The following is an edited excerpt from: Stigmatization, Neoliberalism, and Resilience by Leanne S. Son Hing to appear in “Social Resilience in the Age of Neo-Liberalism.” Edited by Peter Hall and Michèle Lamont, Cambridge University Press, in press.

This chapter applies the theories and tools of contemporary psychology to explore the relationship between neo-liberalism understood as a set of values and socioeconomic conditions and various aspects of inter-group relations. My focus is on the sources and effects of prejudice or stigmatization and on the factors that confer resilience in the face of discrimination. There are significant puzzles here. Important contemporary social debates, about immigration, racial equality and aboriginal rights center on inter-group relations and such debates are now conditioned by neo-liberal ideas (see the chapters by Kymlicka and Jenson and Levi). Does the prevalence of neo-liberal beliefs increase the incidence of prejudice, as some suspect, or render it less likely by bringing meritocratic values to the fore (Becker 1957)? How might the popularity of neo-liberal beliefs affect the resilience of people who experience discrimination? These are issues on which contemporary psychological research can shed light.

After considering the forms that prejudice can take, I begin by reviewing the changes in prejudice that have taken place during the neoliberal era. Second, drawing on literatures in psychology that associate prejudice with experiences of psychological threat, I explore how societal changes linked to neoliberal policies, practices and narratives might have increased the incidence of prejudice. Finally, I review psychological research, including my own, that examines the relationship between attitudes that reflect prejudice and beliefs associated with neoliberalism.

In this chapter, I draw predominantly on psychological studies of North Americans and Western Europeans, conducted mostly with undergraduate students, but I also consider research conducted around the globe and with adult samples published mainly between the mid 1980s and 2010. Some findings may be valid only for specific time periods and settings, but the basic processes are likely to be more general. Whether the results of any study generalize to a different sample, location, or historical period is an empirical question.

The Nature of the Problem: Prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination

The consequences of stigmatization for members of a group that is devalued can be adverse: the more members anticipate being stigmatized, perceive their group to be stigmatized, or experience stigmatization themselves, the worse their physical and mental health, well-being, and performance (Pascoe and Smart Richman, 2009; Williams and Williams-Morris, 2000). Three aspects of stigmatization are widely studied in social psychology: prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination. Prejudice can be defined as negative overall evaluation of, or attitude toward, outgroups marked by cognitions (e.g., stereotypes), affects or emotions (e.g., antipathy), and behavioral intentions (e.g., to discriminate; Zanna & Rempel, 1988). Stereotypes are beliefs about what typical outgroup members are like. Discrimination involves the treatment of ingroup (vs. outgroup) members that results in unfair, illegitimate, or negative outcomes. Both prejudice and stereotypes can be explicit (i.e., controlled and deliberate) or implicit (i.e., automatic and uncontrollable). Whereas explicit processes can be assessed with self-report surveys, implicit processes are assessed with computerized split-second response time tasks. For instance, people with more implicitly-prejudiced attitudes are quicker than those with less implicitly-prejudiced attitudes to associate negative stimuli with outgroups and positive stimuli with ingroups because
such associations are well-practiced and well-formed in the brain. Explicit and implicit prejudice are only weakly related (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005); and implicit attitudes and stereotypes predict discriminatory behavior better than explicit attitudes and stereotypes (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Rudman, 2004). Now that we understand what stigmatization is, let us turn to the issue of how neoliberalism might be related to it.

Neo-liberal beliefs and types of prejudice at the macro level
One way to explore the link between neoliberalism and stigmatization is to look at how the nature of prejudice has changed during the neoliberal era in comparison to earlier periods. I will focus on longitudinal research conducted in the United States on Whites’ attitudes toward Blacks. Changes in prejudice cannot be conclusively attributed to the influence of the prevailing neoliberal discourse; but it is possible to explore how expressions of prejudice altered as neoliberal ideology rose to dominance in the United States during the early 1980s.

