The administrative dilemmas of government communications

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Abstract

Government communications with the public is a rare area of federal public administration that is found in both the public service and political spheres. This reflects its position on the cusp between politics and administration, nurturing both but belonging fully to neither. The situation is not new: there is evidence of politically driven communications activities throughout the past century, with government communications an important part of the federal response to major emergencies and periods of national stress but often mired in the swampy zone between information and propaganda and between public and partisan interests. As a result it has often operated in the shadows, with numerous abortive efforts to institutionalize the function in an effectively accountable manner, a point that the Gomery commission’s ahistorical perspective failed to recognize. The situation has been made more acute with the growing importance of information as a public resource and as a focus of public administration. The paper sketches current dilemmas about government communications from a public administration perspective. It discusses the historical evolution of the function and then reviews the resulting current institutional arrangements, which have unique and troubling aspects. A third section reviews four issues that arise from this situation: the challenge of operating on the cusp between politics and administration; the separation of government communications from service to the public and from Access to Information in the context of the 24-hour news cycle; and the complexity but also the weakness of the accountability regime for government communications. These dilemmas do not have simple solutions, but the paper offers some starting points, beginning with the importance of sensitivity to the current situation and associated risks.

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Introduction

In recent years there has been increasing attention paid to the importance of communications instruments in the political process. The Conservative government of Stephen Harper has been accused of being particularly aggressive in its use of public communications while in office (Canadian Press 2011), foreshadowed by the importance attached to the communications function in its rise to power (Flanagan 2007). Earlier governments have also treated political communications as an integral part of gaining and retaining power (Goldenberg 2006, Newman 2005).

Less media and academic attention has been paid to communications with the public as a function of public administration, which for the purposes of this paper are referred to as government communications. Arguably the most politically sensitive area of federal public administration, it is a rare area that is found organizationally in both the public service and political spheres (i.e., ministerial exempt staff and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)); it also has an unusual degree of internal coordination and political oversight. This reflects its position on the cusp between politics and administration, nurturing both but belonging fully to neither. The situation is not new: there is evidence of politically driven communications activities throughout the past century, with government communications an important part of governance at all times but especially of the federal response to major emergencies and periods of national stress. More than once, however, these have become mired in the swampy zone between information and propaganda and between public and partisan interests. As a result government communications has historically often operated in the shadows, with numerous abortive efforts to institutionalize the function.

Most recently, aspects of government communications – notably sponsorship and advertising – were given close scrutiny by the Gomery commission, which was highly critical of the situation it found (Canada Gomery 2005a & b, 2006), although it was regrettably ahistorical in its analysis. While institutional arrangements have stabilized under the current government, the pressures on the communications function have been made more acute under the impact of information and communications technologies (ICTs) in the past quarter century, with the emergence of networked government information combined with the continuous scrutiny provided by the 24 hour news cycle and compounded by Question Period and other features of the Canadian version of the Westminster model. One far-reaching consequence has been that communications has become isolated from other aspects of public administration.

This paper looks at government communications as a function of public administration, from both an historical and institutional perspective; on that basis it discusses some of the dilemmas that the function faces. It argues that government communications are conditioned by several factors: a chequered history in institutionalizing the communications function, in particular what can be categorized as communications common services and political oversight to government communications activities; the resulting current institutional arrangements, which have unique and troubling aspects from a public administration perspective; the wear and tear of operating on the cusp between politics and administration; organizational and policy separation from two closely related areas, service to the public and Access to Information; and a complex and opaque accountability regime. The resulting dilemmas do not have simple
solutions, but the paper, which is structured around these elements, offers some starting points, beginning with the importance of awareness of the current situation and associated risks.

**Evolution of the government communications function**

The public information function has long been a part of Canadian public administration, paralleled by ambivalence and controversy about many of its aspects. The function’s institutional roots can be traced to the 19th century, although its later evolution was heavily influenced by 20th century experience with war and national unity debates. Informing the public in support of government programs has always been a central concern of government communications, but governments have also from early times been aware of their political potential, notably in the areas of advertising and more recently sponsorship and public opinion research (Rounce 2006). Government communications has been part of the same institutional evolution as the rest of Canadian public administration – it was the subject of one of the reports of the Glassco commission and, to some degree at least, has been administered within the model recommended by Glassco – but its features have resulted in a unique and, until recently, highly volatile institutional environment. These historical threads are woven together in this section, providing a context for looking at the current organizational arrangements in the next. Particular attention is paid to advertising, the area of government communications that has been the most controversial politically and unsettled institutionally.

**Wartime and other early influences**

There are many early examples of public information activities related to the government’s work. The *Canada Gazette* was established in 1841, building on even older roots, as the official publisher of statutes and other government notices for the United Province of Canada. It was reconstituted in 1867 as the Government of Canada’s official newspaper, a role that it still plays (Kennedy and Foote 2001). The Department of Agriculture began issuing bulletins to farmers in 1887 (Canada Glassco 1962 3: 61); the Department of the Interior advertised heavily to attract European immigrants to Canada in the early 20th century (Rose 2000: 49—56); and the Laurier government established a permanent Exhibition Commission in 1902 to market Canada overseas (Canada 1969b: 123). Both world wars saw a major expansion of government information activities, with the establishment during World War I of a Press Censorship Branch in the Department of the Secretary of State (127). A Bureau of Public Information – later described as “fraught with political legitimacy problems” (Rose 2000: 65) – was formed in the Department of National War Services at the beginning of World War II, as well as an official-level Censorship Coordination Committee (132) and a Cabinet Committee on Public Information (Murray 1988: 12). In 1942, a Wartime Information Board, reporting to the Prime Minister, was given a broad mandate that included dissemination of war news and co-ordination of government information activities (Canada 1969b: 133—134; Osbaldeston: 369), described in the Glassco report as “a propaganda effort with a special department headed by a minister assigned to the task” (Canada Glassco 1962 3: 62).

