Integrating Civilian-Military Operations:  
The Comprehensive Approach and  
the ATF Experience, 2008-2009

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A. Introduction

“Imagine an array of individuals and institutions trying to identify, recruit, and prepare people who have never been deployed before in the middle of an active insurgency where dangerous people are trying to kill you.”

- Colonel Brett Boudreau, Former Director of Communications, ATF (Personal Communication, June 2009)

This was the situation facing Canadian officials working on the Afghanistan file in 2009. Similarly complex humanitarian-security challenges in other regions of the world are forcing governments everywhere to rethink and retool their response mechanisms. In Canada, the Comprehensive Approach (CA), as it has come to be known, has evolved from the Martin-era Three Block War and the Whole of Government (WoG) approach combined with the experience of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The Canadian perspective on the CA has been highlighted recently in the work Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski (2011). They argue that an evolution in thinking is underway as governments and multilateral institutions look for more effective ways of addressing security/humanitarian challenges. These innovations will have significant implications for both domestic and international policy mechanisms.

Not surprisingly, military-civilian tensions and inter-departmental rivalries feature prominently in the study of the CA, particularly in the context of Afghanistan. Stairs and Middlemiss (2008) point out that Canada’s defence establishment has long been a driving force behind Canada’s foreign policy in high conflict zones. Other scholars, such as Cottey and Foster (2004, p. 5), describe the more recent usurping of traditional diplomatic authority by DND as “defence diplomacy.” The work of Rostek, Gizewski and others has focused on the logistic, philosophic, and operational barriers between government departments.

This study offers another element not present in the CA literature: an examination of the consequences of operational integration on the relationship between the bureaucracy and the political executive. This aspect of the CA experience is evidenced by a little known group housed in the Privy Council Office (PCO) – the 26-member Afghanistan Task Force (ATF). The ATF was a small but unusually powerful secretariat which serves as a prototype for the CA. Beginning in 2008, the ATF became the primary institutional mainspring for reconfiguring the Harper government’s foreign policy on Afghanistan. In implementing Manley’s plan to transform Canada’s role, the ATF – led by an elite group of inspired public servants – succeeded in amalgamating the political executive and Ottawa’s bureaucracies to achieve an unprecedented degree of policy and operational integration. This very success, however, also presents serious challenges to the traditional relationship between the political executive and the public service. The ATF experience calls into question how our system of governance adapts to new forms of
strategic and humanitarian threats, a key factor in determining the nature and success of the CA in Canada.

B. The Evolution of Horizontal Management

In May 2007, the Conservative government, which saw Afghanistan as central to Canada’s international engagements, formed the Afghanistan Task Force (ATF) under DFAIT’s jurisdiction. While Afghanistan task forces already existed within individual departments, this overarching ATF was charged with the harmonizing Canada’s diplomatic, development and military efforts. David Mulroney, Harper’s former defence and foreign policy advisor, was appointed Associate Deputy Minister (ADM) of Foreign Affairs and Interdepartmental Coordinator for Afghanistan. He was to work with Lieutenant-General Mike Gauthier of CEFCOM,\(^1\) Vincent Rigby, ADM of policy at DND, Stephen Wallace, the newly-appointed Vice-President of the Afghanistan Task Force at CIDA, Brigadier-General Tim Grant of Task Force Kandahar and Ambassador Arif Lalani in Kabul to develop a “single narrative” which exceeded the standard 3D (defence, development and diplomacy) approach (Mulroney, cited Perkins and Thatcher, 2007).

Given its traditional leadership role on foreign policy matters, situating the ATF within DFAIT was a logical move which did result in improvements to organizational clarity and inter-departmental coordination. However, the ATF also met with resistance both within DFAIT and from other departments. Some within DFAIT resented the emphasis on Afghanistan while others complained of the scope of interdepartmental responsibilities placed on their doorstep. Aside from the increased workload, the department’s culture and *modus operandi* were not conducive to combat. In the words of a high ranking diplomat, “Foreign Affairs does not *do* wars” (Confidential interview, 3 June 2010).\(^2\) The semi-autonomous status of the ATF did little to enhance DFAIT’s power while the volatile nature of the Afghanistan conflict exposed it to significant risk. Outside of DFAIT, the military viewed the ATF as a counter-weight to its influence while CIDA saw it as a rebuke for failing to achieve its objectives on the ground (I. Brodie, personal communication, 18 Feb. 2009).

