” it “does not remove barriers to women’s advancement” (Meyer 2003, p. 353). This is in fact supported by cross-national research by Meyer that concludes globalization and liberalization “has had positive effects on reducing occupational segregation and inequality in many nations, particularly in the developing world”, although she questions whether these jobs can be categorized as being “well paid”, “safe” or long-term (Meyer 2003, p. 374).

There is a similar impact of the role of race and ethnicity with respect to inequality. However, the concepts of race and ethnicity are highly contested. For example, race itself has been largely accepted in the contemporary scientific world as something that does not exist, due to insights from the study of biology and genetics. Similarly, psychologists have also argued that humans mentally are "on average, the same", with individual differentiation as opposed to systematic differences as linked to racial categories. Instead most social scientists now agree that race is a “social construction” (Wade 1997, p. 13). Nevertheless, it is also argued that race is more than "merely ideas", as it plays an important part with respect to discrimination based on perceptions of race (Wade 1997, p. 14). There are however different perceptions of race. Juliet Hooker argues that
in Latin American national elites, race is not seen to represent a cultural differentiation and as a result blacks in many Latin American countries Afro-Latinos are not seen to be a distinct cultural group, as opposed to Indigenous cultures (Hooker 2005). Racial construction however can only be understood by recognizing its historical foundations in the process of European differentiation of the other (Wade 1997).

Ethnicity is not as problematic a concept, as it doesn't have the same history or moral baggage, though there are other concerns. Traditionally, ethnicity was viewed in terms of "dress, speech, customs, appearance and so on", serving as a means to categorize cultural differences; this was criticized by some who adopted a "resource mobilisation" model. This model concentrated on the creation of in-group identity in an effort to control resources or power (Wade 1997). Peter Wade however links ethnicity to geography, whereby "social relationships become concrete in spatialised form". This nevertheless, conceptualizes ethnic identities as being "nested", Westerners can be European, British, English, or northern based on regional differences (Wade 1997, p. 18). This reflects the fact that regional differentiation is also an important factor. It is now necessary to explore how the role of race and ethnicity impact the lives of individuals in terms of inequality.

Race has been an important factor in inequality due in large part to the racialized practice of slavery, while ethnicity has influenced the relationship between the dominant minority and the Indigenous population. This can be best seen when viewing the development of the New World. There have been a number of explanations offered to explain the divergent growth rates of countries in the New World over the past 250 years. Some of these attribute North American success to “the superiority of English institutional heritage or to the better fit of Protestant beliefs with market institutions”. These theories however become problematic due to the divergent growth rates of
British colonies, as a similar culture and institutional framework has influenced these colonies (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002, p. 43).

Instead, Engerman and Sokoloff highlight the role of economic inequalities and political influence as the most important factor. In many of the Spanish colonies, there was the practice of “awarding claims on land, native labor, and rich mineral resources to members of the elite” leading to inequality (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002, p. 44). Further, restrictive immigration and the widespread use of slave labour in Spanish colonies also contributed to increased inequality. This economic inequality than became institutionalized through the political process, which was controlled by elites (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002). However, John Coatsworth challenges these claims, arguing that the degree of inequality between North and Latin America was similar until the late 19th century, when there was divergence. He also finds that the contribution to these inequalities was in fact partly due to what Charles Tilly referred to as the “legacies of categorical distinction”. After independence though racial distinctions were eliminated under the banner of “liberal equality”, legal and institutional frameworks continued to replicate older as matrixes of power and the continued racialization of the state (Reygadas 2010, p. 29).

Nevertheless, there has also been a regional element to this problem of racial and ethnic inequality. In Latin America, living in the rural areas creates vast inequities in terms of the quality of life. For example, it plays a large factor in limiting an individual’s educational and career opportunity. Further, due to the centralization of government services and without the aid of proper infrastructure, the ability to receive social services is also restricted. This regional inequality is also directly linked to ethnic inequality due to the historical development of rural communities. These communities were often created by Indigenous peoples who “sought refuge in isolated regions in order to avoid exploitation in reservations, plantations and encomiendas” and Blacks who “fled
toward quilombos” to escape slavery (Reygadas 2010, p. 34). These inequalities are further exacerbated through the role of institutions, as Easterly argues “ethnic diversity has a more adverse effect on economic policy and growth when institutions are poor“ (Easterly 2001, p. 703). As a result, inequality has been multifaceted and can only be explained through historical processes that take into account these other factors.