The WIB was replaced in 1945 by the Canadian Information Service, which retained a co-ordination function but whose operational roles were limited to distributing abroad information about Canada. It was wound up in 1947, with its international
activities absorbed by the Department of External Affairs (Osbaldeston 1992: 197; Canada 1969b: 134). After World War II there was a major growth in government information activities, including advertising, but no interdepartmental liaison (Murray 1988: 14): “The picture that emerges of public information services in the government is one of a general blur of diffuse activity. ... Central planning, direction and co-ordination are lacking” (Canada Glassco 1962 3: 110). In the absence of a formal central co-ordination mechanism, however, it can be assumed that any needed policy direction was provided through Cabinet discussion, supported by Privy Council Office (PCO), which had assumed the role of Cabinet secretariat during World War II (Heeney 1946).

Defining the communications function: the Glassco report and Information Canada

The Glassco report influenced government communications at two levels. Indirectly it established the institutional framework that continues to shape the public service, featuring a three-part organizational categorization of line departments that deliver programs and services to the public, central agencies that support collective ministerial decision-making, and common service organizations that provide services to government departments where it is judged essential or desirable for them to do so (Canada Glassco 1962 1). This led, in 1966, to the reconstitution of the Treasury Board committee of Ministers to provide an overview of management practices in government. With central agency support from Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS), Treasury Board issues Policies that define management programs in each area of public administration by setting out public policy goals in that area as well as roles and responsibilities of all those involved in implementing the policies and supporting administrative instruments and accountability mechanisms. The Department of Supply and Services (DSS) was also established to provide a range of common services to government, including several aspects of government communications.

More directly, Glassco’s Report 13, “Public Information Services” (Canada Glassco 1962 3) discusses government information services in the early 1960s, categorizing them under the headings of services for the public (dissemination of information by statistical and science-based organizations and promotional information linked to programs such as Unemployment Insurance); enlisting public support and co-operation (encouraging early income tax filing, or public service recruitment); and the public’s right to be informed, under which they group both responsiveness to public requests for information and publicity (63—72). Advertising was a feature of many of these information activities, and the commission notes the potential value of hiring outside advertising agencies, given that “advertising is a technical business” (94—95). They also note that, “By long established practice, advertising agencies are selected at the ministerial level”, although there is no indication of a co-ordinating mechanism for managing advertising contracts, and recommend that advertising accounts be awarded on the basis of competitive proposals “in the manner of other government contracts” (95). This set up a theme that continues to resonate. The report also reflects on the government’s broader publicity activities. Drawing a distinction between releasing news and “telling the department’s story” (69), the commission comments on the importance of factual and objective information provision, the danger of the sheer volume of information being transformed into propaganda, and the distinction “between material which genuinely informs and that
which is calculated only to impress” (70). Noting that “the publicizing of a department may be an excursion into the realm of political controversy” (69), the commission rejects the “philosophy of the public relations man” and concludes that “the objective of being ‘well and favourably known’, so legitimate in competitive business, forms no part of public information policies of departments” (70—71).

This philosophy is noteworthy, given the commission’s private sector orientation, and it can be speculated that it reflected a residual distaste for the part played by wartime propaganda on both sides of World War II. Whatever the reason, the commission, which in other respects laid the foundation for the contemporary Canadian administrative state, did not address the issue of the need for advertising common services. It did, however, recommend that the Queen’s Printer be given an advisory role to departments and Treasury Board and that a committee of senior information officers “review and advise on co-ordination of public information policy and activity throughout the public service” (113—114).

Building on its pre-Confederation roots, the Queen’s Printer was formally created as a government agency in 1869 (Kennedy and Foote 2001) and incorporated into a Department of Public Printing and Stationery, with its own minister, that was set up in 1886 and remained in existence until 1969 (Osbaldeston 1992: 472). In 1963/4, the Department’s printing functions evolved into the Canadian Government Printing Bureau, in the Department of Defence Production. When DSS was established in 1969, in the aftermath of the Glassco report’s recommendations on common service agencies, it absorbed both the Departments of Public Printing and Stationery and of Defence Production, bringing together the publishing and communications purchasing functions of the former and the printing functions of the latter under a Director General, Printing and Purchasing in the DSS Supply Sector, who also carried the title of Queen’s Printer (195).¹

The Pearson government took two other steps parallel to these developments. In 1964, it established the Advertising Group in the General Purchasing Group of the Department of Defence Production, later DSS. This unit was asked to ensure that the government obtained best available rates, including negotiating bulk contracts with agencies, develop standards and common criteria to guide departments running their own campaigns, record all advertising contracts undertaken by government departments and independent agencies (except commercially-oriented Crown corporations), and work with the Advertising Audit Unit set up at the same time in the Comptroller of the Treasury to control advertising costs (326).² In 1966, Pearson also struck an ad hoc cabinet Committee on Advertising, which developed criteria for selecting advertising agencies and provided oversight to campaigns (324).

