‘Metagovernance’ of urban governance networks in Canada: in pursuit of legitimacy and accountability

Carey Doberstein, Ph.D. candidate
University of Toronto

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DRAFT – comments welcome
Introduction
To a number of scholars, the concept of ‘network governance’ to describe the institutional framework under which public policy decisions are made is hardly applicable to the Canadian scene (Haddow and Klaasen, 2006). ‘Network governance’ is meant to convey the shift from traditional government and bureaucratic hierarchy towards a more horizontal and inclusive (of civil society actors) planning and decision-making context (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007). To some Canadian political observers, this shift is more easily found in the academic literature, based on a normative interest in such governance arrangements, rather than a real shift of the way decisions are made (Skogstad, 2003). Indeed this may be an accurate observation at the federal and provincial policy level, but this paper will demonstrate that there is considerable governance by networks at the local level. That is, public decisions are often made by purposefully created networks consisting of public and private actors, most of whom are unelected and not directly accountable to citizens in terms of traditional liberal-democratic mechanisms. While many may view this as fatally flawed from democratic accountability perspective—in theory and practice—this paper demonstrates that governance networks with substantive public decision-making power in Canada are never very far from government and the traditional Westminster systems of accountability and legitimacy.

Such governance networks are always on some sort of ‘leash’—the type and length of which may vary—as even the most network-friendly government recognizes that government remains a critical voice at the table. The concept of ‘metagovernance’ captures the relationship (and tension) between the willingness of the state to engage with civil society on policy development and implementation, while maintaining some degree of control over the activity of such governance networks to be consistent with traditional notions of democratic accountability. This paper begins by introducing the ‘metagovernance’ concept, documenting its emergence from the so-called ‘second generation’ of policy network literature, which is cross disciplinary, comparative, and sensitive to the multi-level nature of new governance arrangements. The paper proceeds by exploring fourteen cases of network governance arrangements at the local level from all regions in Canada, for which there is considerable variation. While each case is not described in detail, lessons are drawn from all them when key features of ‘metagovernance’ are analyzed in the following dimensions: network mandate, enabling investments, path to formation, accountability, and democratic legitimacy. The final section summarizes the patterns of ‘metagovernance’ that are exhibited in the Canadian context and considers the implications with respect to the design and management of governance networks in the pursuit of effective, accountable and democratically legitimate decision-making.

New forms of governance
It is uncontroversial to suggest that the practice of government has changed in the past thirty years from a context in which the state was the dominant unitary actor setting policy, to one in which power and influence are more horizontally distributed among state and civil society agents. To be sure, this is a misrepresentation in both directions: non-state actors have always had considerable influence on government policy (Pross,
The empirical reality of horizontal governance patterns in a Canadian context is by no means universal across policy domains. There are, however, policy domains in Canada that are characterized by linked governance not only among levels of government but also in close policy consultation with civil society groups, at the local level in particular. The concepts developed by scholars to describe such governance patterns are varied—‘multi-level governance’ (Bache and Flinders, 2004; Weiss, 1998), ‘partnerships’ (Pierre, 1998), ‘polycentric governance’ (Ostrom, Bish and Ostrom, 1998), and ‘policy networks’ (Rhodes, 2000)—but they all share a focus on studying the relationships between interdependent public and private actors as they work to address public policy issues. This paper focuses on ‘governance networks’ specifically—that is, the inclusion of civil society actors in a substantive decision-making or advisory role in a particular sector.¹

The governance literature broadly captures the “increased complexity, proliferating jurisdictions, the rise of non-state actors, and the related challenges to state power” (Bache and Flinders, 2004: 3-4). To many scholars, society has become increasingly complex in conjunction with rising citizen expectations and, as a result, public problems cannot be resolved by the state alone—the knowledge, expertise and resources of diverse public and private actors are ever more required for effective policy responses (Triantafillou, 2007). Yet this literature is not premised on a neoliberal perspective of the government-society interface. In contrast, it is part of a normative project to better democratize decision-making and governance and in fact to empower typically marginalized voices in public policy debates channeled through liberal democratic institutions. ‘Governance’ thus implies that the focus is not just on institutions but also on process (Peters, 2011). As such, scholarly attention should not be reserved for only the division of powers between governments and the nature of bureaucratic design, but also the distribution of power between public and private actors, the potential for synergy in collective action, and the empowerment and inclusion of civil society in the policy process (Marwell, 2007; Pierre, 1998). Civil society actors are thus important policy actors in governance in terms of problem definition, priority setting, and as accountability holders.

Yet network governance structures that include civil society actors in public decision-making also include government actors, structures and backstops. Jessop (1997) is one of the first scholars to offer the term ‘metagovernance’ to capture how political authorities organize and manage such network governance structures (see Bradford, 2012 for its introduction into the Canadian context). Though in many ways dependent on civil society actors—for their expertise, representative legitimacy, capacity for implementation, etc.—government is nonetheless the only actor with the authority and legitimacy to set the ground rules for network structures, resolve disputes, rebalance representation and power differentials, and assume political responsibility in the event of governance failure (Jessop, 1997). ‘Metagovernance’ is thus the “governance of governance”, and helps us understand how government crafts or manages non-traditional

¹ As distinct from a ‘policy network’, which is a concept to capture the general relationships between interest groups or civil society actors with government decision-makers. ‘Governance networks’ represent one end of the policy network spectrum, in which civil society actors are given an institutionalized decision-making or advisory role.
hierarchical public decision-making (Heritier and Rhodes, 2011; Sorenson and Torfing, 2007).

Metagovernance is a useful concept to bridge two competing literatures as it regards the changing nature of state-society relations and the empirical reality (or lack thereof) of pure network governance, particularly in the Canadian context. Most agree that society has become much more complex in the past 40 years, stemming global economic restructuring, immigration patterns, and evolving expectations of the role of state in solving public and private problems. Some scholars who favour a society-centric approach argue that the state has lost the power to effectively govern (Klijn and Koopenjan, 2000). Only by including relevant and affected groups and organizations in governance networks can the state overcome the societal fragmentation and resistance to policy change (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Stoker, 1998; Mayntz, 1993). Network actors can better identify policy problems, imagine innovative solutions, and negotiate flexible responses to the complexity and variety of conditions (Klijn and Koopenjan, 2000).