Inequality is an important concept that has been recognized as such in the past, and continues to be presently. Perhaps most interestingly for the subfield of comparative politics is that inequality is not something that exists in only one area of the world, rather it can be found in all corners of the earth allowing for wide scoped comparisons. For example, gender based inequality, particularly with respect to income, is not just limited to the Global South, but is also a problem for the Global North. All the while race continues to play a major role in multi-racial states, where institutional discrimination is so entrenched that even centuries after the end of slavery, and decades after the end of official segregationist/apartheid equality of opportunity can be more accurately viewed to be an ideal than a reality. Finally, ethnically based inequality has found a home in the European Union, with respect to the free movement of Central and Eastern Europeans into Western Europe and the economic and social inequality they encounter there. Due to these factors, inequality can only be understood within this type of multifaceted contextualization. This also then feeds back to higher order concepts such as democracy and development, which lack credibility without this more in-depth explanation.

Citizenship/Migration/Welfare

Citizenship is a central concern in political science as it provides the legal and social framework through which individuals can exert their individual autonomy within a political democracy (Shafir 1998). Citizenship was first conceptualized in ancient Greece as the ability to
deliberate with other citizens. Nevertheless at this time, the extension of this right was limited to free men. Since that original interpretation, the understanding of citizenship has nevertheless changed throughout history. In the Roman Empire, citizenship became a legal status that protected Roman citizens from the Emperor through various gradations of citizenship, dependent upon various factors. Additionally, it extended Romans the right to be proprietors, whereby citizenship was linked to being able to possess and dispose of possessions freely (Shafir 1998). This division serves as a guideline to the communitarian versus liberal standards of citizenship today. The work social contractarian work of John Rawls extended the liberal position, by introducing citizenship based on the notion of "justice as fairness", which advanced the idea that citizenship should not only reflect an individual’s freedom to contract, but also should include in it the importance of this cooperation as being mutually beneficial to all parties (Shafir 1998, p. 6).

However, the social contractual understanding of citizenship nevertheless faces criticism from a diverse range of perspectives. The communitarians, including Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Alexis de Tocqueville, sought for the implementation of the Greek model of civic republicanism, which is built on citizen involvement in the governing process. They understood politics to be a "communal affair". Therefore, the minimalist understanding in the liberal interpretation whereby individuals pay taxes, vote, and obey the law did not truly constitute citizenship (Shafir 1998, p. 10). Citizenship as such would be seen to be a "practice" rather than simply a "status" (Shafir 1998, p. 11). Building on this, T.H. Marshall's model underpinned by a liberal-democratic welfare state, views citizenship to be beyond just a political matter as it also incorporates socioeconomic factors and is a dynamic understanding of citizenship. Rights then progress from civil rights, to political rights, and finally some degree of social rights (Kymlicka and Norman 1994, p. 354). These social rights serve as a means to enhance “social solidarity” between citizens (Banting 1993).
The multiculturist approach advocated by Will Kymlicka argues for a type of citizenship that allows for "accommodation of the cultural distinctiveness of multiple ethnic groups in a single state" (Shafir 1998, p. 18). These "cultural pluralists" argue that differences in race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and sexuality, need to be addressed, as minorities may feel excluded from the "common culture" of a shared national identity. Instead of citizenship being extended through individuals, citizenship would be extended to entire groups and the type of rights they receive would reflect the group membership (Kymlicka and Norman 1994, p. 369-70). For liberals, including Kymlicka, the rights would still be based on a liberal interpretation and would require that the rights of individuals be safeguarded. Additionally, community rights would be seen as an extension of individual rights. This model argues that instead of the threat of fragmentation of society, by extending a fourth citizenship right, that of cultural citizenship, migrants can become a part of the whole while retaining their own cultural heritage. Though how far and widely these rights can be extended could become an issue (Shafir 1998, p. 19-20).