The situation changed more dramatically with the advent in 1968 of Prime Minister Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, a former magazine editor. As part of a general overhaul of the machinery of government, Trudeau appointed a Task Force on Government Information, which tabled its report, To Know and Be Known, in 1969 (Canada 1969a&b). The report recommends a more comprehensive approach to the provision of government information

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¹ The evolution of the Queen’s Printer, especially in the 1960s was more complex than is reported here, reflecting continuing uncertainty about where the evolution should lead. The Task Force on Government Information begins its discussion of the Queen’s Printer by stating that, “Nowhere in official Ottawa are the corridors more tortuous and reality more elusive that at the Queen’s Printer (Canada 1969b: 230).

² The Advertising Audit Unit was transferred to DSS in 1969 (Canada 1969b: 327).
to the public – including embracing the tools of modern public relations that were so categorically rejected by the Glassco commission – in the name of a more open and democratic society. The report stresses the new role of the media and the importance of government escaping the mediation of the media in getting its message to the public. Advertising should be a basic pillar in this approach (Canada 1969b: 323), and the government should also be more open about its polling activities (Canada 1969a: 27; Canada 1969b: 353—364). The report has a lengthy discussion of the problem of patronage in the awarding of advertising contracts (334—339), recommending creation of an Advisory Committee on the Appointment of Advertising Agents consisting of “distinguished businessmen who are not associated with advertising agencies” (336, 338). Stressing that the key is coordination, not excessive centralization, the task force advises a more strategic approach to public communications generally. Its elements would include: developing a new information policy for government and supporting administrative structures; appointing a minister to be in charge of information programs, who would also chair a cabinet committee on information policy with a secretariat provided by PCO; creating Information Canada as the government’s operational (in Glassco’s terms, common service) agency in this field, with its own minister; establishing a Parliamentary oversight committee; and establishing a council of directors of departmental public affairs divisions (Canada 1969a: 49—54).

In response, Trudeau created Information Canada in 1970, consolidating a number of government information services including government publishing (but not printing, which remained with DSS) and the dissemination of government information to the public (Murray 1988: 42; Osbaldeston 1992: 284—285). Reporting to a Minister without Portfolio (in effect, a junior minister under the Prime Minister), Information Canada had two main units: Information Out, grouping a variety of information dissemination activities; and Information In, which included enquiry centres, correspondence and media analysis and attitudinal surveys (Canada Information Canada 1970: 3-IC). Another of its responsibilities was the Federal Identity Program (FIP), which had its roots in Expo 67 and the Centennial year celebrations, when the government adopted a uniform, bilingual graphic scheme for government signage, letterhead and other means of identifying it to the public. Of these, perhaps the most important was the “Canada Wordmark” – the word Canada with the flag over the final letter “a” – which rapidly became the brand not just for the federal government but for the country as a whole.

In retrospect, Information Canada was probably doomed from the start. Murray notes that Trudeau was cryptic in launching the agency and never explained why most of the task force’s recommendations were not acted on (Murray 1988: 43). The fact that members of the task force and the first director-general of Information Canada were known Liberals meant that it was easily criticized as serving the partisan interests of the government, and it was mercilessly attacked as “Prop Can” (Rose 2000: 72) by the Opposition and media and resisted by both the government information community, which felt threatened (Murray 1988: 45), and a government culture of secrecy (83). Management mistakes and critical reports by PCO and a Senate committee all contributed to the agency’s loss of legitimacy (103) and the government’s lack of commitment (77), although Murray argues that most of the criticism was unfounded (111). In 1976, it was wound up as part of cutbacks associated with wage and price controls. While many of its individual functions were re-absorbed into DSS, the demise of Information Canada made
future governments cautious about centralizing government information activity too visibly, with the result that later incarnations were more narrowly focused, generally on national unity-related agendas, lower profile, and impermanent. This enduring trend has been at the expense of full public scrutiny and accountability of government communications activities.

**The national unity effect**

The election of the Parti Québécois in November 1976 and the subsequent events leading to the patriation of the constitution provoked a new requirement for a coordinated approach to government communications. The Trudeau government set up a small group in the federal-provincial relations office of PCO to develop and oversee its national unity communications strategy and established the Canadian Unity Information Office (CUIO) in August 1977 to implement that strategy, while working through DSS for printing and other services. Originally established under the Secretary of State, the CUIO was transferred in December 1978 to the Department of Justice, which had a lead role always under the Prime Minister and PCO – on constitutional matters. The Progressive Conservative government of Prime Minister Joe Clark, which was in office at the launch of the 1980 Quebec referendum campaign, retained the CUIO, and it became even more prominent in post-referendum efforts to patriate the constitution. Rose notes that the CUIO was part of an elaborate communications strategy, which also included the appointment of the Task Force on Canadian Unity as a source of public input to the unity process. Charged with creating favourable public opinion, the CUIO was engaged in a deliberate persuasive campaign, disguised as information provision (Rose 1993). It was this quasi-propaganda element – even if one that could be presented as legitimate in the circumstances – that made it easy for the Mulroney government to close the office in 1985 as an early signal of its different approach to the constitutional file.