Despite the initial fears of many scholars of the constraining nature of globalization on the ability of governments to address domestic problems with unique approaches, evidence suggests that the state still possesses that capacity and opportunity to make important strategic choices (what kinds of economic, social, cultural investments), and remains an indispensable institution as the provider of social justice and accountability to citizens (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Cameron and Stein, 2000). Indeed, in the Canadian context, scholars have noted the distinct lack of pure network governance examples given Westminster traditions of accountability and legitimacy, as well as our liberal orientation (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The governance landscape in Canada, they argue, looks nothing like the continental European experience with institutionalized networks. The closest we get in Canada is with the Quebec model of corporatism, and thus the network governance literature does not speak to Canada (Haddow and Klaasen, 2006).

The metagovernance concept helps reconcile the valid claims that societal change means that government increasingly needs to govern via networks and with the valid claims that Canadian governments do not govern primarily via network arrangements, by capturing an increasing willingness by the state to engage with civil society partners on policy development and implementation, while maintaining traditional Westminster systems of accountability and democratic legitimacy. That is, while there are few, if any, examples of ‘pure’ network governance in Canada, there are a variety of ways through which the state has devolved some decision-making to networks consisting of public and private actors (for effectiveness, equity and inclusiveness benefits), while maintaining a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ to ensure traditional understandings of accountability and democratic legitimacy are retained.

The metagovernance concept is especially useful because it captures the now generally accepted potential weaknesses of pure network governance arrangements: unstable constructions, inefficient decision-making capacity in the absence of any hierarchy, the marginalization of elected officials, joint-decision traps, lowest common denominator policy outputs, and its potential to reinforce power hierarchies (Heritier and Rhodes,
2011; Mueleman, 2008; Sorenson and Torfing, 2007). Indeed, while many elements of governance networks are self-regulated, it would be dangerous to promote self-organizing networks of societal interests to dominate public decision-making in the absence of elected officials and a liberal constitutional-rights framework. Metagovernance thus offers a potential path to the achievement of the purported benefits of network governance, while curbing the drawbacks by retaining much of the hierarchical and traditional-democratic oversight and control.

Core features of ‘metagovernance’
Bell and Hindmoor (2009) describe six core elements of metagovernance—the functions that government tends to perform in such governance arrangements: steering, effectiveness, resourcing, democracy, accountability, and legitimacy. The steering function captures how the state sets the ground rules for network activity, organizes and coordinates the interactions and, if necessary (or desired), rebalances power differentials (Jessop, 1997). The overall effectiveness of the governance arrangement in achieving its desired policy development and implementation objectives rests with government, and therefore one of its functions is to monitor the performance and restructure the arrangement if necessary (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009). The provision of resources in order to bring disparate actors together is typically, though not always, the task of government given the depth of its resources and access to large professional bureaucracy (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009).

Though conventional understandings of democratic legitimacy suggest that governance arrangements that may marginalize elected officials is problematic, other understandings suggest that government can use the involvement of civil society actors in policy development and implementation to enhance democracy by providing a check on centralized power and promoting compromise (Fung and Wright, 2003). With respect to accountability, despite the horizontal nature of decision-making in such network governance arrangements, government is where the buck finally stops with respect to public policy and, as such, is empowered and motivated to hold others within the network under varying degrees of control or supervision (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Mulgan, 2006). Finally, government can foster legitimacy in network governance arrangements by facilitating its transparency, fair process, and effectiveness—and thus has both input and output dimensions (Skogstad, 2003; Scarf, 1997).

The foregoing paragraphs are perhaps a generous interpretation of the role, activity and intent of government in such network governance arrangements, that some would argue may not in fact represent reality. ‘Steering’ could be reframed as ‘puppetry’, ‘resourcing’ as a form of institutionalized subornment or cooptation, and ‘accountability’ as something that is, by design, to be avoided rather than reinforced in this context (Whitehead, 2003). This is indeed possible, and a few of the cases presented in this paper demonstrate as such. Yet others argue that more typical is that governments lack the capacity, resources, and skills to ‘metagovern’ a network governance arrangement, and thus are not master puppeteers (Bell and Park, 2006). On the other side of the state-society power relations interface, public choice theorists would argue that there is the threat that governments end up being captured by the civil society actors whom have
been given an elevated policy and governing role (Laffont and Tirole, 1991). Thus there is a danger in these governance arrangements that civil society actors will seek private rather than public benefits and outcomes.

Related to the risk of capture is that governance networks may represent a threat to representative democracy since they undermine the interface between state and society. If we create institutions of collective decision-making that involve civil society actors, then on a practical level it becomes less clear the role and legitimacy of elected officials, and on a normative theoretical level we undermine the basis of liberal democracy. And of course questions of who get invited to such network governance arrangements, who dominates deliberations, and whether they pursue private or public interests are indeed important to reflect on before assuming strong normative position on the promise of governance networks. Yet it is important to recognize that these questions are not reserved for networks, but apply to liberal democratic institutions as well—and the answer for which is sometimes less positive than many assume, particularly with respect to the effective representation of marginalized populations in society. Indeed, Fung (2008) demonstrates that inclusive network governance arrangements “can work as a powerful corrective to conventional representative structures where the normal checks and balances on representatives and agency officials fail to direct their energies to the public’s interests” (65).

