Meanings of Silence in Democratic Theory and Practice

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Democratic theorists are united by the conviction that people gain entry to democratic life by their ability to speak. It is through speech, as Aristotle (1988) first recognized, that democratic citizens transform raw sense into reasoned judgement – distinguishing right from wrong, good from bad or useful from harmful. And it is in speaking, as Aristotle’s modern counterparts recognize today, that democratic citizens exercise their right to a metaphorical ‘say’ in government – expressing judgements about who should hold power, how it should be used, and to what end. As a consequence, democracy is often about empowering citizens to act as speaking subjects.

Democracy should also seek to empower citizens as silent subjects. What I mean by ‘silent subjects’ will become more apparent as my analysis unfolds. For now, it is sufficient to note that democratic theory hears silence only as speech’s absence. This is a problem – democratic theory needs to listen more carefully. As I shall conceive it here, speech refers to the act of publically disclosing oneself through the medium of language. In speaking, citizens name internal goals and desires for others to hear and respond to in turn. Speech translates into expressive political action and thus institutional voice. It includes votes, protests, petitions, lobbying, representation, discussions and deliberations. These acts of disclosure are ‘speech’ in a broad sense – they transform inner passions and thoughts into shapes fit for public viewing, enabling individuals to be publically recognized as citizens. It is in this broad sense that Hannah Arendt ([1958] 1998) famously defines democratic politics as a domain of action mediated by speech.

If speech is associated with disclosure then the opposite is true of silence. This is heard as a residual of speech – listless, devoid of content, meaning or imagination, and indicating disempowerments democratic theorists read into silence, ranging from apathy and disaffection to acquiescence and domination. Silence is taken as the absence of expressive action and institutional voice – it individualizes and privatizes citizens by rendering their actions publically invisible. Silent citizens are inattentive to public issues, never weigh in on public affairs, do not debate, protest, take action and, most importantly, do not cast judgement through the ballot box.

To be clear, I do not want to suggest that democratic theory’s attention to speech is wrong – indeed, like Arendt, I believe it is essential. Speech enables citizens to come together in pursuit of common ends, challenge one another, make commitments, gain perspective, express identity, articulate desires and needs, and creatively and intelligently control their lives. What I do want to suggest, however, is that by attending exclusively to speech, democratic theorists fail to capture how many citizens communicate in modern mass democracies – that is, anonymously, often selectively, and with unequal influence, resources, and expertise. In doing so, they also ignore a deeper sociological observation about silence’s role in human interaction and cannot conceive of silences having a positive role in democratic practice. Like speech, silence’s value is social: it takes at least two to create silence, and silences can be used to affect human interaction, for better or for worse.

Most democratic theories make three moves that prevent them from attending to silence’s multiple meanings. The first is to suppose that only speech can fit into structures of inter-subjectivity, because only by speaking can individuals give psychic desires intentional direction. Only language, in other words, transforms thought into action. The second is to assume that, because only linguistic transformations are believed to enable political action, citizens’ capacity for democratic self-rule is a function of their ability to
speak. I call this assumption the *speech clause*, and throughout this paper I highlight its role in shaping democratic theory today. The third move is to conceive of silence only as a symptom of citizens’ exclusion from public life once the speech clause is introduced. Silence, on this view, signals a dangerous disconnect between thought and action remediable only by devising better ways to empower citizens’ speech. My contention is that, in making these three moves, many democratic theorists have conflated two distinct dimensions of democracy: the distribution of empowerments that enable citizens to contribute to democratic decisions and the mode of communication citizens adopt in contributing. The result is a one dimensional, speech-centric model of communicative citizenship.

A key goal of this paper is to examine the speech-centric model of citizenship and the assumptions that sustain it. My argument is that when this model is exposed, explained and evaluated, it proves to be both conceptually and normatively inadequate to the task of accurately mapping patterns of speech and communication in modern mass democracies. These patterns include silence and one key claim I am making is that once different types of silence are distinguished, some types of silence will be recognized as playing a positive role in democracy – especially in situations where speech is certain to fail. Attending to the multiple meanings of silence thus presents democratic theory with new problems as well as new potentials for deepening democratic practice.

In this paper, I consider what these might be by disaggregating the speech-centric model of citizenship back into its three constituent moves. In the first move, I review the tight theoretical connection between speech and self-rule. I claim that this connection causes democratic theorists to subscribe to the archetype of the speaking citizen – an ideal-type that associates empowered political action exclusively with the medium of speech. In the second move, I illustrate how the archetypal speaking citizen deafens democratic theorists to silence’s more positive possibilities. Silence, on this view, is solely a symptom of citizens’ disempowerment or disengagement from democratic life. I organize these exclusions into four distinct non-communicative states silent citizens may embody: awareness, ambivalence, aversion and alienation. In the third move, I consider two forms of silencing that democratic theorists identify as causing citizens’ disempowerment and disengagement, and I argue that solutions to silencing will continue to fall short so long as they are speech-bound.

**Move I: Activating the Speech Clause in Democratic Theory**

Because democratic theory prioritizes speech, I begin by asking this: *How does democratic theory conceive of citizens’ speech in democracy?* I believe the answer given by most democratic theorists is much like Aristotle’s and Arendt’s. Namely: that speech empowers citizens to act politically. The tight theoretical connection democratic theorists draw between speaking and acting has led many to conclude that democracy’s archetypal citizen is the speaking citizen. The ideal-type of a speaking citizen features prominently in many contemporary theories of democracy, much as it did in Aristotle’s day. And, while contemporary democratic theories use this archetype to different ends, in this section I focus on the way they use it similarly: they all assume that citizens’ capacity for self-rule is a function of their ability to articulate judgements through speech. I call this assumption the *speech clause*, and I argue that it prevents democratic theory from conceiving of silence as anything other than a symptom of disempowerment or
disengagement. The clause also leads democratic theorists to conclude that only one mode of communication (speech) can secure the twin goods of control and involvement, considered by many to be the essential empowerments required for democratic self-rule (Markell, 2008; Richardson, 2002: 37). Although theorists may have normative disagreements about the necessity of realizing these goods in practice, they do agree that such goods are best realized through the speaking citizen. In the next section, I consider the implications of democracy’s speech clause for those who refrain from speaking – for silent citizens.