The literature in psychology distinguishes among different types of racism. Traditional racism is characterized by bigotry, antipathy, beliefs in race-based superiority, and a desire for racial segregation. Reports of traditional, blatant racism have decreased steadily over time (Firebaugh & Davis, 1988). For example, the percentage of White Americans who favor laws against racial intermarriage decreased from 39% in 1972, to 33% in 1982, to 19% in 1993, to 10% in 2002 (author’s compilation of GSS data). When asked why Blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing compared to Whites, the percentage of White Americans who attribute these outcomes to the inborn and lower abilities of Blacks to learn decreased from 26% in 1972, to 19% in 1989, to 10% in 1998, to 8% in 2006 (author’s compilation of GSS data). Thus, traditional prejudice has declined. Furthermore, the predictive validity of traditional prejudice measures has waned over the neoliberal era (McConahay, 1983; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).

Over time, however, White Americans’ sympathy for corrective measures has also declined, in tandem with changes in their beliefs about why inequality exists. When asked why Blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing, compared with Whites, the percentage of White Americans who attribute these racial differences to internal causes (e.g., a lack of motivation) versus external causes (e.g., discrimination against Blacks) has increased over time (Bobo, 2001). The percentage of Whites who believe that Blacks just need to try harder increased from 70% in the 1970s to approximately 80% by the mid-1980s (Bobo, 2001), and Whites have become less concerned with the unfair treatment of minority groups. The percentage of young Whites expressing apathy about racial issues increased from 10% in 1976, to 13% in 1988, to 16% in 1998, and to 18% in 2000 (Forman, 2004). The percentage of White Americans who believe that the government has an obligation to improve Blacks’ living standards has decreased from 11% in 1975, to 4%-5% in 1986, 1996, and 2006 (author’s compilation of GSS data). Interestingly, the more Whites perceive Blacks to be worse off financially, the more negatively they stereotype Blacks as lazy (Brezina & Winder, 2003). The 1990 General Social Survey revealed that 44% of White Americans perceive Blacks to be lazy and 56% perceive them to prefer to live off welfare (Davis & Smith 1990). Taken together, these figures reveal that Whites have become less likely to see structural barriers against Blacks, more likely to attribute their disadvantaged status to laziness, and, thus, less concerned with social justice and government assistance for them. How can we account for such changes in the attitudes associated with prejudice? Is there a relationship here to neoliberal ideas?

1 Generalized apathy, in contrast, has held steady over time at 10-11% (Forman, 2004).
During the 1980s, two social psychological theories were introduced to explain the changing nature of prejudice toward Blacks in the United States – those associated with ‘modern racism’ (McConahay, 1986) and ‘symbolic racism’ (Kinder & Sears, 1981). In keeping with the data I have just reported, both theories assert that only a small proportion of racists hold the attitudes described as ‘traditional prejudice’. Since the 1980s, the majority of racists are said to hold attitudes characteristic of modern or symbolic racism, which are less blatantly prejudiced and stem from a blend of antipathy to Blacks and strongly individualistic values. Since the two theories are very similar (symbolic racism theory places a stronger emphasis on individualism), I will use the term modern racism to refer to both.

Modern racists justify their racial antipathy on the grounds that Blacks violate traditional American ideals such as the Protestant work ethic (Kinder, 1986; Sears & Henry, 2003). Measures for modern racism tap the beliefs that discrimination no longer exists; that Blacks’ demands for special treatment are unfair, and that Blacks fail to get ahead because of a lack of hard work and self-reliance (Henry & Sears, 2002). These theories of modern racism reflect the fact that neoliberal values have provided narratives that allow some individuals to articulate racial prejudice in less blatant ways. For example, we have found that the higher people score on modern racism and modern sexism scales, the more likely they are to oppose affirmative action — specifically on the grounds that it will assist women and minorities whom they see as less deserving (Bobocel et al., 1998). Thus, people whose attitudes reflect what is widely seen as modern prejudice discriminate based on concerns with meritocracy.

