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Title: Intersections between indigenous politics and social citizenship: A case study of Māori in New Zealand

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Abstract
Recent concern about the impact ethnic diversity and sub-national recognition have had on mainstream public attitudes towards social citizenship (Banting et al., 2006; Keating, 2005; McEwan, 2006) has thus far ignored how such ethnic politics may shape the attitudes of indigenous peoples themselves. Building on the author’s previous work in comparative indigenous politics, this paper offers a case study of Māori, the indigenous peoples of New Zealand, whose indigenous rights are (incompletely) recognized through an official discourse of biculturalism, separate Māori electorate seats and a welfare state that has provided space for considerable mobilisation and identity-building potential (Béland and Lecours, 2008). Drawing upon New Zealand Election Study data 1990-2008 and a 2007-2008 qualitative study of New Zealand attitudes to social citizenship, the paper argues that ethnicity appears to shape Maori attitudes towards four key social rights, even if indigenous and social rights may not be distinct from each other in Maori minds. It is less clear whether the twin revolutions of neoliberalism and biculturalism have impacted upon Maori attitudes towards social citizenship, although there is no support for the claim that increasing recognition of diversity has had a negative impact. Overall, the findings challenge the idea that recognition and redistributive politics are antithetical (Fraser, 2003); instead, analysis of the intersections between indigeneity and social citizenship supports Isin et al’s (2008) claim that both involve performing the fundamental right to have rights by asking questions concerning social justice.

Introduction
The relationship between redistributive and recognition politics is still under debate, despite growing awareness they are not antithetical simply because the former tends towards dedifferentiation and the latter promotes group specificity (Fraser, 2003). Arguing that “the fundamental issues of our time are refracted through struggles over citizenship rather than analytical categories of redistribution or recognition”, Isin et al. (2008:4) call for sociological and political analyses centred on social relations at various scales and sites. This paper contributes one such analysis: a unique empirical focus on indigenous attitudes towards social citizenship, an idea which Marshall (1950/2000)
conceived as a set of rights to basic levels of economic welfare and security. An exploratory case study of indigenous Māori in New Zealand examines attitudes towards four key social citizenship rights: education, health, employment and assistance for the unemployed. All have been challenged by a neoliberal economic agenda over the past three decades but the first two have also been major sites of a bicultural project aiming to better recognize the indigenous/Treaty rights of Māori.

Such an analysis is pertinent because ‘indigeneity’ is a two-dimensional social division rooted simultaneously in the economic structure and the status order of capitalist society, resulting in both maldistribution and misrecognition (see Fraser, 2003). In addition, despite growing recognition of their unique rights in many advanced welfare states, indigenous peoples remain disproportionately located in the lowest socio-economic rungs of society due to poor incomes and being more likely than other ethnic groups to receive a welfare benefit. Later discussion highlights that Māori experiences of neoliberalism have been far from homogenous, but a ‘self-interest’ argument associates these two circumstances with support for social citizenship (Coughlin, 1980; van Oorschot, 2000) and thus we might expect indigenous individuals to be concerned with social rights, even if they do not refer to them as such. This hypothesis is supported by traditionally high levels of Māori trade union membership and support for the Labour party, as well as evidence that Māori voting is shaped more by economic living standards than cultural identity (Cheyne et al., 2008; Fitzgerald et al., 2007).

Being a member of a minority ethnic or cultural group has been found to have a mostly positive effect on attitudes towards the welfare state in the few international studies investigating this issue (Coughlin, 1980; Page and Shapiro, 1992) but it is unclear if these findings are relevant for indigenous peoples. Māori, for instance, traditionally adopted a collectivist approach to wellbeing centred on extended kinship ties with individuals possessing different rights depending on their ancestry and place within the group (Ballara, 1998). In being neither egalitarian nor communalist, these values sit in tension with the more individualized focus of liberalism and social democratic attempts to address social problems through national institutions. We thus cannot assume claims that indigenous individuals draw upon a relatively set of moral repertoires (Dean, 2004) or ideas about deservingsness (van Oorschot, 2000) when thinking about social citizenship, as has been found more generally.