In addition to this, there are also transnational pluralistic and post-national models. In the EU, for example, migrant rights are extended not as rights derived from the nation-state, but rather are conceptualized as "universal personhood", relying on transnational structure such as the EU (Soysal 1998, p. 189). These rights develop from the transnationalization of civil society, within both the realm of oppositional politics as well as professional associations. This transnationalization may be the result of processes of migration, which constructs "solidarities with one another across territorial divides". Alternatively, there is the global humanitarian strand that creates global solidarity in terms of "ecological interdependence, economic globalization" creating "structural interdependencies and senses of global responsibility" (Sassen 2002, p. 282). Finally, there is another form of citizenship that is developing with respect to local forms of citizenship. Specifically,
in "global cities" those on the margin, could demonstrate a "presence" and to claim rights within the city (Sassen 2002, p. 285).

According to feminist scholars, these models fail to address the male-centric nature of the citizenship. They argue that the "gender-neutrality" of citizenship hides many of these biases (Lister 2003, p. 68). The historical understanding of citizenship, as having included the ability to contract, made it so that only men could be granted full citizenship under this criterion. In some states, this is still the case (Lister 2003). This in large part reflects the break down of the public, masculine, and rational sphere, with the private, feminine, and emotional sphere. The importance of linking citizenship to participation in the public sphere has disadvantaged women (Pateman 1988). Particularly important in this is the gendering of the welfare apparatus, which creates a two-tiered system through women's dependency on the system and creates an outlook where women are incapable attaining of full citizenship (Vogel 1994). As a result, difference feminists believe citizenship needs to address the differentiated needs of women, which are covered away under the liberal equal rights interpretation (Shafir 1998).

However, even before citizenship is granted, immigrants need to navigate the problems associated with getting to certain countries. Western European and “settler” countries, have used restrictive models of immigration to restrict immigration of non-Europeans through out their history. Although there were intervening periods where foreign workers were brought in as laborers, each country set up a racialized state with the goal of limiting immigration from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and to some degree the Jewish population (Janoksi 2010, p. 121). As a result, these efforts by states to restrict the immigration to certain races and ethnicities in the present context cannot be seen as something that is unique or necessarily a direct result of increases in migration activity, but reflect a general level of racism and discrimination “found in all countries” linked to “different
historical experiences of the nation-state formation” (Castles and Miller 1993, p. 196). Nevertheless, though countries may now not have openly hostile immigration standards, in order to maintain homogeneity, some states have instituted very naturalization requirements, based on bloodline for example (Schierup, Hansen and Castles 2006).

However, who gets these citizenship rights is a contested area. As a result, it is necessary to understand the variety of ways which individuals can gain citizenship, specifically migrants. According to Fiona Williams, there are four types of regimes of citizenship: the imperial, ethnic, republican and multi-culture (Williams 1995). The first of these ideal type regime models is the imperial model, which allowed for citizenship based on the fact that individuals were subjects of the same ruler. Second, there is the folk or ethnic model, based on a shared ethnicity. Third, there is the republican model, where citizenship is based on adherence to political rules and national culture. Finally, there is the multicultural model, which is underpinned by the republican political requirements, but with the recognition of cultural diversity (Williams 1995). As a result of the diversity in the type of citizenship models, there is also diverse range of naturalization models that reflect the particular goals of the state, including efforts to maintain homogeneity.

