

Who Donates to Canada's Political Parties?

by

Harold J. Jansen
Department of Political Science
University of Lethbridge
harold.jansen@uleth.ca

Melanee Thomas
Department of Political Studies
Queen's University
melanee_lynn@yahoo.co.uk

Lisa Young
Department of Political Science
University of Calgary
lisa.young@ucalgary.ca

Draft: Please do not cite without authors' permission.

Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association
Edmonton, Alberta, June 12-15, 2012

Who Donates to Canada's Political Parties?

By 2016, Canadian political parties will be almost entirely dependent on relatively small contributions from individuals to sustain their organization and contest elections. Corporate and union contributions have been illegal since 2004; public subsidies in the form of quarterly allowances are being phased out and will disappear by 2016. Aside from subsidies on election expenses, registered parties in national politics will rely solely on individual contributions (which are in turn subsidized through the political contribution tax credit). Simply put, individual donors will soon be a significant group of actors in national politics: without them, parties will be unable to contest elections.

In light of the emerging significance of the individual donor, this paper offers a preliminary examination of available data to consider the question of who donates to political parties in Canada. To date, the study of Canadian political party finance has focused almost exclusively on the relationship between party income and expenditure patterns and party organization or on the impact of changing party finance regulatory regimes. Conversely, most studies of mass political participation in Canada have emphasized voter turnout and have looked at very few other forms of participation, let alone political contributions. In this paper, we seek to bridge the gap between these two literatures and approaches by using mass survey data to better understand the characteristics of donors to national political parties in Canada.

Our analysis finds that donors fit the profile one might expect: donors are more likely to be partisans, and interested in politics. These partisan and attitudinal differences map onto socio-demographics: Canadians who are men, older, university educated, affluent, white, and live in the West are more likely than women, high school graduates, and the poor to be both interested in politics and members of political parties. As a result, these older affluent, politically engaged men are also the most likely to be political donors. Given the future importance of the individual donor, these findings offer interesting insights into the possible dynamics of the Canadian political system when parties become reliant on individual donations alone.

Political contributions as political participation

Most studies of political participation in Canada have emphasized voter turnout, partly because of the dramatic downturn in electoral participation in recent decades and partly because of its relationship to other forms of participation (e.g., Gidengil et al., 2004; Rubenson et al., 2004; Johnston et al., 2007). There are a few studies that look at the extent to which Canadians participate in conventional electoral politics in other ways.¹ Studies of party membership (Howe and Northrup, 2000; Cross and Young, 2002; Cross, 2004) have found relatively low levels of party membership at any given time, but that a significant proportion of the population (16-18%, depending on estimates) have joined a party at some point. Analyses of campaign activity show similarly low levels of volunteering, even for activities that require few resources. Gidengil et al. (2004) found that fewer than ten per cent of Canadians engaged in any form of campaign activity, even displaying a lawn sign.

These findings of low levels of partisan involvement in Canada are consistent with a broader comparative literature that has documented the decline of both political party membership (e.g., Scarrow, 2000) and party identification (Dalton, 2000). Although Scarrow (2000: 99-100) cautions against an automatic association of membership decline and party organizational strength, cross-national evidence suggests a decline in citizen volunteer campaign activities (Dalton et al., 2000: 57-59). This decline in campaign activity is related to the increased professionalization of campaigns. As the pool of campaign volunteers has decreased, political parties have increasingly used technology to reach voters, with television and online campaigns, phone banks, and sophisticated voter tracking (Dalton et al., 2011; Farrell and Webb, 2000). Conversely, as political parties rely more on technology and campaigns managed by professionals, the scope and opportunity for citizen participation in campaigns decreases (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993: 233).

Although political parties have (and arguably require) fewer campaign volunteers, their need for money has increased. The professionalization of campaigns, the need to use new technologies, and the shift to the permanent campaign has strained party finances (Farrell and Webb, 2000: 113-115). As argued by the cartel party thesis, parties have increasingly turned to the state to finance their activities (Katz and Mair, 1995). As will be discussed below, in the Canadian case, a significant proportion of state funding is delivered through the tax credit system, requiring parties to solicit donations from individual contributors (Young, 1998). When quarterly political allowances are fully phased out in 2016, public funding for parties and candidates will come only through the political contribution tax credit and the partial reimbursement of election expenses. For many citizens, and for their parties, political contributions can be seen as an increasingly important form of political participation in an era of diminished partisan involvement and professionalized campaigns. The average citizen may not be able to help craft or deliver a finely tuned campaign message, but they can contribute money to the campaign that allows such activity to take place.