However, it is important to note that not all people became modern racists during the neoliberal era. Another theory, associated with aversive racism, also proposed in the mid-1980s, has been developed to identify and explain prejudiced attitudes held by politically-progressives Whites (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Aversive racists value fairness and espouse egalitarian values, yet unconsciously hold negative feelings toward outgroup members (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Since they explicitly denounce prejudice, aversive racists are said to discriminate only in situations where they can appear non-prejudiced, that is, ones in which there are no clear standards for non-racially-based behavior or where there is a non-race related excuse to respond negatively. Participants affiliated with progressive (liberal) political parties have shown this pattern of discriminatory behavior (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). Thus, racial prejudice is found on the political left.

Moreover, a theory of principled conservatism has been advanced to show that political conservatives are not all prejudiced (Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986). Its proponents argue that many conservatives are misclassified because measures for modern racism often confound racism and conservatism. Principled conservatives are said to be those with right-wing policy preferences, which have negative implications for group equality (e.g., opposition to affirmative action) but who are motivated by non-racial principles (e.g., concerns with meritocracy). When presented with clear evidence of the deservingness of a claimant for unemployment assistance, for instance, principled conservatives do not discriminate against a Black claimant (Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). Thus, conservatives do not always discriminate against subordinate groups.

In sum, although research into modern racism provides some evidence that neoliberal beliefs are closely associated with prejudice, it is important to emphasize that a left-right political/economic orientation does not map perfectly onto prejudice. There are a number of

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2 The theory of modern racism has since been extended to other groups.
3 In fact, they show a preference for Black versus White claimants, likely because the former have violated their expectations and thus appear particularly deserving (i.e., a “shifting standards” phenomenon).
aversive racists on the political left who are prejudiced and principled conservatives on the right who are not particularly prejudiced.

**Neoliberal initiatives as an indirect factor behind prejudice**

Alongside the direct links between neo-liberal beliefs and prejudice, there is a second channel through which developments during the neo-liberal era might have led indirectly to higher levels of prejudice. In recent decades, changes in attitudes associated with multiculturalism, human rights, and the civil rights movements have likely led to some decline in prejudice. However, neoliberal policies, practices, and narratives have also created specific social conditions (i.e., more intense competition over resources, uncertainty about the future, and greater inequality) that have the potential to increase the incidence of prejudice. Significant literatures in psychology suggest that social conditions of this sort often have psychological effects (notably, increased feelings of threat), which stimulate psychologically-based mechanisms (based on social dominance, self-esteem, and system justification) that are known to give rise to prejudice (see Figure 1).

This model moves from the macro- to the micro-level and there may be complex interaction effects here. For instance, individual-level prejudice could be used to rally support for neoliberal policies. Consequently, this model should be seen only as a starting point from which to develop a fuller understanding of the links between neoliberalism and prejudice, but I will outline a few of the potential paths in the model for illustrative purposes (see Figure 1).

Neoliberal policies and practices, which open markets and reduce regulation, often lead to increased competition among individuals. Other social changes during the neoliberal era (associated with globalization, immigration, and the increased participation of women in the labor force) may also have led to greater intergroup contact and competition (e.g., for jobs, promotions). In parallel, a neoliberal discourse, which emphasizes how individuals facing competition need to maximize their “human capital” and marketability, reinforce this sense of more intense competition.

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Insert Figure 1 About here

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That context of greater competition should lead, in turn, to increases in feelings of threat, which can lead to prejudice — particularly when people perceive themselves to be in competition with outgroup members. The perception of competition is a major source of the feelings of threat from outgroup members that result in intergroup conflict (Campbell, 1965). People can perceive outgroup members to be a threat based on competition over resources or over more symbolic goods, such as values (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Correlational research reveals that perceptions of threat account for 30 to 71% of the variance in prejudice toward immigrants in the United States, Israel, and Spain (Stephan & Renfro, 2002). Thus, where neoliberalism inspires increased competition, it may lead to greater feelings of threat and prejudice.

