Local Context and Individual Attitudes about Ethnic Diversity in Canada

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Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Edmonton, Alberta, June 2012. The author would like to thank Reg Bibby at the University of Lethbridge for providing some of the necessary data. She is also indebted to Fred Cutler at the University of British Columbia for all his helpful comments and suggestions.
Due to changing immigration patterns over the past 50 years, a new kind of multiethnic and multicultural society has emerged across North America and Western Europe. In Canada, the demographic impact of immigration from ‘non-traditional’ countries has been considerable: the 2006 census found that almost 20 percent of Canadians were born outside Canada, and about 85 percent of these immigrants were from non-European countries. Compared to 35 years previous, the change is dramatic: in 1971, 15 percent of Canadians were foreign born, and only 24 percent were from non-European countries. For the most part, Canada has avoided the violent inter-ethnic conflicts recently experienced by Western countries grappling with this new ethnic diversity, such as England, France, and the Netherlands. Canada has not escaped controversy, however. The fierce public backlash over proposed Sharia arbitration in Ontario in 2005 is one example that hints at tension between Canada’s majority and minority ethnic groups.1 Other examples include the strained conditions that led to the 2007 Bouchard-Taylor Commission on reasonable accommodation of minorities in Quebec2 and the 2008 riots in Montreal after the police shot an unarmed Honduran teen.3

Still, Canada’s recent history has been characterized by relative interethnic harmony, despite its considerable ethnic diversity. Commentators attempting to explain this harmony refer to the fact that the country has had a federal policy of multiculturalism since 1971 (which was constitutionalized in 1982), as well as a long history of living with sizable French and Aboriginal minority communities (Adams 2007; Banting et al. 2006). While these facts may answer questions about Canada’s history of interethnic harmony, they fail to answer questions about the resilience of this harmony in the future. Census projections indicate that non-traditional immigration will result in further increases in diversity, so that in 2031 the visible minority population will have more than doubled from the 5.3 million reported in 2006. Compare this to the 12 percent projected increase for the rest of the population.4 Clearly, Canadian society will continue to diversify for the foreseeable future. An important question to ask is: As this

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diversification continues, can the relatively peaceful relations between ethnic groups be maintained? Will Canada’s history of negotiation between the majority and minority ethnic groups help societal harmony in the face of this new ethnic diversity? Will the country’s multicultural ethos and related policy framework provide durability for Canada’s multicultural project in the future? More specifically, will Canadians continue to support the interethnic status quo in the face of this new diversity? And, how do Canadians think about immigration and multiculturalism? What shapes the terrain of their attitudes? Does context matter, or are attitudes primarily shaped by individual-level factors? And, are these factors different for ethnic minorities, compared to the ethnic majority?

These questions motivate the analysis here. The durability of Canada’s interethnic harmony depends on the support of its citizens. The attitudes Canadians hold will determine whether their society – the first to become officially multicultural – continues its comparatively successful integration of its disparate ethnic groups. Attitudinal research outside of Canada has identified key ingredients – namely, prejudice, material self-interest, and political principles – that underpin ethnic diversity attitudes. But, few attempts have been made to apply this research agenda to the Canadian context. Even fewer attempts have been made to compare multiple determinants in a single analysis. While Canadians are generally supportive of ethnic diversity issues, deep divisions mark specific questions of how immigrant communities should be integrated into the larger Canadian society. This paper asks about the multiple motivations behind these divisions about ethnic diversity. Are negative attitudes about, say, the contributions of immigrants or the preservation of ethnic minority culture motivated by prejudice, particularly since the public rhetoric around immigrants and multiculturalism is often shorthand for racially distinct communities? Or, are negative attitudes fueled by the perception that newcomers themselves, or their demands on society and government, strain finite material resource, thus affecting people’s material self-interest? Or, are attitudes about ethnic diversity shaped by a clash of deeply held values that have little to do with prejudice or material concerns? Importantly, how might these factors depend on the individual’s ethnic minority or majority status?

In addition to these key attitudinal ingredients, Canada’s interethnic harmony also depends on understanding how people’s lived contexts affect their attitudes. The diversification of Canadian society forces this issue onto the research agenda. Fortunately, the Canadian
literature has begun to devote attention to the effect of context on attitudes about ethnic diversity. Typical questions ask whether diversity – or lack of diversity – in an individual’s neighborhood has an effect on her attitudes, and, if yes, whether this effect is negative or positive. Questions of interest in the present analysis include whether ethnic diversity in one’s local context shapes support of multiculturalism or immigration policies. For example, does contact with individuals who are perceived as ethnically different increase or decrease support for immigration? Does living amongst people of a different ethnicity make Canadians more or less aware of different ethnic identities, thus shaping support for multicultural norms and policies? Importantly, contextual influences also include factors beyond local diversity. For instance, how might local unemployment rates, a measure of a neighborhood’s material well-being, affect attitudes about immigration or multiculturalism? Do local income rates have similar effects? And, similar to individual-level determinants, do these contextual-level determinants depend on an individual’s ethnic status?

With individual-level survey data from the 1995, 2000, and 2005 waves of the Project Canada series, and neighborhood-level Canadian census data from 1996, 2001, and 2006, individual and contextual factors shaping the terrain of ethnic diversity attitudes are investigated here. In particular, I look at measures of prejudice, material self-interest, and political principles at the individual and local level. I compare their relative effects on individual attitudes about several topics related to multiculturalism, immigration, and ethnic diversity. I also test for interactive variations across majority and minority ethnic groups. Including multiple factors at different levels in a single analysis allows a unique comparison of their relative purchase in informing attitudes in the Canadian context. Discovering the interplay of factors shaping attitudes towards salient political issues will help predict the resiliency of the multicultural project in Canadian society. The health of Canada’s society depends on the harmonious relations between communities encouraged to be distinct by federal and provincial governments.

This paper begins with a brief outline of the debate around the determinants of attitudes toward ethnic diversity in Canada and elsewhere, beginning with the individual level and followed by the contextual level. After this, I empirically analyze the relative influence of ethnic prejudice, material self-interest, and political principles at both levels using multivariate regression analysis. The paper concludes with relevant discussion on the shape of attitudes in this politically salient realm in Western society.
Individual Level Influences

Like most political attitudes, there is no single factor that explains attitudes toward ethnic diversity. Past research on ethnic diversity attitudes tends to focus on three factors – ethnic prejudice, material self-interest, and commitment to deeply-held political principles. These three determinants, or “primary ingredients” (Kinder and Sanders 1996), largely determine the terrain of individual attitudes about a variety of issues related to the political and social integration of ethnic minority communities. Identifying precisely how these primary ingredients shape attitudes toward ethnic diversity can contribute considerably to understanding and prediction of the vicissitudes of public opinion about a political issue that has the potential to violently disrupt societal harmony.