Bell and Hindmoor’s (2009) brief survey of metagovernance cases in Europe, North America and Australia suggests that there is no unified narrative regarding the contradictory threats of government domination, incompetence, or capture. It is contingent on the policy issue, the capacity of the government (and ministry in charge), the degree of inclusiveness, and the tasks of the network. Though we must consider the potential threats from all perspectives, there is no justification to privilege one view a priori. It is generally understood, however, that governance networks require some basic regulation in order to function efficiently, and that the state is the most appropriate mediator, institutional designer, and integrator (Heritier and Rhodes, 2011; Sorenson and Torfing, 2007). Indeed, this paper presents a wide spectrum of local governance networks in Canada to provide a more nuanced picture of how the metagovernance functions outlined above relate to the capacity of the state, the power of the relevant civil society actors, and the governance and policy objectives.

Network governance in Canadian urban policy domains
The purpose of this paper is, rather modestly, to take an inventory of network governance as applied in various urban policy domains in Canada to understand the types or styles of metagovernance exercised by the state. How do government actors or agencies interface with civil society actors in governance networks? How do they ensure democratic ideals? How do they create and sustain its legitimacy? What mechanisms do they use to promote accountability? Are the ‘metagovernors’ elected officials or bureaucratic actors? Are there any patterns in metagovernance across local policy domains in Canada, or is it sector-specific? The urban or local focus is not just one of scope, but also that it is in such policy areas where governments are experimenting with new forms of governance networks of public and civil society actors, given the unique pressures they face. The
wide consideration of diverse policy areas via case studies, based on secondary research, allows for some tentative reflections on why specific metagovernance choices were made and whether any patterns emerge that may represent a Canadian-style of metagovernance.

The following section proceeds by introducing, at a very high level, over a dozen network governance examples in the local Canadian policymaking context—summarized in Table 1—for the purpose of identifying patterns of network institutional designs across several dimensions, including the enabling investments, network mandate, and the primary metagovernance instrument. A more complete description of each governance network is provided in Appendix A. While the cases presented are not at all meant to be a representative sample, they were nonetheless selected from a variety sectors—including economic development, immigrant settlement, health, neighbourhood revitalization, and homelessness—as well as across the country, in order to establish a broad first picture of network governance activities across the Canadian urban scene.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network name</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Enabling investments</th>
<th>Path to formation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Immigration Partnerships (LIPs)</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>constrained DM</td>
<td>contribution agreements; city staff</td>
<td>top-down formation; local priorities implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Health Integration Networks (LHINs)</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>constrained DM</td>
<td>significant funding; secretariat</td>
<td>top-down formation; local priorities implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homelessness Partnering Strategy (HPS)</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>constrained DM</td>
<td>contribution agreements; GoC staff or city staff</td>
<td>top-down formation; local priorities implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Aboriginal Strategy (UAS)</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>constrained DM</td>
<td>contribution agreements; GoC staff</td>
<td>top-down formation; local priorities implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City for All Women Initiative (CAWI)</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>advisory</td>
<td>public and private; city staff</td>
<td>bottom-up formation, implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Health Councils (DHCs)</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>advisory</td>
<td>coordination funding; city staff</td>
<td>top-down formation; local priorities implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy (NAPs)</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>constrained DM</td>
<td>public and private; city staff</td>
<td>accountable to tripartite group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Halifax Partnership (GHP)</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>constrained DM</td>
<td>public and private; secretariat</td>
<td>accountable to city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sask. Regional Economic Development Authorities (REDA)</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>constrained DM</td>
<td>public and private; secretariat</td>
<td>accountable to private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Futures Development Corporations (CFDCs)</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>constrained DM</td>
<td>contribution agreements; GoC staff</td>
<td>top-down formation; implementation performance agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Within Table 1, the governance networks are differentiated by sector, economic and social. This is to make clear the apparent patterns of difference in terms of the metagovernance features between the sectors, and the similarities within them. One may argue that these governance networks are not, in fact, comparable: the networks found in the economic sector are fundamentally different from those in the social sector, in terms of their functions and outputs. It is clear from Table 1 (and Appendix A) that there is extensive variation among the various governance networks in terms of mandate, path to formation and accountability, yet they all share the common feature of including non-state/civil society actors in a decision-making or advisory role that is distinct from traditional mechanisms of consultation by government decision-makers. The cases will not receive much individual analysis, as the purpose is to identify patterns (and non-patterns) of metagovernance design, instruments, and implementation based on the work of existing studies of the cases, few of which have been analyzed through a metagovernance lens. Each network will be analyzed through the following key metagovernance attributes, organized in sections below: network mandate, enabling investments and resources, path to formation, democracy, and accountability.

**Network mandate**

Governance networks are designed and supported in several ways by metagovernors, as Table 1 illustrates. There are a number of networks in this sample that are advisory in nature, which is distinct from government merely consulting relevant stakeholders, since such networks have an institutionalized policy role. Advisory networks cut across sectors, as demonstrated in these cases, including The Ottawa Partnership, the District Health Councils, and CAWI. The value of networks, however, is *not necessarily* diminished by the advisory nature of their work. That is, we should not assume that a network without real, autonomous decision-making authority is by definition less influential. The City for all Women Initiative (CAWI), for example, is technically advisory with respect to the Ottawa city council, yet has managed to push Ottawa to institutionalize a diversity and gender lens to all strategic planning throughout city offices and activities, among other successes (Klodawsky, 2007; Andrew, 2009).

Yet a more typical story on advisory networks or boards is that they are designed as non-serious attempts to incorporate diverse views, and may in fact, be used by the metagovernor as a technique to diffuse accountability. District Health Councils (DHCs) in Ontario were such an example. They were local boards with a balance of citizens, municipal officials, and health administrators tasked with advising the Minister on local priorities and health planning, yet they functioned as a “political buffer between the provincial government and local institutional health professionals” (Church et al., 2002). Abelson (2001) likewise found that many citizens came to conclude that the DHCs were a tool of the provincial government and simply disengaged from them. This is the fundamental tension with advisory networks: citizens are generally motivated to participate if they feel that their advice will be taken, yet governments may structure them as advisory in order avoid doing so.