There were two other important developments under Trudeau. When the division of labour between PMO and PCO was delineated early in the Trudeau government (Robertson 1971, Lalonde 1971), the role of the Prime Minister’s media spokesperson was assigned to a senior PMO official, treating this as an essentially political role. The PCO never established a distinct media relations office, but instead developed a communications secretariat linked to the Plans sector (now Plans and Consultation), with a dual role of ensuring that public communications issues were addressed in ministerial proposals to cabinet and of liaising with the PMO press office as a link between it and public service information activities. This arrangement was reflected in departments, where typically ministers had a media advisor and public spokesperson on their political exempt staff, while day-to-day communications activities were carried out by a public service unit, most often headed at the director-general level. PMO provided informal leadership to the network of exempt staff advisors, while the PCO communications secretariat did the same with departmental communications offices. As discussed in a later section, this arrangement is still in place.

A second, related, development under Trudeau was the emergence of a Cabinet Committee on Communications. It is not clear whether he retained Pearson’s *ad hoc* secretariat.

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3 It is not clear when the PCO secretariat was set up. There is an early reference to a Public Information secretariat in Campbell and Szablowski’s 1979 discussion of Trudeau’s first PCO (Campbell and Szablowski 1979: 75).
committee on advertising or set up a new committee later on, but it is referred to as a coordinating committee in a 1981 PCO description of the cabinet system (Canada PCO 1981: 7). The precise coordination functions are not clear, but it can safely be assumed that the committee was supported by the PCO communications secretariat and was concerned with coherence in the government’s big communications files, working closely with the PMO. It is not unreasonable to assume that this committee provided ministerial oversight – on behalf of the Prime Minister, for whom this was a top priority – to the public communications aspects of the unity file, including the work of the CUIO and related activities such as advertising and polling (which would link back to the Pearson cabinet committee). Certainly, by the time period covered by the Gomery commission, such oversight was a central role played by the cabinet communications committee, under both Prime Ministers Brian Mulroney (it was chaired by Lowell Murray, the government leader in the Senate from 1989-1993) and Jean Chrétien, when most famously it was chaired by Alfonso Gagliano while he was minister of PWGSC.

Mulroney was known to take a strong interest in the government’s communications activities. He re-established the cabinet committee on communications, which had been wound up by John Turner during his brief period in office in 1984 (Clark 1985: 190), and retained the PCO communications secretariat. Although the CUIO was wound up, the government engaged in a number of major advertising campaigns to promote initiatives such as the launch of GST, free trade agreements, and the Meech Lake/Charlottetown constitutional rounds (Rose 2000, ch. 5 and 6). This strengthened the Advertising Management Group, which had served as an advertising policy advisory committee under Trudeau. By the late 1980s the AMG was a unit within DSS’s Supply Sector, selecting advertising agencies and monitoring government advertising campaigns for quality and effectiveness. (Further research would be required to confirm that it was an evolution of the Advertising Group established in 1964, although this seems likely.) A separate DSS unit, the Public Relations and Print Contract Services Sector, conducted the process of letting individual contracts, the descendant of a succession of such units. The two units were merged under Chuck Guité in November 1994, which Judge Gomery considered to be a contributory factor to the Sponsorship scandal (Canada Gomery 2005: 21 & 22). This was against the background of a continued political role in the selection of advertising agencies – what Rose calls the symbiosis of government party and advertising agency (Rose 2000: 89—92) – notwithstanding advice going back to Glassco to end the practice.

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4 Given that the 1980 Trudeau cabinet committee system was closely modelled on the one adopted by Clark in 1979 (the Policy and Expenditure Management System), it is likely that the Clark government also had a communications committee.

5 For at least some of the Chrétien government it was referred to as an ad hoc committee, implying that it did not meet regularly. There is also reference to the committee being reconstituted in 1998, when Gagliano became its chair (Canada CIO 1999: 4). The full history of the cabinet committee and PCO secretariat are matters for further research.

6 The Gomery report takes the AMG’s existence as given before Guité’s appointment as its head in 1990. It stands to reason that such a group existed for the CUIO and perhaps earlier.

7 Rose describes a 1905 confidential memorandum prepared by Laurier listing government-friendly agencies with which government newspaper advertisements could be placed (Rose 2000: 51). Later, he quotes Jim Coutts, who headed Trudeau’s PMO in the late 1970s and early 1980’s, as saying that “There are Liberal agencies and Tory agencies. That’s the way advertising works in Canada.” (89). Norman Spector, a former head of Mulroney’s PMO, quotes Alan Gregg, Mulroney’s chief pollster, that the
Two other important steps were taken in the late 1980s to strengthen the communications function in government. In January 1987, the Public Service Commission released an occupational group analysis of government information officers, and later that year PCO sponsored a management review of federal communications, stressing the importance of shifting from communications services to communications management. This led, in June 1988, to Treasury Board issuing a comprehensive Government Communications Policy, providing policy direction to deputy ministers and departmental communications and program managers on the full range of communications activities. These provisions included administrative procedure guidelines to common service agencies, such as the AMG, and to the departments working with them.

In 1990, a companion policy updated the Federal Identity Program (Canada TBS 1990). Administration of both policies was assigned to TBS, working closely with the PCO communications secretariat. The Government Communications Policy was drafted to be complementary to other government policies relating to the management of information, including policies on Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) and Government Security, and this suite of related policies was administered by a unit within the TBS Administrative Policy Branch. In a parallel development, the government decided to professionalize the administration of the printing, publishing and public inquiries common services provided by DSS, the then incarnation of the Queen’s Printer. These were incorporated into a special operating agency, the Communication Group (CCG), that was launched in April 1989, although working under the broad direction of the cabinet communications committee and the Government Communications policy.