Attitudes are shaped not just by identity but also by institutional factors. In the case of indigenous peoples, a history of colonization likely complicates indigenous views on social citizenship, which generally endorses a certain level of government responsibility over key policy areas, due to high levels of distrust in the ‘state’ and a continuing desire for greater self-determination which involves less government intervention in indigenous lives. More specifically, the extension of social citizenship rights to indigenous peoples has often come at a price. For instance, the 1945 Māori Social and Economic Advancement Act formally outlawed discrimination that New Zealand’s highly discretionary approach to social protection allowed even after Māori became officially eligible for the same social security entitlements as other New Zealanders in the 1930s. But the legislation also encouraged Māori into the mainstream economy and an urbanized, nuclear family model, effectively diminishing the level of Māori autonomy and control had over their own lives (Fleras and Spoonley, 1999). Jenson (2001) notes it is often assumed that access to citizenship rights will create a
feeling of belonging and loyalty among those grateful to be included, but this example highlights how this assumption is challenged in an indigenous context, making Māori attitudes towards social citizenship less certain.

However, the state is also the arbiter of important policies of recognition of indigenous cultures and rights which attempt to alleviate the ongoing impacts of colonization and systemic discrimination. New Zealand governments have made no commitment to provide for Māori self-government or a systematic policy of jurisdictional devolution of funding to Māori organizations, but they have acknowledged the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi as critical to both historical and contemporary claims upon the state. The Treaty recognized Māori tribes’ ownership over the country and sought their agreement for British colonization in return for the right to British citizenship. Since 1975, the Waitangi Tribunal has acted as a commission of inquiry to resolve tribal Treaty claims, while an official policy of biculturalism from the mid-1980s has seen the government sector incorporate Māori knowledge, cultural practices and involvement in policy development and Māori providers contracted to deliver social services (Durie, 1998; Fleras and Spoonley, 1999). More recently, health legislation included the first-ever Treaty clause in social policy and offered Māori guaranteed representation on newly formed District Health Boards (Humpage, 2003).

But has government recognition of indigenous rights influenced the way indigenous peoples think about what welfare state theorists would traditionally consider issues of redistribution? Some authors would expect so, being concerned with the impact of cultural recognition for minority groups on the population as a whole and contending it comes at the cost of a focus on material disadvantage that affects all cultural/ethnic groups (Barry, 2001; Gitlin, 1995). Yet, in the most substantial test of this hypothesis to date, Banting et al. (2006) found that increasing cultural diversity and policies of multiculturalism (including those focused on aboriginal peoples) did not lead to diminishing support for the welfare state amongst the Canadian public. A positive relationship has also been identified between the development of public and institutional sub-national cultures and support for public collectivism, universalism and redistributive policies in Scotland, Wales, Quebec, Catalonia and the Basque country (Keating, 2005; McEwan, 2006). Although not considering indigenous attitudes specifically, these findings indicate that institutional recognition of indigenous rights has the potential to enhance Māori support for social citizenship.

Yet, New Zealand’s biculturalism emerged in tandem with the neoliberal economic agenda implemented from the late 1980s. North American research highlights how apparent overlaps between indigenous and neoliberal discourses have not always brought positive results (Altamirano-Jiménez, 2004; McDonald, 2011), while Fraser (2003) contends that neoliberalism encourages a false antithesis between redistribution and recognition, each being associated with specific but different social movements. In New Zealand, Poata-Smith (2004) similarly argues that biculturalism’s focus on cultural marginalisation and institutional racism as the key explanation for persisting ‘ethnic’ inequality has allowed successive governments to ignore the class-based causes of inequalities that affect all New Zealanders. The Mana party’s 2011 emergence, based on an electoral platform incorporating both indigenous and social rights, challenges this argument, but neoliberal reforms decentralising and commodifying the delivery of social services certainly made the welfare state a site for considerable mobilisation and identity-
building potential for Māori (see Béland and Lecours, 2008). 2500-3500 Māori organisations now offer personal, health, community education, cultural and recreation services, with most receiving some form of government funding through contractual arrangements (Te Puni Kōkiri - TPK, 2008). Thus, many Māori work for organisations that are part of and financially reliant on government for their existence, a fact that may influence their attitudes towards government and its policies.

At the same time, neoliberal welfare reforms intersected with existing racialized views of the welfare state. Building on the poor relief tradition that has long stigmatized welfare recipients in liberal welfare states (van Oorschot, 2000), neoliberal discourse has increasingly framed dependency on state support as corroding an individual’s self respect and representing a threat to social cohesion, leading to a focus on obligations over rights when it comes to employment (Mead, 1992). Because Māori are disproportionately more likely than other ethnic groups to receive welfare benefits, this focus on obligations has further accentuated their status as problematic political subjects. A Social Darwinist interest in assimilating indigenous peoples into the dominant culture is now officially condemned, but ‘race’ continues to provide a backdrop to political concern about indigenous welfare dependency and the dysfunctional behaviours said to result from it. In particular, Māori culture is often viewed as the cause of dependency, even while government policy increasingly acknowledges that recognition of ethnic culture is a key solution in reducing dependency.