The public dissatisfaction with DHCs as an inadequate local democratizing governance arrangement led to the current Local Health Integration Networks (LHINs)—which, as it
happens, are also controversial. Thirteen LHINs covering the entire province of Ontario are not simply advisory networks, but have real decision-making authority with respect to funding and coordinating services, delegated from the Minister of Health and Long-term Care. In fact, LHINs collectively allocate $20 billion, but have a complex and lengthy Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Ministry, which constrains the nature of their decision-making. Though LHINs remain controversial for many reasons, they do not suffer from a lack of sustained engagement from citizens and health administrators, precisely because they have an empowered institutional structure (MOHLTC-LHIN Effectiveness Final Report, 2008).

When comparing the various networks along the lines of network mandate, it becomes clear that those which are empowered with a real (though always constrained) decision-making role are much more likely to remain active and retain civil society interest than those that are merely advisory. Indeed, the Community Advisory Boards for the Homelessness Partnering Strategy (HPS), the Steering Committees for the Urban Aboriginal Strategy (UAS), Community Futures Development Corporations (CFDCs), and the Local Immigration Partnerships (LIPs) are all designed such the networks in each locality are empowered to set local priorities and allocate funds as they see fit—though always under the supervision of their metagovernor. Though there are a few exceptions, in the vast majority of cases these local networks are vibrant, active and participants largely satisfied with their role (Bradford and Andrew, 2010; HRSDC, 2008; Spence and Findlay, 2007; see Leo and August, 2009 for an example of exceptions in Winnipeg). The Greater Halifax Partnership is a unique example of an economic development network that has been delegated real decision-making power by the Halifax Regional Municipality and, as such, has been characterized by several observers as resulting in high level of engagement and rapid implementation of policy (Grant et al., 2008; Bradford, 2003). The networks designed with an advisory function, like TOP, DHCs, and the Aerospace Action Partnership in Toronto diminished or folded entirely when the advice produced by the respective network went largely unimplemented by decision-makers (Galvin, 2012; Andrew and Doroleux, 2010).

Enabling investments and resources
One of the core elements of metagovernance is resourcing (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009), or what Bradford (forthcoming, 2012) calls ‘enabling resources’, which in both cases means that governments use their spending power as a means to encourage behaviours they wish to promote—for our purposes, this means the formation of local networks to articulate specific priorities within government-defined parameters. In all of the networks investigated in this paper, there was some level of public funding, either for start-up costs to bring people together or an envelope of money to allocate which lured them in. Financial incentives to form local advisory or governance networks are thus powerful

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2 For example, the Central Toronto LHIN itself has six advisory councils, three professional councils, and three community councils, signifying the intense demand to influence planning and decision-making.

3 ‘Advisory’ in this title is somewhat of a misnomer. CABs under HPS can be organized such that they are accountable to the Government of Canada indirectly under the Community Entity model (in such scenarios they make the ‘final’ decisions) or via the Shared Delivery model (where the decisions must be approved by the Minister). It is a misnomer in a practical sense because the Minister rarely rejects any funding allocations on substance, and only occasionally on a technical matter (Doberstein, 2012).
tools to bring people together, though some types of financial incentives serve to sustain cooperation better than others.

It is no surprise that the networks that form in response to a metagovernor offering an envelope of money to be allocated are most likely to remain active and sustain cooperation. Thus the Community Advisory Boards for the Homelessness Partnering Strategy (HPS), the Steering Committees for the Urban Aboriginal Strategy (UAS), Community Futures Development Corporations (CFDCs), and the Local Immigration Partnerships (LIPs) have little trouble sustaining their activity—as long as the funds remain available for distribution to local projects. Most of the social sector networks are representative of this situation. They, of course, only exist because of this envelope of public funds and therefore many are liable to dissolve if their metagovernors cancel the program, thus calling into question their sustainability.

Enabling investments are much more likely to come in the form of public and private contributions in the economic development sector than the social sector examples described above. Whereas the magnitude of financial incentives will matter quite greatly for whether a social sector network will receive sustained civic engagement and have a meaningful impact, this is less clear in the economic development sector. Of course a minimum threshold of funds is required on a practical level to administrate economic development networks and bring actors together, but the level of success of such a network does not hinge on financial incentives like it most certainly does in the social sector. This is because in economic development, policy alignment across levels of government is key (Galvin, 2012; Creutzberg, 2005; Wolfe, 2009). The Aerospace Action Partnership (Toronto) and the Ottawa Partnership (TOP) suffered primarily from a lack of policy alignment and interest among levels of government, not insufficient financial incentives (Galvin, 2012; Wolfe, 2009). The Greater Toronto Marketing Alliance (GTMA) is an exception in terms of scholars citing its limited financial backing as a key barrier to its effectiveness, yet they also acknowledge that a disengaged provincial government and independent-minded GTA municipalities from a policy perspective likewise undermines its role (Nelles, 2009; Wolfe, 2009). The Neighbourhood Action Partnerships (NAP) in Toronto have likewise suffered from a shifting political environment, to which such multi-level governance arrangements particularly sensitive. Designed to feed into a tripartite governance structure, the progress in creating NAPs stalled in conjunction with federal government turnover in 2006, and even though the policy framework was reassessed after this development, NAPs remain mostly unconstituted in Toronto (Horak, 2010).

Path to formation and policy development
One of the most striking differences in the case studies examined is the nature of policy development in the networks across sectors. In the economic development sector, the formation of the network, as well as policy development, is largely bottom-up, driven by the actors in the network, not the metagovernor. This is likely closely related to the mandate of the network: they are typically advisory in nature, and when they are not as in the Greater Halifax Partnership, the metagovernor appears genuinely interested in the formulation of strategies that have broad stakeholder support and buy-in (Grant et al.,
2008; Bradford, 2003). For the economic sector networks like the Ottawa Partnership, the Aerospace Action Partnership, and Saskatchewan REDAs, the strategies and policy planning is driven largely by the civil society actors from the bottom up, not explicitly constrained within parameters set by the relevant metagovernor (Galvin, 2012; Fernandes, 2003).