The Gomery Commission has described arrangements under the Chrétien government, but some aspects merit highlighting. Perhaps the most important is the continuing organizational flux for communications common services in general and for advertising and related activities in particular. At an undetermined point, the Advertising Management Group assumed responsibility for polling and its name changed to variants on Advertising and Public Opinion Research Sector (APORS). With the reorganization launched by Prime Minister Kim Campbell when she came into office in June 1993 – and confirmed by Chrétien when he replaced her in November 1993 – its home department became Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC), which consolidated most of the government’s common service functions in a single department. Notwithstanding two changes of government in 1993, the AMG/APORS continued its role of screening and coordinating government advertising activities, working under policy direction from the PCO communications secretariat. Testimony before the Gomery commission indicates that its head, Guité established a direct relationship with the first Liberal PWGSC Minister, David Dingwall, continuing the relationship he had had with sponsorship scandal has to do with how parties pay off election campaign advertising, “as they pull together a consortium of essential volunteers. They’re either unpaid or they’re paid significantly below market value. And at the end of a winning campaign ... there’s a kind of nudge, nudge, wink, wink, you know, we owe you one.” (Spector 2005) This echoes discussions of the patronage dimension of government advertising in the Task Force on Government Information report, which also talks about a standard industry commission of 15% on any work done (Canada 1969b: 335).

The Department was called Public Works and Supply and Services under Campbell and renamed PWGSC by Chrétien.
Progressive Conservative ministers\(^9\). In April 1994, cabinet approved a new advertising annex to the Government Communications Policy, which established more formal procedures for advertising contracting (Canada Gomery 2005: 446).

Events took another course, however, with the return of the Parti Québécois to power in September 1994 and the Quebec referendum on October 30, 1995. In the immediate aftermath of the referendum, the federal intergovernmental affairs minister, Marcel Massé, led a cabinet review of the results, which concluded that better government communications efforts were needed in Québec (Jeffrey 2010: 287). At about the same time, as a result of its program review exercise, the Chrétien government decided to privatize the CCG’s printing activities, which occurred in February 1997 (Canada Auditor General 1997). Before that, however, CCG’s public inquiries and other government-related related common service functions (including the newly-launched government of Canada internet home page, the Canada Site) were incorporated into the Canada Information Office (CIO), which was established in July 1996, based on Massé’s recommendations.

The CIO was given the mandate of coordinating federal national unity communications and federal presence in Quebec; it was also given responsibility for administering Sponsorship grants, which provided cash grants to community events in return for displaying the Canada Wordmark (Canada Gomery 2005: 446). The CIO was established as a separate department reporting jointly to the Minister of Canadian Heritage and the Deputy Prime Minister (Canada PCO 1996), whose supporting department was the PCO. In practice, given the stakes involved, the PMO, which had already begun dealing directly with Guité on advertising contracts (Gomery 2005: 447), retained a strong interest. At the same time as the CIO was created, Alfonso Gagliano became Minister of PWGSC and chair of the cabinet communications committee, working closely with the PMO to oversee the national unity effort in Quebec, which was a personal political priority for the prime minister, as it had been for his predecessors. After an initial period, the administration of the Sponsorship program was transferred to APORS (ibid.; O’Neal 2004 Part II), which following some internal manoeuvring by Guité had also gained control of the actual awarding of advertising contracts, ending a longstanding separation of the purchasing function. In November 1997, an expanded APORS became the Central Communications Services Branch (CCSB) within PWGSC, with Guité for practical purposes having a direct reporting relationship to the minister. In April 1998, responsibility for the CIO was transferred to the Minister of PWGSC and it was given a mandate to provide strategic and operational advice to the cabinet communications committee, which Gagliano also chaired (Canada CIO 1999).

**The near past: consolidation outside the administrative mainstream**

When matters began to unravel in 2001, CCSB was transferred to the Canada Information Office, renamed Communication Canada but still a separate agency reporting to the Minister of PWGSC. Following adverse reports in 2003 on government advertising and sponsorship activities by the Auditor General (Canada Auditor General 2003), Paul Martin, who had succeeded Chrétien in late 2003, appointed the Gomery commission to

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\(^9\) An important difference was that the lead Mulroney minister was Senator Lowell Murray, as chair of the cabinet communications committee, rather than Paul Dick, who was DSS minister during the second Mulroney government and also under Kim Campbell.
look into these two areas. He also wound up Communications Canada in March 2004, and most of its functions were incorporated into a new Government Information Services Branch of PWGSC, major exceptions being the Sponsorship program, which was terminated (although there is still a sponsorship annex to the Government Communications policy), and advertising contracting, which was moved to PWGSC’s Acquisitions Branch. Martin did not have a cabinet communications committee but assigned oversight of government communications to a new Cabinet Operations committee chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, giving it operational management of the government’s public and political relations agenda (Canada PCO 2003).

Stephen Harper has retained an Operations committee since he became Prime Minister in 2006 with a mandate to provide “the day-to-day coordination of the government’s agenda, including issues management, legislation and house planning, and communications.” Second after Priorities and Planning on the Cabinet committee list, it is currently chaired by Jason Kenney, the Minister of Citizenshhip and Immigration (Canada Prime Minister 2012). The new Harper government also took ownership for the communications function, issuing a revised Communications Policy for the Government of Canada in 2006 (Canada TBS 2006), while retaining the existing FIP policy.