At a minimum, explanations of attitudes about multiculturalism, immigration, and ethnic diversity need to consider the role of ethnic prejudice. Prejudice is typically defined as an antipathy derived from a faulty and inflexible generalization (Allport 1954). The general consensus is that prejudice is a relentless undercurrent in real-world interethnic relations in Canada and elsewhere, but the extent of its influence is debated (e.g., Sniderman and Hagen 1985). The Canadian literature tends to paint an optimistic picture of Canadians’ level of tolerance, suggesting that prejudice is comparatively low (e.g., Adams 2007; Berry and Kalin 1995). However, relying on this optimism is short-sighted. There is ample evidence in the comparative literature that people have a high propensity for intolerance against others perceived as different. Experiments in social psychology demonstrate how easily individuals divide themselves into groups and hold preferences for their perceived ingroup (i.e., ethnocentrism) and resent or feel threatened by perceived outgroups (i.e., prejudice) (e.g., Sherif et al. 1961; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Social identity and self-categorization theories propose that group membership becomes part of an individual’s identity, creating a ‘collective identity’ for this individual. These social psychological theories, thus, frames an individual’s identity as being closely bound to collective-level orientations, which in turn takes on considerable emotional significance (see Duckitt 1992; Pettigrew 1998; Turner 1999). Prejudice results from emotional investment in one’s ingroup if this investment negatively affects the evaluation of people outside the ingroup.

Theories of ethnocentrism and prejudice have become central to the political literature on race and ethnicity (e.g., Citrin et al. 2001; Kinder and Sears 1981; Mendelberg 2001). Research
has found that prejudice is a central determinant of a host of political behaviours and attitudes, such as voting for extreme right political parties (Husbands 1979), support or opposition to welfare policies (Gilens 1999; Quadagno 1994) and immigration levels (Brader et al 2008), preferences for multicultural policies (Citrin et al. 2001), and attitudes toward affirmative action and educational quotas (Kinder and Sanders 1996).

Canada tends to be an anomaly on issues related to ethnic diversity and is often a positive outlier when compared to other Western countries (Hiebert 2006). Citizens overwhelmingly support the idea of ethnic diversity and take pride in their perceived collective tolerance (Adams 2007; Reitz and Breton 1994). However, questions that dig beneath the surface reveal a more varied, and less rosy, picture. Evidence suggests that many Canadians view their society as composed of ethnically-defined groups, which is not, in and of itself, a negative orientation. However, Canadians often arrange these groups in a social hierarchy from the most acceptable to the least acceptable, usually with their own group on top (Berry et al. 1977; Berry and Kalin 1995; Kalin and Berry 1996; also see Goldstein 1985). This hierarchy hints at a deeply embedded prejudice and ethnocentrism that is not readily visible. Canadians’ policy attitudes also reflect a hierarchy of acceptable cultural expression encouraged by official multiculturalism policies. Relatively benign policies, such as government support for festivals and other cultural events, receive less public opposition than other, potentially more threatening, policies, such as third language education and ethnic-specific broadcasting (Berry et al. 1977). As seen in other countries, intolerant attitudes about ethnic minorities are related to electoral support for Canada’s right-wing political parties (Nevitte et al. 2000). Still, even after extensive analysis of tolerance, attachment to Canada, and views on multiculturalism, Berry and Kalin (1995) argue that prejudice in Canada is not generally a problem and that the country’s multicultural experiment is largely successful. While this assertion may be true, there is still a suggestion that the interethnic status quo contains seeds that could – given the right circumstances – become socially and politically disruptive.

Material self-interest is perhaps the most common – and most controversial – explanation for political behavior. Certainly, Downs’ (1957) theory of humans as single-minded pursuers of material advantage has been one of the most influential works on political motivation. How material self-interest fits into examinations of political behaviour, such as voting or policy opinions, is obvious. Less obvious is how it might fit into examinations of attitudes about ethnic
diversity. Research has found that material self-interest can shape ethnic attitudes in a subtle way. Often, these attitudes look prejudiced, but are not. Attitudes that appear to be targeting ethnic groups due to their ethnicity may simply be an individual’s concern about the impact of increased economic competition and increased material uncertainty (Kluegel and Smith 1983; Mayda 2006; Palmer 1996). These materially-based attitudes may target ethnic minorities in one scenario, but may target another group elsewhere. For example, Bobo (1983) argues that whites’ opposition to the American desegregation policy of busing was driven, at least partially, by material self-interest. The author claims that whites resented the change in their preferred state of affairs. This preference had little to do with racial segregation and more to do with privileged access and influence. Whites simply wanted to protect this perceived material advantage and would object to any policy that might threaten it. Similarly, Jackson and Esses (2000) find that perception of economic competition from immigrants decreases support for “empowerment” approaches to helping newcomers. Empowerment approaches tackle barriers to immigrant success so immigrants can help themselves, as opposed to direct assistance through aid. Thus, the more economically threatening immigrants seem, the less likely majority group members will want to encourage self-sufficiency. And, while Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) find no significant relationship between overt perceptions of job competition and negative attitudes toward illegal immigrants, they do find that believing illegal immigrants receive a disproportionate amount of tax dollars through various services is related to negative attitudes about illegals. Palmer’s (1996) Canadian study found that attitudes about immigrants were highly correlated with unemployment status – over a 20-year time period, the unemployment rate and preferences for decreased immigration correlated at .74 (p<.01). There is considerable evidence, then, that material self-interest shapes the terrain of attitudes about ethnic diversity, at least partially.

The third attitudinal ingredient under examination here are an individual’s political principles. The role of political principles in forming attitudes about ethnic diversity is perhaps the least developed in the literature. Sniderman and his co-authors, however, have laid considerable groundwork for this line of argument. Sniderman and Hagen (1985), for example, argue that much of white American attitudes about race can be explained by a combination of principled stances on moralism (or viewing individual moral deficiencies as the cause of social ills) and individualism (lauding self-reliance and hard work). As such, opposition to policies
intended to help blacks is not about opposing blacks as a group, but opposing the policy as violating these values. In the Netherlands, Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) find that a commitment to liberalism and tolerance fosters acceptance of Muslims as a group, even though many Dutch are troubled by aspects of Muslim cultural practice. So, ironically, the Dutch people’s deeply-held liberal values result in their acceptance of Muslims’ illiberal practices (also see Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; and see Bobocel et al. 1998; Citrin et al. 2001; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Sears et al. 2000).

There is little work on how political principles inform Canadians’ attitudes about multiculturalism, immigration, and ethnic diversity. Though, Berry and Kalin’s concept of a “multicultural ideology”, developed in the Canadian context, makes a much-needed contribution. For them, a multicultural ideology asserts ethnic diversity is a normative good; it supports “having a culturally diverse society in Canada, in which ethnocultural groups maintain and share their cultures with others” (Berry and Kalin 1995, p. 306; also see Berry et al. 1977). The concept is vague, but implicates the principles of egalitarianism that are central to some attitudinal studies conducted outside Canada (e.g., Sears et al 2000; Gaertner and Dovidio 1986). As such, this ideology might be viewed as conflicting with classical liberalism, which posits that individuals – not groups – are the primary societal unit. However, the multicultural ideology can be linked to theoretical arguments asserting that multiculturalism is not in direct competition with the individualistic element of liberalism (Kymlicka 1989; Taylor 1992). These arguments posit that, instead of inhibiting individual expression, multiculturalism’s recognition of distinct cultural identities – seen as a critical psychological anchor – provides individuals with the confidence needed to fulfill liberalism’s promise of individual liberty. Being influenced by a multicultural ideology would certainly shape an individual’s attitudes about ethnic diversity. In Canada, where multiculturalism has been politically salient for decades, the influence of this particular political principle will likely be readily visible.