This blurs the lines between social citizenship and indigenous rights, provoking resistance from those who do not support the latter. For instance, a new Whānau Ora (Family Wellbeing) programme was negotiated as part of the National party-Māori party supply and confidence agreement in 2008. The Māori party originally aimed to improve Māori access to social services and offer Māori organisations greater control over welfare spending, regarding Whānau Ora as a step towards self-determination (Whānau Ora Taskforce, 2010). However, political resistance to this ‘race-based’ policy soon saw National reframe it as “an inclusive interagency approach to providing health and social services to build the capacity of all New Zealand families in need” (TPK, 2012). Māori are therefore the main targets of the programme because of their greater needs (high levels of welfare dependency, due to a ‘cultural’ deficit), not because of their inherent rights as indigenous peoples. This continued ‘misframing’ of indigenous claims supports Fraser’s (2009) contention that justice needs to focus on redistribution, recognition and representation, even if Māori are better situated than many of their indigenous counterparts on this front.

The paper explores Māori attitudes to social citizenship within this rather ambiguous political context, drawing on the New Zealand Election Study (NZES). At least 2000 individuals have responded to a relatively stable set of questions every three years, making this study the most comprehensive and reliable for assessing attitudes towards education, health, employment and assistance for the unemployed across a time period (1990-2008) when biculturalism and neoliberalism simultaneously reshaped New Zealand policy. The attitudes of Māori, respondents who self-identify ‘Māori’ as one of their ethnic affiliations when randomly selected from the electoral roll (including the separate Māori roll), are compared to ‘Europeans’ a category that incorporates white New Zealanders of mostly European descent. The Māori sample is too small in some years to reliably disaggregate data by key demographic variables but presentation of the attitudes
of low income earners and those in receipt of New Zealand’s main benefits allows a cursory assessment of the relationship between these variables and Māori attitudes to be made. The paper further draws on an interview and focus group study of 87 New Zealanders’ attitudes towards social citizenship between 2007 and 2008. This included 13 Māori participants whose verbatim quotes are used to illustrate, challenge or extend NZES findings regarding education and health, then employment and unemployment in the following discussion.

**Education and health**
Although publically-funded education and health services remain the norm in New Zealand, between the 1930s and the early 1990s these were formally accessible to all, largely free of charge and the New Zealand public strongly endorsed education and health as social rights. However, indigenous peoples did not always benefit from this principle of universalism made education and health obvious sites for the bicultural project but these changes often intersected with neoliberal restructuring. Reforms of the administration of the compulsory education sector in the late 1980s, for instance, saw devolution of everyday decision-making to the community level and improvements in responding to Māori cultural needs (Cheyne et al., 2008). A system of government-funded Māori immersion education at the preschool, compulsory and tertiary levels now exists (Fleras and Spoonley, 1999). But the majority of Māori students still take part in mainstream educational institutions and, despite improving Māori retention in compulsory schooling and participation/completions rates in tertiary education, gaps with European New Zealanders have not closed. 1990s reforms of school funding also resulted in ‘activities fees’ becoming a significant cost for families within the ‘free’ education system. A loan system was established to address inequities created by tertiary fees introduced in 1990, but Māori and other low income earners have also been detrimentally affected by user-charges in tertiary education (Cheyne et al., 2008).

Responses to the NZES proposition that ‘government should take responsibility to provide a free education from preschool to tertiary levels’ allow us to assess whether Māori consider education to be a social right of citizenship. Table 1 shows Māori support for this proposition was slightly higher than that of Europeans (with the exception of 1990) and that while European support declined by 5.8 per cent overall, it grew by 3.6 per cent amongst Māori. Despite the disproportionately low socio-economic status of Māori as a group, Māori respondents offered slightly less support for the statement in all years than low income earners and main benefit recipients. While the difference between Māori and low income support decreased, it increased for main benefit recipients because their support rose (by 4.2%) at a faster rate than amongst Māori. Often individuals support social citizenship in principle, but are less enthusiastic about government increasing spending on a particular policy area (Curtice, 2010). But Table 1 shows that while Māori support for increased spending on education fluctuated, it remained at a similar level as for the ‘free education’ and was again consistently higher than Europeans, low income earners and main benefit recipients throughout the period, even if differences between Māori and these groups narrowed. The qualitative study further supports the argument that education remains viewed as a social right: when participants were asked to name activities or issues they considered to be a government responsibility, Māori
were second most likely to name education, with 77 per cent of the sample doing so compared to only 45 per cent of Europeans.  