To identify the speech clause in democratic theory, we must first examine how the theorists who employ it understand democracy. Here, democracy refers to a system of government based on the principle of self-rule (Dahl, 1989; Habermas [1992] 1996; Rawls, 2005; Skinner 2008). According to this principle, citizens are free to the extent that they are self-determining – both individually and collectively. To ensure that citizens are self-determining, all those affected by political authority must have an equal opportunity to participate in the exercise of that authority. By clarifying who should be included in the demos and how, the principle of self-rule specifies the basic distribution of empowerments necessary for collective powers of decisions to be legitimately exercised, as well as for citizens’ consent to such powers to be legitimately given.

Most democratic theorists accept the normative thrust of the principle of self-rule, but differ over the degree to which it can be actually achieved under the conditions of modern mass democracy. Those I call democratic minimalists accept that self-rule requires citizens’ control over collective powers of decision, but downplay the further requirement that citizens always be involved in collective acts of deciding (Przeworski, 2010). By contrast, those I call democratic pluralists accept minimalists’ claim that collective decisions need not involve all citizens, but reject the further claim that institutional constraints on collective decision power alone can prevent its abuse (Held, 2006). Finally, those I call democratic expansionists seek to move beyond minimalist scepticism and pluralist caveats by arguing that citizens can only make collective decisions effectively to the extent they are involved in actually deciding (Warren, 1992).

Minimalists, pluralists, and expansionists disagree over how self-rule should be enacted, but generally leave the principle itself intact. However self-rule is realized, all agree that it ideally springs from citizens’ ability to have a say in how political authority is exercised and who exercises it. For citizens to have a say, however, they must be able to speak – here, democracy’s speech clause comes into view. The speech clause is premised on the idea that citizens rule when democracies empower public forms of self-expression – enabling citizens to voice opinions, interests, beliefs, arguments, reasons, and, above all, judgements over what to support and whom to hold to account. The speech clause carries the underlying logic of this idea to its ultimate conclusion: if practices of democratic citizenship are artefacts of language, then citizens’ capacity for self-rule is contingent upon their ability to speak.

Since the speech clause is implicated as the reason behind democratic theorists’ inattention to silence, it is worth examining the clause’s role in shaping democratic theory today. My claim is that most democratic theorists jointly subscribe to the archetype of a speaking citizen – a citizen who, at minimum, must be assumed capable of publically
disclosing judgements expressed as choices to others. I attribute this assumption to a communicative minimum all democratic theories must demand in order to satisfy the speech clause and attain self-rule. This frames speech a functional necessity for democracy, rather than a normative goal for democratic practices. Democratic theorists do differ over the question of how many disclosures citizens must make beyond the communicative minimum, however; I suggest that this difference best distinguishes minimalist, pluralist, and expansionist democrats from one another. In what remains of this section I review each theory in turn.

Mininalist theories and choice

Minimalist democrats’ starting point often appears to be the mirror image of the speech clause’s: they hold that one of modern representative democracy’s most distinctive features is its citizens’ inability to make meaningful political choices (for example, Green, 2010; Schumpeter, [1942] 1962; Weber [1922] 1978a). In part, this inability arises from modern circumstance: as modern mass society grows in size and complexity, a set of institutional arrangements must also grow for the state to continue to govern effectively – creating problems of size and scale. Solutions to size and scale involve delegating decisions powers to political elites, compounding a second problem endemic to mass democracies – namely, competence. Apart from an occasional ‘yes/no’ choice made during elections, citizens usually approach political decisions from the outside – they have little sense of what decisions relate to them and what options they should pursue (Przeworski, 2010). Given this bleak picture, how can minimalists still believe mass democracy to be democratic?

On the minimalist account, citizens exercise control over government when they can ensure that what is decided politically is not imposed arbitrarily. Basic institutional safeguards such as the rule of law can guard against arbitrariness but, in a democracy, the obvious way to ensure control is to empower choice – to make real the threat that, should leaders abuse power, citizens can choose otherwise (Hayek, [1960] 2011: 60-65). For minimalists, voting is citizenships’ defining activity: only elections exert constant regulative pressure on political elites. And, as a method of control, voting has the benefit of enabling citizens to convey immediate judgments about past political actions and future prospects.

For now, it is sufficient to note what acts of voting entail: public disclosures of judgement expressed as choices (Macpherson, 1977: chp. 2; Held, 2006: 152-154). This, of course, is the communicative minimum demanded by the speech clause to ensure self-rule. Judgement refers to a capacity for reasoned evaluation, a psychological process of

1 In arguing for the presence of an archetypal speaking citizen within democratic theory, my intention is not to argue for the presence of a comprehensive theory of citizenship shared by all theories of democracy. My use of the speaking citizen archetype is only intended to highlight one shared dimension of citizenship – namely, the idea that public participation in politics is only possible if citizens’ are able to speak. I recognize that the idea of ‘citizenship’ itself is essentially contested – with liberals, republicans, social democrats, communitarians and others, all assuming it to mean different things. On the history of the concept of citizenship within competing schools of democratic thought, see, e.g.: Heater 2004: Held 2006; and, Kymlicka 2001, chp. 7.