In the social sector—which includes the homelessness, immigration settlement, urban Aboriginals, and health networks—formation and policy development follows a pattern in which the metagovernor sets high-level strategic priorities, and the local networks develop local strategies and sub-priorities that are consistent with them, and allocate resources accordingly. For example in the Homelessness Partnering Strategy, the metagovernor—the Government of Canada—requires the formation of a community-based governance network to form for access to the envelope of funds. In terms of its effect on policy, the metagovernor has historically defined certain high-level priorities over different years of the program, like ‘emergency needs’, ‘supportive housing’, and most recently ‘employability’, yet each local network is not compelled to fund, for example, a certain number of supportive housing units. It is up to their discretion to specify local priorities and allocate funds as they see fit. One notable exception to this flexibility is that the Government of Canada has always forbade local networks from allocating funds to affordable housing projects—ironically—since Chretien and subsequent Prime Ministers decided that affordable housing provision is strictly a provincial matter (HRSDC, 2008; Smith, 2004).

The Local Immigration Partnerships (LIPs) are likewise a clear example of a policy framework in which the metagovernor sets national objectives, yet allows for considerable scope for local discretion in priority setting and funding allocation (Burr, 2011; Stasiulis et al., 2011; Bradford and Andrew, 2010). Like the HPS program, LIPs are also flexible with regards to how the networks are structured and managed. Many are led and administered by municipal or regional governments, but some are managed by local non-profit organizations (with local government endorsement). This is particularly valuable governance innovation by the metagovernor, for several reasons: (i) not all cities have the capacity to administer such networks from municipal offices; (ii) in some cases a non-profit is more connected and neutral to service providers and community members; or (iii) in other cases, a single municipality hosting the network might be inappropriate given the regional distribution of the policy issue. Such flexibilities in terms of institutional design are critical to the functioning of networks, and have contributed to their ability to generate and implement policy priorities with broad buy-in, all the while consistent with metagovernor strategic priorities and expectations (HRSDC, 2008; Bradford and Andrew, 2010).

4 The Greater Vancouver Regional Steering Committee on Homelessness (the network for the HPS program) is a clear example of this. Given the regional dimension of homelessness in Greater Vancouver, and the local governance fragmentation of city administrative boundaries, it did not make sense for the City of Vancouver to administer this program. Instead, the United Way of Lower Mainland initially managed the network when the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) did not have such capacity, and it has since been transferred to the GVRD.
Accountability and metagovernors

Accountability in network governance arrangements is a key concern among critics and proponents alike. The delegation of decision-making to unelected societal actors is controversial on its own, and also represents a potential threat to our traditional understandings of accountability in public decision-making. If citizens overwhelmingly disagree with a network decision, even if reached by consensus, then how are they able to register their displeasure and protest? As it turns out, metagovernors have designed several ways in which to delegate decision-making to networks, yet retain traditional avenues of Westminster accountability.

One method in which metagovernors retain an oversight role on networks is to join them as members. This is common in the economic development sector. In fact, in all of the economic development networks analyzed, the metagovernor is a formal member of the network, an active member in the deliberations and decisions (Galvin, 2012; Andrew and Doloreux, 2010; Wolfe, 2010; Gertler and Wolfe, 2004). This, of course, assists with the steering of the activity of the network given their broader decision-making authority, even if they are not dominant numerically. By contrast, the formal membership of metagovernors on the governance networks in the social sector is less common. The Urban Aboriginal Strategy, HPS, LIP, DHC, and LHIN networks are largely absent of the primary metagovernor (the funder or key traditional decision-maker). This does not mean that governments are not involved in such networks, but that (i) unlike local economic development networks, elected officials tend to not be intimately involved, and (ii) non-metagoverning governments tend to be involved. For example, under the HPS program in Greater Vancouver, the Government of Canada (metagovernor) does not sit on the Regional Steering Committee on Homelessness, yet provincial government and local government representation is high (Doberstein, 2012).

This leads to a second notable pattern: elected officials tend to be members of economic development networks, yet bureaucrats tend to be the government representatives on the social sector networks investigated. This may be due to a perceived electoral advantage to be seen to be attending to economic strategic planning, as well as an avoidance of the sometimes-heated debates found in the social sector. For example, the Greater Vancouver Regional Steering Committee on Homelessness at one time considered inviting local elected officials to become members of the network, but then concluded that their presence would likely over-politicize the process and probably result in them being placed in a ‘firing line’ in front of all the community members on the network (RSCH, 2003).

Concerns of ensuring mechanisms of accountability are easier to assuage in advisory networks, like the Ottawa Partnership, CAWI, and the former DHCs because they are, by definition, not final decision-makers. In all of the above cases, elected officials on city council or in the provincial legislature hear the advice and take the decisions, and thus remain accountable to the electorate. In networks that have been afforded decision-making authority, there are several ways in which the metagovernors square the accountability circle. In the Greater Halifax Partnership, for example, the network has been delegated economic development policy activity from the city council. The council
therefore supervises the activity much like a government department, remains ultimately responsible for it, and is able to pull back their authority from network activity if required (Grant et al., 2008). The other accountability mechanisms, typically found in the social sector networks analyzed, are in the form of contribution or performance agreements between the metagovernor and the local network. In such an agreement, the metagovernor establishes its expectations to the network in exchange for the authority to make decisions and the funding to allocate into the community. This is the accountability model for the local UAS, HPS, LIP, and LHIN networks, as well as SREDa and CFDC networks in the economic development sector (Bradford, 2012; Doberstein, 2012; Andrew and Doloreux, 2010; LHIN Effectiveness Report, 2008; Spence and Findlay, 2007; Bradford, 2003).