Feelings of threat lead to prejudice through various socio-cognitive mechanisms (see Figure 1). One of the most prominent is social dominance orientation (SDO): a set of attitudes that reflect is the degree to which people believe that hierarchy among social groups is good for society (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). There is strong empirical evidence, for instance, that increases in threat lead to higher social dominance motives, which in turn lead to greater prejudice. In one study, non-Asian Americans who were experimentally threatened by inducing
a sense of competition with Asian Americans (i.e., primed with the idea that Asians are taking over America) reported higher levels of social dominance orientation than those in the control condition (Morrison & Ybarra, 2008). The effects of threat on SDO are particularly strong for people who belong to groups of higher status (Morrison, Fast, & Ybarra, 2009).

Greater feelings of threat can also lead to prejudice because they motivate people to bolster their self-esteem (Branscombe & Wann, 1994); and people often engage in downward social comparisons with outgroups in order to enhance the status of their ingroup and their self-evaluations (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). After threat, the more people derogate an outgroup member, the higher their self-esteem (Fein & Spencer 1997). When Whites are threatened via negative feedback from an outgroup member (e.g., a Black evaluator), they automatically activate negative stereotypes more quickly than when they are not threatened (Sinclair & Kunda, 1999). But, even when people are threatened (e.g., receive failure feedback) by an ingroup member, they apply stereotypes more in their judgements of outgroup members, compared with when they are not threatened (Fein & Spencer, 1997). Another mechanism operates through system justification. When people are threatened, experience fear or face uncertainty, they become more strongly motivated to rationalize their social system as just or fair (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). For instance, when people’s system justification motives are activated by threatening the legitimacy of their society, participants later rate powerful people as more intelligent and independent, and people without power as less intelligent and independent, compared with those in a no-threat condition (Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005; see also Kay et al., 2009). Thus, increases in economic insecurity and in income inequality that are a hallmark of the neoliberal age may lead people to engage in system justification in which they evoke stereotypes speaking to subordinate groups’ lower levels of competence and deservingness.

How neoliberal economic beliefs and stigmatization are related at the micro level
Are people who are more prejudiced more likely to endorse neoliberalism? Before I draw on the psychological research pertinent to this issue I must note that psychologists do not study “neoliberalism.” Typically, they study people’s political and economic beliefs conceptualized along a traditional left-right continuum. Of course, many of the results are relevant to capitalist societies in general, but some have direct bearing on the relationship between neoliberal beliefs and prejudice. First, let us consider the explicit prejudices people may have. A small but consistent literature indicates that people who more strongly endorse neoliberal economic beliefs tend to hold more explicitly prejudiced attitudes. The more strongly European American students believe that economic inequality is legitimate (e.g., agree that “Laws of nature are responsible for differences in wealth in society”), the more racist they are (Jost & Thompson, 2000). The more positively Belgians evaluate capitalism, private initiative, unrestricted competition, income differences among people, for instance, and trade unions and government intervention into the economy negatively, the more racist they are (r = .33; Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004). Materialist attitudes are also directly related to racist attitudes (r = .22; Roets, Van Hiel, & Cornelis, 2006). Among Australians, a stronger self-identification with the group “Capitalists” is associated with more negative attitudes toward women’s rights (Heaven & St. Quintin, 1999). Studies conducted in the United States and Sweden found that the more participants support free-market capitalism (i.e., positive attitudes toward capitalism and negative attitudes toward socialism, and nationalization of corporations) then the more racist they were. This is the case for Americans toward Blacks, r = .25, and Swedes toward

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4 This is true regardless of the form of explicit prejudice studied: traditional, modern, or negative affect.
immigrants, \( r = .38 \) (Sidanius & Pratto, 1993; cf., Leeson & Heaven, 1999). Thus, investigations in multiple countries during the 1990s and early 2000s indicate the presence of a positive but weak relation between neoliberal economic beliefs and explicit prejudice.

Much of the research on this topic uses only a few items to measure economic beliefs and these measures were not validated. To better assess the relationship between neoliberal economic beliefs and prejudice, my collaborator, Suzanne Kiani, and I developed a 25-item measure of neoliberal economic beliefs, which includes attitudes toward free market capitalism, competition and the meritocratic ideal, and privatization and limits on regulation (Son Hing & Kiani, 2008).\(^5\) The topics examined do not cover all neoliberal beliefs, nor are they necessarily exclusive to a neoliberal worldview. Yet they have strong internal consistency or coherence for our participants.