2 Although the two concepts are closely related, it is important that the communicative minimum not be conflated with the ideal of autonomy, which is a key normative difference that separates minimalist democratic theories from others. As an ideal, autonomy refers to the idea that individuals should be free to pursue their own self-defined interests – interests that result from a process of conscious, critical self-examination rather than coercion, deceit or manipulation. The communicative minimum, by contrast, refers more narrowly to the minimum abilities citizens must demonstrate to participate the democratic process at all. Ideally, the two concepts are linked – so that effective participation enhances and develops autonomy – but they need not always be. For more on the ideal of autonomy see, e.g.: Bohman 1996, pp. 11-15, 162-168; Habermas [1992] 1996, pp. 449-451; Held 2006, pp. 262-267; Pettit 1997, pp. 184-186; Richardson 2002, pp. 18-20, 70-72; and, Warren 1992, pp. 11-12.
self-examination that results in making and expressing choices – choices, first, about what needs, wants or desires an individual deems most important and, second, about what actions or state of affairs are deemed most likely to satisfy them (Garsten, 2006: 7-8; c.f. Elster, 2007: 192-196). In this way, exercises in judgement are communicative: in judging, individuals can make their inner strivings, desires, compulsions and feelings explicit to others. Judgements are also highly political: in making judgements, individuals reveal choices that may conflict with those of others. And, because they must cast judgements and express choices at the ballot box, even minimalists’ citizens can be characterized as minimally speaking citizens.

**Pluralist theories, interests and priorities**

Democratic pluralists and expansionists depart from minimalists’ caricature speaking citizens only when it comes to questions of articulateness – questions, that is, of how many more disclosures self-rule requires beyond choice. Pluralists argue that citizens must also be able to reveal interests and priorities. Whereas minimalists are primarily concerned with the way democracies select leaders, form government, and hold elites accountable, pluralists are also worried about responsiveness: periodic elections aside, they fear that the organization of modern representative democracies limits citizens’ ability to hold elite decision-makers to account (for example, Dahl, 1956: 133; McLennan, 1995; Norris, 2002: 19-26; Verba and Nie, 1972: 2; Wittman, 1995: chp. 3).

The pluralist solution to problems of responsiveness lies in the critical potential of civil society – the multiple, overlapping webs of social ties and associational loyalties that anchor citizens’ daily lives and orient their political energies (Warren, 2001: 56-58). Civic relations can limit the arbitrary exercise of power, pluralists argue, because they connect aspects of citizens’ personal lives – their identities, beliefs, values or memberships – to outcomes of the political process. For pluralists, these connections motivate citizens to organize collectively, promoting common interests. Because certain decisions will affect the lives of some citizens more than others, some citizens will attend to certain issues more than others. Ideally, these different commitments can create a permanent but rotating cast of vigilant citizens: people willing to become involved in a political issue by raising public awareness, disseminating information, representing marginalized or subaltern perspectives, organizing protests, building coalitions and lobbying decision-makers (Cohen and Arato, 1992: 422-429; Edwards, 2009; Rosanvallon, 2008: 40). For pluralists, the ability of civil society to organize expression, pressure and resistance provides the key compliment to voting as means of maintaining popular control.

A common quality of pluralist theories is that to self-organize within civil society, citizens must be able to disclose more than choices. They must also be able to engage in complex communicative acts of advocacy and bargaining. Advocacy refers to a reflective awareness and ability to transform personal choices, desires, needs or wants into goal-oriented interests that motivate individuals to speak and act publically (Elster, 2007: 89-93). Interests refer to whatever affects an individual’s life prospects – from basic material goods such as food, clothing and shelter to less tangible, symbolic goods such as the recognition of language, culture or life-style choices (Warren, 1992; Young, 2000: 134-135). To say that an individual ‘has an interest’ is to suggest that they are aware of what relates to them: of how specific issues, institutions, social relations, or opportunities
affect their lives. Individuals advocate an interest by communicating a commitment to furthering the outcome they desire.

Bargaining is built on self-understandings of interests. It requires a type of social competence, a strategic realization that, to satisfy self-interest, one must take others’ interests into account by articulating *priorities*. Priorities, in turn, are individuals’ interests ranked and ordered by personal importance and weighted against the priorities of others (Heath, 2001: 240-253; Walzer, 1999). When priorities differ, individuals try to split the difference through the successive communication of offers and counter-offers to arrive at a compromise or build a coalition. While most democratic decisions will imperfectly coincide with the full range of advocated interests, pluralists argue that better decisions aim to satisfy as many citizens’ interests as possible through bargaining.

*Expansionist theories, intentions and reasons*

Expansionist theories of democracy go even further. Beyond expressing choices, interests and priorities, expansionists argue that citizens must also be able to disclose *intentions* and *reasons*. Their concern is *autonomy*: civil society may balance arbitrary exercises of political power, but it often rewards those who act in cynical, strategically calculating ways, rather than out of concern for all affected (for example, Cohen and Rogers, 2003: 247; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996: 60-62; Habermas [1992] 1996: 302-314). Expansionists worry that, much like powerful politicians, powerful interest groups can circumvent the democratic process through tactics that disable citizens’ judgement – for example, by capturing bureaucrats and politicians, monopolizing expert opinion, or dominating media discussion.

Expansionists, particularly deliberative democrats, address concerns about justification by directly appealing to citizens’ speech. This is because language can uniquely develop individuals’ critical faculties: it creates citizens who, by virtue of speaking, can better know themselves and others, and identify false claims (Bohman, 1996: 110-118). Such citizens can accept the duties and obligations of democratic life confident that these commitments are authentically their own. And when citizens, advocates, politicians and other decision-makers expect their claims to be challenged, the criteria for making legitimate collective decisions shifts away from simple aggregations of self-interest towards consensus forged by talk (c.f. Mouffe, 2000). For democratic expansionists, the ability to speak critically and willingness to listen openly is considered a condition of self-rule that, together with democratic mechanisms of empowerment, provide the medium through which authentic public views are forged, publicized and legitimized.

