THE CLASS BASIS OF CANADIAN ELECTIONS

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June 2012


Research on this paper was supported by the University of Pennsylvania, the University of British Columbia, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Amanda Bittner, Janine van Vliet, Sule Yaylaçi, and Grace Lore have been essential to moving this research forward. A special thanks for advice from Clive Bean. None of the foregoing persons or institutions is responsible for any errors or omissions in this paper.
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Class was important in Britain because nothing else was. (Finer 1970, p.142)

The Canadian party system stands out for the weakness of its class basis. Early attempts to define the problem away—by redefinition of class categories, by reclassification of parties, or by reframing the statistical issues—largely failed. Arguments that accepted weakness in the class basis as an empirical fact and went looking for culprits—agenda control by the “bourgeois” parties or failures on the part of organized labour—begged as many questions as they purported to answer. After a while, the research agenda just seemed to fade. The questions remain unanswered and the ongoing empirics of the situation, largely ignored. But the 2011 election forces us to reopen the question.

This paper brings the empirics up to date and considers the Canadian case through the lens of left mobilization in other countries. Canada’s place as a laggard in class politics is confirmed and refined. The paper then looks at compositional effects from the social forces identified in the comparative literature as mobilizationally critical: the union movement as impetus and ethnoreligious and linguistic-regional groups as barriers. These factors provide only a partial account. Although a coordinated national union movement was late to arrive in Canada, the spatiotemporal pattern of unionization does not account for NDP strength or weakness. Comparative evidence suggests that this is not unusual. More to the point for Canada, and also consistent with comparative evidence, are resistance by voters in Quebec and among Catholics. But Catholic resistance has crumbled and controlling religious affiliation and Quebec residence still leaves us short of a full explanation. A more complete account requires that these forces also be understood contextually. Most critical is the NDP’s historic inability to connect with the massive concentration of union members in Quebec. Not only did this deny the party a serious bloc of votes—the compositional effect—but it also inhibited the NDP’s credibility as a primary coordination point for progressive voters outside that province—a contextual effect. A somewhat similar logic applies for the impact of religious affiliation. Understanding these federal patterns is helped by counterfactual reasoning and evidence. The critical counterfactual is the provincial arena. Voters outside Quebec cannot be oblivious to that province in federal elections, but they can be in provincial ones. Whether or not Catholics and non-Catholics can be oblivious to each other depends on the share of Catholics within the province and, critically, the impact of that share is greater in provincial than in federal elections. The account has obvious implications for understanding the 2011 election but also for a more general understanding of Canada’s electoral system and party system.

Scholarly Background

Alford (1963) was the first to observe the weakness of class in Canadian elections. His account was pathbreaking, not only as an early example of comparative survey research but also in setting the agenda for further study, abroad as much in Canada. Alford focused on employment and stipulated that the statistical representation of class was the arithmetic gap between manual and non-manual workers in support for the party or parties of the left. This is equivalent to an unstandardized bivariate regression coefficient, and its logic extends to multivariate approaches.
and to marginal effects on conditional probability derived from maximum-likelihood approaches, such as logit or probit. Subsequent research has questioned the assignment of parties to left or non-left groupings, the exclusive focus on manual status at the expense of heterogeneity among non-manual workers (and on employment as such, as opposed to, say, income or union membership), and the appropriateness of what has come to be known as the “Alford index.” The state of play is ably captured by Evans (1999a).

Early reaction in Canada tracked each of these lines of critique, but mainly for the purpose of denial. Alford’s classification of Canadian parties was suspect: he put the Liberals on the left with the CCF/NDP and Social Credit with the Conservatives on the right. Contrasting the Liberals and Conservatives, on one hand, with both of the pre-1980 minor parties, on the other, produces a sharper class cleavage (Ogmundson 1975). In due course, the focus migrated to the NDP alone (Erickson 1981; Archer 1985). Hunter (1982) moved away from a dichotomous representation of class, and seems to have been followed by most later work. Archer (1985) and Brym (1989) focused on the union movement as the critical mediator of class politics. Myles (1979) seems to have been the first to query Alford’s statistical logic, and advocated odds ratios in preference to regression coefficients. On this basis, he concluded that Canadian and American class effects were substantively identical. The focus on odds ratios continued with Erickson (1981) and Fletcher and Forbes (1990). Brym et al. (1989), on the other hand, gives a passionate articulation of a multivariate, maximum-likelihood version of the original Alford approach.

All this foundered on the summary weakness of class differences and of the NDP itself. Some authors looked for anticipatory signs of NDP strength in the then-current geology (Wilson 1968, 1974; Ornstein et al. 1980; Erickson 1981; Zipp and Smith 1982; Brym et al. 1989) or in actions by the union movement (Archer 1985). But comparative study only confirms the system’s weak class foundations (Evans 1999b; Nieuwebeerta and de Graaf 2009).

So it is natural that one branch of the literature addresses this history of futility. One focus is outside the party system. For Horowitz (1968), a key was division in the ranks of organized labour, between the craft-oriented Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) and the industry-oriented Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL). Only with their 1956 merger as the Canadian Labour Congress could a formal link with a political party be imagined, and this was realized with the 1961 mutation of the CCF into the NDP. Whether the marriage was really consummated remains open. Archer (1985), in particular, is a sceptic: NDP affiliation by a union local has a massive electoral effect, but such affiliation is rare. Jenson (1990) is similarly pessimistic, arguing that Canadian labour relations have a peculiar history. Others focused on the flip side of the geographic patterns mentioned above. For Gidengil (1989) class interests align differently in different regions, undercutting prospects for a Canada-wide class division. Johnston (1991) comes to a similar conclusion by linking the weakness of class to the strength of Catholic religion. Brodie and Jenson (1988, 1996) lift the argument to the next higher level, to the party

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1 The cultural interpretation in Horowitz’ first chapter has been much more celebrated but it seems at odds with the rest of his book, which is structural in focus.
system as such and its role in framing the agenda: Liberals and Conservatives engage in bourgeois obfuscation while the NDP is timid.2

Interest in an apparent nullity was probably bound to fade, and besides, fashions change. Even in the 1980s, empirical research on the question was dominated by sociologists or sociological journals; political scientists were already voting with their feet. In the 1990s, the question faded tout court, along with the NDP itself. Comprehensive accounts mention class or union affiliation, but only in passing (Nevitte et al. 1999; Blais et al. 2002; Gidengil et al. 2006; Johnston et al. 1992 is a qualified exception). In recent years, the notable exceptions are Parker and Stephenson (2008) and Janzen and Young (2009).