*Insert Table 1 about here*

Table 1 also considers Māori attitudes towards healthcare. Colonial governments allowed for a level of Māori self-governance in respect to health, welfare and moral wellbeing in the early part of the 20th century, but policies of assimilation and integration later saw Māori incorporated into the mainstream health system (Cheyne et al., 2008). The Department of Health’s early adoption of biculturalism eventually culminated in *He Korowai Oranga: Māori Health Strategy* (King and Turia, 2002), which situates whānau (extended family) wellbeing within a Treaty framework. As noted, the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 also referred specifically to the Treaty and guaranteed Māori representation on 21 District Health Boards (Humpage, 2003). But real opportunities for greater Māori control and management over health came through neoliberal reforms of the health sector in the 1990s, which introduced a quasi-market model devolving delivery to contracted health providers (Cheyne et al., 2008; Durie, 1998). Māori health providers increased from 20 to 160 between 1993 and 1995, then to 240 by 2009 (Chant, 2006; Minister and Associate Minister of Health, 2006). Yet, increased user-charges in primary healthcare saw affordability problems grow, leading a Labour-coalition government to introduce the 2001 Primary Health Care Strategy. Influenced by the extended family, holistic model developed by Māori health providers, this has seen population-based initiatives provided through community-based Primary Health Organizations. 91 per cent of the population were enrolled by October 2004, including over three-quarters of Māori and almost 80 per cent of those living in highly deprived areas (Cheyne et al., 2008; Cumming et al., 2009).

Māori responses to ‘government should take responsibility to provide free healthcare for all’ suggest they consider health a social right. Table 1 indicates Māori support was consistently higher than for European, although it fell amongst both groups during the 1990s then increased from 2002 for Māori and in 2008 for Europeans. In that low income earners followed the same trend as Māori suggests this may relate to the fact that both groups were first to benefit from the greater subsidies and population-based funding model shaping the primary health system after 2001. Māori support was slightly higher than that found amongst both this group and main benefit recipients across all years, yet support declined by 5 per cent amongst Māori and 2.2 per cent amongst main benefit recipients between 1993 and 2008, while increasing slightly amongst Europeans (1.7%) and low income earners (1.7%). Overall, the gap between Māori and the latter two groups narrowed but it stayed much the same for main benefit recipients. Support for government spending on health was again consistently higher amongst Māori than Europeans and low income earners but (with the exception of 1990) slightly lower than that of main benefit recipients. Notably, although support for increased spending rose amongst all groups between 1990 and 2005, this growth was smaller amongst Māori (5.9%) than other groups (7-9%).

These findings suggest that Māori support for free health and health spending became more similar to that of low income earners and Europeans and less like that of main benefit recipients between 1990 and 2008. Support remained strong but there is little evidence that greater recognition of Māori cultural and indigenous rights had a
positive effect on Māori support for free health or health spending. In the qualitative study, Māori were the second most likely (on 70%) of all ethnic groups to name ‘health’ as a government responsibility but findings regarding free health care were more mixed. This may be because many Māori-focused health providers offered free primary healthcare long before PHO subsidies were introduced, confusing the issue of government taking responsibility for free health. That the Māori focus group was recruited through and conducted at an urban Māori organisation which provides some free health and educational services may have enhanced this effect on participant attitudes. But the qualitative data highlights that the wording of the question may also have shaped responses. For instance, in response to the statement that government should ensure *everyone* is provided for, a Māori female middle income earner said:

I think first, before government thinks of everyone, they should fix up what they damaged in the beginning. They have never ever dealt with Māori issues first, in terms of we always come behind everybody else …. Even whānau from over in Iran and that, they can just come into our country and we have whānau with seven kids sometimes been waiting and they went in with whānau and squashed in a house still waiting for a house and they [immigrants] can just move into brand new homes.

The quote illustrates that while many Māori support government taking responsibility for a range of social policy areas, they were concerned that immigrants received greater or first priority assistance from the government. This may explain why Māori mentioned ‘health’ and ‘education’ as a government responsibility more often than European but were less likely to name them as *rights* of citizenship and as human rights. A small number of Māori participants referred to ‘Treaty/indigenous rights’ when asked what rights they associated with New Zealand citizenship and discussion indicated this may incorporate issues associated with social citizenship. This highlights the inherent blurriness of social citizenship versus indigenous/Treaty rights in an internally colonized context, alerting us to differences in the way indigenous and non-indigenous peoples may interpret terms such as ‘rights’ or ‘citizenship’ when responding to survey questions.