The radically democratic thrust of expansionist theories is animated by the assumption that self-ruling citizens can express choices, interests, and priorities, and justify them through communicative acts of *negotiation* and *deliberation*. Negotiation rests on a stylized form of self-presentation, a selective (sometimes deceitful) disclosure of the *intentions* motivating an individual to behave as they do, made to convince others

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1 The additional demands of justifying political decisions by disclosing intentions and reasons parallels a distinction often made in the literature between *aggregative* and *deliberative* models of collective decision-making. The aggregative model roughly corresponds to pluralist theories of democracy, which view political decisions as the outcome of a competitive process in which political elites’ try to satisfy (‘aggregate’) the largest number of citizens’ preferences as possible. The deliberative model, by contrast, treats political decisions as the outcome of a dialogical exchange of intentions and reasons that all can agree upon. For an overview of this distinction and its significance in dividing democratic thought, see Goodin (2008, pp. 4-10) Held (2006, pp. 234-237).
of the validity of their choices, interests or priorities (Mansbridge et al., 2010: 69-72; Patton, 2005: 279). Intentions in turn are the goals individuals identify. Individuals enter into negotiations by communicating their intentions, hearing the intentions of others, locating the associated value of each position, and sorting those that irreducibly conflict from those individuals share in common (Holzinger, 2001: 197-198). Unlike bargains aimed at strategic compromise, negotiations aim at collaboration – producing agreements all identify with, even if for different motives or to different ends.

Deliberation transcends negotiation by compelling individuals to provide reasons supporting their position, such that others can consider them as arguments. Reasons refer to the terms by means of which individual’s understand their position, typically related to specific problems or issues, commitments, normative beliefs, values, prejudices and so on (Dryzek, 2000: 76; Goodin, 2008: 40-42; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996: 26-28). There are better and worse reasons for a position, and by deliberating individuals seek to change minds and solidify support by provoking critical, open-ended discussions that bring everyone closer to consensus based on mutual interest. Taken together, expansionist theories of democracy argue that negotiation and deliberation require democracies to promote settings free of coercion and manipulation (Habermas, [1992] 1996: 228). In these theories involved speech is thus synonymous with control: it is the medium that democratic empowerments aim to support and through which collective self-rule ought to be conducted.

**Move II: Explaining the Speech-centric Model of Citizenship**

With respect to the speech clause’s effect on democratic theory, the key point is this: it exclusively associates activities of speaking with empowered political action and thus institutional voice. Minimalist, pluralist and expansionists all assume that citizens’ capacity for self-rule is contingent on their ability to speak. I am arguing that the speech clause wrongly confounds two distinct dimensions of democracy – distributions of empowerment and modes of communication – leaving democratic theorists unable to conceive of silence as anything but a deficit of democracy. The next question, then, is: *How does democratic theory conceive of citizens’ silence in light of its conception of citizens’ speech?*

If democratic theory’s archetypal citizen really is the speaking citizen – then the citizen who refrains from speaking – the silent citizen – is a figure inimical to the one demanded by the principle of self-rule. This is because silence has functional implications for democracy. Silent citizens are quietly set apart from democratic life – they do not justify their actions with reasons or intentions, make priorities, recognize interests, and crucially, they do not express choice. For the principle of self-rule, silence raises fears that citizens are uninvolved and unable to exercise control – an indictment of the structural conditions under which democratic citizenship is practiced as much as it is the motivation of citizens to speak publically.

Democratic theory thus hears silence as deficits of democracy. Democratic theorists have offered many reasons for silent citizens but all interpret silence as a sign of disengagement or disempowerment. In this section, I organize these negative valuations into four distinct non-communicative states often equated to degrees of disengagement and disempowerment in democratic theory. In the next section, I consider some
consequences of conceiving of silence solely as a symptom exclusion from democratic life – arguing that, in some cases, silence is misdiagnosed.

Figure 1: The Speech-Centric Model of Citizenship

We can summarize the arguments of the previous section by illustrating the one dimensional, speech-centric model of citizenship that emerges from democratic theory’s speech clause (Figure 1 above). Ideal-typed along the top of the spectrum are the communicative acts citizens must express to be considered capable of self-rule. Listed along the spectrum’s bottom are the corresponding disclosures citizens make when engaged in each communicative act. Note that the spectrum itself is additive, so that more communicatively complex acts build on and include the disclosures of less complex acts. The combination of communicative acts with disclosures produces nine distinct communicative states citizens are described as embodying, depending on how much or how little they disclose through speech. Most democratic theorists’ assume communicative states match levels of empowerment, so that states requiring higher, more complex kinds of disclosure are found in citizens with access to resources, institutions and opportunities that enable greater political agency. As I have been arguing, this conflates two distinct dimensions of democracy: the distribution of powers to act and the mode of communication through which actions register politically.

Working across the spectrum, the four states on the left indicate degrees of silent citizenship, and the four on the right indicate degrees of spoken citizenship. Occupying the spectrum’s middle, ‘judgement’ is the communicative minimum democratic theory demands from citizens to satisfy the speech clause and be self-ruling. Again, minimalist, pluralist and expansionist democrats are best distinguished by how much speaking – how many communicative acts – self-rule requires in addition to disclosures of choice. When each theory is placed on the spectrum, it thus becomes possible to generalize their relationship: the threshold theorists set for self-rule is a function of the number of disclosures citizens are expected to make when speaking. Put this way, it is easy to understand why democratic theorists commonly correlate different communicative states to specific levels of empowerment. It is also easy to understand why democratic theory so often looks to solve problems of disempowerment by devising ways to amplify and augment citizens’ speech to higher communicative states – a point I will return to later in the paper.
The model of citizenship prompted by the speech clause equates degrees of silent citizenship with degrees of disengagement and disempowerment. Again, the logic of this equation is simple: if citizens’ ability to speak sets the threshold for self-rule, then those who refrain from speech – who are silent citizens – deny themselves, or are denied, equal say in directing the collective powers that shape their lives. This has functional consequences for democracy – although democratic theorists may or may not explicitly address these consequences, depending on their normative commitments. Different democratic theories do offer different reasons for citizens’ silence and, following Figure 1, I organize these reasons into four distinct non-communicative states: awareness, ambivalence, aversion and alienation.