The 2011 election, with the NDP breaking through to Official Opposition status and enjoying a substantial footing in Quebec, is a call for reconsideration. Such reconsideration would be warranted anyway, as, notwithstanding distinguished individual contributions, the ensemble of writing on class and the NDP is unsatisfactory. Once Alford threw down the gauntlet, Canadian scholars tended to ignore the obvious comparators. Notwithstanding universalist talk (much of it neo-Marxist), analysis was resolutely parochial.3 The data are almost always old, old in some cases even when they were analysed: Erickson (1981), for instance, works with the 1965 Canadian Election Study. This is nobody’s fault. When class was the ruling preoccupation, lead times for access to data were long and file management and computing were cumbersome. By the time access and analysis became easy, interest in the question had faded. It is time for renewal of the frontal assault.

To this end, comparative experience suggests that we look, on one hand, at mobilizational factors--forces that might drive class politics--and, on the other, constraints and opportunities--variables that might suppress, amplify, or condition the mobilizing factors. Most of the mobilizing factors lie in political economy: industrialization, urbanization, concentration of workers in large firms, and--most critically--numerical mobilization of labour into unions and centralization of union decision-making. But political parties have considerable scope for initiative themselves. Constraints and opportunities range from economics through political structures to political culture. In the economy, the relative place of agriculture can be critical. In political structures, key elements include how resistant the state is to incorporation of the working class into the electorate and how disposed other parties, especially ones of the centre, are to cooperation with organized labour or with left parties. In culture, the key is the country’s ethnoreligious diversity. None of these relationships is simple.

**CLASS IN WESTMINSTER ELECTIONS**

Anglo-American democracies offer an obvious basis for comparison. I propose to modify Alford’s case selection slightly, by focusing on the Westminster systems, and substituting New Zealand for the US. Notwithstanding geographic proximity and the history of transborder union

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2 This argument was anticipated with eerie prescience by Zipp and Smith (1982).

3 Again, Janzen and Young (2009) are a notable exception, but focussed on organization and finance rather than on electoral foundations.
activism, the US is not a useful comparator for this essay. As a presidential system, its institutional context has profoundly different implications for party organization and strategy from those in parliamentary systems. The state of the theory on the matter is represented by Shugart and Carey (1992) and Carey and Shugart (1995), but Seymour Martin Lipset (1954, 1960) anticipated the issue years ago. Although Lipset often made transborder comparisons, the comparison in his 1954 article goes to the question of why Canada has a social democratic party and the US does not, and his answer anticipates the now-prevailing institutionalist view. If the question is strength or weakness, as opposed to existence, institutional convergence may be a virtue (but see Iversen and Soskice 2006). To be sure, the four Westminster polities exhibit institutional variation of their own: only Britain and Canada currently operate under the First Past the Post formula; Australia uses the alternative vote; and New Zealand now uses a fully proportional formula. But the left has remained highly consolidated in Australia and remarkably so in New Zealand.

The next question is how to represent the system’s class foundations. In contrast to Alford and to the mainstream represented by Evans (1999a), I propose three indicators: occupation, union membership, and income:

• Occupation needs no further justification, as it is the canonical indicator. What might need justification is a focus on the traditional contrast between manual workers and all others. The literature has moved in the direction of increased nuance, as did Canadian analysis in the 1980s. In part, this seems driven by the declining distinctiveness of manual workers as well as by shrinkage in their overall share of the labour force, even as the labour left continues to be electorally resilient. The chief difficulty is that the Canadian data do not readily admit such nuance most years. (Indeed, employment data do not even appear in all Canadian Election Studies, a point I return to.) But there seems to be an additional conceptual difficulty. The distinctiveness of certain occupational groupings (highly-educated knowledge workers in particular) hardly seems like an expression of class politics, understood as essentially about political economy. Rather, their distinctiveness seems grounded in culture, specifically in rejection of moral traditionalism. Research based on a class indicator that sums across all categories in a nuanced occupational group classification risks conflating economic and non-economic dimensions of choice. Manza and Brooks (1999) is a case in point. Better for my purposes to stick with the old occupational distinction. As it happens, it will not stay long on this paper’s stage.

• Union membership in the household has emerged as the standard indicator in Canadian empirical work. It regularly differentiates NDP support, and so is an obvious point of cross-national comparison. And the union movement is everywhere a critical mobilizational factor on the left (Bartolini 2000). Even if the fundamental interest lies in occupation, the union movement can amplify the class divide—or mute it, if union membership is shifting into white-collar employment groups. The very fact that the parties in question are labour parties points to the critical character of union membership, whatever the occupation.

• Income is curiously neglected in the literature, but seems an obvious factor to consider. Income differences in US voting, which have grown massively since the 1970s, are striking (see, for
instance, Bartels 2008), which makes us ask, what about other countries? And part of what makes occupation interesting is its impact on income, with follow-on implications for life chances more generally. Although union members’ incomes are slightly above the median, the size of the labour movement is a major factor in the distribution of post-tax and transfer income, indeed of market income, as is the political power of the left (Pontusson et al. 2002). As a complication, labour parties seem to be abandoning workers not in union-protected occupations (Pontusson 1995; Rueda 2008). All this suggests that income should be investigated in its own right.\textsuperscript{4} To standardize across years and countries, income is presented in terciles and bounded by 0 and 1.\textsuperscript{5}

The estimation strategy bridges the divide between pro- and anti-Alford index camps. Coefficients from maximum-likelihood strategies yield estimates of effect that are independent of marginal distributions on the dependent variable, and so indicate the “intrinsic” class effect. At the same time, Table 1 also presents marginal effects for each factor, ceteris paribus, with the other factors set at their means. These estimations should not be seen as statements about the total effect of any one factor. The presence of all three factors could mask the total impact from a factor further back in the causal chain. Alternatively (as will become evident for Canada below) the coefficient of direct impact can overestimate the total impact if that relationship is conditional in some way on the other variables in the setup. Data appear from two periods, early and late. The early estimations are from the 1960s where possible and the early 1970s where necessary. This stands for the late days of the golden age of class politics. Data from the early-mid-2000s captures the recent period, when class differences in behaviour allegedly have declined.