My collaborators and I found that, among a community sample of Whites from the American South aged 20-69, endorsement of neoliberalism was positively associated with holding modern racist attitudes toward Blacks (\( r = .35, p = .001 \); Son Hing, Nail, Zanna, & Zuniuk, 2012). By contrast, neoliberalism was marginally and inversely associated with implicit prejudice toward Blacks (\( r = -.19, p = .06 \)). When we controlled for the participant’s age, the negative relationship between neoliberalism and implicit prejudice becomes significant (partial \( r = -.24, p = .03 \)).

Thus, when using a better measure of participants’ neoliberal economic beliefs, we find that the more people endorse such beliefs, the more likely they are to be explicitly prejudiced. However, the more people endorse neoliberalism, the less likely they are to have negative automatic or uncontrollable biases. It appears that, when Southern Whites have positive automatic reactions toward Blacks, they are less likely to endorse competition, merit-based rewards, and unrestricted markets.

In a parallel study of Canadian university men, we found that endorsement of neoliberal beliefs was positively, if moderately, associated with their levels of modern sexism (\( r = .55, p < .001 \)). By contrast, we found no relation between men’s levels of neoliberalism and their implicit prejudice (i.e., automatic associations of competence with men and incompetence with women), \( r = -.09, n.s. \)^6 Thus, the more inclined men are to endorse neoliberal beliefs, the more explicitly—but not implicitly—sexist they are.

Why neoliberals tend to be more explicitly prejudiced

Why is it that people who more strongly endorse neoliberalism also tend to have attitudes that are more explicitly—but not implicitly—prejudiced? I want to suggest that, within social contexts marked by group inequality and a history of capitalism, explicit prejudice and neoliberal economic beliefs should be linked because they are part of a cluster of ideologies that serves to legitimize a hierarchical status quo. In contrast, implicit prejudice is not related to neoliberal beliefs because the kind of automatic responses driven by paired associations that this type of prejudice reflects is based on repeated experience — not on a well-articulated ideology.

The particular socioeconomic or political beliefs that people adopt may well be driven, in part, by their endorsement of two broader socio-political ideologies: social dominance orientation (SDO) and conservativism (Duckitt, 2001; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway,\(^5\) The neoliberalism scale demonstrates predictive validity, in that stronger neoliberal beliefs predict self-reported voting in the 2008 presidential race (American sample) and evaluations of a fictitious conservative political candidate (Canadian sample).

6 Interestingly, among women, the more they endorse neoliberalism, the less implicitly sexist they are (\( r = -.21, p = .03 \)). It is perhaps the case that the more women automatically associate competence with men, the less positive they are toward competition and merit-based outcomes. However, it is important to note that this is not an issue of prejudice.
2003). As I have noted, SDO reflects the degree to which people believe that hierarchy among social groups is good for society (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Conservatism reflects the degree to which people support common conventions and the status quo (Stangor & Leary, 2006), and it can refer to political conservatism (i.e., left-right identification) or to social conservatism (i.e., attitudes toward morality, traditional family, etc.). If the levels of SDO or conservatism that people display conditions both their attitudes to neoliberalism and explicit prejudice, then, these overarching orientations may explain the empirical link between the two. If it is the case that SDO drives the relation between explicit prejudice and neoliberalism, then SDO should be positively related to both and, in general, it is. People higher in SDO are more sexist, racist (e.g., toward Blacks, Aboriginals, Indians, Arabs, Asians), prejudiced toward immigrants, lesbians, gay men, feminists, housewives, and physically disabled people (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001), compared with people lower in SDO. Moreover, experimental studies reveal that inducing an increase in SDO gives rise to higher levels of explicit prejudice (Guimond, Danbrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003). It is also likely that people who display higher levels of SDO should endorse key aspects of neoliberal ideology more strongly (e.g., marketization, privatization of risk). Our research finds that Canadian men who more strongly endorse neoliberal beliefs score higher in SDO, \( r = .50, p < .001 \). Thus, SDO can plausibly drive the relationship between neoliberal economic beliefs and explicit prejudice.