Four states of silent citizenship

The first and least concerning, explanation of silence involves institutional biases towards speech. Because modern democracies focus on empowering citizens as speakers, democratic institutions are only receptive to those kinds of self-disclosure most easily translated into institutional voice – such as votes, petitions, demonstrations, deliberations, and so on. Despite the fact that silence does not register voice institutionally, those who refrain from speech are not always silent for want of agency. I call this state of silent citizenship awareness to refer to situations where individuals actively choose silence over speech because they feel nothing of real importance is at stake, already tacitly agree with decisions, or simply lack interest (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1987: 70-73). Awareness results from attention without activity – the aware citizen maintains meaningful psychological attachments to democratic life, but declines the opportunity for public expression. Pluralists point out that democracies with strong civil societies can compensate for the silence of uninvolved awareness by ensuring that those most affected by an issue will speak, even if others do not (Fraser, 1990; Pitkin, 1967: 137-140).

Of more pressing concern for many democratic theories is the fact that some silent citizens seem to lack cognitive resources for speech – such as confidence, assertiveness or persistence – causing them to make increasingly unconscious withdrawals into private life. The second state of silent citizenship is ambivalence, and it refers to a psychological disposition towards passivity – the fatalistic feeling that what individuals say does not have an impact on collective decisions (Green, 2010: 33-35; Norris, 2002: 26-31; Neuman 1986: 17-20; Zaller, 1992: 80). Ambivalent citizens externalize the demands of democratic life by separating its effects from the personal choices, interests and goals considered essential to a good life. So democratic theory interprets ambivalent silences as apolitical – as indicating that citizens perceive democratic politics as distant, unimportant or uninteresting, and are oblivious to opportunities for public speech and action.

Feelings of ambivalence run the risk of becoming pathological. When they do, some democratic theorists worry that citizens not only silently avoid politics, but also silently distrust it. The third state of silent citizenship is aversion, and it refers to the transformation of public passivity into passive aggression, a cognitive bias against those in authority, learned and chronically reinforced by feelings of isolation, helplessness and

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4 I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Jane Mansbridge, who alerted me to the importance of clarifying this point.

5 Some scholars view the silent ambivalence of citizens as functionally beneficial to democracy, because it limits the number of conflicting interests that democratic processes must seek to satisfy – see, e.g., Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki (1975, pp. 160-166).
hostility (Rosanvallon, 2008: 267-273). Averse citizens avoid the obligations of democratic life because they perceive them as corrupt, filled with daily injustices and humiliations. Because personal feelings of distrust lead to conscious activities of self-exclusion, democratic theorists frame acts of silent aversion as anti-political – as symptoms of political malaise, where discussion is actively avoided and citizens make a special point of not speaking (Capella and Jamieson, 1997: 58-62; Putnam, Pharr and Dalton, 2000: 7-12, 23-25).

Finally, citizens may withdraw into silence when they no longer recognize or respond to others, leading to mutual feelings of deviancy and threat (Finifter, 1970; Rotenstreich, 1989: 77-80; Seeman, 1959). The fourth state of silent citizenship is alienation, and it refers to psychic distortions of the self that deprive individuals of even the language to articulate their internal desires and impulses in ways others might understand (Arendt, [1958] 1998: 162). Alienation is thus the silence of being separate and set apart – of being so dramatically disconnected from self and society, that citizens lose their sense of self-identity, can no longer articulate needs and wants, are not recognized by fellow citizens as speakers. For democratic theorists, this alienation reflects citizens’ inability to speak and incapacity for self-rule. In practice, silent citizens experience alienation when opportunities for public interaction are radically circumscribed, impersonal, unfulfilling or beyond intelligent intervention and control.

Together, these four states of silent citizenship cover the typical reasons democratic theorists give for citizens’ silence in modern mass democracies. Whether they consider these reasons normatively problematic for mass democracy is a different issue – one I pass over here. For now, it is sufficient to note that these reasons support the conclusion that democratic theory conceives of silence as a sign of citizens’ disempowerment or disengagement from democratic life.

Of course, quite often, silence can disempower and disengage. As I will highlight in the next section, democratic theorists concerned by exclusionary silences aptly link them to deeper, structural problems with democracies themselves. This is particularly true of systemic inequalities in income, status, education, race and gender – all of which can severely undermine some citizens’ capacities for speech (Feldman, 2006; Gilbert, 2002; Olson, 2006: chp. 2; Young, 2011: chp. 3). An underclass of citizens thus emerges: an underclass who refrains from speaking, who are aware but uninvolved, ambivalent and inattentive, averse to politics or alienated from the political process – who are, in other words, silent citizens. At least, this is how I argue democratic theorists interpret silence when influenced by the speech-centric model of citizenship.

Move III: Alleviating Symptoms of Silent Citizenship
Silence is functionally problematic for democracy. It is often normatively problematic for democratic theory as well. Functionally, silent citizenship erodes the ability of modern democracies to secure the twin goods of control and involvement minimally required for democratic self-rule. Normatively, silence is symptomatic of citizen-trait many democratic theorists (especially expansionists) rightly view as undesirable – traits such as anonymity, apathy, inattentiveness and a general lack of knowledge of public affairs. In light of these problems, I ask a third question: How does democratic theory seek to overcome silent citizenship?
The answer is largely presupposed by democratic theory’s assumption of the speech clause. Because the clause equates speaking with empowerment, democratic theorists seek to overcome silence by devising new, better ways to empower citizens’ speech. As I will argue, the normative impetus for this move is grounded in an appeal to a subsidiary norm of the speech clause: communicative equality. According to this norm, citizens are self-ruling only if they have equal opportunities to speak – to publically initiate conversations, raise concerns, debate, join dialogues and so on (Bohman, 1996: 113; c.f., Richardson, 2002: 86-87). Ideally, incorporating a norm of communicative equality sharpens theorists’ criteria for judging democratic practice: communicative equality requires democracies strive to create conditions that enable all citizens to effectively influence collective decisions.