Contribution or performance agreements like those in place in the networks analyzed have critics. Phillips and Levasseur (2004) argue that they are often unnecessarily stringent and can stifle innovation on the ground. This critique is valid with respect to a government-NGO project funding contract, yet such performance agreements are essential in metagovernor-network relationships. They are based on the idea that networks can retain the authority to make decisions and allocate public dollars as long as it abides by the framework set forth by the metagovernor. Though indeed some network members, for example in the UAS, HPS and LHINs, have expressed frustration with the complex and lengthy performance agreements that structure the local network’s behaviour, on the whole it has served such programs well from an accountability perspective. For example, the Government of Canada—the metagovernor for the HPS and UAS—has on several occasions dismantled (and reformed) local networks when they became dysfunctional or acted contrary to government expectations in Winnipeg and Toronto (Leo and August, 2006; Walker, 2005). In a less dramatic fashion, the metagovernor in these programs also requires regular reporting demonstrating how the activity of the network has been consistent with their locally defined plans, and how they will meet ongoing challenges.

It is thus clear that accountability mechanisms in Canada tend to focus on ensuring accountability upwards, to bureaucrats and elected officials, which is consistent with the focus of the metagovernance literature that focuses on the steering and management of networks by government. But accountability also has another dimension, flowing downwards: is the representation of the network and the decisions or outputs of it legitimate to the target population (Bovens, 2007; Malena et al., 2004)? Accountability from the perspective of the affected citizen or their representatives has several names in the literature, including ‘social accountability’ (Bovens, 2007) and ‘demand-side accountability’ (Malena et al., 2004), but they are all trying to capture a relationship in which citizens or civil society representatives exact accountability, distinct from top-down mechanisms of political, administrative, or legal accountability. Of course, citizens exact accountability in this manner through regular elections, yet that is a rather blunt instrument and thus scholars have sought to define additional social accountability mechanisms for public actions in between elections. Social accountability mechanisms can include civil society or citizen report cards, budget analyses, deliberative public forums, and protests. Social accountability mechanisms are also particularly important in
governance networks under investigation here, since in many cases decision-making is delegated to give civil society actors a more substantive role in shaping policy, yet top-down mechanisms of accountability do not assist in measuring whether the participation is viewed as representative and the outputs legitimate from the perspective of the policy community and target population.

**Democracy and legitimacy**

One of the purported advantages of network governance is the democracy-enhancing potential of less-hierarchical decision-making. Networks can indeed be inclusive and diverse in their membership, but they can also be closed and unrepresentative of relevant interests (Schaap, 2007; Rhodes and Marsh, 1992). By passing the test as to whether the local networks are representative of the population it is tasked with governing over, the networks enhance their legitimacy as policy and decision makers (Borzel and Panke, 2007; Dryzek, 2007).

The democracy enhancing potential of networks is particularly important to consider in the case of marginalized populations. As such, the representation on local networks of the HPS (homelessness) and UAS (urban Aboriginal plight) are critical to consider. Networks in these contexts are especially valuable, if designed and populated appropriately, because they offer political representation that is often not afforded through the electoral system (Fung, 2008). Networks therefore become an important democratic corrective. On the whole, the local networks for the HPS and UAS are indeed democracy enhancing for marginalized populations like urban Aboriginals, homeless persons, and youth (Doberstein, 2012; HRSDC, 2008). For example, there are Aboriginal-specific networks in the HPS program, and interviews with Aboriginal network members in Vancouver and Toronto overwhelmingly suggest that these governance networks, however small their funding envelopes, represent an important correction to an often ignored or inappropriately serviced urban population (confidential interviews, 2012). After attending several of their meetings and analyzing their decisions, it is clear to this author that they set priorities and allocate funds much differently than what would otherwise be done by a bureaucrat on behalf of elected officials (Doberstein, 2012).

The networks analyzed in this paper are not always democracy enhancing, however. LHINs, for example, are not exactly democracy enhancing, as professional actors (business actors and health administrators), not ordinary (or even critical) community members dominate most of the networks (LHINs Effectiveness Report, 2008). The networks in the economic development sector, while exhibiting diversity in membership (with the exception of social actors), are not principally designed for their democracy enhancing potential but rather to harness the benefits of shared expertise among economic, educational and government actors. Generally speaking, the inclusion of social actors in economic development networks is the exception, rather than the rule. One caveat is that this appears to be true in English Canada, though not the case in Quebec economic development networks (Loxley and Simpson, 2009; Mendell, 2006; Fontan et al., 2006). The most unique element of the ‘Quebec model’ is the legitimized role of social actors in economic development planning and decision-making. Quebec
has a long history of corporatist-style governance and the jointly negotiated policymaking traditions are an important part of the political culture in Quebec (Mendell, 2006; Haddow, 2004). The Quebec model is quite distinct from many of the networks analyzed in this paper and, as such, is discussed separately below.

**A note on the Quebec model**

The Government of Canada’s HPS is also present in Quebec, and thus has created local governance networks, though it is administered by the Quebec government. The Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec signed a bilateral deal that essentially gives the metagovernor role to the Quebec government, but they largely proceed much like the Government of Canada in terms of supervising the local networks. Community futures development corporations, funded by the Government of Canada, are likewise present in Quebec communities.

The ‘Quebec model’ of governance, however, has several distinct features from governance structures in the rest of Canada. The Quebec model is characterized by interconnections between government, business, trade union and social economy actors, and their collective contributions to public policy development and decision-making (Mendell, 2006; Shragge et al., 2001). In contrast to most of English Canada, in Quebec there are “multiple public spaces” in which diverse societal actors “can influence the allocation of resources through negotiated strategies of socio-economic development”. (Mendell, 2006: 1). Perhaps the best examples for the purposes of this paper are les corporations de developpement economique communautaire (CDECs), because they have unique origins and have undergone dramatic changes through the years.