The concerns over homogeneity can also been seen in the current naturalization methods applied by liberal states. In these methods, it is often the case that liberal values are applied haphazardly to limit the migration and naturalization of specific groups, in the current environment this effort has concentrated on Muslims. For example, in France, naturalization of migrants is dependent on “assimilation” as written into law. However, courts have interpreted this standard broadly, seeking only a “sufficient knowledge” of French, having been linked to education level. This had even been the case as applied to Muslim immigrants, including women who wore headscarves (Joppke 2010, p. 47). However, in 2008, Muslim immigrants were denied citizenship.
based on “insufficient assimilation, other than linguistic” as per a new French law. By applying this standard, the French liberal model highlights how migration has put stresses on the liberal right to freedom of religion, within this case as argued by the court, equality and gender (Joppke 2010, p. 139). The Netherlands and Germany have also been found to apply similar restrictive practices (Joppke 2010). The application of these standards may reflect historical legacies with dealing with race and difference (Meer and Mouritsen 2009). Nevertheless, through the application of these types of laws, there are governments already instituting a dual outlook on the ability of certain groups to assimilate as opposed to others, expressing inequalities even prior to citizenship.

When individuals do gain citizenship, states still need to deal with the issue of cultural diversity and social accommodation of minority groups. In order to do so they need to take into account the cultural biases that exist within the state. It is argued that “even liberal states can never be neutral”, there is always a privileging of some perspective over another “in their apparently innocuous decisions about certain language(s), holidays, and symbols, states cannot but promote certain identities and thereby disadvantage others” (Joppke 2010, p. 24). For example, one of the main practices in Islam is the requirement to pray multiple times a day, however, in the context of most liberal states, this right itself is not protected, although the right to freedom of religion nevertheless is. The freedom of religion then becomes differentiated between differing groups. However, arguments have been made that as some states have begun to phase out recognize the White male conception of citizenship, by extending rights to women, the same could be applied to religious minorities (Spinner-Halev 1999). Extending these rights, however, has its own problems as it is often used as fuel for right wing movements.

Next, it is necessary to speak on the issue of welfare state, which is often organized into multiple divergent models (Esping-Andersen 1990, Giddens 1998). Here an effort will be made to
understand the welfare state in terms of the limitations it has historically had, due to its White male normative structure. This will be reflected in the welfare state’s interface with not only women, but also undocumented migrants. The development of the welfare state has generally concentrated on the industrialized world and is reflective of particular contextual historical developments. As a result, the development of the welfare state cannot be viewed with respect to T.H. Marshall's linear progression towards social citizenship, but rather it is more reflective of unique situations faced by state elites in response to the mobilization of the working class (Segura-Ubiergo 2007). Although the legislative underpinnings of the welfare state were put in place between 1880-1920, it was not until the 1920s and more importantly the 1930s that the state's vast fiscal involvement came into being. This occurred under the guise of the New Deal in the US, though it was more limited in Europe (Pierson 2006, p. 120).

Nevertheless, it was not until after World War II that the welfare states entered their "Golden Age". This was when many of the traditional relief systems that existed in Europe to deal with those in "extreme poverty" were transformed into something more substantive (Quadagno 1987, p. 111). During this time the welfare state was conceptualized as providing a means for individuals and families to escape poverty, deal with social risks such as sickness and aging, and offer state services to all citizens (Segura-Ubiergo 2007). These services were often viewed as a "political right, not charity" (Wilensky 1975, p. 6-7). All the while for Gotsa Esping-Andersen, the key aspect of the welfare state is not just providing these limited services, it also has to have the power of decommodifying labor. His qualitative measure of welfare requires that “labor is decommodified to the degree to which individuals or families can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independent of market participation” (Esping-Andresen 1990, p. 37). It is only through decommodification that individuals can be "emancipated" from their dependence on the market (Pacek and Radcliff 2008, p. 183).
There are four general theoretical explanations that seek to address the factors that have contributed to the development of welfare states. First, there are the "logic of industrialism" and economic-openness theories. These emphasize the role of economic development, arguing as states industrialize there is great upheaval and dislocation of populations, corresponding to the law of “increasing state activity” (Segura-Ubiergo 2007). Due to the inability of individuals to seek out the traditional safety net, support from family, the state steps in to provide certain services (Quadagno 1987). While increased international competition often requires states to expand welfare programs to compensate the “losers” (Segura-Ubiergo 2007). Empirical studies have brought these claims into question. David Collier and Richard Messick found that social security programs began in less industrialized states first and may be better explained by the state attempting to increase tax revenue and limit labour power (Collier and Messick 1975). While John Williamson and Joseph Weiss research links it to the strength of labor unions and the socialist party (Williamson and Weiss 1979).