In one of the few studies to examine political contributions as a form of political participation, Verba et al. (1995) note the distinctiveness of this form of activity. They note that money is unequally distributed and as such poses obvious challenges to the goal of more equal participation in political life (see also Burns et al. 2001). They found that donors were more likely to be affluent, but not necessarily particularly likely to be interested in politics. In other words, resources rather than political engagement motivated participation. Verba et al. also found that political contributors found their participation to be political unsatisfying. They note, however, that despite these concerns with equality and participant satisfaction, this was the form of political participation that had most increased in the United States in the two decades before their study.

The Canadian context of political contributions

Before looking at the characteristics of party donors in Canada, it is important to understand the context of political contributions in Canada. Canada displays many of the trends identified in the comparative literature above. Faced with increasing costs associated with television advertising and the increased use of polling, combined with a series of minority government that saw five elections in a decade, in 1974, political parties accepted state regulation of their activities in

return for access to state funding. Particularly important was the establishment of the political contribution tax credit, which was to accomplish two things. First, it was to shift the financial support for parties away from corporations and unions and towards individuals. Second, the tax credit system rewarded smaller donations with more generous tax credits in the hopes that this would encourage a large number of donors to donate small amounts of money rather than have political parties rely on large contributions from a few donors.

Over the years, there was tinkering with the system, but the essential framework remained in place until 2004. In that year, a new party finance regime came into effect, which banned corporate and union donations to national political parties (and limited them at the local level) and replaced the lost revenue with an allowance paid quarterly and calculated on the basis of the number of votes earned in the previous election (Young and Jansen, 2011a). This “quarterly allowance” has received most of the attention, but the 2004 reforms also substantially increased the size of the political contributions tax credit, making donations of up to \$400 eligible for the 75% tax credit, up from the \$200 in place previously. The 2004 reforms also capped the maximum donation to parties, candidates and electoral district associations to \$5,000. The Conservative government later altered the limit to allow a \$1,000 annual donation to each manifestation of the party.

Under the current legislative framework, Canadians can make five kinds of donations to national partisan bodies. They can donate to:

- the national party
- local electoral district associations
- candidates
- contestants seeking the nomination of a party
- contestants seeking the leadership of the party.

Obviously, the last of these only occurs when there is a leadership contest. Similarly, a great many nomination contests are uncontested or low intensity affairs. The first three constitute the most regular opportunities for individual donations, with donations to candidates only possible around elections. All five forms of donations are eligible for the political contributions tax credit, which constitutes a significant source of indirect public funding for Canada’s political parties (Jansen and Young, 2011b).

The 1974 *Election Expenses Act* created an incentive for political parties to pursue individual donations through direct mail and other means. The 2004 reforms only accelerated the trends already in place. Figure One reports the value of individual donations to Canadian national parties, adjusted for inflation since 1995. There is considerable fluctuation from year to year, particularly between election years and non-election years, but the overall trend is that the value of individual donations has increased over time. Of course, much of this increase is due to the Conservatives’ extraordinary success at individual fundraising (Flanagan and Jansen, 2009; Jansen and Young, 2011a), but all three of the largest parties attained their personal bests in fundraising in 2011 (and the Green party had its second best year ever).

[FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE]

The amount raised by political parties through individual fundraising shows the increasing importance of these donations for parties, but it does not necessarily indicate an increase in the number of donors. The 2004 and 2006 changes places limits on the amounts individuals can donate to parties, requiring parties to fundraise more broadly, but in enriching the tax credits, also created incentives for individuals to donate more and for parties to encourage donors to give more intensively. Figure Two reports the number of individual donors to Canada's national political parties as reported by Elections Canada as a stacked area graph. The total height of the graph represents the total number of reported donors to Canada's national parties. There are some limitations to these data. These data likely double count some donors who may have donated to more than one party (for example, to both the Green and New Democratic parties). These data also only count donors to national parties, not donors to local entities of parties, such as local candidates or electoral district associations (EDAs). It also does not include provincial parties or local entities. Nevertheless, even with these limitations, Figure One shows a significant number of donors even just to Canada's national political parties. Furthermore, the secular trend is of increasing numbers of donors to parties. In the election year of 2008, the total number of donors to national parties topped 200,000 individuals.

[FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE]

Consistent with the findings of Verba et al., the data from Elections Canada demonstrate that both the number and value of political contributions has increased over time. In the 2011 budget, the Conservative government carried out its campaign promise to phase out the quarterly allowance by 2015. Political parties will only be able to make up the missing revenue by more aggressive fundraising. Given the past trends and the legislative changes, we can only expect the incidence of individual contributions to increase over time.

Although the Elections Canada data provide a nice aggregate picture of the parties' individual donations, they tell us very little about the people who donate to political parties. To understand their characteristics, we need to turn to other data.

Data source

Our analysis uses data from the Canadian Election Studies (CES) in 2006, 2008, and 2011, all of which ask questions about political contributions. The 2004 and prior studies did not ask about political contributions. Unfortunately, the political contributions questions have been moved to different components of the CES over time. In 2006, the CES asked six questions on political contributions in the post-election telephone survey. It asked whether respondents had ever donated to a national political party, to an electoral district association, or to a candidate. If any respondent said yes to one of those questions, a follow-up question asked whether that donation was made in the last twelve months. In 2008, the same battery of questions was asked, but in the mailback portion of the survey. The 2011 CES changed the questions on political contributions significantly. The questions were moved to the web-based component of the survey and the number of questions was reduced from six to two. No questions were asked on donations to EDAs, and the questions were only framed in terms of donations in the past twelve months. Most significantly, though, the question was changed from asking about donations to **federal** political

parties or candidates to unspecified political parties and candidates. This limits the comparability of the 2011 data with the data gathered in the two previous studies, as the 2011 question now presumably includes donations to parties or candidates in provincial or municipal politics (Question wording available in Appendix A). Whether most Canadians meaningfully distinguish between donations to different orders of government in responding to survey is an open question, but this data limitation must be borne in mind in interpreting the results that follow.

How many people donate and to whom?

Our first question is simply the proportion of people who donate to the various manifestations of political parties in Canada. Table One reports the proportions as found in the 2006 and 2008 Canadian Election Studies.² Table One shows that a significant proportion of the population has been donors at some point in their lives and a relatively large proportion of Canadians report having donated in any given year.

[INSERT TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE]

There is some evidence of an overall increase in political contributions over time, although some of the increase is likely due to the changing location of the donation questions within the CES itself. The mailback and web-based surveys are much more self-selecting than the telephone administered components of the CES and, as such, likely over-represent the politically interested and active.

There are reasons, however, to suspect that these figures over-estimate the extent of donations to political parties in Canada in all years, even in the case of the 2006 figures. According to the 2006 census, there were 24,564,795 Canadian citizens over the age of 15.³ If the CES is correct and 6.3% of Canadians donated to national political parties that year, then over 1.5 million Canadians should have donated to national parties in 2006. The data from Elections Canada, however, report that just under 180,000 people donated to national parties in 2006 (See Figure 2). Even if we account for the fact that the CES only surveys those over 18, there is a significant over-reporting of political contributions in the CES, even in the telephone-administered post-election survey.

It is difficult to determine why political donations are so significantly over-reported in the CES, besides the obvious problem of relying on recall data. First, some Canadians may have trouble distinguishing between political contributions and memberships paid to political parties, since both involve giving money to political parties. Second, it is worth questioning whether many Canadians can meaningfully distinguish between donations given to national parties, electoral district associations, and candidates. Third, it is possible (and indeed likely) that Canadians have difficulty distinguishing between donations made to federal and provincial parties, although we do note that removing the “federal” qualifier from the 2011 CES resulted in a noticeable increase in the number of reported donors. Nevertheless, despite these evident problems, the Canadian Election Study data are likely the best (and only) available source of data.

One of the issues in the recent reforms to Canada’s party finance laws has been the balance between national and local entities of the party, specifically whether the financial resources

available to national parties outstrip those available to local party entities (Coletto et al., 2011). Although Table One shows that donations to national parties are the most common, donations to one party entity do not preclude donations to other entities of a party. Table Two breaks down individuals as to whether they donate to the national party, the local party (defined as a donation to a candidate and/or to an electoral district association), or a combination of the two. A more detailed breakdown is available in Appendix B.