Much the same can be said of conservatism. If conservatism is the driver behind the relationship between explicit prejudice and neoliberalism, then conservatism should be positively related to both. And, indeed, people who are more politically conservative tend to be more racist (Van Hiel et al., 2004). The relationship is even stronger for those who are more socially conservative. Moreover, our Canadian research found that undergraduate men who endorse neoliberal beliefs more strongly also endorse political conservatism \( (r = .35, p < .001) \) and social conservatism \( (r = .30, p < .001) \) more strongly. The relationship is even stronger among a sample of White Americans in the South: those who more strongly endorse neoliberal beliefs more strongly endorsed political conservatism \( (r = .53, p < .001) \) and social conservatism \( (r = .49, p < .001) \). These data support the notion that neoliberal economic beliefs and explicit prejudice can, in some social contexts, serve as hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies.

Structural equation modelling techniques reveal that the relation between explicit racism and right-wing economic beliefs can stem from SDO (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1993; Van Hiel et al., 2004) or from political conservatism (Sidanius & Pratto, 1993). So which of SDO or conservatism is the more important causal link between neoliberalism and explicit prejudice? There is reason to believe that the answer should depend on the perceived status and conventionality of the outgroup of interest, because SDO predicts explicit prejudice particularly toward groups with low status (e.g., Blacks), whereas conservatism predicts explicit prejudice particularly toward groups (e.g., gays) whose values are seen to threaten social conventions (Duckitt, 2006). Therefore, SDO is likely a causal link between neoliberal beliefs and explicit prejudice toward low status outgroups, while conservatism is more likely to provide the causal link between neoliberalism and explicit prejudice toward an unconventional outgroup.

Thus far I have looked at implicit and explicit attitudes separately. Next, let us consider how implicit and explicit prejudices operate in tandem and how the results relate to neo-liberal beliefs. Previously it was impossible to differentiate ‘modern racists’ from ‘political conservatives’ (because of a confounded measure) and to differentiate ‘aversive racists’ from

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7 Given that the United States is more neoliberal than Canada, it is interesting to note that neoliberal economic beliefs are more strongly related to social and political conservatism in the United States.
people with truly little prejudice (because of self-reporting problems). But my colleagues and I have proposed and tested a two-dimensional model of prejudice that disambiguates prejudice from left-right orientations (Son Hing et al., 2008). We employ the distinction between explicit and implicit prejudice to classify people into one of four prejudice profiles (see Figure 2 and pp. xx). Truly low-prejudiced people are low in modern racism and low in implicit prejudice. Aversive racists are low in modern racism but high in implicit prejudice. Principled conservatives are high in modern racism and but low in implicit prejudice. Modern racists are high in modern racism and high in implicit prejudice.