The first CDECs were created in Montreal in the mid-1980s, the result of a bottom-up coalition of organizations and citizens to generate a strategy that built partnerships across interests and a consensus on the direction for local economic development. The early CDECs received substantial grants from provincial and federal governments, but their activity was strongly driven by the local community actors (Fontan et al., 2006). Though each of the early CDECs engaged in different work depending on neighbourhood priorities, most of them funded revitalization efforts, employment and training programs for the excluded, and venture capital for small to medium enterprises (Klein and Tremblay, 2010). Building on the success of the early CDECs, in 1990 the Montreal municipal government extended CDECs to all neighbourhoods except the downtown core, and forged an agreement between all three levels of government to recognize and finance the CDECs (Fontan et al., 2006). Under this agreement, a tripartite ‘comite d’harmonisation’ formed and assigned three basic objectives to them: job creation, integration of the unemployed into labour market, and local mobilization; this served to strengthen the role of governments as program funders and evaluators (Fontan and Shragge, 1997). This is the beginning of an evolution of the CDECs from bottom-up community driven to top-down policy implementers.

Over the years, the provincial government created complementary community economic development organizations, to which CDECs had to reform to accommodate, but most importantly, the provincial government slowly emerged as the primary funder and policy
definer of CDECs (Fontan and Shragge, 1997). This culminated in 2003 when the provincial government under Premier Charest passed legislation that reformed the manner in which the Board of Directors of CDECs across the province were populated. In short, the provincial government limited the representation of individual members of the local population, kept sectoral representation (business, institutional, community group), and enhanced municipal and provincial elected official representation on CDECs such that they alone constituted the majority (Fontan et al., 2006). This action, of course, the reduced power of local community to shape direction of CDECs, and turned them into extensions of that local government. The policy result was immediate: a shift from local economic development focused on revitalization, empowerment and social justice to one of entrepreneurship and employability, consistent with the provincial government neoliberal orientation (Fontan et al., 2006). The CDECs thus have been transformed from locally driven and representative networks, each negotiating and implementing local priorities to merely a transmission belt for provincial government policy.

Discussion
Several patterns have become clear as a result of considering a cross-sectoral sample of local governance networks through the lens of metagovernance. First, the local governance networks can be usefully differentiated by two key criteria: mandate (advisory or decision-making) and path of formation (top-down creation by government or bottom-up formation from civil society actors). Articulating such differences in a typology with the two criteria, and populating it with the cases presented in Table 2 below can help identify some tentative patterns of governance based on this small, yet cross-sectoral, sample. Table 2 shows that among local governance networks examined, one category predominates: governance networks that are characterized by top-down formation and constrained decision-making—what one might call state-directed network governance. What this demonstrates is that for matters local in nature, governments in Canada (federal, provincial and local) indeed are experimenting with network governance arrangements, but under conditions whereby they set the terms of the network and scope of decision-making. This is in contrast to a context in which local networks form without government as the principle initiator, and then government decides whether the network's contribution is advisory or delegated some decision-making power. Thus the dominant style of metagovernance in Canada, tentatively offered from this cross-sectoral sample, is one of state formation and management of governance networks, which implies a strong state steering function.

5 Klein and Tremblay’s (2010) analysis suggests, however, that CDECs still remain able to articulate local policy preferences in certain high profile cases of high-level policy imposition.
Table 2: Patterns of metagovernance in Canada differentiated by path to formation and mandate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path to formation</th>
<th>Advisory role</th>
<th>Constrained decision-making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top-down formation</td>
<td>STATE-DIRECTED ADVISORY GOVERNANCE</td>
<td>STATE-DIRECTED NETWORK GOVERNANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex. DHCs; AAP</td>
<td>Ex. LIPs; LHINs; CFDCs; HPS; UAS; GMTA; NAPs; CDECs (post-Charest)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up formation</td>
<td>SOCIETY-DIRECTED ADVISORY GOVERNANCE</td>
<td>SOCIETY-DIRECTED NETWORK GOVERNANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex. CAWI; TOP</td>
<td>Ex. GHP; SREDA; CDECS (pre-Charest)</td>
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Second, a pattern appears such that when the metagovernors are bureaucrats, rather than elected officials directly, governance networks are more likely to survive changes in government. This is most certainly due to the under-the-radar nature of this work that would continue unless explicitly ordered otherwise upon a new administration. Also, governance institutions that are metagoverned by bureaucrats also tend to avoid the partisan stamp that may be placed on certain governance networks whose metagovernors are elected officials (the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy as an example). A third and related pattern that emerges is that, somewhat paradoxically, political disengagement does not always mean failure of a network governance arrangement. In some networks, political disengagement is clearly responsible for its failures, with the Aerospace Action Partnership (Galvin, 2012), the Ottawa Partnership (Andrew and Doloreux, 2010), and the Neighbourhood Action Partnerships (Horak, 2010) as obvious examples. Yet many of the most celebrated and functional networks examined in this paper have never obtained the engagement at the political level that doomed other networks. CFDCs, LIPs, UAS and HPS local networks more or less operate under the immediate radar of elected officials, only briefly considered during program review for the purpose of metagovernor budget allocations. This is because they have a strong institutional base within the metagoverning bureaucracy, which effectively manages the networks without elected official involvement. Thus in the sample of cross-sectoral cases examined in this paper, it appears that the most effective metagovernors may be bureaucratic actors, whose commitment to a well-functioning governance network is a core part of their job, rather than a pet project or side-of-the-desk project by a fleeting elected official. This, of course, comes at the cost of having a high-profile champion of the local network, the influence of which should not be understated.