Yet, overall, neither biculturalism nor neoliberalism appears to have had a significant impact on Māori attitudes towards health and education. As common elsewhere, support for spending on both policy areas appears to be thermostatic, shifting in response to government spending, rather than representing a long term decline (Curtice, 2010). Meanwhile, Māori support for education as a social citizenship right strengthened over time, if only slightly, while support for health as a social right decreased a little. In both cases, the impact of ethnicity may have diminished between 1990 and 2008 but it remained associated with stronger support for government responsibility for education and health.

Evidence from the qualitative study suggests this is because Māori attitudes are shaped by their experiences as indigenous peoples. For instance, although distrust in government was a factor in explaining support for health and education amongst Māori, low income earner and main benefit recipients, this was much more so amongst Māori participants (77%) than other groups, including Europeans (49%). Importantly, European distrust emerged from concern with the democratic process and the idea that government
represents all New Zealanders effectively, but Māori distrust was associated with the perceived failure of the Crown to live up to its obligations to honour the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, both in adequately addressing desires for greater self-determination across a range of policy areas and in meeting the socio-economic needs of Māori. It was exactly this poor historical performance by the state that led Māori to strongly support the idea that government should take responsibility. A Māori low income earner said: “For Māori it is about entitlement. Because, how did we get in this position? How did it turn out to be this way? So we were disowned from our land, put into a position of poverty, government says ‘Oh, we’ll take care of you’ but are they taking care of us in a standard that we want to be accustomed to be taken care of?” In this way, Māori support for two key social rights – education and health – was facilitated, rather than diminished, by their concerns about injustices that Māori alone suffered as a result of colonial economic exploitation and cultural marginalisation. This highlights that recognitive and redistributive politics are not necessarily separated in the minds of indigenous individuals.

**Employment and unemployment**

Māori attitudes may also have been shaped by the way in which they have been integrated into the mainstream market economy. Until the middle of the twentieth century, Māori acted as a reserve army of labour combining seasonal work as freezing workers, shearsers or agricultural labourers with living traditionally on rural lands (Spoonley, 1993). Government relocation programmes and economic assistance redirected from rural to urban areas saw Māori rapidly urbanize from the 1940s and become disproportionately concentrated in low skilled, secondary sector occupations, including manufacturing, construction and public utility industries (Ongley, 2004). New Zealand’s system of centralized bargaining ensured a ‘family wage’ for most families, affording Māori a relatively high level of job and wage security during the industrial boom years. But deindustrialisation, labour market deregulation and privatisation saw Māori unemployment skyrocket in the late 1980s and 1990s. Previously similar to that of the total population, Māori unemployment peaked at 25.4 per cent in 1992; European unemployment never rose above 7.9 per cent during the recession period (Poata-Smith, 2004; Spoonley, 1993).

Neoliberal reforms did not affect all Māori equally and the proportion of Māori households in the top income band, which includes Māori lawyers, consultants and professionals leading tribal corporations that benefitted from a government-led process of settling Treaty of Waitangi claims and from a neoliberal economic agenda of tax reductions and labour market deregulation, increased slightly between 1982 and 1996 (Poata-Smith, 2004). However, given the narrowness of their education and skills, most Māori were not well placed to take advantage of new growth areas in the economy and although younger Māori are more occupationally mobile, they remain vulnerable to economic downturns (Ongley, 2004). In December 2011, Māori (13.4%) were still more than twice as likely as the population as a whole (6.5%) to be unemployed (Department of Labour, 2012). As such, they have been disproportionately affected by neoliberal welfare reforms repositioning work as an obligation not a right, including increased work tests for the unemployed (Isin et al. 2008).
Although Māori unemployment figures are routinely criticized, employment and welfare have never been a major focus of the bicultural project. The Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Māori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare’s (1986) did report high levels of institutional racism, providing early recognition that biculturalism was needed in this policy area. Trade training and work programmes have also specifically targeted Māori as a disadvantaged group needing special assistance (Fleras and Spoonley, 1999). But the debates about Treaty rights and obligations found in health and education have been far less prevalent. Some Māori politicians have even appeared to contribute to the welfare dependency discourse when calling for indigenous social service organisations to control the welfare payments of indigenous individuals (Tamihere, 2003). In the 2008 election, the co-leader of the Māori party, Tariana Turia, also supported abolishing the unemployment benefit because it is not “healthy for the spirit of our people, to be getting money for doing nothing” (cited in Tahana 2008: A5), promoting Māori-centred make-work programmes as a solution for high levels of longterm unemployment.