The basic pattern identified by Alford in the 1950s was still in place in the 1960s-70s, with Canada in last place.\textsuperscript{6} Most striking among individual elements is manual employment in Britain,

\textsuperscript{4} Including income in an estimation raises the matter of missing values, which are much more ubiquitous for income than for other indicators. The best way to deal with the problem is to conduct a Bayesian imputation, which conveys a more honest sense of uncertainty than would a deterministic imputation. But the Bayesian approach does not derive believable confidence intervals for estimated marginal effects. Comparison of estimates with and without imputation indicated that little was lost simply by taking the income variable as is and accepting the missing values.

\textsuperscript{5} The exception is Australia in the 2000s, for which the income brackets are quintiles. This was how the income data have been coded in the CSES Module 2, my source for the recent Australian election study. Although the Australian indicator has the same 0,1 bounds as for the other estimations, this probably biases the 2000s coefficient upward slightly relative to a tercile framework.

\textsuperscript{6} The indication of “power,” E(PRE), merits spelling out, as power indicators for estimations with limited dependent variables are controversial. The indicator here is based on the percent correctly predicted (PCP), intuitively the most satisfying representation (in contrast with the manipulation of likelihood ratios that typifies the other family of power indicators). The PCP is then adjusted for the percent that would be predicted by the null model; this takes the dependent variable’s marginal distribution off the table, so to speak. But conventional adjustments arguably overcorrect, and fail to distinguish cases where the predicted probability barely clears the 0.50 threshold from those where the prediction is more certain. E(PRE = proportionate reduction in error) takes this difference into account in a quasi-Bayesian fashion. See Herron (1999).
although occupation also shines through for Australia. Also consistent with Alford is the absence of effect in Canada. For income effects, the outstanding site is Australia, where movement from the bottom to the top tercile decreases the Labor vote by 20 percentage points. There is a hint of an income effect for Britain, but again none for Canada. Where Canada shines through, sort of, is for the union effect. Being in a union family increases the probability of an NDP vote by about 10 percentage points. The marginal effect for Britain and Australia is about twice as great, but this reflects the very size of the labour parties in those countries. The coefficients for each country are all roughly the same, and all well within one standard error of each other. So the intrinsic power of union membership is the same in all three places. The fate of the labour party varies across the countries but not, arguably, because of factors specific to the union movement.

**[Table 1 about here]**

By the 2000s, things had changed, although mainly for Britain: the British model is now the weakest overall and each element has retreated. Yet this was a period in which Labour governed. The Australian and Canadian patterns were quite like those for the earlier period (although the Australian income effect shrank) and the New Zealand pattern, now on screen, is quite like the contemporary Australian one. For Canada, the marginal effect of union membership increased.

Ebb and flow in the distinctiveness of the NDP’s union basis has characterized the entire postwar period, as shown by Figure 1. The figure plots estimated marginal effects and associated 95% confidence intervals for all elections since 1940. It combines evidence from each Canadian Election Study with data from Gallup polls stretching from 1940 to 1988. Many individual Gallup polls asked respondents to recall their vote in the preceding election, and marginal distributions are fairly accurate and quite insensitive to time since the last election. Between widely spaced elections the merging of Gallup files can cumulate to very large samples, as the narrow confidence bands for some years indicate. Key moments in CCF/NDP history appear on the plot. The 1945 election is an early high point, possibly not matched until 2006. The union vote is generally more distinct in the the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s than in the 1950s. The 1990s are a disaster, but the 2000s reveal a generally greater distinctiveness than any earlier decade. Visual comparison between Figures 1 and 2 suggests that this pattern corresponds somewhat to the overall success of the party: 1945 as the breakthrough year; stronger after the organizational renewal of 1961, weak in the strange decade of the 1990s, strong again with the party’s recovery in 2004. But overall strength does not account for all of the shifts: although the party surged in 1945 and in the 2000s, in none of those years was its strength as great as in the 1980s. The figure also reveals an awkward fact about Table 1: in Canada, union membership pulls against income and employment. Retreating to the simple bivariate setup, as in Figure 1, reduces the union coefficient.

**[Figure 1 about here]**

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7 The effect is also absent in a bivariate estimation.

8 The relative width of the 1967 gap is not a measurement artifact. The measurement peculiarity for Australia pertains solely to the later estimation.
On one hand, Alford’s story of a weak class basis for voting in Canada remains broadly true. Canada may less distinct than it was, but not because of change in its own pattern. On the other hand, there is an economic story for Canada, just one that is confined to the union/non-union contrast. Union membership has an intrinsic effect comparable to that elsewhere but this effect has not delivered an overall share to rival that for the other Labour parties.

**THE MOBILIZATION OF LABOUR**

At a minimum, class politics would seem to presuppose the mobilization of an industrial workforce. This includes the initiation of industrial occupations, the concentration of that workforce in urban places and large firms, and the appearance of labour organizations (Shalev and Korpi 1980; Archer 2008). In all of these, Canada was a laggard (see for instance, Huber and Stephens 2001), so perhaps it should not be surprising that the CCF/NDP had a late start and stunted growth.

In fact, although a robust union movement is ultimately a critical prop for the left (as Janzen and Young 2009 show for Canada), the full cross-national record gives us no specific expectation for the early years. On the European landscape, social mobilization may work longitudinally but not cross-sectionally, especially for the late 19th and early 20th centuries:

… whether one considers the *timing* of industrialization, the *length* of industrial-sector predominance, or *levels* of sector occupation, it does not seem that socialist mobilization was earlier or stronger in the more industrially advanced economies.” (Bartolini 2000, p. 140)

This generalization also applies to labour mobilization. Nor was it obvious that the initiative lay with labour once it was mobilized, as opposed to the independent initiative of political parties. The willingness of parties already in place to accommodate labour is very important, and this in turn reflects earlier history. Particularly critical seems to be the place of liberals. Depending on how they fit into pre-class politics, some liberals are willing to ally with labour, some are radically capitalist, and yet others vacillate (*Ibid.*, pp. 420-2).