Alternatively, there is the "class analytical tradition" or "power-resource theory", concentrating on the broad mobilization of the working-class, which works in unison with parties that represent their interest in attaining the best means by which to redistribute resources (Segura-Ubiergo 2007). This bottom-up process links for example the growth in public employment in Europe, as well as the growth in the union movement, to the establishment of the welfare state (King 2004). This power mobilization theory also faced problems, as it was unable to define the conditions necessary for mobilization as highlighted by Esping-Andersen (Esping-Andersen 1990b). Specifically, it is unable to address the time frame in which power needs to be mobilized in political structures before goals are achieved. All the while, it does not take into account the regulating power of right parties. Finally, there is also a concern that parties from across the spectrum can mobilize to support the welfare model (Esping-Andersen 1990).

Finally, the last approach reflects a paternalistic role of the state. Here, using the efficiencies
of state-centralization, state managers are able to widely implement welfare policies. This is in part due to the decreased number of veto players as would exist in a federal system, where social provision may go to the "lowest common denominator". Additionally, the welfare state might be desired by bureaucrats due to its ability to enhance the budgeting ability of agencies in order to maintain these services (Segura-Ubiergo 2007, p. 10). However, this is problematic when taking into account the type of welfare model that is being studied in reference to Esping-Andersen's classification. For example, though a decentralized corporatist models include more veto players, due to its decentralized nature, localized change may be more likely (Swank 2001).

The discussion will now turn to an evaluation of how the welfare state impacts citizens and migrants. First, there will be a short discussion on how women are negatively impacted by the gendered nature of the welfare state, specifically with respect to neoliberal restructuring. The neoliberal response to what supporters viewed to be an over intrusive and expansive welfare state was to attempt to severely limit its size and application. Additionally, they argued that the "ungovernability principle" was in effect, whereby welfare states had to deal with the increasing expectations of the citizenry, which resulted in the growth of the state. However, this expansion then decreased the state’s capacity to handle these claims effectively. In order to achieve a balance they sought to offload some of these capacities to individuals and non-state actors. They rationalized this by arguing that decisions should be made by individuals, and that self-responsibility allowed for greater choice and freedom (Offe 1984, p. 67-71). However, neo-liberal policies resulted in disproportionate impacts on citizens and in particular women felt the brunt of these measures.

These policy preferences affected women in two different ways. First, there has been the issue of cutting the size of the public sector and services offered. By cutting public sector jobs, in which women make up the majority of the workforce, women are disproportionately negatively impacted (O’Connor 1996). Second, there is also the consideration of the use of the welfare state by
women versus men. Due to the problems associated with getting full time, high paying jobs in the private sphere, there exists a greater dependency of women on the welfare state for services. For example, in non-social insurance-based programs women make up the majority of recipients of welfare aid (O'Connor 1996).

However, there are other neoliberal policies that more specifically affected women. These policies are associated with efforts to offload state services, such as caregiving, to non-state actors and individuals (O’Connor 1996). This is particularly a concern for women due to the issues involved in the sequence of caring. Due to the expansive nature of these cutbacks, the caring that needs to be provided for includes not only that of children, but also husband care, and increasingly important the care for the elderly. These issues present contradicting pressures on women in the work force. On one side, due to a decrease in services, they are forced to provide care at home. However, in order to maintain some standard of living within the family they are also forced to attempt to find paid work. Due to this economic reality, there is even greater stress on women than had been the case previously (Sassoon 1987). Clearly, this demonstrates how the welfare state, if viewed from Marshall’s conceptualization as a means to extend social rights, falls short of meeting that goal due to its gendered application.