In light of this resistance, combined with growing public concern about Canada’s role in the Afghanistan conflict, opposition pressure to withdraw, rising casualties and an emboldened insurgency, Harper undertook a calculated gamble: he established the Manley Panel to review Canada’s Afghan policy. The panel’s findings, released on January 21, 2008, criticized the government’s communication efforts and its emphasis on the military aspects of the mission; the opposition’s call for withdrawal in 2009; CIDA’s ineffective performance and the lacklustre contributions of some NATO allies. The panel’s recommendations provided the government with a more politically palatable policy on Afghanistan and a blueprint for bridging the gap between military, development and diplomatic efforts.
The success of the Manley Panel owed much to its Secretariat, chaired by David Mulroney. Transferred from the DFAIT Task Force in October 2007, Mulroney surrounded himself with a select group of highly talented and ambitious bright lights seconded from a cross-section of departments. As members of the Secretariat, they used their familiarity with earlier attempts at policy coordination to go beyond the 3D concept. In just four months, this select group of civil servants – highly attuned to the sensitivities of their political bosses and the intricacies of Ottawa’s policy-making bureaucracies – did a masterful job of working with panel members to develop recommendations which would *genuinely integrate* diplomatic, development and defence instruments. Key recommendations included the purchase of medium-lift helicopters known as Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs), the development of a clear system of benchmarks and timelines to measure the effectiveness of Canadian aid contributions, the provision of “franker and more frequent reporting on events in Afghanistan,” and the enlargement of the civilian presence in theatre. It also called for “a single task force directing the activities of all departments and agencies.” (Manley et al, 2008, p. 38)

The Manley Report provided a framework within which a divided parliament and public could come together and gave the government a chance to save itself and its mission. Taking advantage of this opportunity, however, meant that the Prime Minister would have to loosen his grip on foreign policy and also provide more operational support than had been possible within DFAIT. David Lynch, the Clerk of the Privy Council Office (PCO), and other government insiders believed that inter-departmental collaboration could be driven more successfully by the PCO, a smaller body better suited to managing different cultures, capacities and political priorities. “At this stage everybody was in agreement about the mission. However, what was needed was a coordinating body that was much more operational,” noted a high ranking advisor in the PCO (source confidential, 8 June 2009). Determined to strengthen the public service and reduce uncertainty in what he described as complex and unpredictable times, Lynch smoothed the way for these changes. (Lynch, 2009). David Mulroney was soon moved to the PCO to head the newly-minted, 26-member Afghanistan Task Force Secretariat. Moving the ATF to the PCO achieved the highest possible level of senior bureaucratic and political interaction.

Promoted to Deputy Minister, Mulroney appointed two of his colleagues from the Manley Panel Secretariat to key positions. Sanjeev Chowdhury became Director of Operations for the ATF and Elissa Golberg was appointed Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK). Colonel Brett Boudreau was seconded from National Defence to act as Director of Communications while other senior civil servants were seconded from CIDA, Treasury Board, Correctional Services, Public Safety, DFAIT and the PCO. The task force immediately began the process of implementing the Manley recommendations by rebalancing the military-civilian contribution and by requiring Ottawa’s line departments to integrate their efforts consistent with the government’s Whole of Government (WoG) approach. In short order, the newly-appointed Deputy Minister and his small Secretariat were now managing Canada-wide operations in Afghanistan.
Rather than relying solely on traditional hierarchical approaches in making public policy, Mulroney’s ATF incorporated the concept of horizontal management, which complemented the WoG initiative. Political-bureaucratic players emphasized working through partnerships and networks instead of hierarchies and silos. Despite displeasure from Ottawa’s line departments, horizontal management created greater interdependence between the bureaucratic-military-political actors at all levels and resulted in speedier and more effective policy making.