Moreover, urban proletariats do not seem all that privileged as originators of left party support. Lipset (1960, pp. 232-6) noticed that producers situated far from population centres and with insecure incomes, even ones who owned their means of production--such as farmers and fishermen--were particularly susceptible to appeals from the left. Also pushing in this direction were communication structures that facilitated internal exchange even as they screened information from the outside (*Ibid.*, p. 249). More generally, left parties’ early bargains with the agricultural sector are critical to their later success (Bartolini 2000, Tables 8-3 and 8-4). One

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9 The British example is telling and hardly isolated. The party predilection of the early labour leadership was generally Liberal, but met resistance from elements in that party. In a sense, the Liberals kicked labour out. Although the formation of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) was critical, the ILP sought organized labour more than the reverse. And even so, the Labour Representation Committee formed in 1900 and heavily populated with ILP personnel operated more as a parliamentary lobby group and adjunct of the Liberals than as a party in its own right (Ball 1981, pp. 44-9). It is not fanciful to posit that had the Liberals held themselves together, including on the very question of attitude to unions, they may have remained the coordination pole for the labour movement.
pattern is where farmers form cooperatives and federate, which then facilitates bargains with urban workers.\textsuperscript{10} Figure 2 lays out the longitudinal pattern for Canada. At the start of the 1930s, less than 10 percent of the labour force was unionized. Among non-agricultural workers the percentage then began to climb as US industrial unions, mainly affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), extended their organizing activity northward. But Canada’s continuing agricultural character is shown by the effective stasis in union membership relative to the labour force as a whole. Only in the 1940s, with the rapid industrialization induced by World War II did organized labour start its truly consequential growth.\textsuperscript{11} Masked by the figure are two additionally important facts. First is the pre-1956 division in the house of labour, mentioned above, between the TLC and CCL. Second, several key CCL unions had Communist leadership and this led to hostility on both sides of the divide. Purging Communists was critical both to labour unity and to any prospect of party affiliation (Abella 1973). But union density did climb and considerable unity, outside Quebec at least, was achieved.

The electoral side could be read as echoing this mobilization pattern. The 1945 election was one critical moment. Although the ultimate result was disappointing, given the CCF’s success in Saskatchewan (1944) and near-miss in Ontario (1943), the 1945 share nonetheless was nearly double that of 1940. Another marker might be 1961. The formalization of the link between organized labour and the party system in that year also brought electoral gains. And a rough correspondence can be seen between post-1961 trends in union density and vote share. But in the bigger picture, correspondences are weak. On one hand, the CCF’s origins precede the great surge in labour mobilization. What is more, the early geography of CCF electoral strength is unrelated to the aggregate position of organized labour. Figure 3 shows that the breakthrough region, as is well known, is the West, especially Saskatchewan and British Columbia. But in those provinces the union movement was less advanced than the party and no more successful than in some provinces where the NDP was weak. In Saskatchewan, farmers supplied critical

\textsuperscript{10} Tensions may remain: socialists have to make their peace with private ownership; the presence of an agricultural proletariat can be an issue; and then there is the price of food.

\textsuperscript{11} Why was unionization so late even within industrial occupations? One issue may have been the lack of concentration in employment. Large firms are easier to organize and this seems especially important for industrial, as opposed to craft unions (Bartolini 2000, pp. 158–9; Lipset 1960, Table VIII, p. 251). So the industrialization of the 1940s might have been as important for its concentration as for its sheer scale. Unionization might also have been inhibited by a hostile regulatory climate. The Industrial Disputes Investigation Act did acknowledge industrial reality but its emphasis on postponement, inquiry, and cooling off probably discouraged strike activity (Craven 1980). Even though the Act was struck down in the 1920s, it remained the basis of provincial labour law. Only with the proclamation of order-in-council PC 1003 in 1944 did the regulatory climate become accommodative. Riddell (1993) attributes the 5-10-year lag relative to the US to this regulatory impediment. As with the older Act, PC 1003 became the basic model for provincial action. All this said, the cross-national evidence is actually quite equivocal on the relationship between regulatory constraint and union mobilization (Bartolini 2000, Table 6-10, p. 290 et passim).
leavening and in British Columbia the early strongholds were commonly isolated resource towns. In both provinces, Lipset's (1960) observations about resource producers are mirrored. A comparison between Saskatchewan, on one hand, and Manitoba and Ontario, on the other, testifies to the importance of party initiative. Manitoba Liberals were less hostile than their counterparts further west and the province’s farmers could not countenance an alliance with organized labour (Morton 1967). The Liberals, for their part, courted farmers shrewdly in both Manitoba (Morton 1950, pp. 122-3, 243) and Ontario (Saywell 1991, pp. 82-3, 96). When it came to labour, however, the Ontario Liberals, especially under Mitchell Hepburn, were markedly hostile (Ibid.; Horowitz 1968).

And when labour mobilization did take off, the party did really follow suit, not even when it morphed into the NDP. The national gains of 1945 largely dissipated, according to Figure 2, and a similar pattern followed 1961. From 1945 to 1988, the gap between union density and the NDP vote averaged 10 to 15 points, depending on the density indicator. And the rhythm was not promising: 1945 and 1962 saw the party surge and the gap close; subsequent elections saw it widen, as labour mobilization continued but the party stagnated or grew only marginally. Regional patterns show a similar disconnect. The party’s electoral strength remained distinctly Western even as labour mobilization proceeded nation-wide. And by the 1960s union density exceeded NDP electoral returns almost everywhere.

In case there is any doubt, Table 2 formalizes these observations. First consider the panel regression, which suggests that the left vote grows with union density. The rate is scarcely spectacular, as the facts of the Canadian case already suggest. Even with no union members, the expected CCF/NDP vote in a province is about 10 percent and growth in union density as actually experienced in most provinces would roughly double that share. This of course roughly tracks the actual experience of the party from 1935 to 2008, but says nothing definitive about unionization as a causal mechanism. That the fixed-effects setup indicates different intercepts for different provinces (this is the import of the F test) is also completely consistent with the evidence in Figure 2. Finally, the decade by decade cross-sections indicate no link between union density and the vote--until 2011. The Canadian pattern replicates the Europe-wide one found by Bartolini (2000).

12 Silverstein (1968, pp. 448-51) confirms that even in the 1960s, crop ecology remained a factor in the Saskatchewan NDP vote.