[INSERT TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE]

Bearing in mind the limitations of recall data, Table Two shows that the most common donation pattern is a combination of local and national donations. It also suggests that purely local donations seem to have declined over time, although it is difficult to reach a definitive conclusion on this because of the limitations surrounding the 2011 data and the small number of cases involved here. Nevertheless, the individual level data tend to support the contention of party organization scholars that there is a trend towards greater centralization of party revenue and fundraising.

What are the characteristics of donors?

If we consider political donations as one of several available types of political activity, we would expect donors to be similar to others active in formal politics. Income, formal education, being male, being a member of a majority ethnic group and being older are positively associated with most kinds of formal political participation, including voting, campaigning and contributing (Verba et al 1995). In their comprehensive analysis of political participation in the United States, Verba et al (1995: 363) found that income was the strongest predictor of making a political contribution, but that education, civic skills, occupational characteristics and religious affiliation and attendance had no discernible effect.

Given that political contributions require financial, as distinct from psychological, resources, our expectations that donors would be more affluent than other Canadians is heightened. In practical terms, the political contribution tax credit means that the cost of a \$400 donation is only \$100 after the tax credit is claimed. The \$300 'loan' to the government between the time of donation and the time the tax credit is claimed presents much less of a burden to the affluent than to others.

In the context of Canada's party-centric political system (as distinct from the American candidate-centered model), there is every reason to expect that membership in a political party, identification with a political party, and positive attitudes toward political parties in general will positively predict propensity to donate. Given the patterns of donation reported above, we would expect Conservative identifiers to be substantially more likely to have donated than non-identifiers, and Liberal and NDP identifiers to be somewhat more likely to have donated than non-identifiers.

Understanding political contributions as one of a range of political activities, we would anticipate that political interest, subjective political competence, and greater confidence in parties and in government would all be positively predictors of propensity to donate.

To conduct this analysis, we coded as donors any respondent who said they had donated to a political party or candidate in the preceding twelve months (2006-2011) or to an electoral district association in the preceding twelve months (2006-2008). Respondents who donated to any of these are coded as 1; those who have not donated are coded as 0. Those who indicated “don’t know” are excluded from the analysis. Because this variable is binary, we use probit regression.⁴ Both coefficients and the change associated with the likelihood to donate are presented here. We include changes in likelihood only for statistically significant factors; these should be interpreted as percentage points.⁵ We first assess the effect of sociodemographic factors on the propensity to donate, before examining how party membership and identification, and political engagement affect donations.

With the exception of age, all sociodemographic predictors are dummy coded. Age is a mean centered, continuous variable.⁶ Respondent sex is coded 1 for female respondents. University graduates are similarly coded 1, as are Canadians in the highest income tercile.⁷ Those who are employed, rural residents, visible minorities, those who report religion is very important to them (religiosity), Catholics, and residents of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba, and the Atlantic provinces are all coded 1 as well. Quebec is excluded from the analysis, leaving Ontario as the regional reference category.

Party membership is also dummy coded, as is party identification. Partisans for each party are coded 1 respectively; those who do not identify with any political party are the reference category. Finally, four indicators capture political engagement. First, political interest is coded 1 for those who are very or somewhat interested in politics.⁸ Subjective political competence is coded 1 for those who **reject** the idea that politics and government are too complicated for a 'person like them' to understand. Views toward parties is an index of two questions ranging from 0 to 2. Respondents who indicated that political parties are all the same were coded 1, as were those who perceived that political parties always broke promises. Finally, those who believe that government does not care what a person like them thinks are coded as 1.

To control for variations in donations from one election to another, dummy variables are included for each election year, with 2006 as the omitted category. Standard errors are clustered on election year, to allow for the non-independence of observations in any given election study.

Table Three reports the results of the analysis of whether respondents had donated to political parties in the preceding twelve months. We then ran the analysis for respondents who had **ever** donated to a political party. Because this question was not asked in 2011, it only includes pooled respondents from 2006 and 2008; in all other respects, the model is the same as for the first analysis. The results of the analysis examining donors from the past twelve months are presented in Table Four.