The fourth observation that comes out of the analysis of the cases is that our traditional understandings of accountability need to be expanded in the context of network governance. In a democratic system, it is usually preferable for elected officials to be the final decision-makers and thus held accountable through regular elections. But we must also acknowledge the democracy-enhancing potential of networks, within a post-liberal lens, particularly for policy issues that involve marginalized populations whose interests are rarely reflected sufficiently via the representative democracy institutions. In this
regard, accountability has another dimension: the judgment of the target population of policy initiatives. As such, one does not need to look exclusively ‘upwards’ to elected officials for accountability, but can also look ‘downwards’ to the specific community or target population (Malena et al., 2004). And, counter-intuitively, government can play a critical role in ensuring community accountability via the tools of metagovernance. Sufficient inclusion, publicity, and responsiveness are critical dimensions that metagovernors must operationalize when managing networks (Esmark, 2007). As mentioned, in the UAS and HPS programs, the metagovernor, in their supervisory role, has heard from communities about networks gone awry and made considered corrections when justified. Yet it is balancing upwards and downwards accountability where the solution lies with respect to governance networks—a balance not observed in the various governance networks examined here. Critical factors of success of building social (bottom-up) accountability requires access to information, civil society capacity, media engagement, and institutionalized space (Malena et al., 2004).

**Conclusion**

A number of tentative lessons emerge from the analysis of a handful of cross-sectoral governance networks at the local level. First, the dominant style of metagovernance in Canada, tentatively offered from this cross-sectoral sample, is one of state formation and management of governance networks, which implies a strong state steering function. Second, financial incentives are powerful tools to bring disparate actors together and sustain cooperation, but real decision-making authority (or at least genuine interest in advice from networks) is likewise a powerfully sustaining fuel for networks. Third, governance arrangements in which the metagovernors are bureaucrats, rather than elected officials, appear to be the most high-functioning and able to achieve an effective balance between crafting locally-informed responses under broad parameters sets by metagovernors, with the HPS, UAS and LIP networks as notable models. The foregoing lessons are offered merely as tentative observations based on the limited sample of local governance networks in this paper, hopefully to be challenged and refined by others using the metagovernance lens.

This exploratory investigation of metagovernance patterns among governance networks at the local level in Canada raises a number of research questions that require further exploration, both empirical and conceptual. From an empirical perspective, additional cases studies beyond the fourteen presented here are essential to provide much-needed nuance to the tentative patterns offered here. This of course includes governance networks at non-local levels to the extent that they exist. In terms of conceptual development, scholars need to develop a better link between the metagovernance literature, which privileges top-down accountability mechanisms, and the literature that explores how bottom-up accountability is an important pillar of modern governance. In the context of network governance, the social accountability literature is in a more nascent stage and requires specific criteria and measures before we can think about how top-down and bottom-up accountability mechanisms can work in a complementary fashion.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sources (partial list)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Immigration Partnerships (LIPs) (Ontario cities)</td>
<td>Local networks tasked with the development of strategic plans for improved immigrant integration, including education, employment, health, inclusion, and civic engagement.</td>
<td>Andrew &amp; Doroleux (2010); Burr (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Health Integration Networks (LHINs) (Ontario cities)</td>
<td>Regional networks created by the Provincial government to produce and implement local health care services plan to address unique needs of community</td>
<td>MOHLTC (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homelessness Partnering Strategy (HPS) (cities across Canada)</td>
<td>Community networks created to develop and implement a community plan for homelessness, coordinate existing policy activity, allocate federal dollars according to local priorities</td>
<td>Doberstein (2012); Leo (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Aboriginal Strategy (UAS) (cities across Canada)</td>
<td>Community networks of urban Aboriginals to build capacity and leadership within the community, identify local priorities, and fund new service initiatives</td>
<td>Leo &amp; August (2009); Spence &amp; Findlay (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City for All Women Initiative (CAWI) (Ottawa, ON)</td>
<td>A network of diverse women engaged formally with the City to research and promote ‘diversity and gender’ inclusive local governance practices</td>
<td>Andrew (2009); Klodawsky (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Health Councils (DHCs) (Ontario cities)</td>
<td>Community networks established to provide advice to the Provincial government on health needs in their geographic areas and disseminate information in the community</td>
<td>Abelson (2001); Church et al. (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy (NAPs) (Toronto, ON)</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Action Partnerships to be created in thirteen priority neighbourhoods in the city to lead neighbourhood–defined revitalization efforts</td>
<td>Horak (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Halifax Partnership (GHP) (Halifax, NS)</td>
<td>A partnership between the Halifax Regional Municipality and the Chamber of Commerce focusing on business development, investment attraction, city marketing, and networking to meet training needs.</td>
<td>Grant et al. (2008); Bradford (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sask. Regional Economic Development Authorities (REDAs) (cities and regions in SK)</td>
<td>A local economic development authority to help establish a diversified local economy by helping to coordinate economic development, providing training, and attracting business investment</td>
<td>Bradford (2003); Fernandes (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Futures Development Corporations (CFDCs) (Canada-wide)</td>
<td>Volunteer boards of local development corporations engage in strategic planning, supplying business services, providing investment loans that emphasize multi-sectoral and regional partnerships</td>
<td>Bradford (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les corporations de développement économique communautaire (CDECs) (Quebec) – pre-Charest</td>
<td>Grassroots networks of neighbourhood/ community actors to set direction for local economic development and support business ventures and employability</td>
<td>Fontan and Shragge (1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les corporations de développement économique communautaire (CDECs) (Quebec) – post-Charest</td>
<td>Networks created by provincial government, consisting of business, social, government and community to implement strategic development priorities of province with some local flexibility</td>
<td>Loxley &amp; Simpson (2007); Fontan et al. (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ottawa Partnership (TOP) (Ottawa, ON)</td>
<td>A partnership bringing high-level coordination to the high-tech, life sciences and tourism sectors and providing strategic advice to improve Ottawa’s economy.</td>
<td>Wolfe (2009); Andrew &amp; Doroleux (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerospace Action Partnership (AAP) (Toronto, ON)</td>
<td>A multi-stakeholder group established to guide the development and implementation of comprehensive aerospace strategy to advance the growth of the sector in Toronto</td>
<td>Galvin (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Toronto Marketing Alliance (GTMA) (Toronto, ON)</td>
<td>Government and private sector group tasked with coordinating the international marketing efforts and providing investor support services for twenty nine GTA municipalities</td>
<td>Nelles (2009); Wolfe (2009)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
References