In addition to implementing the Manley recommendations, the ATF provided secretariat support to the Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan (CCOA). Mulroney acted as Secretary to the CCOA and chaired the Deputy Ministers’ Coordinating Committee. His involvement provided the bureaucratic bridge to a political entity. Chaired by the Minister of International Trade, David Emerson, the CCOA had been established on February 8, 2008 to preside over security, development and defence issues relevant to Canada’s mission. Joining the Chair were Peter McKay (Minister of Defence), Stockwell Day (Minister of Public Safety), Bev Oda (Minister of International Cooperation, CIDA) and Maxime Bernier (Minister of Foreign Affairs). One of Emerson’s key objectives was wrestling back control of the mission from the military in order to complete Canada’s signature projects: the eradication of polio, the building of schools and the renovation of the Dahla Dam in Kandahar province. (D. Emerson, Personal Communication, 16 April, 2009)

C. Civilian-Military Convergence: the “First Piece of the Puzzle”

Elissa Golberg had been appointed as the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) in order to implement the Manley recommendations on the ground. Reporting to David Mulroney’s ATF in Ottawa and Canada’s Ambassador Arif Lalani in Kabul, Golberg, at 35 years of age, became Canada’s senior civilian representative and principal interlocutor in the southern province of Kandahar. Her mandate was to work with the Commander of Task Force Kandahar, Brigadier-General Denis Thompson, to integrate civilian-military policy in one of the most dangerous war zones in the world. This presented a field-level challenge to traditional planning and decision-making systems that “mitigate against horizontality” and typically do not reward collaboration (E. Golberg, personal communication, 9 June 2010). Dubbed “the Rock” over her 11 months in Kandahar, Golberg worked very closely with Thompson as she presided over a civilian team of Corrections Canada officers, CSIS agents and Canadian police in addition to CIDA and DFAIT personnel. During her tenure, the number of civilian personnel expanded from 15 to 62.

The starting point for Golberg’s team was the government’s six mission priorities which had been identified as a result of field-generated input involving civilian-military officials based in Kandahar and Kabul:

1. Enabling the Afghan National Security Forces in Kandahar to sustain a more secure environment and promote law and order
2. Strengthening Afghan institutional capacity to deliver core services and promote economic growth, enhancing the confidence of Kandaharis in their government
3. Providing humanitarian assistance for extremely vulnerable people, including refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons
4. Enhancing border security, with facilitation of bilateral dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani authorities
5. Helping advance Afghanistan’s capacity for democratic governance by contributing to effective, accountable public institutions and electoral processes
6. Facilitating Afghan-led efforts toward political reconciliation.

Golberg, with support from Mulroney and Lalani, began by imposing a rigorous interface between civilian agencies and military forces. She and Thompson shared an office and worked exceptionally well together. To improve coordination, Golberg instituted weekly meetings at the Governor of Kandahar’s office and biweekly meetings between Correction Services, RCMP, CIDA, Public Safety Canada and CSIS. During those meetings, Brigadier-General Thompson would take the lead on security issues while Golberg would take the lead on governance issues. This arrangement broke new ground for both military and civilian personnel. While interdepartmental committees were not new in Ottawa, Brigadier-General Thompson observed that “what was unusual here was the level at which they were formed” (D. Thompson, personal communication, 2 June, 2010). Given that Canada was part of a NATO operation, integration also had implications for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Golberg was the only civilian allowed to speak at weekly meetings of its Synchronization Board, which coordinated activity among all stakeholders.

Golberg, with Thompson’s support, redressed the imbalance between civilian and military financial authority and access to resources. Golberg was given signing authority for CIDA and the Kandahar Local Initiative Program (KLIP) – a project designed to increase the capacity of Afghan government institutions and civil organizations as well as to complete local reconstruction projects. Improved access to financial resources was complemented by “leaner, quicker program response mechanisms” initiated through Golberg’s office (Golberg, 2008). These improvements were expedited by close support from Lalani in Kabul and the ATF in Ottawa, which by this time enjoyed immediate access to key members of the CCOA and the Clerk of the PCO. As Golberg explained, these initiatives were undertaken “so all civilian-military staff could see we were a team and as recognition that the mission had not been appropriately weighted” (E. Golberg, personal communication, 9 June 2010). In fact, field-level integration met with less resistance in Kandahar, where civilians and the military shared common dangers, than in Ottawa, where departmental officials viewed integration as a devolution of their authority.