One other institutional strand has shaped the current situation. In 1993, a different CIO – initially a Chief Informatics Officer and since 1997 a Chief Information Officer – was established in TBS on the margins of the Campbell reorganization. The following year it was assigned responsibility for administering the Government Communications and FIP policies, along with the related information policies including ATIP. Among the motives for this change was a growing focus within government on improving service to the public and a desire to make full use of then-new information and communications technologies (ICTs) – notably the Internet and networked data bases – in doing so. In 1998 most of the CIO’s information policy functions were re-assigned within TBS to permit the CIO to concentrate on IT management issues and on leading the movement of major government services, including information services, into the electronic environment – what became the successful Government On-Line (GOL) initiative (Brown 2007). The Communications and FIP policy centres were combined with the Service policy to form a new Service sector within TBS, with a mandate to develop a Service Improvement Initiative (SII) to frame all service improvement efforts, including GOL, and also to pursue the integration of non-electronic service channels and develop a single-window agency to provide services to the public, Service Canada.

With GOL well launched, in 2002 the Service Sector was disbanded and the SII and Service policy were transferred back to the Chief Information Officer. The Government Communications policy and FIP were, however, transferred to the TBS unit, reporting to the Secretary, responsible for TBS public communications as a department as well as for liaison with the office of the Treasury Board President. No explanation was given for this transfer, which made communications the only area within TBS in which its central agency and departmental operational units are combined. The anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that it was a combination of the political sensitivity of the function at the height of the Sponsorship scandal and Gomery commission and of the incumbent Chief Information Officer in effect passing up the opportunity to assume this particular set of responsibilities, notwithstanding their linkages to other CIO policy areas.

10 Service Canada was transferred to the Department of Human Resources and Skills Development.
Current institutional arrangements

This section provides a snapshot of the institutional arrangements resulting from the long and often tortuous history of government communications over the past century. The picture that emerges is that the function is a hybrid – it has many, even most, of the characteristics of a mainstream sector of federal public administration, but it is also hardwired into the political process. This description provides a reference point for the discussion in the next section of dilemmas facing the communications function from the perspective of effective and accountable public administration.

The communications policy covers a wide territory and comes into the closest contact of any Treasury Board policy with the political process. With the stated objective of ensuring “that communications across the Government of Canada are well co-ordinated, effectively managed and responsive to the diverse information needs of the public,” the policy includes requirements in 31 areas, many with related directives and guidelines. These can be grouped into three broad areas: 11

- guiding principles – informing and serving Canadians, charging and not charging for information, plain language, official languages, corporate identity, reflecting diversity;
- substantive components of the communications function – public opinion research, consultation and citizen engagement, risk communication, crisis and emergency communication, internal communication, technological innovation and new media, Internet and electronic communication, media relations, spokespersons, public events and announcements, fairs and exhibitions, advertising, partnering and collaborative arrangements, sponsorships, marketing, publishing, copyright and licensing, film, video and multimedia productions; and
- managing the communications function – environment analysis, management and co-ordination, planning and evaluation, memoranda to Cabinet and Treasury Board submissions, regional operations, cataloguing and securing information, training and professional development.

The policy assigns lead agency (i.e., common service) roles to: Service Canada, which runs the Canada Site, the federal government’s Internet home page (www.canada.gc.ca) and the 1-800-OCANADA government call centre; Library and Archives Canada, which is the definitive repository of all government publications and archived websites as well as of communications-related records; and the Government Information Services sector of PWGSC, which as the descendant of the Queen’s Printer provides a number of communications common services to the government including with respect to publications (among them the Canada Gazette), public consultation (the Consulting With Canadians website: www.consultingcanadians.gc.ca), depository libraries, advertising, public opinion research, and electronic media monitoring.

The Communications Policy’s most unusual feature as a Treasury Board policy is the explicit recognition of the political importance of government communications, uniquely assigning specified roles to Ministers (which includes determining the role of their political communications staff), the Prime Minister, Cabinet and Treasury Board.

11 This categorization is for the purposes of this paper only. The policy lists them in a seemingly random order that may be historical.
While overall policy administration is by the Strategic Communications and Ministerial Services Sector in TBS, the PCO Communications and Consultations secretariat has a number of functions under the policy, including coordinating a detailed annual planning process for public opinion research and advertising. More important are its roles, in the PCO context (and not spelled out in the Communications policy), of working with the media office in the PMO to coordinate the government’s political and public service media operations and of supporting Cabinet discussions of communications issues and strategies, including the Cabinet Operations Committee’s oversight of government communications on a weekly basis. In practice, communications is a shared policy responsibility between TBS and PCO, with PCO – in its own complex relationship with PMO – in the lead on matters of substance and the relationship with the government’s political advisors, while TBS is concerned with the administrative underpinnings.  

The Federal Identity Program (FIP) Policy is the government’s corporate branding program. The FIP governs the visual aspect of federal presence and public accessibility, providing graphic standards for signage, letterhead, cheques and government Internet sites, among numerous forms of federal presence. It was given a major impetus with the Official Languages Act in 1969, which requires that federal presence and services be equally visible and accessible in both English and French where there is significant demand and for services across the country catering to the travelling public regardless of demand. The FIP facilitates access to services but is also an accountability device, as it visually demarcates federal jurisdiction. Its most iconic component is the Canada Wordmark. When the federal government began to establish itself on the Internet in the early to mid-1990s, the FIP was used to establish “common look and feel” standards for government webpage design, the one Communications-related policy instrument that continues to be managed by the TBS Chief Information Officer. In the nature of Canadian federalism, the FIP has spawned parallel programs in the provinces and territories and the development of blended identity standards in areas of politically-visible joint presence, such as signage for joint infrastructure spending.