[INSERT TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT TABLE FOUR ABOUT HERE]

Results indicate that party activity is the most important predictor of donations. These factors explain more variance than sociodemographic and attitudinal factors combined. In particular, party membership substantially increases the likelihood of being a donor in the preceding twelve months and it has a huge impact on ever having donated to a party. Members are 26 points more likely to have donated in the previous twelve points and a whopping 62 points more likely to have ever donated. Partisanship is also a strong predictor of donation, particularly being an NDP partisan. Being a Conservative partisan is significant and relatively important in the preceding twelve months model (Table Three), but not in the “ever” model (Table Four). This may reflect the recent success of the Conservatives in fundraising. The strength of the impact of NDP identification is somewhat surprising, given that it is the Conservatives, not the NDP, that has dominated fundraising. This suggests that the Conservative support base is captured by other variables in the model, while NDP partisanship has a stronger effect independent of the other variables. Liberal partisanship has no discernible impact on likelihood to donate in either model. Residents of Atlantic Canada are less likely to donate in both models as are visible minorities in the “preceding twelve months” model.

Relatively few demographic variables are significant in the final models. In both models, but particularly in the “ever donated” model (Table Four), the significance of demographic variables disappears once party activities are added but particularly when attitudes are included in the models. This suggests that these demographic variables for the most part do not have a direct impact on likelihood to donate, but that their effects are mediated by other factors. Income and gender are particularly interesting in this respect. Higher levels of political interest are associated with higher levels of income and with men, respectively. This attitude may explain why higher income Canadians are more likely to donate than are Canadians with lower and moderate levels of household income (Tables Three and Four), and why men are more likely to donate than women (Table Four). Age is associated with being more likely to donate. Every decade above the mean age of CES respondents increases the likelihood of having donated in the previous twelve months by two points; for obvious reasons, this effect is larger among people who have ever donated to parties. The “greying” of political parties described by Cross and Young (2002) evidently also extends to the financial support base as well. Respondents with university degrees are more likely to have donated in the preceding twelve months, but are no more likely to have ever donated than those with no degree.

Although the socio-demographic explanations lose their explanatory power once partisan and attitudinal variables are introduced, the analysis is worth noting. It confirms expectations from the literature that donors are more likely to be male, older, well-educated, affluent and from non-minority groups. They are more likely to come from Western Canada, and less likely to come from Atlantic Canada than from Ontario. To the extent that political parties are responsive to the attitudes and interests of their donors, the demographic profile of those donors is significant. These Canadians are more likely to be interested in politics, and it is plausible that it is this interest that increases their propensity to donate. Certainly, though political interest does not have as large an effect on the propensity to donate as does party membership, it can explain why political donors have this demographic profile. Furthermore, these results show that net of these

attitudinal and partisan effects, donors are older and whiter than non-donors. These findings suggest that existing patterns of political influence will be reinforced by the shift away from state funding toward reliance on individual donors.

Conclusion

Our findings suggest that a significant number of Canadians have donated to political parties and do so in any given year, although we do suspect that the Canadian Election Study overestimates the number of political donors. The number of donors compares quite favourably to the proportion who engage in campaign activity, which Gidengil et al. (2004: 124-125) found to be less than 10%, and the proportion of people reporting ever having given to a political party is similar to findings about party membership (Gidengil et al., 2004; Howe and Northrup, 2000). Cross (2004) estimates that between 1 and 2% of Canadians are party members at any given point. Seen in that context, donations are on a similar level to these other forms of political participation.

We find that the likelihood to make political contributions is driven substantially by partisan ties, particularly party membership. The combined influence of party activity variables dwarfs all others in both models. Conversely, demographic variables account for relatively little of the variance in likelihood of political contributions and the effects of those variables can largely be explained by socio-demographic variation in political attitudes. Seen from the standpoint of equality of participation, this is an encouraging finding, as it suggests that potential systematic biases in donation participation can be mitigated by sparking greater interest in politics in previously disengaged portions of the electorate. Specifically, the fact that the top income tercile is not significantly more likely to donate net of attitudinal and partisan is thus encouraging. That said, we acknowledge two caveats. First, generating greater interest in politics is much easier said than done. Second, our results show that age and minority status are associated with the propensity to donate net of party membership and political attitudes. This suggests that only some socio-demographic biases in political donations may be mitigated.


The dominant role of partisan activity in our model poses a challenge for political parties. The gradual phasing out of the quarterly allowance leading to its ultimate elimination in 2016 will reduce the amount of public funding available to political parties, forcing them to fundraise from individuals more aggressively. These findings raise questions about whether political parties will be able to fill the gap created by the decrease in state financial support. In our models, partisan affiliation – either informally through party identification or formally through membership – explained the most variance in likelihood to be a political donor, with party membership having a particularly strong effect. In an era of declining partisan attachment and atrophying party membership, this raises questions as to whether political parties will be able to bridge this gap.