**Contextual Level Influences**

So far, the three primary ingredients – prejudice, material self-interest, and political values – have been framed as individual-level determinants of ethnic diversity attitudes. This section looks at how two of these ingredients – prejudice and material self-interest – may exert an influence on an individual’s attitudinal terrain through their experienced context.
The effect of an individual’s context has taken a central role in the research into ethnic and racial attitudes. Two debates inform much of this research: the contact vs. conflict debate and the realistic group conflict theory.\(^5\) The contact vs. conflict debate attempts to determine whether contact between ethnic or racial groups affects perceptions of group identity and, consequently, attitudes about ethnic diversity. The contact hypothesis posits that interaction between groups fosters tolerance by overcoming ignorance and wariness of people perceived as different (Ellison and Powers 1994; Oliver and Wong 2003; Sigelman and Welch 1993; Welch et al. 2001; Pettigrew 1998). Thus, intergroup contact is thought to decrease the importance of divisive, subordinate group identities and increase the importance of inclusive, superordinate group identities. It is argued that certain conditions need to be met for positive contact to occur, such as equal status and cooperative interdependence. However, some research has shown that contact can be quite casual to have a positive effect. For example, simply knowing about an outgroup’s history is related to less prejudice against that group (Lee 2000; also, Stephan and Stephan 1984). Regardless of how this positive contact occurs, the different strains of the contact hypothesis agree that positive contact results in perceived group divisions breaking down and a single shared identity forming (e.g., Gaertner et al. 1996; Hornsey and Hogg 2000; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2000).

By contrast, the conflict hypothesis asserts that interaction between groups breeds intolerance (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Blumer 1958; Giles and Buckner 1993; Quillian 1995; Taylor 1998). The psychological wariness associated with the formation of ingroups and outgroups at the individual level is heightened as one’s ingroup comes into contact with ethnic outgroups. Intergroup hostility occurs when the outgroup is perceived as a threat to the ingroup’s identity. According to the hypothesis, intergroup hostility can stem simply from an outgroup increasing in size, but economic and political conditions can serve as triggers, as well (Oliver and Wong 2003; Sniderman et al. 2004). As such, poor economic or political conditions can convert previously latent interethnic wariness into outright interethnic hostility. The source of the hostility may appear to be economic or political, but the root is social psychological.

A meta-analysis in social psychology concluded that the majority of studies suggest intergroup contact typically reduces prejudice, supporting the contact hypothesis (Pettigrew and

\(^5\) The political science literature tends to use the contact vs. conflict debate as a catch-all for any study that looks at the effect of intergroup contact (e.g., Putnam 2007). Other literatures – sociology and social psychology, for example – tend to make the distinction I make here.
Tropp 2006). This is not to say that intergroup contact does not produce conflict – the meta-
analysis outlines numerous studies that find that it does. Indeed, some argue that the effect of
intergroup contact should change depending on the level of analysis and type of situation being
explained. Some argue that real or perceived outgroup threat will be more acute at higher levels
of analysis (e.g., Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Oliver and Wong 2003). Others have argued
either the reverse (Arends-Tóth and Van De Vijver 2003) or that the relationship is not
necessarily linear (Haidt et al. 2003). Also, the conditions of contact matter, such as cooperative
or competitive situations, whether or not the opposing groups are perceived as equal, or if the
contact is voluntary (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). These conditions, however, can
be difficult to achieve and may be interpreted differently by different groups (Robinson and
Preston, 1976; Tropp and Pettigrew 2005). Clearly, the effect of intergroup contact on
harmonious relations between ethnic groups is complex and still worthy of study. Putnam (2007)
even argues that both hypotheses are wrong, favouring a “hunkering down” hypothesis instead.

Perhaps the divergent results in the contact-conflict debate is due in part to the
fundamental role of material interests in intergroup resentments, as argued by realistic group
conflict theory. In fact, the conflict hypothesis is similar to realistic group conflict theory, and
the real-world manifestations of their predictions can appear the same (Levine and Campbell
1972; Giles and Hertz 1994; Glaser 2003). Both theories predict that intergroup contact can
produce negative attitudes toward the opposing group. Whereas conflict hypothesis focuses on
the prejudice underpinning these attitudes, realistic group conflict theory focuses on material
interests. The theory asserts that clashes between groups, whether ethnic or not, are driven by a
struggle over limited resources. These resources can be overtly material, like financial wealth.
But, they can also be symbolic, such as leisure time, education, and social access (Sidanius et al.
1996). As Bobo (1983) describes, realistic group conflict arises when a privileged group
perceives a threat to accepted ways of life from another group. When the group is ethnically
distinct, conflict may appear to be motivated by prejudice, but it is truly motivated by a need to
protect the status quo.

Majority and Minority Attitudes

Much of the empirical research on ethnic diversity focuses on predicting majority group, rather
than minority group, attitudes. Less attention is devoted to the differences in possible
motivations between majority and minority groups. However, the asymmetrical social positions
implicated in in the theories – for example, why a majority group might feel threatened – imply different motivations for minorities. In general, ethnic diversification can result in the minority group position being strengthened. In Canada, for example, diversification has been accompanied by a public consensus about multiculturalism and an extensive multicultural policy framework. Changing the status quo through policymaking and public consensus could be perceived as weakening the ethnic majority while strengthening the ethnic minority. Clearly, this change could drive majority group members to resist and minority group members to embrace liberalizing multicultural and immigration policies.

Majority group members and minority group members likely have differing attitudes about other political issues, as well. Berry’s (2001) work on the psychology of immigration makes it clear that, with questions of immigrant integration and acculturation, the political options that immigrants have are considerably different than the options the receiving society has. While the receiving society might offer a multicultural integration strategy to immigrants, immigrants independently decide their position in society depending on how much they want to interact with the majority group and how much they want to maintain their own culture. Moreover, the options available to immigrants will change if the receiving society offers a different integration strategy, such as a melting pot, segregation, or exclusion.

Interethnic contact may reveal practical differences in majority and minority attitudes. Experiments suggest that interethnic contact may produce less negative effects for minority group members than majority group members, simply because the former tends to have more experience with intergroup contact (Hyers and Swim, 1998). This experience allows minority group members to more readily develop cooperative strategies, such as the hyper-awareness and keen anticipation of conflict that characterizes ‘mindfulness’, which reduces intergroup anxiety. It may also explain why ethnic minorities are less hostile to ethnic outgroups if their neighborhoods are mixed (Oliver and Wong 2003), or why ethnic minority trust levels are affected less negatively by neighborhood diversity and white trust levels (Stolle et al. 2008). In all, there is reason to suspect that individuals from ethnic minority groups will hold different attitudes about ethnic diversity compared to individuals from the ethnic majority group. It should be the case that ethnic minorities will generally be more supportive of the ethnic diversity measures designed to socially, economically, and politically benefit them, as compared to

**Attitudes about Immigration and Multiculturalism in Canada**

Keeping in mind the possible differences between majority and minority group attitudes, the empirical analysis here focuses on the individual and contextual factors that shape the terrain of ethnic attitudes in the Canadian context. There are three analytic approaches here. First, there is an investigation of individual level factors. Second, there is a comparison of contextual level factors. And third, there is a comparison of majority and minority group attitudes. The attitudes to be explained are central to Canada’s ethnic diversity debate, tapping different aspects of the question of ethnic minority integration. The present study does not intend to settle the debate of whether these individual-level and contextual-level determinants influence ethnic attitudes; it is assumed that they do. Instead, I seek to examine the relative influence of each across majority and minority ethnic status.