13 Dropping Quebec from the estimation changes none of these conclusions. I also performed Granger causality tests within provinces but could identify coefficients only with election-year-data, as opposed to the decade aggregates in Table 2. The problem is that provincial union density estimates are not available annually, so for any year the value is an imputation from the decade and values repeat within the decade. For what it is worth, however, the pattern is very suggestive and consistent with the impression made by Figure 3. Wald tests suggest that labour mobilization follows NDP growth in the West and Ontario, leads NDP growth in Atlantic Canada (except Newfoundland), and the two are simply unrelated in Quebec.
Finally, although the NDP remained weaker than its Westminster comparators (at least until 2011), this could no longer lay at the feet of Canada’s late mobilization of labour. It is true that Canadian union density never reached the stratospheric numbers elsewhere. The right panel of Figure 2 suggests that as recently as 1980 one-half to two-thirds of workers in Britain, Australia and New Zealand were unionized, while the Canadian number barely brushed 40 percent. We cannot be sure that the bases for comparison are completely consistent across these OECD data but the contrasts are too sharp to be mere artifacts. In the new century, however, Canada emerges as the most unionized of these four countries. The unionization rate has fallen in Canada but not as much as elsewhere. The drops in Australia and New Zealand are especially striking. And yet in all three of these places Labour governed for several post-drop years. Evidently, the electoral strength of the left in other countries is no longer tied to labour mobilization. And yet it still seems reasonable to ask why the resilience of the Canadian labour movement has not helped the NDP more.

**The Competing Claims of Culture**

Perhaps the problem is Catholics. Or Quebec. On the European landscape, cultural heterogeneity is clearly a major barrier to the growth of the left. Linguistic and religious diversity separately constrain that growth, although on different time scales: early in the 20th century, religion was the chief barrier; by the end, language had taken over (Bartolini 2000, Table 4.4 et passim). The power of culture is not a European peculiarity. Lijphart (1979) argues more generally that where class competes with language and religion, class loses. And of all rich, capitalist countries, Canada is the most diverse, more diverse even than Switzerland and Belgium (Fearon 2003, Appendix, pp. 215-16). Fearon’s diversity index goes to the heart of the matter: in round numbers, Canada is nearly half Catholic and one-quarter French. No rich country that has so even a religious split has so large a linguistic minority. No rich country that has a sharp linguistic divide has so finely balanced a religious one.

As in Europe, the religious divide seems to be the historic starting point; only later does language take over. Addressing the Canadian situation, Baum (1980) identifies an ideological tension inside Catholicism. Papal encyclicals on economic questions condemn capitalism but defend property. Notwithstanding their hostility to capitalism, they also condemn socialism for its Marxist and materialist components and its advocacy of class conflict. (The most relevant distillation is the 1931 encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* by Pius XI.) In the Anglosphere, bishops sometimes evaded the issue by distinguishing anglo-style Labour, with its crypto-Christian moral earnestness, from continental Marxism. This cultural pattern also characterized the CCF (*Ibid.*, Chapter One; Allen 1971; Young 1969), building as it did on earlier initiatives by Protestant clergy and prominent laity (Cook 1985). But the language of class conflict that accompanied the transition from the CCF’s founding conference in Calgary to its manifesto in Regina may have

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14 And some of the drop is Canadian union density is artifactual. The abrupt drop in 1997 reflects that fact that the Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act (CALURA) was terminated. Where CALURA required exact reporting of unionization and collective agreements, estimates are now based on the Canada Labour Force Survey (LFS). Although the LFS does enable reporting on the full household, the shift produced an immediate drop in measured density.
frightened Canadian clergy (Baum 1980, pp. 99-118). And of course, Canada is only partly in the Anglosphere. If bishops outside Quebec were initially hesitant, the Quebec hierarchy condemned the CCF outright, and this echoed beyond the province. Lipset (1950/1968, Chapter 8) shows that the Saskatchewan CCF was initially resisted by non-Anglo-Saxon, especially Catholic voters (as well as by poorer ones). In British Columbia, prominent voices inside the party were publicly equivocal about the very wisdom of courting Catholic support (Baum, p. 131). Although Lipset argues that by 1944 ethnoreligious differences were largely effaced, Silverstein (1968, pp. 456-60 and Table 10, p. 469) argues that by the 1960s they had recrudesced. The bishops for their part may have encouraged ambiguity. In 1943, they stated that

“… the faithful are free to support any political party upholding the basic Christian traditions of Canada, and favouring the needed reforms in the social and economic order which are demanded with such urgency in pontifical documents.” (Baum, p. 129)

The CCF no longer stood condemned, but neither was it absolved by name.

Following the European model, the CCF/NDP vote initially followed Canada’s religious geography, as Figure 3 shows. Its appeal stopped at the Ottawa River (although with strength in the 1940s, ironically, on Catholic-dominated Cape Breton Island). But as the decades passed the party grew out from its Western and (later) Ontario base. By the 1990s, the NDP’s geography and that of Catholicism no longer matched.

If the evanescence of religious constraint recapitulates the European pattern, so does its displacement by language—or linguistic geography. Late in the 20th century, the exclusion zone for the NDP had become Quebec. Although the party made inroads in the province in the 1980s, the rise of the Bloc Québécois erased those gains. With the NDP’s resurrection in the 2000s, Quebec stood out for its resistance to the tide.

All these aggregate patterns are mirrored in the survey evidence. Notwithstanding the historical sequence, it is easier to start unpacking the data with Quebec. Whether that region’s early hesitation about the NDP was indeed on religious grounds or on linguistic ones, the fact remains that before the Quiet Revolution, the province was the primary concentration of Catholic religious practice. The top panel of Figure 4, accordingly, looks at how Quebec restrains the expression of union membership in Canada as a whole. It reproduces the all-Canada plot from Figure 1 and then shows what happens when Quebec respondents are dropped. For visual clarity, the Gallup and CES data are presented separately although both on the 1940-2011 time span. Then this logic is repeated within the rest of Canada, with the top line from Panel A reproduced in Panel B and then compared to estimates derived when non-Quebec Catholics are dropped.