Finally, it is necessary to find how welfare links to migration, which as highlighted earlier, has become a major concern. However, one of the major problems in addressing the role of migration and the welfare state has been the fact that typologies, like Esping-Andersen’s, have not included two important components. First, there is the "immigration policy regime" or the "incorporation regime" that "regulates immigrants' inclusion in or exclusion from society". These four models, imperial, ethnic, republican and multi-cultural affect the policies of exclusion and inclusion differently. Additionally, the different entry categories that exist (i.e. labor migrants,
refugees, undocumented immigrants) relate to the "specific rights" these groups have with respect to social benefits. These classifications are important as the rights given to these groups, need to be in accordance with international law. For example, the Geneva Convention gives refugees the same social rights as citizens, while undocumented workers have no legal means through which they can demand social services (Sainsbury 2006, p. 230). Through linking these various strands, Castles and Miller demonstrate that viewing welfare as a stand alone, without taking into consideration immigration, is not sufficient to understand how welfare affects individuals (Castles and Miller 2003).

Diane Sainsbury has shown this type of combined analysis of welfare states and immigration regimes to be more instructive. Her research finds that although non-citizens have greater access to services in comprehensive welfare states such as Germany and Sweden, the actual benefits differ due to the differences in welfare and immigration regime models in the two countries. Additionally, there is a gendered element as women immigrants in Germany receive decreased benefits as compared to those immigrating to Sweden. Additionally, immigrants in Germany are more likely to be under the poverty line due to the more restrictive German model (Sainsbury 2006).

The type of immigrant also plays large factor when comparing immigrant rights to those of citizens. Due to the unique status of refugees, their rights are on par with citizens. However, with respect to asylum seekers, their social rights have decreased over time in Sweden and Germany, while they had no social rights in the US. This demonstrates how these rights are not guaranteed and can be reversed (Sainsbury 2006, p. 240). These findings are mirrored in another study, which found that undocumented workers and asylum seekers have particularly been targeted, and as a result, their access to social rights has been "steadily worsening". In addition to this state response, asylum seekers have suffered further due to a greater stigmatization and even physical violence from the
public (Schuster and Solomos 2002, p. 47-8). As a result, it is no surprise that migration and welfare are central concepts with respect to the literature of far-right movements (Bale 2003, Betz 2005).

As this section demonstrates, issues concerning to citizenship, welfare and migration, cannot be detached from issues concerning inequality and identity. As such, this section helps to demonstrate how there is great value in trying to understand these linkages in order to develop a deeper understanding. As Sainsbury’s research shows, this is a cumulative effort; it is only through finding gaps in previous research that these linkages can be found. However, these gaps themselves can only be located when there is a multidisciplinary approach in that many of the critiques that have emerged regarding the problematic nature of gendering and racialization might not have directly originated from the field of political science. Therefore, this type of research strategy advocates reaching out to different fields even more so than currently is the case, in order to incorporate insights that are available, but often overlooked by political scientists.

**Nationalism/Federalism/Legitimacy**

In the previous section, it was highlighted how states face stresses in dealing with an increasingly diverse population and at the same time recognizing the importance of the rights of individuals and groups within states. While that section highlighted the immigrant perspective, it did not address other groups who also have laid claim to specific rights due to unique cultural differences. These groups however are not migrants, but rather national groups that existed before the existence of current states, and were incorporated into the state and a national demos. These permanent national minorities have existed under the "biased" centrality of individualism, universalism and "statism" that is at the heart of liberal democratic systems. Further, this bias does
not only extend to conceptions of "norms" and "values", but also influences the very institutions and rules of decision-making within these states (Requejo 2010, p. 149-50). As a result, the liberal democratic state and theoretical frameworks that attempt to explain its development do not adequately reflect the existence of "different societies" within states, which results in the existence of "one polity, several demos" (Requejo 2010, p. 152). In addition to this, liberal democratic theory does not adequately address the "self-awarded collective right: the right to self-government for the state collective", for example the incorporation of nations and communities through "wars of annexation, territorial conquest, etc." (Requejo 2010, p. 153). As such, it is necessary to understand how these concepts interlink with one another.