**Data and methods**

To test individual and contextual effects on majority and minority individual attitudes toward ethnic diversity, I draw on the 1995, 2000, and 2005 waves of the public opinion survey, *Project Canada*. The rich and diverse data are from a mail-in survey, clustered by province, which was designed to measure a random selection of Canadians’ views on social issues, intergroup relations, and religion. The data have been pooled so there is a sufficient number of non-white respondents in the analysis. There are 732 non-white respondents (12.5 percent of the sample) and almost 6000 respondents in total.

Importantly, the survey identifies the respondent’s geographic area. This area variable is a mixture of census metropolitan areas, census agglomerations, and census subdivisions. As such, I was able to match information from the 1996, 2001, and 2006 Canadian census on visible minority populations, unemployment rates, and household income levels with the respondent’s local context. The dataset is well equipped to examine the relative effects of individual and contextual factors on ethnic attitudes for majority and minority group respondents.

**Dependent Variables**

The dependent variables used in the analysis measure three central aspects of ethnic diversity debate as it occurs in Canada. I have rescaled each variable so that positive values reflect an

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outlook that is tolerant, and even protective, of ethnic group distinctiveness. The first, which I call ‘immigrant’, measures general attitudes about immigration to Canada. The survey asks if the respondent agrees or disagrees that “immigration is a good thing for Canada” with high scores indicating a positive response (see Appendix for precise wording). This low-stakes question solicits a vague position on immigration and does not overtly press the respondent to expose interethnic resentments, self-interest, or value positions. Indeed, if past Canadian evidence can be applied here, material self-interest may have a stronger association with this type of general statement about immigrants (e.g., Palmer 1996). The distribution of the variable shows considerable consensus – about 69 percent of respondents either agree or agree strongly that immigration is good.

The second dependent variable – that I call ‘ways’ – digs deeper. The survey question asks whether the respondent agrees or disagrees that immigrants “have an obligation to learn Canadian ways.” High scores indicate the respondent disagrees with the statement, thus implying that she rejects compulsory cultural integration of immigrants into a greater Canadian identity. This question asks specifically about a particular aspect of immigrant integration – i.e., acculturation. It does not, however, ask if immigrants should give up their own ways. It also does not specify which “ways” immigrants should be learning. Thus, the question leaves considerable room for interpretation by the respondent. Like immigrant, the distribution of ways shows considerable consensus. In fact, the consensus is larger: almost 90 percent agree or strongly agree that immigrants have an obligation to learn Canadian ways, meaning only 10 percent disagree or disagree strongly.

The final dependent variable – mosaic – measures attitudes about Canada’s multicultural society. It asks if the respondent favours the “melting pot” or “mosaic” type of cultural integration. High scores indicate the respondent favours a mosaic, or, as described in the questionnaire, the kind of society where “people are loyal to Canada yet keep many of the customs of their previous countries”. This question goes a step further than ways, as it suggests the possibility of ethnic groups giving up their cultural distinctiveness. There is considerably less consensus around this statement than with the other two, which is surprising given the oft-touted Canadian pride in multiculturalism. Only 47 percent of respondents favoured a mosaic approach to ethnic group integration – the type of multiculturalism supported by decades of policy-making. Thirty-six percent favoured the melting pot idea, and fully 17 percent of respondents either did
not know, did not respond, or made a qualified statement. This question likely primes any identity concerns the respondent might have. As such, prejudice measures are expected to drive this attitude. However, past Canadian research has shown other primary ingredients to influence explicitly prejudiced attitudes (e.g., Palmer 1996).

*Individual-level independent variables*

At the individual-level, several independent variables measure each of the three primary ingredients. The first ingredient – ethnic prejudice – is measured by two attitudinal scales. The first, *power*, is a scale combining attitudes about the perceived political power of four identifiable ethnic groups. The question asks “Do you think the following groups have too much power, too little power, or about the right amount of power in our nation’s affairs?” The ethnic groups included in the scale are Blacks, Asians, East Indians and Pakistanis, and Whites. The scale measures if the respondent thinks an ethnic outgroup has too much power, tapping the idea of outgroup resentment. As such, it measures if white respondents think Blacks, Asians, and East Indians and Pakistanis have too much power, and if non-white respondents think Whites have too much power. The dichotomous variable used to identify the ethnicity of the respondent, *white*, is generated from a self-identified ethnicity question in the survey. *Power* is rescaled so both whites and non-white responses run from 0 to 2; it has a Cronbach’s alpha of .68. High scores for non-white respondents indicate they think Whites have too much power; high scores for white respondents indicate they think Blacks, Asians, and East Indians and Pakistanis have too much power. The scale is interacted with a dichotomous variable identifying the respondent as white or non-white (*power* *white*). For white respondents, *power* should be negatively associated with the dependent variables – higher outgroup resentment is likely associated with more negative attitudes toward immigrants and multiculturalism. For non-white respondents, *power* is expected to have a positive association with the dependent variables – higher outgroup resentment against whites specifically is likely associated with more positive attitudes toward immigrants and multiculturalism.

The second scale measuring intergroup hostility is *marriage*. It combines three survey questions asking if the respondent approves or disapproves of intermarriage between Blacks and Whites, Asians and Whites, or East Indians and Pakistanis and Whites. The scale taps the

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7 Qualified statements are of theoretical interest, but less than 2 percent of respondents made them. Moreover, the survey does not record the qualifiers, so they may be a mix of more or less tolerant responses. Accordingly, they are collapsed into the “don’t know” category.
respondent’s feelings about ethnic diversity in the small and intimate scenario of a marriage. It has been rescaled to run from 0 to 2, and it has a Cronbach’s alpha of .94. The highest score indicates the respondent does not approve of any intermarriage between the identified ethnic groups, and the lowest score indicates approval of all three intermarriage scenarios. High scores on *marriage*, measuring high intergroup hostility, should be associated negatively with the dependent variables. Unlike views on outgroup power, there is no reason to think views on interethnic marriage are interactive with an individual’s ethnicity. For instance, disapproval of interethnic marriage should not result in more positive attitudes about immigrants and multiculturalism for non-whites compared to whites. Supporting immigrants and mosaic-style cultural integration could be perceived as a way of reducing the power of whites in Canada. The same is not true for reducing the threat of interethnic marriage. So, it is expected that the relationship between *marriage* and the dependent variables will not depend on the respondent’s ethnicity.

The next two variables measure aspects of material self-interest at the individual level. The first is a dichotomous index of the respondent’s reported household income and employment status – typical objective measures of an individual’s material situation. The index, named *security*, categorizes these objective measures so that ‘0’ indicates lower household income and unemployment (i.e., low material security) and ‘1’ indicates higher household income and employment (i.e., high material security). The third variable is a subjective measure of an individual’s material situation. *Satisfaction* asks whether the respondent’s financial situation has gotten better, worse, or stayed the same in the past few years, with a positive response receiving a high score. According to realistic group conflict theory, precarious material situations (real or perceived) tend to produce negative attitudes about ethnic diversity. As such, a lower household income, being unemployed, or being unsatisfied with one’s financial situation should be associated with more negative attitudes about ethnic diversity.