The two policies create requirements and instruments that apply to everyone in government departments and agencies who is involved in communications activities, from the deputy minister to front line program staff. They provide the government-wide framework for the job descriptions of public service communications units and their staffs that are to be found in every department, typically headed by a middle or senior level executive with ready access to the deputy minister and usually a member of the departmental executive committee. The government job classification system includes an information services (IS) occupational group, into which the bulk of communications advisory and operational jobs are classified. A unionized group represented by the Public Service Alliance of Canada, in October 2010 it had 3,729 public services employees. The TBS Communications policy centre includes a Communications Community Office, which supports TBS and PCO in providing leadership to the communications “community of practice,” including human resources and developmental issues as well as supporting monthly meetings of the departmental heads of communications.

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12 For an earlier but more detailed sighting of central communications arrangements, see d’Ombrain 2000.
13 Source: data file for active employees provided by the TBS Office of the Chief Human Resources Officer, October 2010.
Dilemmas of government communications

The government communications function has the potential to touch all aspects of public administration. Communications professionals play an important part in every department and agency, but individual public servants are also key actors in ensuring successful communications between government and the public. In living this reality, those involved in government communications are faced with a number of dilemmas that challenge the function and help to shape it. This section discusses four that are endemic to the communications function – they are essentially structural in nature, pressure points built into the system. They have no easy solutions, but understanding them helps both to enrich the function and to safeguard its essential role in liberal democratic governance.

1. Working on the cusp between politics and administration

The current institutional environment and dynamics of government communications are the product of a lengthy evolution through several governments of different political stripes. This is an area that has been particularly sensitive to the style and priorities of Prime Ministers, including the current one, which unquestionably has had an important bearing on how the communications function has been used. A key test is whether a future Prime Minister and government can take the same institutional machinery in a different direction that reflects their concept of governance and the role of public communications within it.

Most of the 31 communications functions addressed in the policy can be seen as essentially technocratic in nature and non-controversial – they provide a framework of authority, empowerment and controls over the expenditure of public money in important areas of public administration. A sub-set is potentially more controversial: media relations, spokespersons, public events and announcements, consultation, public opinion research, advertising, and sponsorships. Most, if not all, have been the subject of public criticism under the current or previous governments for being administered in an unduly partisan manner. That being said, however, there is no suggestion that these are illegitimate government communications functions or that the current policies are themselves irrevocably flawed.

The dilemma lies in the fact that these are functions that are closely linked to the political process, underlining a government’s status as both the executive of the day and a political party seeking to stay in power. Its policies and programs are linked to its understanding of the public interest, but they also condition the environment in the lead-up to the next election campaign. In a Westminster system, this reality has always been linked to the mechanisms of parliamentary accountability, which in the Canadian case includes a particularly intensive Question Period; its centrality has been heightened under the influence of the ICT-enabled 24-hour news cycle.

The exempt staff model, featuring its PCO/PMO component, was introduced in the early 1970s as a means of reducing political pressures on the public service while ensuring that governments received political and partisan advice in the development and implementation of government programs. This model has endured over time, but from the outset it included twin features not found in any other area of public administration: having parallel communications expertise in both public service and exempt staffs; and providing direct ministerial oversight to both groups by a Cabinet committee on communications. These arrangements were designed to provide an appropriate balance...
between politics and administration; they also carry risks that they will be used unduly by a government to further its partisan ends and, at least indirectly, to politicize the public service. In addressing these risks, however, it is important to distinguish their structural component from the style of the government of the day.

2. Communications and service to the public

The other side of the coin from the political importance of communications is their role in informing the public about government programs and services and through that in enabling members of the public to satisfy their own requirements and to exercise their rights and meet their obligations as citizens. The provision of information is in itself an important service to the public – in the Chrétien government’s Government On-Line initiative, 63 out of 130 commonly used government services were considered to be informational as opposed to transactional (Canada PWGSC 2006: 11). There is a close relationship between government communications and service to the public, reflected in the fact that for most of the time until 2002 the TBS policy centres in these two areas were co-located, from 1998-2002 as the principal elements of a standalone TBS Service Sector. The organizational separation of the communications and service policy centres since 2002 has limited the potential for realizing the synergies between these two areas. In particular, it has weakened an important counterbalance to the political pressures on the government communications function described in the previous section.

3. Communications and Access to Information

A second close relationship is with Treasury Board policies and related TBS policy centres concerned with the management of information and in particular with the Access to Information policy. The government’s information policies are built around the information life cycle of information creation and acquisition, use, re-use, dissemination, protection, and, as appropriate, destruction or long-term preservation. When the Government Communications policy was originally drafted in 1988 it was as one of a set of information policies, focusing primarily on information dissemination although – in an area such as public opinion research – also information collection. Two linkages were particularly important. The first was the combination of government information prepared for and issued into the public domain – the concern of the communications policy – with internal government records to create an umbrella concept of government information holdings, the two parts clearly understood to be part of a larger knowledge whole.