With effective operational mechanisms in place, more civilians began operating “outside the wire.” Joint civilian-military teams, or civilian teams with appropriate military escorts, began to visit a variety of locations in Kandahar province where Canadian-sponsored projects were under way. These “road moves” improved communication between Kandahar and various Canadian
interests in the province and facilitated consultation with local Afghan leaders. Departmental representatives incorporated this information into the Kandahar Action Plan (KAP) “the first jointly developed and implemented integrated civil-military strategy” (E. Golberg, personal communication, 9 June 2010). Golberg described it as a “multi-national and multi-agency strategy ... based on priorities identified by Afghans and shared by Canada and its allies in Afghanistan.” In her opinion, the plan also demonstrated the “added value” civilians brought to the mission (Golberg, 2008). Field generated input from Kabul and especially from Kandahar carried significant weight in Ottawa and allowed the ATF to respond quickly with appropriate assistance. “We, the people working in the field,” explained Golberg to a special committee in Ottawa, “are the ones responsible for executing the strategic plan and adapting it to Kandahar” (Golberg, 2009). To again use Golberg’s words (2008), “The first piece of the puzzle was in place.”

**D. Reigning in the Military**

Of all the line departments, DND was best prepared to enter the conflict in Afghanistan in its initial phase. DND was, to paraphrase Chief of Defence Staff Rick Hillier, the *de facto* lead department of the 3Ds. Within the military, the recommendations of the Manley Panel and the creation of the ATF were widely seen as part of a sophisticated public relations exercise to provided ministers with political cover. Some high-ranking Canadian Forces members thought that the Manley Report “was for the town [Ottawa] and not the mission” (source confidential). To further complicate matters, the military’s strategy was bound by an alliance (NATO) command structure. Canada’s six priorities were candidly described by a senior level officer as “antithetical to the international dimension of the conflict as seen through the eyes of a four-star general running a war” (source confidential).

However, it was also becoming evident to the military that, without a greater civilian presence and clarity of purpose, the mission would not have the political lift to sustain itself. Working under the ATF umbrella could deliver a more disciplined, holistic approach to civilian-military operations, better defined national objectives and agreed benchmarks. The policies and practices introduced by Golberg and Thompson succeeded in “breaking down” CEFCOM plans at all levels to develop a common platform which incorporated the civilian aspects of the mission. Support for harmonization was reinforced by admiration for the growing number of public servants and development officials risking their lives to go “beyond the wire” to coordinate complex initiatives with local Afghan officials.

Harmonizing the civilian and military components of the mission also had a transformative effect on Canada’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Canada’s first PRT included only five civilians – two civilian policemen, a CIDA worker and two foreign affairs officers. After the death of DFAIT’s Political Director in January 2006, only two civilian police officers remained with the PRT. By 2007, 2,500 people were assigned to PRTs – 11 of whom were civilian. The
PRTs’ commanding officer retained firm control over his forces and, according to the former Political Director of the PRT, David Buchan, coordination with civilian authorities was largely “subject to the personalities involved” (Buchan, 2009). By all accounts, civilian input was generally weak and decisions were made on an impromptu basis. It was, to use Buchan’s words (2009), “the phase where ad hoc coordination began to meet its limits.”

The integrative policies of Golberg and Thompson dramatically improved the success of Canada’s PRTs. In comparison to other NATO members, Canada’s PRTs achieved the highest civilian to military ratio which resulted in more effective engagement. When NATO ratified its Comprehensive Approach at the Bucharest summit of April 2008, many of Canada’s NATO partners expressed interest in learning more about the PRTs established on the ATF’s watch.

E. CIDA Goes “Beyond the Wire”

While Gauthier in Ottawa and Thompson in Kandahar were overseeing the military component of integration, Stephen Wallace, as VP of CIDA’s ATF, took the lead in revamping the development effort in Afghanistan. While significant sums of development money were already flowing into Afghanistan, development workers in theatre were hampered by ponderous policy-vetting procedures based on vertical, isolated “policy chambers.” CIDA’s ability to operate in a timely and effective manner was severely restricted. Speed and better targeting, Wallace noted, were most essential in delivering and supporting effective development programs on the ground.