The influence of political principles is measured by *chance* and *education*. *Chance* draws from a survey question that taps the debate between individualism and egalitarianism, which is thought to shape attitudes about ethnic diversity (Bobo 1991; Kemmelmeier 2003). The respondent is asked whether they agree or disagree that “Anyone who works hard will rise to the top” (strongly disagree=1, strongly agree=5). Much of the political debate around ethnic integration in Canada and elsewhere seeks to determine the extent to which ethnic minority
groups face systemic barriers to participation, and what (if anything) should be done to remove those barriers. An egalitarian political value shaping ethnic diversity attitudes would assert that these barriers exist, stymying opportunities for minority ethnic groups (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Strunk and Chang 1999). Individualism, on the other hand, would not only discount these group-level barriers, but even discount the importance of group-level identities. As such, high scores on chance should be negatively associated with the dependent variables. People who agree that one simply needs to work hard to succeed may view any special treatment of immigrants or ethnic minority groups as unfair and, thus, oppose any buttressing of minority distinctiveness on principled grounds. Conversely, people who disagree may think ethnic groups need special recognition to overcome societal biases, so would be supportive of measures designed to provide this recognition.

The second determinant in the political principles battery is the respondent’s education level. Education is thought to instill tolerance, so the more advanced a person’s education, the more likely they will be tolerant of perceived difference. Taking a cue from other work on ethnic attitudes, education should result in more tolerant views (Bobo and Licari 1989; Blake 2003; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). American work has suggested an interactive effect of political conservatism and education (Sidanius et al. 1996). Namely, that education among political conservatives serves to increase rather than decrease prejudice. The argument asserts that political sophistication facilitates a better understanding of the zero-sum game of redistributive policies and, thus, the perceived weakening of the social and political dominance of the majority group. The present analysis will check for this possibility in the Canadian data.

The analysis controls for three additional individual-level variables shown to typically shape attitudes. The dichotomous white has already been mentioned. It indicates if the respondent is white or non-white and has been generated from the survey question asking respondents to self-identify their race. Canada’s ethnic diversity debate is only partially about visibly different ethnic groups – it is also about immigrant status. However, there were practical considerations when selecting an ethnic identity variable over an immigrant status variable, measured by the respondent’s country of birth. Most notably, the number of cases was cut in half when the latter was included in the model. There is considerable over-lap between ethnic identity and country of birth in Canada’s popular discourse on ethnic diversity. In fact, the discourse often focuses on the visible differences between Canadians, rather than where they were born.
The over-lap occurs in the data, as well: of the respondents born outside Canada, 43 percent identified as non-white, whereas only 19 percent identified as white. As such, white is a suitable measure of the stakes tied to ethnic identity.

The respondent’s age and sex are also controlled. Typically, older people and men tend to be more conservative and thus may hold more negative attitudes about Canada’s steadily diversifying population (Gidengil et al 2005; Schuman et al. 1997). Moreover, in Canada, younger people will have been socialized into the multicultural consensus. While there has been some criticism of multiculturalism, it has generally been the norm since the early 1970s.

*Contextual-level independent variables*

The contextual variables measure the identity threat implicated in the contact-conflict debate and the material threat implicated in the realistic group conflict theory. The percentage of visible minorities in the area (vismin) is added to test how potential outgroup threat to individual identity is related to individual ethnic attitudes. This variable is squared (vismin2) to allow for non-linear effects – the presence of visible minorities in a local area may have diminishing or increasing marginal effects on individual attitudes (Wagner et al. 2006). The visible minority measure is also interacted with white since the expectations differ depending on the ethnicity of the respondent. Contact theory predicts interethnic contact produces positive ethnic attitudes for all interested parties. This relationship, however, is dependent on particular conditions (e.g., cooperative situations, shared goals, etc.) that often do not exist in the real world. The contextual variable included here has no information about the kind of contact being made – in fact, it has no information if contact is even being made. It simply tests the influence of the *possibility* of interethnic contact. For whites, then, a negative relationship with the dependent variables is expected. For non-whites, a positive (or, at least, less negative) relationship is expected, since interethnic contact typically has less of a negative impact on them compared to whites (e.g., Hyers and Swim 1998). Tropp and Pettigrew (2005) find that interethnic contact that results in positive attitudes amongst whites has weaker results amongst non-whites. The authors suggest this may be due to their ongoing awareness of their devalued social status. The implication is that non-whites may have similar benefits from interethnic contact as whites if the contact occurs in a scenario that reduces the perception they are devalued. An ethnically mixed neighborhood may be such a scenario. As such, I suspect that living in a mixed neighborhood may bolster non-whites’ self-esteem, generally resulting in more positive ethnic attitudes.
Contextual measures of material interests are also taken into account. Realistic group conflict theory predicts that in two highly diverse areas, people from the poorer area may have more negative attitudes than people from the richer one. People from the poorer area, regardless of their own income, may sense more vulnerability to material competition in the form of disadvantageous ethnic policies or immigrants perceived as increased competition in the job market. Similar to the individual-level measure of material interest, a dichotomous index is used to categorize levels of material security. Lower median household income and higher unemployment (i.e., low security) is ‘0’ and higher median household income and lower unemployment (i.e. high security) is ‘1’.

As mentioned, the contextual data is drawn from the 1996, 2001, and 2006 Canadian census. These data are matched with the survey data through an area identifier common to both data sources. The population numbers of the area identifier vary considerably: the minimum is just over 200, the maximum is about 2.5 million, and the median is about 100 500. As such, I control for this variation with population, which indicates if the localities are small (less than 10 000), medium (from 10 000 to 99 999), or large (over 100 000). I also control for survey year (year), to account for possible period effects.

The analysis
Table 1 displays the odds ratios from three ordered logistic regressions corresponding to the three dependent variables – whether or not immigration is good, whether or not immigrants should learn Canadian ways, and if the respondent prefers a mosaic or melting pot approach to ethnic group integration. The regressions were estimated with robust standard errors and provincial clusters as a response to the survey sampling technique used by Project Canada investigators. The individual-level variables are first, followed by the contextual-level variables. The controls are last.

Before delving into specific associations, some general patterns are apparent across the three models. With two exceptions, the individual-level determinants have a strong and consistent association with the dependent variables. If the determinant has an influence on one attitude, it usually influences the others as well. This suggests that individual-level determinants are structured – they do not seem to randomly influence the attitudes about ethnic diversity under scrutiny here. One exception is the effect of power, which is the odds ratio for non-white respondents (i.e., when white=0). For them, the association weakens across the models until it is
not significant, even though the interactive term remains significant. This association means that, for the third model, the odds of preferring a mosaic over a melting pot are the same for non-white respondents. The other exception is the objective measure of material self-interest – the respondent’s reported income and employment situation (indexed with *stability*) have no effect on the dependent variables. This suggests that the subjective perception of material security (that is, *satisfaction*) is more important to one’s attitudinal terrain than objective material security, at least with the ethnic attitudes measured here.