The NZES asked respondents whether they agreed that ‘government should take responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one’, which indicates whether they consider employment to be a social right. Table 1 demonstrates that Māori were much more likely to agree than Europeans in all years, although the gap between such attitudes dropped from 22.9 per cent to 15.3 per cent between 1990 and 2008. The attitudes of both groups fluctuated but Māori support for government being responsible for jobs fell by 9.3 per cent overall compared to only 1.7 per cent amongst Europeans. Māori support for jobs as a government responsibility was higher than that of low income earners in all years but, although this was the also the case with main benefit recipients in the early 1990s, the reverse was true after 1996.

Table 1 finds that Māori were also more likely than European to support the proposition that ‘government should take responsibility to ensure a decent standard of living for the unemployed’ across the 1990-2008 period. This statement endorses the view that citizens have a right to assistance from the government in times of need. While support increased significantly amongst Europeans between 1990 and 1993, when widely publicized benefit cuts took place, Māori support remained steady during the early 1990s, then increased slightly between 1993 and 1996. It is possible that this is because support for the unemployed was already high (almost three-quarters of Māori believed this should be a government responsibility) and less volatile than that of Europeans, given many Māori had already been feeling the effects of neoliberal policies prior to 1990. However, although support for this statement steadily eroded across the remainder of the period amongst both groups, it decreased only by 7.5 per cent amongst Europeans compared to 11.7 per cent amongst Māori between 1990 and 2008. The percentage gap in support between the two groups also decreased from 14.7 per cent to 10.5 per cent over this period. While it is possible that these were being shaped by personal experience of policies that are harder on the unemployed, unemployment was at record lows during the 2000s. Notably, Māori support was higher than that of low income earners only between 1993 and 1999, with the opposite being true in 1990 and in the 2000s. Main benefit recipients offered higher support for this statement in all years. But the drop in support amongst both these groups was slightly lower (around 10%) than amongst Māori across the 18-year period.
These findings suggest that Māori attitudes towards the unemployed hardened more rapidly than that of European, low income earners and main benefit recipients. However, Table 1 shows that, when it comes to whether ‘people who are unemployed should have to work for their benefits’, Māori (65.4%) were less likely to support this statement than in 2008 than European (77.9%) and low income earners (70.8%) but considerably more likely than main benefit recipients (45.2%). We only have NZES data from 1999, but between this date and 2008, Māori support increased at a slower rate (5.2%) than European (8.7%) and low income earners (8.2%) and faster than amongst main benefit recipients (1.7%).

Even if lower than other groups, the NZES found significant Māori support for the idea of the unemployed working for their benefits. This seems to sit in tension with their strong support for work as a social right but the qualitative study highlights we should not assume they associate this idea with neoliberal work for dole programmes. When qualitative participants were asked specifically about their views on conditions placed on benefit recipients, Māori demonstrated a much higher level of ambivalence generally and were most likely to say ‘no’ to ‘work for dole’. Some also adopted a self-determination discourse similar to that used by the Māori party when discussing this and related issues. For instance, Māori were much more likely to support the idea that ‘people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves’ than other groups because they associated this proposition with a Māori self-determination discourse focused on regaining Māori control over decisions pertaining to their own lives. While there is some overlap between neoliberal ideas of personal responsibility (focused on moving everyone into paid work) and Māori self-determination, they have quite different cultural drivers. When responding to the proposition above, a Māori benefit recipient stressed that Māori had once been responsible for themselves: “Māori had solutions for all of these things that we’re sitting down here trying to find today. We had our own governments, we had our own people running things, we had work”. Another participant referred specifically to the Tuhoe tribe, who have a long tradition of asserting their right to self-determination and, given their location in the isolated Urewera region, have maintained a relatively high level of self-sufficiency, including traditions of hunting and food gathering. The participant’s frustration that Tuhoe are restricted from taking responsibility for themselves was particularly poignant because the New Zealand government conducted ‘terror raids’ on Tuhoe land and elsewhere in 2007, arresting a wide variety of social activists under the Firearms Act and the Terrorism Suppression Act on suspicion of participating in a ‘terrorist’ plot led by members of the Tuhoe tribe (Stuff, 19 November 2010). That this recent government infringement of Tuhoe self-determination on their own lands was mentioned when discussing social citizenship highlights how an indigenous rights discourse inflects Māori thinking about such issues.