In this section, I consider whether this norm of communicative equality can adequately overcome two of the most pervasive forms of silencing in modern democracies: what I call external forms of silencing, which deny some citizens equal opportunity to speak; and, what I call internal forms of silencing, which distort citizens’ speech even while they are speaking. Because it is built on an assumption that conflates democratic empowerment with modes of communication, I argue that the norm of communicative equality used to overcome silencing is both inadequate and incomplete: inadequate because it prevents democratic theorists from identifying more deeply embedded forms of silencing in democracies; and, incomplete because it draws upon an exclusively ‘verbal’ understanding of power and decision-making in democracies.

My positive claim is that, if democratic theory suspends the speech clause, it becomes possible to expand norms of communicative equality to include an account of silence as a distinct mode of communication separate from speech. This allows for problems of silencing to be reframed in ways that might enable silence to be heard in positive place of speech. But more importantly, it allows democratic theorists to begin attending to silence’s other meanings in democratic life – an attendance simply not possible from the vantage point of the speech clause and the speech-centric model of citizenship it produces. I end by suggesting that once we acknowledge that distributions of empowerment and modes of communication comprise two distinct dimensions of democracy, democratic theory can abandon speech-centric model of communicative citizenship as I have described it. In its place, a more expansive norm of communicative equality can be introduced – a norm able to distinguish between, first, the conditions that enable those affected by collective decisions to gain equal standing in collective decision-making, and, second, the mode through which disclosures of choice, interest, priority, intention and reason are translated into collective decisions.

External silencing and barriers to speech

The first and most obvious form of silencing in modern democracies has to do with systemic forms of inequality. Functionally, systemic inequalities endanger democracy by keeping certain citizens on the perimeter of public life, effectively denying them equal opportunities to speak. Many of these moments of speechlessness affect citizens in their daily lives – they may be alienated from public institutions such as their school or workplace after experiencing discrimination, for example, or they may be averse to the democratic process after feeling dismissed or belittled. Even more apparent are those moments that arise from allocative disparities between citizens, allowing those
with greater access to things like education, power and wealth to exercise greater voice in collective decisions (Bohman, 1996: 126-133; Olson, 2006: 101-107; Young, 2011: 53-64). In what follows, I shall refer to the cumulative effects of these forms of systemic inequality as ‘external forms of silencing.’

Because external forms of silencing have to do with distributions of political, social and economic power, as well as distributions of enabling resources, most democratic theorists notice them and know the problems they pose for democracy. They also know the solution: since external silencing is the of result impediments that prevent citizens’ speech, many democratic theorists argue for remedial measures to amplify what citizens do say. Most such measures attempt to amplify citizens’ speech in one of two ways: by appealing to democratic sentiment or to democratic institutions (Fung, 2005: 412-415; Young, 2001).

Appeals to sentiment seek to offset the debilitating effects of external silencing by playing on citizens’ good will and sense of justice. Many democratic theorists argue that, if pressed, the best-placed in society are willing to acknowledge the unfair advantages they derive from their higher economic, political or social standing. This acknowledgement can motivate better-placed citizens to accept, even endorse, more communicatively equal practices of decision-making (Dryzek, 2000: 167-169; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996: 52; Young, 2000: 48-51). While rarely sufficient in itself, an appeal to democratic sentiment may encourage silent citizens towards speech by creating an atmosphere more tolerant of difference, sensitive to reciprocity, receptive to discussion and open to debate. This atmosphere, in turn, opens the door to deeper and more extensive strategies to amplify speech, especially those that appeal to supplementary democratic institutions that translate this speech into institutional voice (Goodin, 2008: 31-32).

Appeals to democratic institutions go beyond appeals to sentiment by multiplying opportunities for marginalized citizens to speak as compensation for the disabling effects of external silencing. Such institutional measures can range from modest devices aimed at encouraging feedback, like opinion polls or surveys, to more formal arrangements that empower citizens’ speech directly, like mini-publics. In the most extreme cases of silencing, theorists’ might also suggest mechanisms of affirmative action within society at large, such as quotas, reserved seats, special veto-powers, and so on (see, Fung, 2006; Guiner, 1994; Phillips, 1998; Niemeyer, 2011). Remedies that work through democratic institutions seek to actualize a norm of communicative equality by drawing silent citizens back into democratic life and empowering them to speak more openly. Although there has been much discussion about the kinds of sentiments and institutions most suited to this remedial task, for present purposes, note only that they are variations on a theme: the amplification of speech as a corrective to silence.

There are good reasons to think amplifying speech can often solve problems of external silencing. Conceptually, however, these solutions come at the cost of perpetuating a fundamental category error – one that frames speech as the only mode of communication through which citizens can contribute to democratic decisions. Perpetuating this error diminishes the conceptual resources democratic theory has to solve less tangible and more intractable forms of silencing in modern democracies. This is especially important to keep in mind when considering a second form of silencing, to which I now turn.
I
nternal silencing and barriers within speech

While problems of external silencing have been the subject of sustained attention in democratic theory, but for a few notable exceptions the same cannot be said about a second problem produced by systemic inequality: distorted speech (Bohman, 1996, 2000). Citizens’ speech is distorted when the range of things they can say is restricted – often unknowingly, and almost always to the disadvantage of some and benefit of others. At the most basic level, distorted speech presents democratic theory with a problem of censorship. It arises from the ways citizens identify themselves and relate to others – as males or females, husbands or wives, rich, poor, educated, uneducated, workers, bosses and so on (Arneil, 2006: 60-68; Giddens, 1984: 41-45, 60-64; Wartenberg, 1991: chp. 7). While these identities are never fixed, they can fix citizens’ expectations. Discrepancies then emerge between what some citizens want to say and what others expect to hear – sometimes innocently, as with a child’s deference to a parent, but sometimes problematically, as when citizens dissociate themselves from groups falsely perceived to be ‘taking advantage of the system,’ like recent immigrants or recipients of welfare. In what follows, I shall refer to the cumulative effects of such distortions as ‘internal forms of silencing,’ because they name barriers that restrict what citizens can actually say.