[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

With Quebec set aside (top panel), the impact of union membership nearly doubles. Instead of the gaps below 10 percentage points that characterize the pre-2004 all-Canada picture, the gap outside Quebec is regularly between 10 and 15 points, and larger again from 2004 on. The impact of dropping Quebec is especially sharp in the Gallup series with its small confidence intervals. But in the years of survey overlap, 1965-88, the point estimates of gaps are very similar. There are moments of Quebec-Canada convergence, with the CES suggesting that for
1988 the Canada-wide focus on free trade with the US produced a geographically uniform response. After 1990 there may have been a general narrowing of Quebec’s distinctiveness, first as the rest of Canada joined Quebec in shunning the NDP and then as union families become more distinct in both places.

Putting Catholics outside Quebec to the side expands the union effect still further, or it does for earlier decades. The impact is especially dramatic before 1960, where an effect in the lower teens is typically transformed into one in the upper teens. Gaps are smaller after 1960 but remain clearly discernible into the 1980s. In the 1990s, it disappears with the NDP’s overall retreat and does not reappear with the party’s renaissance in the 2000s. So for a time, Catholics did indeed resist the CCF/NDP—but they got over it. In doing so, perhaps, they may have helped the NDP in its post-2000 recovery. A cap on the party’s growth was removed, as it were.

**THE GEOGRAPHY OF COORDINATION**

But the party still did not grow much, not before 2011. In the survey estimations, even with Quebec residents and non-Quebec Catholics removed, the union/non-union gap never reaches 20 points. Four times it reaches 17 points and all other times the gap is rather smaller. Similarly, the party’s overall share remains modest even when the calculation is confined to non-Catholics outside Quebec. At its highest points, 2011 and 1988, the party received about one-quarter of this vote, and in most elections rather less. In its historically strongest provinces, Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and Manitoba, the party’s maximum shares are, respectively, 33, 37, and 34 percent of the vote. The corresponding median shares are 27, 27, and 22. So the party was never that triumphant in the least Catholic places nor that big a winner in its most favourable sociological contexts.

Setting aside Quebeckers and Catholics still leaves us short of explaining the weak union/non-union cleavage and the NDP’s historically stunted overall share. That is, doing so does not explain these outcomes in a compositional sense. But focussing on composition and reasoning from marginal effects to overall patterns misses an important mechanism. One hint of this is in the survey data themselves, as represented in Table 1. There we observe that although the marginal effects of union membership differ across the countries, they do so because of the distribution on the dependent variable. For a pro-left impulse of a given strength, the amplification of the impulse by union membership, as shown by the raw probit coefficient, is roughly the same in all four countries; in this respect Canada is not a laggard. The Canadian problem is captured not so much by the union coefficient as by the intercept: the NDP starts the race well behind its counterparts in the other countries. The pro-left impulse that blows through Canadian elections has been feeble.

The Canadian case is a particularly vivid example of a point made by Boix (2009, p. 510):

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15 Note that some election years are missing from the plot that excludes Catholics. None of the polls before 1949 asked about respondents’ religion nor did any between the 1957 and 1958 elections. This also happened in occasional polls between other elections in the 1950s, so even where there are points on the Catholic plot, their underlying poll sources are not always identical to those for the more inclusive plot.
once some parties become established as the main electoral contenders, voters are suddenly more constrained in their behavior. The main parties constantly appeal to their own electoral viability, as already proven in previous elections, in opposition to new, perhaps more preferred but as yet untested candidates, to maintain the allegiance of voters.

This electoral advantage ... has an additional consequence. It gives parties the capacity and time to adjust policy promises and particular candidates to shifts in the electorate. 

The NDP's rivals have not just been bystanders in this, they have manoeuvred to keep the party down. Or at least, the Liberals have, echoing the strategically critical actions of liberals in most countries (Bartolini 2000). If Liberal appeals to their own viability rang hollow in 2011, for many decades such appeals were highly plausible. The appeals worked off patterns already identified in this paper's compositional analyses, for Quebec and Catholics. Now I need to present these factors as contextual, as carrying implications for voters outside Quebec and for individuals on both sides of the denominational divide.

For both factors, a telling counterfactual has been with us all along: provincial elections. Although the geography of religion, and even more the sui generis pattern of Quebec's participation in national elections, testify to the fragmented character of the polity, the fact that federal elections require some form of coast-to-coast coordination makes the behaviour of voters in some regions relevant to the behaviour of voters in other regions. So if heavily Catholic regions persist in supporting Liberals, voters in less Catholic places must concede the Liberals some kind of strategic privilege and this may leak into the federal vote. Similarly, the strength of the NDP west of the Ottawa River makes it relevant in federal elections to voters east of that boundary. But in provincial elections, especially as they are staggered, pan-Canadian mutual reference should weaken to null. The sociology may be the same but not the institutional constraints.

The observable implications of this discontinuity are five.

- The NDP's provincial vote distribution should be generally more dispersed than its federal one.
- The bulk of this extra dispersion should be on the high side: the average share should be higher in provincial than in federal elections as a reflection of the diminished relevance of the party's historically weak position in Quebec.
- In the NDP's weakest provinces the federal-provincial difference may be reversed. In those provinces, voters who prefer the NDP might feel compelled to rally to one of the old parties, to defeat whichever of them they find least acceptable (Duverger 1963; Cox 1997). This rallying could reflect proximity on a left-right scale or on a cultural scale that divides Protestants from Catholics; in the latter case, proto-New Democrats could gravitate to either of the old parties.

16 Although they were hampered in this by their own history, witness the historical legacy of Mitchell Hepburn, among others.
depending on their cultural predilections. In provinces of relative NDP strength, in contrast, this “Duvergerian” impulse will be visited on one of the old parties, not on the NDP itself.

The first three implications refer to the party’s overall share. The remaining two refer to gaps in its support, the union and denominational cleavages.

- Variation across the landscape in the impact of union membership should be greater in provincial than in federal elections. It should certainly be stronger in provincial elections where the NDP is basically strong, but it may be weaker provincially where the party is weak.

- The religious pattern implicit in Figure 3 should be stronger in provincial elections than in federal ones. The NDP should do better among Catholic provincially than federally where Catholics are few in number, but worse provincially than federally where Catholics are numerous and can resist imposition of a class agenda.

Each of these expectations is basically fulfilled.