Our study also points to the need for better data on this question. Political campaigning is likely to remain professionalized and centralized and there is little sign of a (re)invigoration of political parties as loci for mass political participation outside activities such as donation. Political contributions will continue to be an important form of political participation, and their importance will only increase as political parties intensify their fundraising efforts to compensate

for the elimination of the quarterly allowance after 2015. Imprecise and changing wording in the political contribution questions in the Canadian Election Study has not helped in understanding this phenomenon, nor has moving the question from the post-election telephone component to the mailback and web-based survey.

Figure One

Value of Individual Donations to Canadian National Political Parties (2011 dollars)




Note: CPC data prior to 2004 are for the Progressive Conservatives and Canadian Alliance combined.

Source: Elections Canada data

Figure Two

Number of Individual Donations to Canadian National Political Parties



Note: CPC data prior to 2004 are for Progressive Conservative and Canadian Alliance combined.

Source: Elections Canada data

Table One

Proportion of Population Donating to Political Parties

| | 2006 | | 2008 | | 2011* |
|-------------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Ever | Last 12 months | Ever | Last 12 months | Last 12 months |
| Party | 15.2% | 6.3% | 18.8% | 7.6% | 11.7% |
| Candidate | 7.2% | 3.3% | 8.9% | 4.0% | 7.1% |
| EDA | 8.3% | 3.5% | 10.3% | 4.1% | n/a |
| Any of the above | 17.5% | 7.3% | 20.6% | 8.3% | 12.7% |

* 2011 study did not specify national party or candidate

Source: Calculated from Canadian Election Study, 2006 and 2008

Table Two

National-Local Balance in Donations made in Last Twelve Months

| | 2006 | 2008 | 2011 |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| National only | 2.5% | 2.6% | 5.6% |
| Local only (EDA and/or candidate) | 3.6% | 4.8% | 6.0% |
| National and local | 1.0% | 0.5% | 0.9% |

Note: Local includes EDA and/or candidate donations in 2006 and 2007, candidate only in 2011

Source: Calculated from Canadian Election Study, 2006, 2008, 2011

Table Three

Probit Analysis of Donations in Preceding Twelve Months Outside Quebec, 2006-2011

| | Sociodemographics | | Party Activities | | Attitudes | | Change in Likelihood to Donate (Attitudes Model Only) |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|-----------|--------------------|-----------|--------------------|-----------|--|
| | <i>Coefficient</i> | <i>SE</i> | <i>Coefficient</i> | <i>SE</i> | <i>Coefficient</i> | <i>SE</i> | |
| Female | -0.165+ | (0.091) | -0.178 | (0.111) | -0.101 | (0.120) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| Age (mean centered) | 0.022* | (0.002) | 0.018* | (0.001) | 0.019* | (0.005) | 0.2 ppts |
| University Degree | 0.300* | (0.071) | 0.234* | (0.038) | 0.290* | (0.084) | 3 ppts |
| Top Income Tercile | 0.231* | (0.061) | 0.276* | (0.100) | 0.341+ | (0.191) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| Employed (full, part time) | -0.086* | (0.006) | -0.050 | (0.043) | 0.060 | (0.052) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| Rural Resident | -0.004 | (0.086) | -0.076 | (0.117) | -0.068 | (0.187) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| West | 0.111* | (0.039) | -0.104+ | (0.053) | -0.107 | (0.113) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| Atlantic | -0.211* | (0.081) | -0.358* | (0.139) | -0.283 | (0.249) | -2 ppts |
| Visible Minority | 0.062 | (0.263) | 0.231 | (0.265) | -0.829+ | (0.465) | -4 ppts |
| Religious | 0.062+ | (0.032) | 0.007 | (0.008) | 0.064 | (0.070) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| Catholic | 0.050 | (0.063) | 0.168* | (0.055) | 0.121+ | (0.065) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| 2008 | -0.020+ | (0.011) | 0.123* | (0.008) | 0.263* | (0.029) | 3 ppts |
| 2011 | 0.225* | (0.024) | 0.290* | (0.025) | 0.365* | (0.032) | 4 ppts |
| Party Member | | | 1.420* | (0.092) | 1.421* | (0.111) | 26 ppts |
| Conservative Partisan | | | 0.533* | (0.179) | 0.529+ | (0.283) | 6 ppts |
| Liberal Partisan | | | 0.318* | (0.125) | 0.186 | (0.150) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| NDP Partisan | | | 0.883* | (0.126) | 0.927* | (0.245) | 15 ppts |
| Political Interest | | | | | 0.289* | (0.059) | 2 ppts |
| Subjective Political Competence | | | | | -0.099 | (0.138) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| Negative Views Toward Parties | | | | | -0.194* | (0.044) | -2 ppts |
| Government Doesn't Care | | | | | 0.188 | (0.219) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.081 | | 0.311 | | 0.343 | | |
| N | 3011 | | 2516 | | 1382 | | |