Wallace had served on the Pre-Manley ATF and understood that inter-departmental linkages had to be improved and adapted to national priorities. He recognized that, within the public service, issues were increasingly viewed as “horizontal” (personal communication, 8 June 2010). The political consensus that developed in Ottawa around the Manley recommendations created a “unity of purpose” which galvanized development workers. When difficulties arose, they were generally resolved through creative compromise. For instance, CIDA’s concerns around financial accountability were solved by granting field-level CIDA workers greater financial authority to be used in lock step with the greater signing authority granted to Golberg. Despite a host of challenges, including civilian recruitment, “everybody in the CIDA ATF was very inspired by what they were doing. People on staff were embraced by a sense of purpose,” observed Ellen Wright, Wallace’s Chief of Staff, as she described the frenzied pace and long hours at CIDA’s ATF headquarters (personal communication, 8 June 2010). The incorporation of a system of “metrics” or milestones used to measure progress on the mission’s six priorities also improved effectiveness. “If you have to be accountable every month, then you’ve embedded rigor into the process,” Wallace observed (personal communication, 8 June 2010).

While not a popular sentiment in his department, Wallace acknowledged that CIDA and other civilian components of the Kandahar mission had a lot to learn from the military. Wallace pointed out that when operations are run from the field, as military missions usually are, those at
the center of those operations are “always right unless you can prove them wrong” (personal communication, 8 June 2010). Wallace benefited from the inclusion of two military officers at CIDA’s ATF offices while, in Kandahar, the RoCK was shifting the policy center of gravity to “match what the military was already doing” (personal communication, 8 June 2010). From Wallace’s perspective, this transformation, necessitated by field-level requirements to operate on a real-time footing, “gave you more power and legitimacy” (personal communication, 8 June 2010).

F. Public Safety Canada

Created in 2003, Public Safety Canada (PS) was an umbrella organization that coordinated all federal departments and agencies responsible for national security. United under a single portfolio and reporting to the same minister, PS oversaw national security, emergency management, law enforcement, corrections, crime prevention and borders. PS was tasked with providing specialists to reform and upgrade the Afghanistan National Police (ANP), court system and prisons in Kandahar.

In some ways, integration came more naturally to PS than to DND or CIDA. Its bureaucratic culture had already been acclimatized to a multi-agency model based on a central objective: to keep Canadians safe from the threat of terrorism. However, the multiplicity of organizations under the PS portfolio presented a unique set of challenges, and a greatly increased workload, for officials working with Mulroney and Golberg. DMs and ADMs, the RCMP Commissioner and Assistant Commissioners and their counterparts from other departments met weekly with ATF officials to integrate the work of some 50 police officers and 10 Corrections and Border Services officers in Afghanistan. From an administrative perspective, the ATF’s mandate was useful in reconciling conflicting priorities, developing integrated objectives and establishing achievable benchmarks. In acknowledging the leading role played by Mulroney’s ATF, Kristina Namiesnioski, Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) in PS noted: “The process simply forced us to come together.” More importantly, according to the ADM, “it forced a greater level of integration between the operational folks on the ground and the policy folks in Ottawa” (personal communication, 17 June 2010).

Integration was not always successful: the RCMP particularly chafed at the restrictions. From the perspective of PS, the RCMP was in Afghanistan to train and mentor new recruits for the Afghanistan National Police (ANP). However, the RCMP saw an opportunity to advance its domestic agenda by working to curtail the flow of heroin from Afghanistan to Canada. Deputy Commissioner Raf Souccar, responsible for RCMP federal policing and international operations, framed the RCMP’s role in Afghanistan in broader terms as he drew a connection between drugs, the manufacture of IEDs and the complexities of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, where the lines between criminality and politics were often blurred (personal communication, 10 June 2010). As
over 65% of Canadian heroin comes from Afghanistan, “by helping the Afghanis, we’re helping ourselves,” contended Souccar.