Summary statistics on the federal and provincial distributions appear in Table 3. To be clear, the distributions are over both time and space. To maximize comparability between the distributions, provincial data are for the elections temporally closest to a federal one. Ironically, this produces fewer provincial than federal observations, as the crowding of federal elections in periods of party system change and minority governments produces provincial elections with multiple federal matches. The average provincial share for the CCF/NDP is 17 percent, where the federal equivalent is 15. At the low end, the provincial distribution hits the 25th percentile at 3 percent; in federal elections this percentile is 6 percent. But the 75th percentile for provincial results is 31 percent, well above the federal figure of 24 percent. And where the federal maximum is 44 percent, the provincial one is 55 percent. Tellingly, the provincial share is massively more dispersed: a provincial standard deviation of 16.2 as compared with a federal one of 11.2.

The functional link between electoral arenas appears in Figure 5. Coordinates are federal and provincial NDP shares, province by province, for each federal election and the temporally closest provincial one. The curve of relationship is a fractional polynomial. The vertical spikes indicate 95% confidence intervals and the 45° degree line appears to help visual orientation. Points on the scatterplot are labelled by province. Over most of its range, the curve of relationship lies above the 45° degree line, such that the maximum gap between a given federal result and its temporally closest equivalent is about eight percentage points. This space is basically populated by British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. The function and the 45° degree line intersect at 10 percent, roughly, such that below this value provincial outcomes mainly trail federal ones, rather than the reverse. The points in this range come mainly from Atlantic Canada and Quebec.

The projection of these arena effects onto the class divide appears in Figure 6. It combines all Canadian Election Study files, 1965-2011, to show the marginal effect of union membership in federal and provincial elections. The figure glosses over temporal variation to convey a big picture. It does this in part to maximize the power of the survey estimation. But it also reflects
the fact that by the 1960s, the greater part of the growth in union density had occurred and regional differences in density had become small. In the figure, a westward tilt is visible in both lines, but much more clearly in the provincial line than the federal one. The tilt is not perfectly monotonic, as Atlantic Canada is more class divided than Quebec and Alberta is an outlier in the West, but the point stands. In federal elections the tilt may be visible but it barely clears the threshold for rejecting a null hypothesis of no regional differences outside Quebec. The only region where the union effect is significantly different from most others is British Columbia. In provincial elections, in contrast, the gradient is steep. In British Columbia, the union contrast is twice that in Ontario and nearly five times that in Atlantic Canada. Saskatchewan and Manitoba do not quite achieve British Columbia’s eminence, but in those provinces too that gap with the rest of the country is significant both statistically and substantively. And, to come back to the main point, in provinces of relative NDP strength the impact of union membership is higher in provincial than in federal elections. In provinces of relative NDP weakness, the opposite is true.

Figure 7 does for religion what Figure 6 does for class. The strategy here must be quite different, however. Figure 3 indicates that over most of its history, the geography of the NDP vote was under the control of factors other than union membership. The simplest interpretation of the pattern was in terms of the incidence of Catholics. But that regional pattern eventually weakened, a fact that also leaks into the survey-based estimations in Figure 4. And yet, unlike the case for union density, regional differences in religious composition (as opposed to religious impact) remained largely stable over the full period. Given all this, the best approach is make the estimations sensitive to time and to focus on aggregate patterns. Accordingly, Figure 7 looks at the relationship between the provincial percentage Catholic and the NDP vote share, focussing on the provincial-federal contrast. To an extent, this is just a rearrangement of the data in Figure 3, but making the percentage Catholic rather than degrees of longitude the horizontal axis greatly facilitates graphical exposition. To rule out the biggest potential confound and to create a parallel with the compositional comparison of Figure 4, Quebec elections are dropped from the analysis. The estimation does not distinguish between compositional and contextual processes, but Figure 4 indicates that effects in Figure 7 must be mainly contextual, especially in recent decades.

The central point, in any case, is the contrast between provincial and federal arenas. In early decades, this was not so dramatic, reflecting the general weakness of the CCF. Even so, the provincial pattern that dominates even now was basically visible in the 1940s. By that decade, the negative gradient on percentage Catholic was essentially one-to-one. For the 1930s to the 1950s, the federal gradient, although less steep, was of the same order of magnitude. The 1960s brought a qualitative change, but only on the federal side. On the provincial side the one-to-one gradient remained intact even as the whole line lifted. These were the decades when NDP governments started to appear in British Columbia and Manitoba as well as in Saskatchewan. In the 1970s, the NDP formed the Official Opposition in Ontario. Even in Alberta, the NDP under

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17 The biggest change was that Ontario became less distinctively Protestant.
Grant Notley was that province’s alternative voice, so to speak. But the NDP was still unable to reach far beyond its geographic core, and only recently has it become credible in parts of Atlantic Canada. On the federal side, in contrast, the relationship began to weaken as early as the 1960s and all but disappeared in the 1990s.

The electoral record provides one other counterfactual to the earlier history: the 2011 election. Before 1984, the Liberals routinely rolled out over 60 seats from that province, such that they were either the presumptive party of government or the only plausible coordination point for blocking the Conservatives. Even after 1984, they were more plausible than the NDP for taking the province back either from the Conservatives or the Bloc Québécois. The 2011 election refuted that claim, and the NDP’s breakthrough in Quebec was clearly critical to the party’s further success in the rest of the electorate (Soroka et al. 2011). If the NDP can hold much of its Quebec base, it is likely to benefit from further strategically-motivated adjustment. To the extent that this happens, then the historic context effect from Quebec, the suppression of the NDP vote outside Quebec, may turn on its head. The NDP could become the party of “national unity” and the coordination point for progressives, even reluctant ones.

**DISCUSSION**

Canada has been peculiar in certain gross features of left voting and the political weakness of organized labour, but it has not been so peculiar in the mechanisms that produced this result. Earlier work on the Canadian situation arguably partook of a general myopia in the English-speaking world about the evolution of class politics in the larger context of advanced capitalist societies. That myopia may extend to the ur-context, the United Kingdom itself, in portraying the displacement of the Liberals by Labour as inevitable.