Because internal forms of silencing rarely silence citizens entirely, democratic theorists are less likely to notice them than they are forms of external silencing. In part, this lack of notice is a matter of priority: barriers that impede citizens from speaking more fundamentally undermine communicative equality than those that more subtly restrict what they might say. But this lack of notice is also a consequence of democratic theorists preferred solution: like external forms of silencing, those who do attend to problems of internal silencing argue that they can be resolved through citizens’ speech. Rather than advocate for amplified speech, however, these theorists instead advocate for augmenting speech’s definition – expanding, in effect, what counts as speaking (see, Young, 2001: 53-77).

The logic underlying this remedy is simple: measures that augment speech overcome the distorting effects of systemic inequality by allowing citizens with marginal or subaltern vocabularies equal opportunities for self-expression. To the extent that distorted speech empowers some to speak more than others, the recognition of these vocabularies provides the less powerful with resources to work through their anxieties, insecurities and feelings of disempowerment (Fraser, 1990: 61, 67). In doing so, they also enable silenced citizens to publically challenge, criticize and work through distortions of speech – creating a situation that more fully approximates communicative equality’s ideal.

This solution to internal silencing parallels democratic theory’s solution to external silencing in two ways. Like solutions to external silencing, solutions to internal silencing appeal to democratic sentiment: in asking citizens’ to acknowledge the value of subaltern vocabularies, theorists’ hope to solve distortion issues by creating an inclusive atmosphere in which all citizens have a reasonable expectation of being heard – an atmosphere, that is, in which all citizens take hesitant, emotional, figurative and other unconventional speaking-styles seriously. Such an atmosphere encourages silent citizens to speak to the causes of distorted speech in ways that they might be overcome (Young, 2000: 119). And as with external silencing, solutions to internal silencing often appeal to democratic institutions: when backed by safeguards such as the rule of law, civil and
political liberties, as well as measures that amplify voice, many theorists argue that institutions can give citizens the space and resources to work through problems of distorted speech (Bohman, 1996: 133).

**Intransigent silence and the insufficiency of speech**

If the primary reason democratic theory is unable to attend to silence’s multiple meanings is its speech clause, then democratic theorists’ similar response to external and internal silencing should be unsurprising. Because the clause binds citizens’ capacity for self-rule to their ability to speak, most theorists interpret citizens’ silences as deficits of speech. This leads to exclusively negativevaluations of silence in democracy.

I believe that the logic underlying this view of silence is as compelling as it is circular. It is compelling because it clearly names very real symptoms of political exclusion: the denial of equal opportunities to speak and the distortion of what is said. It is circular because its diagnosis of these symptoms is followed by a prognosis described in much the same terms: in aiming to overcome silence by encouraging speech, democratic theorists ignore the fact that sometimes what citizens’ say is precisely the issue – that their speech is riddled with the same anxieties and inequalities that silenced them in the first place. Where speech is distorted, talking things out may merely reproduce distortion. This unfairly biases the democratic process in favour of those citizens who already have strong capacities for speech. When citizens’ speech is distorted, they have already withdrawn from the public life and are less likely to speak up (Bohman, 2000: 381; Spivak, 1988: 104). As a result, silence persists.

This is not to suggest that democratic theory is without conceptual resources to overcome the circularity invited by distorted speech – indeed, the very persistence of silence in cases of distorted speech might provide a way of overcoming it. To even conceive such a solution, however, democratic theory must first conceive of silence as a mode of communication rather than a symptom of unequally distributed power. In this way, some silences can be thought of as expressive responses to distortion rather than the reasons behind it. This gives democratic theorists conceptual as well as normative grounds to begin attending to silence’s multiple meanings in democratic life.

It is ironic that the positive power of silence is best grasped by those regimes least comfortable with unrestricted public speech, such as China. While citizens enjoy the right not to speak in democracies, authoritarian regimes like China often make speech compulsory to control what their citizens say (He and Warren, 2011). This is one reason why the ruling Chinese Communist Party (‘CCP’) retains some trappings of democracy: by compelling its citizens to regularly speak in sham elections, through a censored press, over the internet, and within civil society, the CCP has been able to effectively co-opt dissent and maintain order. China is thus a model case of distorted speech.

Paradoxically, it is because citizens’ speech is consciously distorted in China that the CCP hears silence as a threat. China’s ongoing repression of the mystic Falun Gong movement provides a sombre example. The movement was unheard of in China until 10,000 of its members surrounded government buildings in Zhongnanhai in silent protest of the government’s religious policies. Although the protests caught CCP officials off-guard, it was the protesters’ dramatic silence that caused them to panic – unable to discern the Falun Gong’s political agenda, the CCP feared the worst and quickly labelled the movement a threat to China’s stability (Gilley, 2004: 108-110; Shue, 2004: 40-41).
Similar examples abound, but as democratic theory struggles with distorted speech, I believe the CCP’s crackdown on the Falun Gong may be instructive in three respects. First, it demonstrates silence’s salience: where speech’s possibilities are limited – by constraints, controls, or even compulsion – deliberate silence is conspicuous, especially when marginalized voices refuse to echo voices in power. Where the rule is ‘speak,’ the absence of speech is a powerful political expression. Second, it illustrates silence’s strategic value: silence can have an ambiguous meaning, leaving room for multiple interpretations and giving citizens cover to disarm or frighten opponents, resist imposed roles, expectations, or identities and, more positively, open new spaces to develop authentic capacities for self-expression. Speech does not always have this power, and in situations where speaking is difficult or dangerous, silence can be the only means of communicating the unarticulated choices, interests, intentions or reasons, of the most vulnerable. Finally, it reveals silence’s ability to shift standards for effective inclusion: silence is easier than speaking, and where capacities for speech are unequal, meaningful silence can lower the threshold for contributing to collective decision-making. Just as the low cost of silence makes it the default mode of expression for those with distorted capacities to speak, silence’s low cost also makes it a more realistic mode for effective empowerment.