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05

Cell entries are probit regression coefficients.

Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered on election year.

Table Four

Probit Analysis of Donations Ever Made Outside Quebec, 2006-2008

| | Sociodemographics | | Party Activities | | Attitudes | | Change in Likelihood to Donate (Attitudes Model Only) |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|-----------|--------------------|-----------|--------------------|-----------|--|
| | <i>Coefficient</i> | <i>SE</i> | <i>Coefficient</i> | <i>SE</i> | <i>Coefficient</i> | <i>SE</i> | |
| Female | -0.188* | (0.070) | -0.212* | (0.054) | -0.241 | (0.158) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| Age (mean centered) | 0.027* | (0.002) | 0.021* | (0.003) | 0.022* | (0.006) | 0.5 ppts |
| University Degree | 0.354* | (0.029) | 0.283* | (0.097) | 0.164 | (0.209) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| Top Income Tercile | 0.225* | (0.064) | 0.170* | (0.041) | 0.063 | (0.048) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| Employed (full, part time) | -0.084* | (0.026) | -0.052 | (0.133) | 0.046 | (0.132) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| Rural Resident | 0.127 | (0.122) | 0.039 | (0.141) | 0.075 | (0.258) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| West | 0.129* | (0.009) | -0.014 | (0.071) | 0.023* | (0.003) | 1 ppt |
| Atlantic | -0.228* | (0.019) | -0.308* | (0.102) | -0.169* | (0.015) | -4 ppts |
| Visible Minority | -0.129* | (0.015) | 0.040 | (0.091) | -0.075 | (0.554) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| Religious | 0.081 | (0.052) | 0.062 | (0.062) | 0.096* | (0.044) | 3 ppts |
| Catholic | -0.001 | (0.089) | 0.031 | (0.102) | 0.160 | (0.119) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| 2008 | 0.034* | (0.007) | 0.158* | (0.007) | 0.214* | (0.014) | 5 ppts |
| Party Member | | | 1.830* | (0.047) | 1.861* | (0.025) | 62 ppts |
| Conservative Partisan | | | 0.412+ | (0.234) | 0.200 | (0.327) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| Liberal Partisan | | | 0.209 | (0.149) | 0.006 | (0.173) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| NDP Partisan | | | 0.521* | (0.076) | 0.447+ | (0.232) | 13 ppts |
| Political Interest | | | | | 0.116* | (0.042) | 3 ppts |
| Subjective Political Competence | | | | | 0.169 | (0.124) | 0 ppts (NS) |
| Negative Views Toward Parties | | | | | -0.161* | (0.040) | -4 ppts |
| Government Doesn't Care | | | | | 0.078* | (0.039) | 2 ppts |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.099 | | 0.350 | | 0.363 | | |
| N | 2649 | | 2227 | | 1115 | | |

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05

Cell entries are probit regression coefficients.

Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered on election year.

Appendix A

Political contribution question wording, 2006, 2008 and 2011 Canadian Election Studies

2006 and 2008

Have you every donated money to a federal political party?

Was that in the last 12 months?

Have you ever donated money to a candidate in a federal election?

Was that in the last 12 months?

Have you ever donated money to a local riding association of a federal political party?

Was that in the last 12 months?

2011

Over the last 12 months, have you donated money to a political party?

Over the last 12 months, have you donated money to a candidate?