The individual-level variables are also associated with the dependent variables in the expected directions. White respondents who say they think ethnic outgroups have too much power have lower odds of agreeing immigration is good, disagreeing immigrants are obliged to learn Canadian ways, and preferring a mosaic-style approach of ethnic minority integration. The reverse is true for non-white respondents (with the exception of the third model). Respondents in general have lower odds of positive ethnic attitudes when they disapprove of interethnic marriage. The perceived financial security measured in *satisfaction* is positively associated with the dependent variables, as is the respondent’s education level. As mentioned, Sidanius et al. (1996) argue that higher education may be associated with more negative ethnic attitudes amongst conservative individuals. The analysis here finds no evidence of this proposal. Education does have an interactive effect with a respondent’s political views, but only with liberals and in the expected direction; it does not prompt conservatives to be more or less positive about ethnic diversity issues (analysis not shown).

Finally, as expected, agreeing with the individualistic principle that anyone who works hard will rise to the top is negatively associated with the dependent variables. As expected, it appears that prejudice, subjective material self-interest, and political principles all have an impact on the terrain of ethnic attitudes in Canada. Moreover, objective material measures appear to have no effect. The relative effect of these determinants and how they vary across majority and minority ethnicities – the central motivation of this analysis – is examined in more detail below.

The patterns are different for the contextual-level variables. The only contextual variable that is associated with the dependent variables is *vismin*, or the percentage of visible minorities living in the respondent’s area. The effect is small, however. The positive association for non-whites and negative association for whites with the first two dependent variables are expected, but the reversal in the third model is a surprise. I will examine this in greater detail below. It is
enough to say now that the individual-level variables seem to have more of an impact on the attitudinal terrain as compared to the contextual-level variables. This does not mean contextual explanations should be neglected in favour of individual-level explanations. They are all pieces of the same puzzle. The following analysis devotes attention to the precise effect of visible minority presence in one’s neighborhood, alongside variations in individual-level determinants.

Before proceeding to a more detailed analysis, it is necessary to mention the typical concern of self-selection when examining the relationship between context and individual attitudes. Namely, are the significant relationships observed in the table the result of tolerant, materially-secure, and politically liberal individuals deciding to live in diverse areas, and not diverse areas producing tolerant, materially secure, and politically liberal individuals? Self-selection is undoubtedly a potential confounding factor. Others have shown that even in tightly controlled experimental research, the causal direction of the relationship between context and attitudes is difficult to untangle (Brewer and Miller 1988). However, research suggests the effects of self-selection may not be large (Powers and Ellison 1995). The data here are insufficient to test for self-selection. As such, I recognize the potential problem of self-selection, and any interpretation of the data will keep it in mind.

Predicted probabilities shed more light on the shape of the relationships in Table 1. By manipulating the values of determinants to predict levels of the dependent variables, the relative importance of prejudice, material-self interest and political principles can be explored. For instance, imagine a hypothetical person who is unconcerned about outgroup power ($power=0$), approves of interethnic marriage ($marriage=0$), has a positive judgment about her financial situation ($satisfaction=3$), does not agree that individuals who work hard will rise to the top ($chance=1$), and holds a doctorate degree ($educ=6$) – all indications that she should be relatively tolerant of ethnic diversity.\(^8\) The predicted probability of her approval of immigration in general (model 1) is .38, or 38 percent. However, if this same person has middling views about ethnic outgroup power ($power=1$), the predicted probability of her approval of immigration drops to 24 percent. If she holds middling views of interethnic marriage instead, her probability drops only to 28 percent. Suppose this person, now unconcerned about outgroup power and approving of interethnic marriage, changes her perception of her financial situation from positive to neutral

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\(^8\) Predicted probabilities are calculated using Stata’s margins command. If not specified, variables are set to their means.
(satisfaction=2). This change in perceived material security is accompanied by a decrease in probability to 33 percent. If she becomes ambivalent about the power of the individual to overcome obstacles (chance=3), the probability of agreeing immigration is generally good decreases to 34 percent. Finally, a small change in education, from holding a doctoral degree to holding an undergraduate degree, decreases the probability to 27 percent.

Figure 1 illustrates these changes for each model. Each box corresponds to one of the three dependent variables from Table 1. The horizontal axis indicates the base line hypothetical individual (point 1) and the attitudinal shift for each independent variable (point 2). The decrease in predicted probability is recorded with its corresponding trend line at point 2. Past Canadian literature has found a strong association between material self-interest, education, and attitudes about ethnic diversity (Palmer 1996). In contrast, this analysis finds that respondents’ perception of outgroup power has the most influence on attitudes about immigration, immigrants’ obligation to learn Canadian ways, and preferred cultural integration strategies. Even though this finding reveals the complex terrain underpinning these ethnic attitudes, it supports research that argues for the prevailing influence of prejudice on attitudes relevant to race and ethnicity in general (e.g. Gilens 1999; Kinder and Sanders 1996).

As Table 1 demonstrates, the perception of outgroup power has an interactive association with respondent ethnicity. The effect of this association is examined with predicted probabilities and shown in Figure 2. Here, all variables in the model are set to their means, except for power. We can see the effect of a shift in concern of outgroup power, from being unconcerned to holding a middling view (power=0, 1), for white and non-white respondents. For example, in the first box, the trend line for white respondents shows that this modest attitudinal shift decreases the predicted probability of agreeing immigration is generally good from 18 percent to 8 percent (a decrease of 10 points is indicated beside the relevant line). The trend line is the reverse for non-whites – shifting from disagreeing Whites have too much power to being ambivalent increases the predicted probability of agreeing immigration is generally good from 6 percent to 13 percent. Similar patterns are seen with the other two models, with the exception of the non-white respondent trend line with attitudes about mosaic-style cultural integration. This exception is hinted at in Table 1 with the non-significant coefficient for the main effect of power.

How do these individual-level associations compare with the contextual effects? Table 1 indicates that the contextual variables have relatively weak influence on the ethnic attitudes
measured here. Only the percentage of visible minorities in the area is associated with the dependent variables. Still, it is worth exploring how changes in an individual’s context may influence her attitudes about immigrants and multiculturalism, even if the effect is small. Figure 3 displays predicted probabilities for two hypothetical individuals. Both are unconcerned about outgroup power and interethnic marriage. They are positive about their financial situation, disagree that anyone who works hard will rise to the top, and are highly educated. The only difference is that one identifies as white and one identifies as non-white. The horizontal axis in Figure 3 measures changes in the percentage of visible minorities in the respondent’s locality. It begins at 0 and increases by increments of 10 to 50 percent, which is approximately the highest percentage in the census (Vancouver, BC has the highest percentage at 51 percent). The gap between the highest and lowest points on the curve is indicated beside the corresponding line.