Of course, the political practice of using silence in positive place of speech is not limited to authoritarian systems. Silence is one reason why, for all of the opinion polling preceding an election, it is still possible to be surprised by the outcome of a vote. Although democratic theorists never try to measure these silences, they too can be meaningful. So too can the silences democratic citizens use to convey emotion, express solidarity, demonstrate dissent, facilitate collective actions and regulate collective activities.6

It is true that silence is the result of systemic structures of exclusion, such as discrimination, poverty or relationships of domination. But it must also be recognized that silence is just as likely to result from the strategic choices of those determined to break structures of domination, such as the Falun Gong. In some instances, citizens’ silence may indicate nothing more than a lack of public interest or attention. But it may also be that public silence signals dissatisfaction with available choice and abstention from choosing anything at all. In another example, silence might indicate high levels of trust in government and tacit approval its actions. At the same time, silence can stifle action and demobilize democratic opposition – especially when governments mark certain subjects out of bounds, such as with state secrets or expert-led policy initiatives. In still another example, silence can facilitate democratic decisions by enabling citizens to pause, listen to one another, bracket irreconcilable differences and promote consensus-based compromises.7 In these cases, silence follows from guidelines of tact and polite conduct as a conscious effort to avoid offense and facilitate public exchange.

6 Within political science the literature on silence is disparate and underdeveloped – some notable exceptions include, inter alia: Ferguson 2003; Grogan and Gusman 2007; Hill Jr. 1979; Noelle-Neumann 1974; Sim 2007, chp. 1; and, Zerubavel 2006, chp. 3. For a survey of literature on silence outside of political science, see, e.g.: Acheson 2007; Ephratt 2008; Jaworski 1997; Kenny 2011; Kurzon 2007; and, Tannen and Saville-Troike 1985. In forthcoming work, I organize silence’s effects on democratic politics into four distinct categories: affective silences, through which individuals convey emotions and feelings, such as empathy or solidarity; demonstrative silences, through which individuals make use of contextual implicatures – norms, rules, expectations, gestures and so on – to communicate propositionally complex information, including abstention, protests, boycotts, and exit; emulative silences, which impose norms of silence upon individuals in certain ceremonial or institutional settings; and, facilitative silences, which aid in the regulation of communicative conduct, including turn-taking, pauses, gaps, lapses, and so on.

7 I wish to extend my gratitude to Alfred Moore for alerting my to this example. See Sunstein (1999, pp. 123-128).
With respect to distorted speech the point is this: so long as solutions to silencing are speech-bound, they will fall short. But once democratic theory interprets silence as playing off the same register as speech, then theorists can map how silence is used in democratic practices – for better or for worse. One of the key goals of this paper has been to clear conceptual space to make such an attendance to silence possible.

Conclusion

In this paper I have sketched out how democratic theory hears silence in democracy and why it hears silence the way it does. But the sketch is not filled in: it lacks a typology that distinguishes different kinds of silence, their power, and their effects on human interaction. It also lacks a more robust normative account of silence’s relation to democratic ideals of justice, autonomy, equality, and inclusion. What it does do, however, is provide conceptual and normative grounds to think that democratic theory has inaccurately mapped patterns of speech and communication in modern mass democracies. If they are to draw a better map, I argue that democratic theorists must take two necessary steps.

As a necessary first step, democratic theorists must abandon the speech clause and its archetypal speaking citizen. The speech clause is premised on the idea that citizens are capable of ruling themselves to the extent that they are able to speak, such that it is only in speaking that they come to enjoy a sense of control and involvement over the conditions that govern their collective lives. As I have argued, this conflates two distinct dimensions of democracy: distributions of empowerment, which enable citizens to contribute to democratic decisions; and, modes of communication, which citizens’ may adopt in contributing to decisions. Silence, properly conceived, can be a mode of communication and not just an effect of unequally distributed power. Once silence is recognized as a mode of communication, like speech, then some types of silence can be recognized as playing a positive role in democratic practice – especially in situations where speech is likely to fail. Simply put, there is a great deal of difference between claiming that speech should be a preferred mode of democratic communication and claiming that speech is the only mode of democratic communication. In this paper, I have argued against claiming the latter.

Of course, this argument is subject to many qualifications. One qualification must be that silence is both empowering and disempowering. Silences that deny citizens equal opportunity to contribute to collective decisions are egregious violations of the principle of self-rule. But self-rule requires powers of collective decision be equally distributed to those affected – it does not further require that those affected speak.

It is also important to realize that the ideal standard of speech demanded by the principle of self-rule is too difficult to realize under the unequal conditions of modern mass democracies. This leads to a normative problem: either all citizens have equal ability and opportunity to speak, or democracy risks excluding those who are silent. The problem resolves itself if we acknowledge that, like speech, silence is communicative – if heard clearly, it may even enable the most vulnerable citizens to meet democracy’s communicative minimum. And when vulnerable citizens are empowered to use silence in positive place of speech, they may start to feel like they do have an impact on collective decisions – better disposing them towards speaking in the future.

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8 I would like to thank Shannon Gormley for insisting this point be made clear.
As a necessary second step, democratic theory must adopt a more expansive norm of communicative equality that distinguishes between empowering and disempowering silence. Rather than requiring equal opportunities for speech, an expansive norm of communicative equality might additionally require equal receptivity to how citizens communicate. Silences used negatively to deny opportunities to speak could then be distinguished from silence used in a positive place of speech – empowered acts that demand to be heard. A strategy of equal receptivity would allow democratic theory to hear silence differently, enabling it to devise new – communicatively inclusive – ways of accommodating it. I hope to elaborate on this in future work.
References