Although this intersection between social and indigenous rights may be associated with the high levels of support for social citizenship indicated in the NZES data, the qualitative study offers some evidence that New Zealand’s ‘ethnic’ politics may have a negative impact on social solidarity in the more traditional sense. When qualitative participants were asked to respond to the statement ‘social security recipients are made to feel second class’, Māori and Pasifika peoples (Pacific island migrants or their descendants who live in New Zealand), were least likely to agree with the statement even though both ethnic groups are disproportionately more likely to receive income support
and feature heavily in the media stereotyping of welfare dependency. Questions about why social security recipients feel second class highlighted that both ethnic groups tended to associate discrimination or stigma with *ethnicity* rather than income level or status as a beneficiary. Not surprisingly, ethnic minority groups were also more likely to mention cognitive, rather than redistributive, factors as preconditions of feeling ‘first class’. This appears to support Poata-Smith’s (2004) claim that a governmental focus on ‘ethnic culture’ has discouraged the articulation of injustices associated with class, which he considers the best way to build solidarity against anti-working class policies. While it is possible these findings were influenced by the recruitment of focus groups participants by ethnicity, participants from all ethnic groups were uncomfortable identifying with a class identity, possibly due to New Zealand’s historical myth of ‘egalitarianism’ (Belich, 2001).

Nonetheless, the same ethnic politics endorsed a strong sense of status amongst Māori participants. When asked if they felt ‘first class’ in New Zealand, Māori were second most likely to agree (31 per cent after Europeans, on 33 per cent), despite their noting the ongoing effects of colonisation and the continuing socio-economic disadvantage of Māori as a group. This is because some Māori participants associated the idea of being ‘first class’ with their positioning as the ‘first peoples’ of New Zealand and their own specific genealogical heritage. Thus, the Māori middle income participant below makes an important distinction between her own beliefs and that of others when asked if she felt ‘first class’: “I always do. I was born, I come from a long line of chiefs. If I was treated like a first class citizen, no way .... But in terms of: am I a first class citizen? Yes I am, I feel that. That’s only me. Nobody out there in government made me feel that way. I feel that way because of my whakapapa [genealogy]”

Although there is no room for detailed discussion of responses from Pasifika participants, it is notable that none could conceive themselves ever feeling ‘first class’ in New Zealand. Being able to draw upon an indigenous rights discourse endorsed and legitimated by institutional support for biculturalism and recognition of Treaty rights thus supported a positive Māori identity (at least in some contexts) in ways not immediately available to Pasifika peoples. Despite increasing policy attention to their cultural and socio-economic needs, a lack of official multiculturalism leaves Pasifika peoples in an ambiguous political space. European participants were slightly more likely to consider themselves ‘first class’ overall, but a small number indicated that some also felt marginalized by the seeming ‘privilege’ that institutional recognition of indigenous and Treaty rights offer Māori. An indigenous rights discourse thus appears to shape not only attitudes to social citizenship, but also identity and belonging as New Zealand citizens more generally.

This section has highlighted that although government policy regarding employment and unemployment has not been a significant focus for recognition of indigenous/Treaty rights, Māori were still more likely to support statements that affirm decent employment and assistance for the unemployed as forms of social citizenship. This fits with Māori trade union membership and voting patterns. However, Māori support for the statements regarding government responsibility to provide jobs and to ensure a decent standard of living for the unemployed did *decrease* between 1990 and 2008, by a greater level than amongst Europeans and when support did not diminish amongst the low income and main benefit groups. This indicates Māori attitudes do not
simply reflect their socio-economic positioning, even though Māori as a group were particularly hard hit by neoliberal reforms in employment relations and welfare because of their occupational and class status.

While Māori attitudes bucked the trend regarding employment, they followed it when it comes to the unemployed, even if by small amounts in both cases. Māori support for the unemployed working for their benefits increased between 1999 and 2008, although at slower rate than for European and low income earners. In 2008 Māori were almost 20 per cent more likely than main benefit recipients to support this type of workfare, suggesting Māori attitudes are not strongly shaped by this experience but rather by Māori-specific discourses that at times intersect with and at other times challenge neoliberal views on personal responsibility. Discussion also highlighted that while the (incomplete) endorsement that biculturalism gives to such discourses seems to have a positive impact on identity and belonging amongst Māori, this is not necessarily the case for other ethnic groups.