The association between ethnic attitudes and visible minorities in the local population is not as straightforward as the individual-level determinants. In general, the gaps between the lowest and highest points suggest that this particular contextual effect has a stronger association for non-white respondents as compared to white respondents. The first box, measuring general attitudes about immigration, shows that higher percentages of visible minorities in the area are associated with a higher probability that the non-white respondent will agree immigration is generally good. This association reverses once the local visible minority population reaches approximately 30 percent. Whites have the opposite pattern, though weaker and with a reversal occurring around 20 percent. The second box shows predicted attitudes about immigrants being obligated to learn Canadian ways. As the percentages of visible minorities in the area increase from zero, non-white respondents have a slight increase in the probability of disagreeing with this statement; this probability soon decreases. The predicted probability of white respondents disagreeing decreases slightly, then levels off. The third box, showing attitudes about mosaic-style cultural integration, is different than the previous two. Here, the curved trend lines for both whites and non-whites are convex. Each group has a predicted decrease in preferring a mosaic to a melting pot, but each reverses at a certain point.

The analysis hints at both decreases in outgroup resentment and increases in ingroup bias. Keeping in mind that outgroup resentment and ingroup bias are not zero-sum (Brewer 1999), the

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9 There are non-white respondents living in areas that the census identifies as having zero visible minorities. The number is small – only 15 non-white respondents fall into this category. I suspect this is random reporting error in the census, where some visible minorities did not fill out the census forms.
dynamic observed in the figures offers an optimistic picture of the effect of context on one’s attitudinal terrain. For white respondents, higher percentages of visible minorities in the area are associated with more positive ethnic attitudes, supporting the predictions made by the contact hypothesis. For non-white respondents, the interpretation is more nuanced. The first and second figures taken together suggest a dynamic similar to what the multicultural ideology theory predicts (Berry and Kalin 1995; also Kymlicka 1989; Taylor 1992). That is, it appears that larger visible minority communities are associated with more confident ethnic minority individuals with higher ingroup bias and lower outgroup resentment. As the multicultural ideology proposes, once members of an ethnic group become confident in their own ethnic identity, they are more tolerant of other ethnicities. The predicted probabilities here suggest that non-whites have a higher probability of agreeing immigration is good (ingroup bias) as the visible minority community increases. This growing confidence is accompanied with decreasing outgroup resentment, as demonstrated with the decreasing probability of disagreeing immigrants have an obligation to learn Canadian ways. In other words, a growing confidence is associated with more openness to learning Canadian ways. There is a decrease in the probability of non-whites agreeing immigration is good once the local visible minority community reaches 30 percent. This decreases suggests a limit to the influence of context on one’s ingroup bias, or perhaps it is the point at which ethnic minorities begin to assume the superordinate identity of the majority population.

The third box displaying preferences for mosaic-style cultural integration only partially fits multicultural ideology theory. The increase in probability that non-whites will prefer a mosaic over a melting pot makes sense in terms of the theory’s predictions. Increased confidence in one’s ethnic minority identity would be accompanied by greater support for beneficial social and political approaches to ethnic diversity. In fact, ingroup bias and support for multiculturalism has been shown to be the case in the Netherlands (Verkuyten 2006). The decrease in probability at the lower levels of the contextual variable is a puzzle, however. Why non-whites would have a lower probability of preferring a mosaic as the visible minority community grows from zero to 20 percent is not clear. The probability for white respondents supports contact theory – at higher levels of local diversity, they have a higher predicted probability of preferring a mosaic.

Discussion
The present paper has three broad goals. One is to investigate the relative influence of ethnic prejudice, material self-interest, and political principles on individual attitudes about ethnic diversity. The second goal is to compare these determinants at the individual and contextual level. The third is to examine how these relationships differ depending on an individual’s ethnicity. The attitudes under examination here tap several aspects of the Canadian ethnic diversity debate and capture varying levels of specificity. The implications of the analysis build on comparative literature on ethnic and racial attitudes, offering to fill gaps about the relative influence of attitudinal determinants and how they might vary across ethnic status, particularly in the Canadian context.

The most prominent lesson from this analysis is that individual-level factors appear to exert a stronger influence on the attitudinal terrain than contextual factors. Moreover, amongst the individual-level factors, measures of prejudice have the strongest influence on attitudes about ethnic diversity. Material self-interest and political principles also inform attitudes. But, prejudice – particularly attitudes about ethnic outgroup power – drives statements about immigrants and multiculturalism. For whites, concerns about outgroup power are associated with negative ethnic attitudes; for non-whites, they are associated with more positive ethnic attitudes. While positive ethnic attitudes are *prima facie* good, the implication in the analysis here is that non-whites are buttressing their ingroup identity against whites. The contextual analysis suggested that stronger ingroup identity for non-whites may decrease outgroup resentment. But, keeping in mind that different intergroup dynamics may occur at different levels of analysis, it would be premature to apply contextual-level observations to individual-level dynamics observed here. Thus, for policymakers concerned about the durability of Canadian interethnic harmony in the face of increasing ethnic diversity, tackling the perception of unequal power between ethnic groups for both majority and minority ethnic group members may be critical. In fact, this avenue may be particularly suited for policymakers. Compared to the prejudice scale, *power*, the weaker association of the other scale, *marriage*, with the dependent variables implies that individuals who are threatened by ethnic outgroups are less concerned about potentially threatening scenarios over which they may exert more control. That is, while individuals have little control over interethnic marriage between others, they have complete control over their own choice of spouse. As such, concerns about interethnic marriage do not appear to influence the attitudinal terrain as much as other threats to identity. The amount of societal power of an ethnic outgroup, on the
other hand, is virtually out of an individual’s control. Instead, it is the hands of collective actors, such as policymakers. Not only is concern over outgroup power the most prominent factor in the attitudinal terrain examined here, it is a factor policymakers can influence (even if it is to influence perception of threat, as opposed to influence the actual power of ethnic outgroups).

Another lesson derived from the analysis pertains to material self-interest. Namely, subjective, rather than objective, measures matter. This finding supports the literature on material threats that argues material interests reach beyond an individual’s measurable position in society – in other words, how an individual perceives her position is an important attitudinal predictor. Importantly, the analysis finds that subjective material interests influence attitudes that overtly prime identity concerns. The finding also has implications for policymakers looking to shore up support for ethnic diversity. Convincing citizens that newcomers are not a threat to their material security may result in positive attitudes about immigration and multiculturalism. Perhaps this result could be accomplished by emphasizing the collective economic benefits of immigrants – an argument the Canadian government has recently stressed.¹⁰

While its association is weaker than the individual-level determinants, it is clear that the mere presence of visible minorities in an individual’s local context is associated with her attitudes about immigrants and multiculturalism. Notably, this association is stronger for non-whites than whites. Perhaps this is due to the fact that ethnic minorities often concentrate in enclaves (Hiebert et al. 2007). So, non-whites may notice the visible minority community more than whites. That is, a locality characterized by three percent visible minorities may go largely unnoticed by white residents, but may make a considerable impression on non-white residents. The precise effect of visible minority presence is complex. For whites, the association between ethnic attitudes and the local visible minority population supports the predictions of the contact hypothesis: interethnic contact appears to encourage positive attitudes about immigrants and multiculturalism. For non-whites, the story is a more nuanced version of the contact hypothesis, taking cues from the multicultural ideology theory. Specifically, non-whites appear to have stronger ingroup bias and weaker outgroup resentment when the visible minority population is larger. This interpretation supports the important theoretical work spearheaded in the Canadian context about the importance of multiculturalism in an ethnically diverse, liberal democratic

¹⁰ In the spring of 2012, the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism, Jason Kenney, made a series of announcements about the economic benefit of immigrants. For example, see “Economic Growth and Prosperity the Focus of Immigration Changes.” http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2012/2012-04-20.asp
society. Not only does interethnic contact result in positive attitudes about ethnic diversity for majority group members, it seems that larger ethnic minority communities help minority group members reduce outgroup wariness and integrate into the larger society.