The RCMP also had difficulty with an integrated reporting structure. Its training strategy was centered on a concept of community policing which required armed police trainers to work outside the wire. The necessary security arrangements required coordination through the office of the RoCK and Brigadier-General Thompson. From the perspective of the RCMP, its trainers in Kandahar took their instructions from the Commissioner, as stipulated in the RCMP Act, and should not require local permission. For the RCMP there was a fine line between respecting integration and being told how to do their jobs. A compromise solution was found: instead of reporting to the RoCK, the RCMP stationed in Kandahar would report through the RoCK. “It was ironic,” recalled Namiesnioski, “that the earlier ‘not so good experiences’ led, in fact, to better integration” (personal communication, 17 June 2010).

G. Conclusion

Once reconstituted in the PCO, the ATF was the principle catalyst for effective harmonization of civilian and military policy in Afghanistan. The creation of a field-level authority like the RoCK, on an equal footing with the JTF Commander, unified civilian authority in Kandahar. As DFAIT’s ADM, Yves Brodeur, disclosed: “In practical terms, the civilians ... and the military are on equal footing. There is no hierarchy. The military and us must come together. We must work together, as we are partners” (Brodeur, 2009).

There is no question that harmonization was achieved. Yves Brodeur was unambiguous about the transformation in the bureaucracy both in Ottawa and in the field: “I never saw the government of Canada achieve that level of integration” (personal communication, 19 Feb. 2009). Integration went beyond finding compromise between departments – often described by organizational specialists as “pretended participation” (Olsen, 2006, p. 1). “Working towards a unity of purpose,” Brodeur added, “was not so much a matter of compromise; it was a matter of realigning your department to make this happen” (personal communication, 4 June 2010).

Mulroney’s ATF forced departments and the foreign policy establishment to make hard, unpopular decisions. Along the way, feathers were ruffled. Mulroney was unapologetic:

“Every now and then you have a policy challenge that is so big, where the national interest is so clearly engaged, you have to work clearly and efficiently but you need a special group [ATF] that can actually sometimes bang heads and force departments and agencies and institutions like Canadian Forces to work effectively together.” (personal communication, 15 July 2010)
Attempts by departments to preserve their chains of command and financial accountability were overcome, sometimes by employing the bureaucratic version of banging heads together, but more often than not, by adopting creative ground-level solutions.

Integration allowed complex objectives and policies to be adapted quickly and effectively in response to changing realities on the ground. In testifying before the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan, Golberg said (2009):

“There was never a need for us to call our superiors. That’s the benefit of having mission command, if you will, on the civilian side and on the military side, because our senior managers trust us to make those decisions and to come to an agreement with them.”

When it was necessary to inform a minister, it was done very quickly. “The fact was when people’s lives were at stake, you get people going forward very quickly,” explained Brett Boudreau, former ATF Director of Communications (personal communication, 6 June 2010).

Another benefit of integration was an energized bureaucracy. Elissa Golberg rapidly expanded the civilian footprint in Kandahar both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Her initiatives included everything from “getting the Department of Agriculture staff out into the districts” to assisting NGOs and IGOs in doing their work in the Kandahar region (Golberg, 2008). By pushing her staff further out into the districts, Golberg changed the prevailing cautious civil service ethos. This led to greater readiness to assume personal responsibility, which in turn improved competence and trust among Golberg and her team. The realities of operating on a war footing inspired personal engagement in Ottawa as well as Kandahar. Task-driven civil servants like Golberg, Thompson, Brodeur and others were part of an “explosion in knowledge and intellectual capital” continuing to take hold in the public service (Olsen, 2006, p.1). Motivated public servants participate in the self-management of their workplace and accept personal responsibility when the opportunity presented itself.

For the military, integration enhanced its ability to plan for and adapt to the modern realities of conflicts like Afghanistan. Although the JTF commander now had to coordinate operations with a civilian peer, he benefited from clearer, more consistent and more achievable objectives. The multi-dimensional communications strategy developed and overseen by Brett Boudreau, the Director of Communications in the ATF, also enhanced military prestige. The success of the ATF experience also put Canada’s military at the forefront of NATO’s move toward the CA.