Conclusion: Implications for social citizenship
The paper’s analysis of NZES data suggests that ethnicity may be an explanatory variable in its own right when explaining Māori attitudes to social citizenship. Māori support for four key social rights was not only higher than that of Europeans but it is not completely explained by the low socio-economic status of Māori as a group. The gap between Māori and Europeans and low income earner attitudes narrowed over time in many cases, but there is no evidence that Māori attitudes are aligned with those of main benefit recipients, despite Māori being disproportionately ‘welfare dependent’. Further research is needed to fully explore the interaction between the differing identities and forms of ‘self-interest’ that shape Māori attitudes towards social citizenship, but the qualitative data draws attention to places (such as interpretations of personal responsibility) where the experience of being an indigenous person clearly shaped the views of participants.

While the paper finds that the twin revolutions of biculturalism and neoliberalism had minimal impact on Māori support for health and education, it is possible that a policy hardening against workers and the unemployed combined with a lack of bicultural initiatives in these areas contributed to the decrease in support found amongst Māori. However, it must be noted that diminishing support was also apparent amongst the other groups in most cases. That institutional recognition of indigenous culture and rights has not caused Māori to abandon an interest in social rights challenges arguments that policies offering cultural recognition to indigenous peoples necessarily come at the cost of a focus on material disadvantage, at least when it comes to their attitudes (Fraser, 2003; Gitlin, 1995). Although noting that the empirical evidence on the importance of national identity and support for redistributive policies is mixed, Johnston et al.’s. (2010) Canadian study found a positive relationship between a strong sense of national identity and governmental trust. But this paper indicates that just because indigenous ‘social solidarity’ may be low at the nation state level (as reflected in Māori distrust of government and questions about the prioritisation of immigrants), this does not have to represent an absolute decline in solidarity regarding social rights that impact on all citizens (see Keating, 2005). Indeed, support for social citizenship is to some degree fed by dissatisfaction with government and its perceived intentions.
Although exploratory, the evidence offered here supports Béland and Lecours’ (2008) argument that the welfare state and sub-nationalist projects similarly revolve around the notion of solidarity and are underpinned by collective values and principles. True, these may not have the same drivers but they do both involve – as Isin et. al (2008) indicate – engagement in the process of enacting citizenship; that is, performing the fundamental right to have rights by asking questions concerning social justice. This insight helps explain why many Māori qualitative participants drew upon an indigenous rights discourse to articulate social rights: these two things are not necessarily distinct or separate in the minds of Māori individuals. Given Māori represent an increasing proportion of the voting population, due to higher rates of fertility than most other New Zealanders, and Māori political power has grown since Mixed Member Proportional representation was adopted, ongoing Māori support for social citizenship thus bodes well for the New Zealand welfare state.

It is more concerning that Māori and members of other ethnic groups see inequality in terms of ethnicity rather than class, providing some support for Fraser’s (2003) and Poata-Smith’s (2004) claims about the impact of neoliberalism. But given historical evidence that ‘class’ has always been a rather ‘thin’ identity in New Zealand, that the ‘thicker’ identity of ethnicity has a positive effect on Māori attitudes towards social citizenship should be viewed positively (see Mishler and Pollack 2003). Indeed, Dean (2004) argues that social citizenship can provide a strategic terrain on which to mediate both class and identity. It is beyond the scope of the paper to assess whether Dean’s (2010) call for a human rights framework, through which both redistribution and recognition can be argued, is sound but it is worth investigating given indigenous rights are recognized as human rights and Fraser (2009) calls for justice to be reframed away from purely the nation-state level. Fraser (2003) has also championed a status model of claims-making focused not solely on cultural identity but on establishing the misrecognized party as having full social status within a society. This may prove a fruitful way of making claims that incorporate the complex circumstances and attitudes of indigenous peoples, which emerge from the two-dimensional social division they experience. If nothing else, this paper’s findings illustrate the importance of rethinking social citizenship in a way that that embodies, rather than treats as antithetical, identity-based social movements.

References


Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Māori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare. Puao Te Ata Tu (Daybreak). Wellington: Department of Social Welfare.


Table 1: Attitudes towards social citizenship, affirmative* responses only, percentage

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* Includes 'should' and 'definitely should' responses
** Includes the two lowest income bands each year
*** Includes Unemployment, Invalid's, Sickness and Domestic Purposes benefits
Source: New Zealand Election Study 1990-2008