The terrain underpinning Canadian attitudes about immigration and multiculturalism is a complex mix of individual-level and contextual-level factors. Policymakers can be assured, however, that there are multiple ways in which to address fears about ethnic diversity. Canada’s ethnic composition is changing and will continue to do so for decades to come. To be sure, Canadians are generally positive about immigration, immigrants, and multiculturalism. But, the analysis here and elsewhere has shown the potential for cracks in the public consensus. The lessons offered here could be used to identify weaknesses in the consensus in the hopes of preventing the kind of interethnic violence seen in other Western democracies. Identifying and tackling weaknesses could help ensure the durability of Canada’s interethnic harmony into the future.
Table 1. Individual and Contextual-Level Determinants of Ethnic Diversity Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immigrant</th>
<th>Ways</th>
<th>Mosaic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual-level variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>power</td>
<td>2.311***</td>
<td>1.417*</td>
<td>1.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.339)</td>
<td>(0.276)</td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>white</td>
<td>6.500***</td>
<td>2.487***</td>
<td>1.707***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.405)</td>
<td>(0.782)</td>
<td>(0.260)</td>
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<tr>
<td>power*white</td>
<td>0.185***</td>
<td>0.336***</td>
<td>0.443***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0465)</td>
<td>(0.0998)</td>
<td>(0.0559)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marriage</td>
<td>0.650***</td>
<td>0.795***</td>
<td>0.827***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0384)</td>
<td>(0.0389)</td>
<td>(0.0358)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stability</td>
<td>1.054</td>
<td>0.888</td>
<td>0.881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(0.0761)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>satisfaction</td>
<td>1.217***</td>
<td>1.241***</td>
<td>1.179***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0669)</td>
<td>(0.0539)</td>
<td>(0.0537)</td>
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<tr>
<td>chance</td>
<td>0.925**</td>
<td>0.846***</td>
<td>0.924***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0308)</td>
<td>(0.0224)</td>
<td>(0.0159)</td>
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<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>1.266***</td>
<td>1.161***</td>
<td>1.167***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.0822)</td>
<td>(0.0606)</td>
<td>(0.0531)</td>
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<td><strong>Contextual-level variables</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>vismin</td>
<td>1.060***</td>
<td>1.029*</td>
<td>0.959***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0226)</td>
<td>(0.0150)</td>
<td>(0.0156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vismin2</td>
<td>0.999***</td>
<td>0.999***</td>
<td>1.001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000436)</td>
<td>(0.000319)</td>
<td>(0.000321)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vismin*white</td>
<td>0.932**</td>
<td>0.963*</td>
<td>1.020*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0299)</td>
<td>(0.0198)</td>
<td>(0.0112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vismin2*white</td>
<td>1.001**</td>
<td>1.001***</td>
<td>0.999***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000576)</td>
<td>(0.000408)</td>
<td>(0.000241)</td>
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<td>1.037</td>
<td>1.052</td>
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<td>(0.114)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>age</td>
<td>0.982***</td>
<td>1.013***</td>
<td>1.005</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.00239)</td>
<td>(0.00321)</td>
<td>(0.00290)</td>
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<td>1.297***</td>
<td>0.972</td>
<td>0.683***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0779)</td>
<td>(0.0541)</td>
<td>(0.0605)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population</td>
<td>1.261***</td>
<td>1.019</td>
<td>1.157***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0773)</td>
<td>(0.0698)</td>
<td>(0.0613)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>year</td>
<td>1.045**</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>1.007</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0183)</td>
<td>(0.00970)</td>
<td>(0.0105)</td>
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<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
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<td>3,150</td>
<td>3,191</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Cell entries are ordered logit coefficients; Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities after changes in prejudice, material self-interest and political principles.
Figure 2. Predicted probabilities after changes in prejudice for white and non-white respondents.

1. **Strongly agree that immigration is a good thing for Canada**
   - Blue line: non-white
   - Red line: white
   - Predicted probability changes: +7 for non-white, -10 for white

2. **Disagree that immigrants have an obligation to learn Canadian ways**
   - Blue line: non-white
   - Red line: white
   - Predicted probability changes: +2 for non-white, -6 for white

3. **Prefer mosaic integration over melting pot**
   - Blue line: non-white
   - Red line: white
   - Predicted probability changes: +1 for non-white, -18 for white
Figure 3. Predicted probabilities after changes in the local visible minority presence.

**Strongly agree that immigration is a good thing for Canada**

- **Predicted probability** changes as the percentage of visible minorities changes for both white and non-white groups.

**Disagree that immigrants have an obligation to learn Canadian ways.**

- **Predicted probability** changes as the percentage of visible minorities changes for both white and non-white groups.

**Prefer mosaic integration to melting pot.**

- **Predicted probability** changes as the percentage of visible minorities changes for both white and non-white groups.
Bibliography


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Appendix

Question wording for dependent variables:

*immigrant*  In general, immigration is a good thing for Canada.
   - Strongly disagree
   - Disagree
   - DK
   - Agree
   - Strongly agree

*ways*  Immigrants to Canada have an obligation to learn Canadian ways.
   - Strongly agree
   - Agree
   - Disagree
   - Strongly disagree

*mosaic*  Some people say that Canada should be a "melting pot" for people coming here from other countries – they should give up their cultural differences and become Canadians. Others say that Canada should be a "mosaic", where people are loyal to Canada yet keep many of the customs of their previous countries. How do you feel about this?
   - I favour the “melting pot” idea
   - No preference/qualified statement/don’t know
   - I favour the “mosaic” idea

Question wording for individual-level independent variables:

*power*  Do you think the following groups have too much power, too little power, or about the right amount of power in our nation's affairs? [Blacks/Asians (Orientals)/East Indians and Pakistanis/Whites]
   - Too little
   - Right amount
   - Too much

*marriage*  Do you approve of marriages between: [Whites and Blacks/Whites and Asians (Orientals)/Whites and East Indians or Pakistanis]
   - Yes
   - Undecided/don’t know
   - No

*security*  Index of household income and employment status:
   Which of the figures below comes closest to your total family income, before taxes, in [year]?
   - less than $10,000
   - $10,000-19,999
   - $20,000-29,999
   - $30,000-39,999
   - $40,000-49,999
   - $50,000-59,999
   - $60,000-69,999
   - $70,000-100,000
   - Over $100,000
At present, are you:
  - Other
  - Full-time or temporarily off

*satisfaction* During the last few years, would you say your financial situation has been:
  - Getting better
  - Staying about the same
  - Getting worse

*chance* Anyone who works hard will rise to the top.
  - Strongly disagree
  - Disagree
  - DK
  - Agree
  - Strongly agree

*education* In terms of formal education, what is the highest level you have completed?
  - Grade School
  - High school
  - Technical or business school
  - Undergraduate degree
  - Graduate or professional school
  - Doctorate degree