According to Benedict Anderson, the nation can be defined as "an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign". It is imagined in that the individuals that comprise the nation do not necessarily come in contact with one another (Anderson 2006, p. 6). Anthony Smith expands the definition of nation in incorporating polity into a sense of community and defines a nation as “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith 2005, p. 180). Lastly, for Giddens a nation is a “collectivity existing within a clearly demarcated territory, which is subject to a unitary [and uniform] administration, reflexively monitored both by the internal state apparatus and those of other states” (Giddens 1985, p. 116). Although Anderson’s definition gives us some insight into the differences between nation groups, it is the latter two definitions that better serve to address the problems particular to pluranational states. The problems begin to emerge when the nation as a polity, does not correspond to the nation as a community. As a result, the various ethnic groups within the polity, due to feeling of exclusion and questions of legitimacy of the governance, may conspire towards separate nationhood.
The expression of these nationalist concerns comes through the guise of nationalism. As defined by Anderson’s definition, many subnations within states, for example the Québécois and the Cree in Canada, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Basques and Catalans in Spain and the Irish, Scottish and Welsh in Great Britain, represent self-proclaimed nations already in existence before their incorporation into the larger state body through conquest and treaty (James 1996). Nevertheless, these nationalisms aren’t as much reflective of the top-down approach highlighted by Gellner, who argued that nationalism is such a powerful force it “invents nations where they do not exist” (Gellner 1983, p. 55). Additionally, Gellner viewed the nation-state as being the key source of political legitimacy and argued that nationalism had benefits in maintaining unity during modernization (O’Leary 1997).

Rather, these nationalisms may more rightfully be viewed in Hobsbawmian terms as a bottom-up approach. He finds that nationalism “must also be analysed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people” (Hobsbawm1992, p. 10). Nevertheless, Hobswamb is critical of both political and ethnic nationalism, highlighting his more internationalist Marxist sympathies (Hobswamb 1992). The nationalist movements mentioned above, although in part being founded on the centrality of cultural differentiation and representing different ethnic elements also include more civic qualities. Most importantly however, they espouse a nationalism that upholds the belief that the nation “should be collectively and freely institutionally expressed, and ruled by its co-nationals” (O’Leary 1997, p. 191). It is with this in mind that it is now necessary to turn to the concepts of federalism and legitimacy.

Federalism has traditionally been studied and defined in three different categories. The first of these definitions concentrates on the distribution of power between a central government and constituent regional governments. The second method concentrates on the process through which
several governments, representing political communities, are bound together through systems of "federal representation" and "intergovernmental cooperation". Finally, the third method of defining federalism, combines the previous two and concentrates on the origins of a federal agreement or covenant, by studying how independent political communities come to create a set of rules to form a federal union. This last definition allows for recognizing the variances in the diversity of the operationalization of federal systems around the world (Aroney 2009) and also helps to provide the justification for the implementation of a federal system. It draws from rationalist insights, arguing that the federal model is a bargain between federalizing units in order to achieve certain goals.

Federalism, as it relates to nationalism, has not always been viewed to be incompatible with one another. The national federalists argued for the uniting qualities of the federalist system. During the early round of federation building found in the Netherlands, Germany, and the US, national federalists argued that federalism was a means by which people living in different political units, but sharing a common culture could be brought together (O’Leary 2003). For the purpose of this paper it is this unity factor that is most important, in respect to heterogeneous populations. Nevertheless, even here William Riker argued that the beauty of federalism was that it could potentially deal with the problem of the “tyranny of the majority”, due to its built-in ability to protect the rights of individuals against the center. This could effectively help to safeguard the rights of the subunits and as a result nations groups, particularly through a model such as that of the US (Stepan 2001).

However, in pluranational states there was a clear tension between the values of unity and diversity. James Bryce highlighted this by pointing out that “the problem which all federalized nations have to solve is how to secure an efficient central government and preserve national unity, while allowing free scope for the diversities, and free play to the authorities, of the members of the
federation” (Burgess 2006, p. 16). It is no surprise then that Edward Freeman described the federation as being "the most finished and the most artificial production of political ingenuity" (Burgess 2006, p. 103). However, this artificial production did not necessarily reflect its component parts. In many federal systems it is often the case that the majority has "equated itself with the overarching federal political nationality". As a result, for example in the case of Canada, the Anglophone Canadians equated being Canadian with English speaking Canada (Burgess 2006, p. 104).