In Canada, the spatiotemporal patterns for union mobilization and CCF/NDP growth were quite divergent. The NDP’s early growth might be said to precede that for organized labour even as the party later struggled, mostly without success, to keep up with the union movement. This seems inconsistent with the view that unionization is a necessary--and possibly sufficient--condition for left voting. The historic links between a labour party and the labour movement turn out to be variable and contingent. It is not unusual for left parties to become competitive before union densities surge. In this respect, the close ties of the early CCF to farmers is scarcely unusual. A strong labour movement may be critical to organizational consolidation and financial security for left parties, but this seems to be a product of later stages of Organizational and electoral history. And if the lag between union growth and the NDP vote seems strange, it is worth considering how great the lag was in the United Kingdom. Mass unionization in Britain preceded the breakthrough by Labour by several decades, and the electoral breakthrough may have required that the United Kingdom lose most of Ireland.

The cultural barriers to NDP growth are hardly peculiar to Canada, although much commentary on the Canadian left seems oblivious to just how diverse Canada was right from the start. Only in certain parts of the country could the illusion be fostered that Canada was just another British

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18 Some of this adjustment may be not so much strategic as sincere, as persons who all along would rather have voted NDP no longer have reason to hesitate.
overseas settler society. The very size of its Catholic community arguably makes it an electoral nucleus rather than a second-tier element in an electoral coalition with some other consideration--such as class--at its core. The contrast with Australia and Britain, where Catholics in their smaller numbers tend to vote Labour, is instructive.

Of course, Quebec is the biggest single chunk of the historic Catholic bloc. Discourse about socialism inside the Quebec church (and its branch in West; see Perin 1990) was unlikely to be part of the softer discourse in the rest of the English-speaking world. Notwithstanding the regional character of the church, primacy lay in Quebec and the hierarchy in that province sent a clear, if short-lived signal. Even though Quebec secularized and its discourse shifted to linguistic and national issues, the province remained the pivot for government formation right down to 1993. The existence of a regional pivot may the most distinctive feature of Canada in the Westminster world. It made the Liberal party a coordination point--even when the party did not itself win Quebec--for voters who could not stomach the Conservatives. Under an electoral formula that compounds even modest advantages, this may have been critical to staving off invasion from the left. The logic turned on its head in 2011, of course. By swinging to the NDP, Quebec has, ironically, made federal elections more like those in Australia.

A critical body of evidence for this paper’s arguments about Catholics and Quebec as barriers to NDP growth comes from a home-grown counterfactual, provincial elections. Discrepancies between Canadian provincial and federal elections have long occasioned comment. These discrepancies have grown, as provincial electorates seem resistant to federal trends. The logic that I argue to account for the discrepancies--indeed the discrepancies are offered as observable implications of the logic--may have outlasted the politics that spawned them. If the federal pattern holds, will it seep into provincial elections and make the two arenas more alike?
**APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES**

*Survey Data*

The integrated file of *Gallup* (Canadian Institute of Public Opinion) data originated with the UBC Data Library, which is an official depository. The impetus to build a file that encompassed the entire history of the poll originated with Jean Laponce. Among those who have worked in updating and cleaning the file have been Neil Sutherland, Jasjeet Sekhon, and Mark Pickup. The Gallup file is complete to late 2000, at which point Gallup survey fieldwork in Canada appears to have ceased. The movement of Gallup’s interviewing capacity out of Canada had worrisome effects on the data, especially that collected from francophones, hence my decision to cut off the series before the 1993 election.

The *Canadian Election Study* has been in existence for every election since 1965, except the 1972 one. The studies from 1965 to 1984 were all face-to-face, geographically clustered, and post-election, except for the 1980 study, which was by telephone but with a proper subset of the 1979 FTF sample. From 1988, the main body of the CES (and all data used in this paper) has been conducted by telephone on an RDD sample. Creating and updating the CES sample has been the responsibility of Amanda Bittner, John McAndrews, and Grace Lore.

*Australian National Political Attitudes* (1967) data were kindly furnished by Clive Bean while data from the 2004 *Australian Election Study* were furnished through the CSES Module 2. The 2005 *New Zealand Election Study Data* were downloaded from http://www.nzes.org/. The 2005 *British Election Study* data were downloaded from http://www.essex.ac.uk/bes/. Access to Political Change in Britain data from the 1960s proved surprisingly difficult, so I have resorted to the British sample in the *Political Action* Survey, for which fieldwork spanned November 1973 to February 1974.

*Election Returns*

Wherever possible election returns are based on official sources, usually the online site of the Chief Electoral Officer or equivalent for the jurisdiction in question. There is simply no denying the utility of Wikipedia and other online sources in speeding this process along, however. Provincial sources can be quite spotty for earlier years. Research assistants on this venture were Amanda Bittner and Şule Yaylaçi.

*Union Density*

Consistently measured union data are surprisingly hard to come by. The cross-national data originate with the OECD *StatExtracts* (http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?), which usually accepts what national statistical agencies report with a preference for data from surveys. The OECD methodological document can be found at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/2/35695665.pdf. For a useful account of the evolution of data gathering in Canada, see Akeampong (2004). I have supplemented data from Labour Canada with data from Kumar (1986). Data on union density by province was gathered through intermittent reports, usually one per decade. In all of this, assistance from Janine van Vliet (at Penn) and Amanda Bittner was vital.
REFERENCES


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**Table 2: Labour Mobilization and CCF/NDP Support** (Temporal unit is a decade)

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F(9,78) for all \(u_i\) = 0: 11.49, Prob > F = 0.0000

\(N\) 89 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10

\(^a\) Estimation by panel regression with fixed effects.

\(^b\) Estimation by ordinary least squares.
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Figure 1: Impact of Union Membership, 1940-2011

Note: Circles are point estimates for the marginal effect of union membership derived from bivariate probit estimates. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals. Non-voters excluded.
A. Late Unionization

B. Comparative Context

Figure 2: Labour Mobilization and the CCF/NDP Vote, the National Picture
Figure 3: Labour Mobilization and the CCF/NDP vote, Province and Decade

Note: entries for 2010 are for the 2011 election only.
A. Canada, with and without Quebec

B. Rest of Canada only, with and without Catholics

Figure 4: Unpacking the Cleavage
Figure 5: The Provincial Counterfactual I - Overall Shares

Note: Each coordinate represents the NDP share in a federal election in a province and the same party’s share in the provincial election closest in time to the federal one. Federal years from 1935 to 2008 inclusive.
Figure 6: The Provincial Counterfactual II - Union Impact
Figure 7: The Provincial Counterfactual III - Catholic Resistance

Note: Quebec excluded.