The second linkage, operating under the information holdings umbrella, was with the Access to Information policy, and to a lesser extent the Privacy policy, both based in legislation. The starting point for Access to Information is a public right of access to internal government records, a definitional boundary being that it does not apply to material in the public domain – which is covered by the Communications policy, in particular its publishing provisions. Access to Information’s primary orientation, therefore, is towards dissemination and its original objectives included increasing openness and accountability of government (Canada Secretary of State 1977). These are goals that it shares with the Communications policy, and the two policies in that respect are complementary, with Communications concerned with active and Access to Information with responsive dissemination. There are significant differences as well: Access to Information is also concerned with information protection, including of
Cabinet confidences, which are at the heart of the government decision-making and in that sense of the political process. Conversely, a major concern of the communications function is to prevent or manage political embarrassment to the government, which is not sufficient grounds for preventing the release of a government record under Access. But Access to Information works best in an environment in which there is an active culture of proactive information dissemination and least well when it becomes the first line of information provision rather than a backstop.

It is questionable whether a climate of openness currently exists. Indeed, the evidence goes the other way. Information released under Access to Information is known to feed the news cycle and political controversy, creating a climate of adversarialism (Roberts 2006) and efforts at communications damage control (Roberts 2005) in the administration of the policy. Although designed to be complementary, the Access to Information and Communications policies have been organizationally separate within TBS since 1998, limiting the possibilities for shifting the balance towards the original intentions. This is compounded by the fact that there is no legislation underpinning government communications, leaving requirements to inform the public in the realm of public policy while Access to Information protections are statutory, compounded by post-9/11 security of information legislation. Ideally, the solution is a combination of public information legislation to reinforce principles of information dissemination and openness (Reid 2004) and of more closely integrated administration of TBS policies on Access to Information and communications. Whether either step is realistic at the current juncture is a good question, but at the moment there is no indication that the issue of minimizing the friction and increasing the synergies between the two areas is even being considered.

4. Accountability for communications

Accountability for implementation of Treasury Board policies is complex at the best of times and has been the subject of continuing scrutiny by the Auditor General (e.g., Canada Auditor General 2004). It is particularly difficult in the case of government communications, which as discussed in this paper has a unique set of institutional roles and relationships, including the separation of policy direction from operations, the further division of policy direction between PCO and TBS and the two committees of ministers they support, the role played by the Prime Minister, and the structural positioning of the communications function on the cusp between political and public service staff, not least between PMO and PCO.

The Gomery report used the situation it found in the administration of the Sponsorship program and of government advertising to recommend measures to strengthen accountability in the public service, notably the adoption of the Accounting Officer model with respect to Deputy Ministers (Canada Gomery 2006). These recommendations were based on its finding that the Deputy Minister of PWGSC did not have effective oversight of the unit administering advertising, public opinion research and sponsorship. While there was discussion of the roles played by many of the actors described earlier in this paper, including the Cabinet committee on communications, PCO and PMO there was no recognition that these were highly institutionalized roles and relationships and that government communications is a unique sector of public administration requiring a tailored accountability regime. Indeed, in considering the question of the appropriate centre for the oversight of government advertising, the report, after considering and rejecting the alternatives of the Auditor General, PWGSC and the
Comptroller General in TBS (but not looking at the Government Communications policy responsibility centre) concludes that PCO “should remain the custodian of advertising oversight” (166). In doing so, there was no recognition that the organization that provides policy direction to the advertising office was also being asked to be its own guardian. This is not to suggest that Gomery was wrong in this particular case – indeed government advertising has been uncontroversial since the commission reported (and since advertising was restructured within PWGSC, including separating coordination from contracting). Rather, it is to argue that a more comprehensive approach needs to be taken to accountability for government communications, recognizing, working with and possibly adjusting its unique position in federal public administration. Simply recognizing that uniqueness is a necessary, but not sufficient, point of departure.

Conclusions

The nature and history of government communications have placed the function in a unique and frequently uncomfortable position in Canadian public administration; at the same time it is one of the most important. Some components are among the oldest in the federal public service, others are in response to the most recent technological developments. The organizational structure of Information Canada – Information In and Information Out – embodied in simple terms the fact that in a liberal democratic society, communication between government and governed is a two-way street, with the health of the information flow a barometer for the health of the polity. The current institutional arrangements are the linear descendants of those units, but considerably more elaborate and conditioned by national unity debates and scandal. They remain tested by the same tensions between politics and administration, propaganda and information, perception and reality that have been present since the two World Wars, compounded by information and communication technologies that accelerate the flow of information in both directions and feed media and Parliamentary machines that often appear to have gone into overdrive.

One of the most basic challenges is lack of awareness of the features of government communications as a sector of public administration. This is partly because they are overshadowed by the more purely political dimensions of communications. There is also a legacy of distrust of communications and of its potential to slide into the realm of propaganda that grew out of wartime experience but was reinforced several times after, notably with the failed Information Canada experience and the later use of communications institutions and instruments in the national unity context. While understandable this has also had the effect of driving communications activities into the shadows, making it more difficult to monitor them and to hold them to account.

In more recent times, the central role of communications in politics has been recognized, saved perhaps by the fact that political communications tools are available to all political parties. This has created new pressures on government communications, raising questions about whether they are being unduly politicized. This paper does not attempt to address that point, although it does seek to set out the institutional and historical context in which it can be addressed. It also argues that government communications have become isolated from other areas of public administration with which it has a natural affinity and complementarity. This separation has weakened the administration of Access to Information and probably also service to the public, but it has
also made government communications more vulnerable to politicising pressures than it otherwise would be. There are no simple solutions: public information legislation and a more robust accountability model for government communications would be important steps forward, as would more attention from Parliament (outside Question Period), the media and academic commentators. Ultimately, the government communications function has an important role to play in telling its own story – good communications are the best guarantee that they remain a healthy feature of federal public administration.
Works cited