The ATF experience demonstrates that the CA holds significant promise for governments in search of more holistic approaches to security challenges such as Afghanistan. On a multilateral level, Canada’s ATF experience was at the forefront of a movement by NATO members towards the greater use of the CA. However, the CA also poses challenges to traditional governance models on both a national and international level.
International law distinguishes combatants from non-combatants in order to protect civilians. Aid workers, diplomats and others embedded in military operations become legitimate targets and humanitarian organizations may find their access restricted if they bear a military taint. The CA negates this distinction and conceivably limits the number of individuals and organizations willing or able to work effectively in combat zones. However, the nature of modern warfare has already begun rendering this distinction obsolete. The Afghan insurgents ignored the division between military and humanitarian targets long before the RoCK arrived. Increasing reliance on sophisticated intelligence gathering has also blurred the line between civilian and military activities regardless of formal integration. It is common knowledge that Golberg’s team included CSIS agents. Many civilians have also become willing to be more directly involved in conflict. Social scientists working in Kandahar identified opportunities to provide development and governance assistance while also noting military targets of opportunity.

The CA also challenges a domestic governance model which relies on a division between the political executive and the bureaucracy. Convention dictates that agents of change are Ministries which are guided, supported and sometimes challenged by the PCO, the chief enforcer in the public service. By assuming responsibility for the ATF, the PCO assumed an active operational role and risked losing its ability to ensure “non-partisan support to the Prime Minister on all policy and operational issues.” (Privy Council Office, 2010) Converversely, one of the primary rationales for moving Mulroney’s ATF from DFAIT to the PCO was precisely to improve its operational capabilities. Both the Clerk and the government were willing blur the distinction between the political and bureaucratic realms in the interests of efficacy. The government managed to quickly and effectively reconstitute the Afghan mission during a vulnerable period. The PCO managed to re-establish bureaucratic authority and prestige. These advantages simply outweighed the potential disadvantages, at least in the short term. Some insiders and PCO officials also point out that, as a task force, the ATF was by definition temporary (C. Carriere, personal communication, June 2009).

Related to the shifting relations between the political executive and the bureaucracy is the issue of ministerial responsibility. Ministers, as representatives of Cabinet, are answerable to the public and to Parliament for the actions of their departments. The ATF appropriated a large measure of the ministerial authority without commensurate accountability. Just as importantly, the ATF, the RoCK and the Task Force Kandahar Commander received much of the credit traditionally reserved for ministers. This outcome was a consequence of the explosion of governmental websites and quarterly reports that formed part of the more transparent communications strategy called for by Manley. In a rapidly evolving world where integration is becoming more common-place, it is likely that policy-makers and the public will have to come to terms with the overwhelming pressures – international and domestic – forcing a greater overlap of bureaucratic and political spheres.

The many high-profile accomplishments of the ATF have put a new, more adventurous face on Canada’s approach to stabilization missions. While not within the bounds of this study, it should
be noted that the success of the ATF was not solely a reflection of the talents of its founding members. In 2009, David Mulroney was replaced by Greta Bossenmaier who served until Canada's troop withdrawal in July of 2011. In January of 2009, Ken Lewis replaced Elissa Golberg as the RoCK and was in turn replaced by Ben Boswell in July 2010. Tim Martin was Canada's last RoCK, serving in Kandahar from August 2010 until July 2011.

The ATF model holds great promise as an effective civilian-military response to global dangers. One example is the prompt and well-coordinated intervention in the Haitian disaster of 2010 by the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) headed by Elissa Golberg. Romeo Dallaire has called for the fuller adoption of the CA and a permanent “harmonized decision-making structure” composed of “ministers, deputy ministers and military leaders” capable of deploying even more quickly and efficiently to trouble spots like Gaddafi’s Libya (Dallaire and Lagasse, 2011, p. 2). Other situations requiring rapid and multi-faceted responses will continue to arise. A better-informed public is likely to be more concerned with results than distinguishing between the political and bureaucratic realms and the intricacies of ministerial responsibility. It is likely that the ATF was more than a temporary political-bureaucratic expediency. It may prove to have been the beginning a permanent, genuinely integrated agency.

H. Notes

1 Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) is the unified command that is responsible for all Canadian Forces (CF) expeditionary operations

2 It is well known that the Harper government was also not pleased with DFAIT’s performance in coordinating the extraction of Canadians during the Lebanon crisis

3 The five agencies are Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Correctional Service Canada (CSC), National Parole Board (NPB), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)]

I. References


Manley, J. et al., Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, January 2008