Appendix B

Breakdown by Party Entity Donated to, 2006-2008

| | 2006 | 2008 |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| National party only | 2.5% | 2.6% |
| National + candidate | 0.8% | 1.0% |
| National + EDA | 0.9% | 1.0% |
| National + candidate + EDA | 1.9% | 2.7% |
| Candidate only | 0.4% | 0.4% |
| EDA only | 0.5% | 0.2% |
| Candidate + EDA | 0.1% | 0% |

Works Cited

- Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Coletto, David, Harold J. Jansen, and Lisa Young. 2011. "Statarchical Party Organization and Party Finance in Canada." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 44: 111-136.
- Cross, William. 2004. *Political Parties*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Cross, William and Lisa Young. 2002. "Contours of Political Party Membership in Canada." *Party Politics* 10: 427-444.
- Dalton, Russell J., David M. Farrell, and Ian McAllister. 2011. *Political Parties and Democratic Linkage: How Parties Organize Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dalton, Russell J. 2000. "The Decline of Party Identifications." In Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds. *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dalton, Russell J., Ian McAllister, and Martin P. Wattenberg. 2000. "The Consequences of Partisan Dealignment." In Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds. *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Farrell, David M. and Paul Webb. 2000. "Political Parties as Campaign Organizations." In Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds. *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Flanagan, Tom and Harold J. Jansen. 2009. "Election Campaigns Under Canada's Party Finance Laws." In Christopher Dornan and Jon H. Pammett, eds. *The Canadian General Election of 2008*. Toronto: Dundurn.
- Gidengil, Elisabeth, André Blais, Neil Neviite and Richard Nadeau. 2004. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Jansen, Harold J. and Lisa Young. 2011a. "Cartels, Syndicates, and Coalitions: Canada's Political Parties after the 2004 Reforms." In Lisa Young and Harold J. Jansen, eds. *Money, Politics, and Democracy: Canada's Party Finance Reforms*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Jansen, Harold J. and Lisa Young. 2011b. "State subsidies and political parties." *Policy Options*, October: 43-47.
- Johnston, Richard, J. Scott Matthews, and Amanda Bittner. 2007. "Turnout and the party system in Canada, 1988-2004." *Electoral Studies* 26: 735-745.

- Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair. 1995. "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party." *Party Politics* 1: 5-28.
- Rosenstone, Steven J. and John Mark Hansen. 1993. *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*. New York: Longman, 1993.
- Rubenson, Daniel, André Blais, Patrick Fournier, Elisabeth Gidengil, and Neil Nevitte. 2004. "Accounting for the Age Gap in Turnout." *Acta Politica* 39: 407-421.
- Scarrow, Susan. 2000. "Parties without Members? Party Organization in a Changing Electoral Environment." In Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds. *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stolle, Dietlind, and Michele Micheletti. 2006. "The Gender Gap Reversed: Political Consumerism as a Woman-Friendly Form of Civic and Political Engagement." In *Gender and Social Capital*, ed. Brenda O'Neill and Elisabeth Gidengil. New York: Routledge.¹
- Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehmann Scholzman and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Young, Lisa. 1998. "Party, State and Political Competition in Canada: The Cartel Model Reconsidered." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 31: 339-358.
- Young, Lisa and Harold J. Jansen. 2011. "Reforming Party and Election Finance in Canada." In Lisa Young and Harold J. Jansen, eds. *Money, Politics, and Democracy: Canada's Party Finance Reforms*. Vancouver: UBC Press.

Notes

¹ Even fewer studies examine extra electoral political participation (see Stolle and Micheletti, 2006).

² For comparison purposes, the 2011 study found that 11.7% of respondents had donated to a political party and 7.1% had donated to a candidate in the previous twelve months and that 12.7% had donated to a one or both of these.

³ Canada's population was 31,612,895 in 2006, of which 5,579,835 were under 15. The 2006 census also reports that 94.36% of those people were Canadian citizens.

⁴ Because the distribution of donors is skewed in these data – that is, a relatively small number of Canadians are political donors – an alternative model was generated using a Poisson estimator. The results did not substantively change.

⁵ The changes in likelihood are calculated using the `mfx` post estimation command in Stata 11.

⁶ The average (mean) age in these data is 52 years.

⁷ Alternative models included predictors for high school education or less, and for the lowest income tercile. Their inclusion did not substantively change the results, nor do they have a meaningful effect on political donations in Canada. The results are available from the authors upon request.

⁸ The CES uses a 0 to 10 scale to measure political interest, where 0 is no interest at all in politics and 10 is a great deal of interest. “Very” and “somewhat” interested correspond to categories 6 through 10 on this scale.