Due to this, not only is the issue of culture a major dividing point in federal systems, but also the federal system itself often lends itself to problematic interpretations as national minorities often see it as a representation of the majority culture. This then renders problematic the legitimacy of the institutions that reflect the federal system. Legitimacy is viewed to be at the heart of political matters. This is because in order to exercise political power that is accepted as being just by citizens, requires the state to have legitimacy. It is "the core of political organization" according to Muthiah Alagappa, "the central issue in social and political theory" according to David Beetham and "the master question of politics" according to Bernard Crick (Gilly 2006, p. 499).

Legitimacy according to David Easton's understanding is the convictions that are held by the polity, which considers authority to be just and moral. It can be attributed to political authorities and political regimes, with its sources being ideological, structural and personal (Muller 1970), building on Weber’s work on legitimacy (Bendix 1977). Further, for Easton legitimacy could only be possible if there existed a "common interest". This common interest would help to create a common standard through which the performance of outputs could be evaluated (Gilly 2006, p. 502). This is a problematic area, when consideration is given to the belief that many of these permanent nation groups do not view the federal structure as being representative of a common goal. This may be the
result of asymmetrical federalism due to uneven socio-economic relations or constitutional differences within the subunits of federation. As a result, these asymmetries are also reflected in the bargaining processes within the federation (Stepan 2001). As a result, the federal structure and the formal processes under which it operates can also be viewed as having the interests of the majority identity ingrained in the functional aspects of federal governance. Changes to take this into account have occurred, through allowing for self-government, though they are rare (Burgess 2006).

This helps to lead us back to one of the initial concerns, particularly with respect to inequalities within a state. Regional inequalities in a federal system could provide those areas which are privileged, for example in terms of resources, to demand changes within the federation relationship, or greater autonomy, for example with respect to fiscal power. This material impetus for change may function as a greater force than any nationalist desire. However, these asymmetries can be dealt with, without necessitating complete secession. For example, one way of dealing with these asymmetries is by reconfiguring internal subunits such that the minority national group can become a majority and a result in greater control over the local region.

Alternatively, as Daniel Elazar argues, “a larger power and a smaller polity are linked asymmetrically in a federal relationship whereby the latter has greater autonomy than other segments of the former and, in return, has a smaller role in the governance of the larger power” (Bauböck 2004, p. 222-3). These steps are not necessarily detrimental to the state. Even though some have highlighted the disintegrationist nature of taking these steps, Stepan finds that “democratic federal devolution of power, or granting of group specific rights, has not been a slippery slope to session, or a violation of individual rights, as liberal theorists often fear” (Stepan 2001, p. 359). There are clear linkages between these multiple and varied concepts and to deal with the problems they raise, they need to be considered together in order to provide more comprehensive solutions.
Conclusion

The goal of this paper was to demonstrate how the concepts and processes that are currently being studied in subfield of comparative politics, are far more interrelated and require a greater depth of understanding than can be adequately allowed for by just looking at them individually. Though the desire to do this is understandable, as comparativists make an effort to limit their studies for the sake of greater precision and control, it nevertheless does not help to fully contextualize what is being studied. It is through this contextualization, that we are able to observe the tensions within the processes that are taking place in the world around us. It is hoped that this paper has demonstrated there is far more utility in understanding them in a holistic manner, such that we can better observe the dynamics inherent in comparative studies. Undoubtedly, in a paper such as this, there are some major shortfalls. For example, there is no doubt that with respect to development it may have also been possible to explore the issue of environment. In grouping related to identity, there may have been other concepts such as sexuality and religion that also may have been helpful in linking research strands. Likewise, in the case of citizenship and nationalism, the inclusion of right-wing movements could have proven to be insightful. Nevertheless, this paper sought to serve as a demonstration of this process, and argue that the mainstream means of researching and teaching comparative politics may require greater complexity to understand an increasingly complex world.
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