Our studies of Canadians and Americans validate this classification and reveal the types of beliefs endorsed by those who display each form of prejudice. We found that principled conservatives are the most identified with the social groups “Capitalist” and “Conservative” and most strongly endorse neoliberal economic beliefs. Modern racists are the next most right-leaning on our measures of political conservatism and neoliberalism, whereas aversive racists are the most left-leaning. In a study of prejudice toward Asians among White Canadians, we found that modern racists scored the highest on the two best predictors of generalized prejudice (SDO & social conservatism), whereas the truly low-prejudiced participants scored the lowest, while aversive racists and principled conservatives fell in the middle (Son Hing & Zanna, 2010). Consistent with theory (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), we found that the discriminatory behavior of aversive racists and modern racists depended on the situation (Son Hing et al., 2008). Participants either evaluated an outgroup member who was a well-qualified job applicant (i.e., the no-excuse-to-discriminate condition) or an outgroup member whose qualifications were ambiguous (i.e., the excuse-to-discriminate condition). In the no-excuse-to-discriminate condition, where discriminatory behavior would be obvious, aversive and modern racists avoided it; but, in the excuse-to-discriminate condition, they evaluated an outgroup member as less hirable than a matched ingroup member. Neither the truly low-prejudiced nor principled conservatives discriminated, even when there was an excuse to do so (Son Hing et al., 2008). In sum, the relationship between neoliberal beliefs and prejudice is not monotonic. The people who were the most racist and likely to discriminate (i.e., modern racists) were not the strongest endorsers of neoliberalism; and the people who were the least racist and discriminatory (truly low-prejudiced people) were not the biggest opponents of neoliberalism. Moreover, the people who are most neoliberal, the principled conservatives, were not the most prejudiced in terms of their underlying ideologies, and they never took the opportunity to discriminate against an outgroup member.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explored the relations between prejudice, stereotyping or discrimination and developments associated with the neoliberal era. I have noted that there are different types of prejudice or racism, including explicit and implicit racism, and that the incidence of each seems to have changed in recent decades. In particular, traditional, explicit racism has given way to implicit racism, modern racism, and aversive racism, especially in North America. Drawing on my own research as well as the existing literature, I have identified four types of racism (Figure 2). When we examine the relations between these types and neo-liberal beliefs, we find a complex relationship. Those who evince neoliberal beliefs most strongly are
more likely than others to express explicit, modern racist views but, when multiple forms of racism are considered, they are generally not the group most likely to discriminate; and some who are unsympathetic to neoliberal beliefs nonetheless do so, almost automatically, when circumstances allow them to without being blatant about it. Nevertheless, I also find evidence of a relationship between neoliberal beliefs and explicit racism that seems to be driven by the overarching belief systems associated with a social dominance orientation and conservatism. Drawing on the relevant literatures in psychology, I have also argued there are good reasons for thinking that the higher levels of competition and uncertainty associated with many neoliberal initiatives are likely to trigger threats to status that are typically associated with the stigmatization of others.

Given the limitations on the data available, it is impossible to reach precise conclusions about the impact of the neoliberal initiatives or ideas that have been so prominent in recent years on the nature or incidence of prejudice. It is clear that, despite the hopes of some exponents, the rise of neoliberalism has not done away with prejudice (cf. Becker 1957), although, in tandem with developments associated with the movements for civil rights, human rights and multiculturalism, it may have contributed to a decline in blatant or explicit racism, while rendering many more vulnerable to the effects of discrimination that often stem from subtle and implicit racism. The larger lesson here, however, is that key features of social and cultural context can have important effects, operating through well-known psychological mechanisms. Neo-liberal ideas are not irrelevant to the likelihood that someone will discriminate or to the effects of such discrimination; and many other elements in the wider cultural and institutional environment also contribute to the resilience that people can muster in contexts of prejudice or discrimination.
Figure 1

- Neoliberalism
  - Policies
  - Practices
  - Narratives

- Social Conditions
  - Competition
  - Uncertainty
  - Inequality

- Psychological Conditions
  - Feelings of Threat

- Motivations
  - Social Dominance
  - Self-Esteem
  - System Justification

- Prejudice
  - Prejudice
  - Stereotypes
  - Discrimination
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<th>Implicit Racism</th>
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<th>Higher</th>
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<td>• most neoliberal, politically conservative, socially conservative</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• least socially dominant</td>
<td>• moderate in social dominance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• do not discriminate</td>
<td>• do not discriminate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aversive Racists</strong></td>
<td>• least neoliberal, politically conservative, socially conservative</td>
<td>• moderate in neoliberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• moderate in social dominance</td>
<td>• high in political and social conservatism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• discriminate under ambiguous conditions</td>
<td>• most socially dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modern Racists</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>• discriminate under ambiguous conditions</td>
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Darker shading indicates more stigmatizing attitudes and behaviors
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Van Hiel, A., Pandelaere, M., & Duriez, B. (2004). The impact of need for closure on conservative beliefs and racism: Differential mediation by authoritarian submission and


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