Assessing Democratic Urban Governance: Towards a Comparative Framework

Oliver Dlabac*

Work in progress, please do not cite without the author’s permission.

Abstract
Urban regime theory maintains a privileged position of business power within governing coalitions. New institutionalism points to power asymmetries in the institutions and practices of governments and bureaucracies. Yet, it is precisely in this domain of urban governance where democratic innovations are presumed to hold their most radical potentials. In an effort to integrate advancements in urban research and democracy research, I propose democratic criteria for a global assessment of participatory governance arrangements (empowered advocacy, accountable administration). These arrangements are conceived as embedded in a broader democratic context, i.e. institutions of local government (accountable leadership, representation, self-rule, rule of law) and metropolitan governance (advocacy of affected localities, capacity for collective action).

*Visiting Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Political Science, 1866 Main Mall, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada V6T 1Z1. Thanks to Mark E. Warren for the helpful discussion of some earlier ideas. Postdoctoral Fellowship granted by the Swiss National Science Foundation.
1. Introduction

Globally competing city regions are shaping the daily life of an increasing share of the world’s population. More than half of the world’s population depends on the economic opportunities offered in urban regions, while being affected by available housing, commuting ways, available means of public transportation, health and social services, schools and daycare structures, opportunities for leisure and socialization, and the quality of the environment. At the same time, it is in globally competing city regions that social and cultural differences are particularly pronounced and where the population size and complexity of governance at multiple levels make effective political involvement of all population groups seem unlikely. In fact, many people wonder whether their municipal and regional governments are actually responding to the needs of the broader population and not to the interests of particular segments of the population, business sectors and international investors.

Skepticism towards representative governments is by no means limited to the urban scale but comprises also the more distant regional and national layers. As a general trend, while citizens in developed industrial democracies have remained supportive of the democratic ideal, they have also become ever more suspicious about their representatives and their political institutions – a combination that led to the expression of ‘critical citizens’ or ‘dissatisfied democrats’ (cf. Norris 1999). As these citizens have also become better educated, connected and informed as ever before, they are also pushing for more radical forms of citizen involvement in political decision making (Dalton 2004). Political elites, in turn, have responded to popular pressures by cautiously reforming disproportional electoral systems, strengthening judicial and administrative review, decentralizing the political system, and introducing more radical forms of citizen participation (Dalton 2004; Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow 2003). Enthusiasts of participatory democracy often refer to Switzerland with its strong self-rule by means of direct legislation at all state levels (Barber 1984; Budge 1996; Kriesi 2005; Zittel and Fuchs 2007). Concurrently, governments in countries as diverse as Brazil, India, the United States and Canada are experimenting with deliberative citizen assemblies, new forms of community planning and the use of new social media (see e.g. Archon Fung and Wright 2003; Warren and Pearse 2008; G. Smith 2009).

While such reforms may have the potential to radically transform the practice of democracy – particularly at the neighbourhood, municipal and regional level – their actual contribution to the quality of democracy is far from clear (Warren 2003; Dalton, Cain, and Scarrow 2003). Do they actually protect and empower affected population groups that have hitherto been marginalized? Are political leaders and state officials actually being made more accountable and more responsive towards the broader population? In other words: is the quality of democracy really expanding?

Even though democracy research has made considerable progress in developing empirical measures for differentiating degrees of democratic quality in advanced industrial democracies, most measures adhere to a minimalist conceptualization of representative democracy at the national level, basically accounting for freedom rights, separation of powers and competitive elections (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 11; Pickel and Pickel 2006, 154). Newer measures now depart from broader grounds of democratic theory to include accounts of inclusion, public accountability, and direct participation (e.g. Diamond and Morlino 2005; Bühlmann et al. 2011). Inspired by this multidimensional approach, a similar measurement instrument has now been developed to measure the variation of democratic qualities in subnational political systems, namely for the half-direct democracies constituted by the Swiss regions (Dlabac and Schaub 2012).
As we are interested in assessing the democratic qualities at the urban scale, it would be tempting to simply apply existing democracy measures to the local level. Yet the political processes and policy fields at the urban scale are quite distinct from the national and even regional political system. Distinct enough to have led to a sub-discipline of political science dedicated to the study of urban politics (John 2009). I believe that a framework for assessing urban democratic governance must be tailored to the particularities of the urban scale. In the next section I will therefore propose a layered framework of democratic criteria that apply to three levels of urban governance: Participatory governance, local government and metropolitan governance. In section 3 I will summarize the comparative framework and its characteristics. The paper closes with a short outlook on how the comparative framework could be tested in a comparative case study in order to develop a consolidated measurement instrument that can be applied to a wide range of Western cities.

2. Democracy in the Urban Space

Urban research offers a rich background for tailoring a comparative framework for democratic governance at the urban scale. Community power theorists in the 1950s and 1960s have abandoned the previous static analysis of local government institutions, asking instead whether power is concentrated in elite networks or dispersed to a plurality of interest groups (Hunter 1953; Dahl 1961). The call for community involvement, however, was most consequential within the field of urban planning, where many cities of the 1960s and 1970s introduced forms of public involvement, which have gradually expanded beyond spatial planning to include strategic planning and effective service provision (Balducci and Calvaresi 2005). Yet another strain of urban research has argued that the analysis of urban governance must necessarily encompass the metropolitan scale, as the strong interdependencies of municipalities within city regions have made more or less formalized forms of regional governance factually indispensable (Savitch and Vogel 2000).

While the analysis of urban governance has always been coupled with considerations on the effectiveness and legitimacy of urban governance, a more systematic attempt to assess the democratic legitimacy of urban governance across cities can be found in a European comparative research project (Haus, Heinelt, and Stewart 2005; Heinelt, Sweeting, and Getimis 2006). The research team explores how cities in different institutional settings and with different political cultures combine urban leadership and community involvement to produce more or less effective and legitimate outcomes. While basing their comparisons on elaborate empirical typologies of local government institutions, leadership styles and forms of community involvement, the actual evaluation of different forms of urban governance was confined to measures of urban sustainability and subjective assessments of legitimate policymaking.

The normative framework developed here takes into account three central layers of urban governance that can be identified in urban research. At the heart of the framework are the evolving participatory governance arrangements, as they hold the potential of empowering advocates of marginalized population groups and making bureaucracies more accountable towards the broader public. These arrangements, however, do not exist in isolation and must be conceived as embedded in a broader democratic context, i.e. institutions of local government and metropolitan governance. Firstly, elected leaders and representatives will remain the central figures to be held responsible for their acts by the broader public. Even where decision power is delegated to community representatives, agenda setting, political
communication and actual enforcement of the agreed policies remain highly dependent on democratically accountable urban leaders and political representatives. Secondly, the institutional design of metropolitan governance will determine whether population groups across the metropolitan region will engage in collaborative action or whether some localities will suffer from negative-sum rivalries and external costs caused by unilateral strategies pursued by other localities. Let us now consider the democratic potentials offered at these three governance levels one after another.

2.1. Governance-Driven Democratization: Empowered Advocacy and Accountable Administration

Accounts of urban governance beyond city hall have typically been painted in dark colours. Taking a middle ground between elitist and pluralist theories of urban politics, urban regime theory focuses on informal governing coalitions forged by urban leaders and senior bureaucrats to include resourceful business elites and selected community representatives securing the necessary electoral support for pursuing a more or less progressive policy agenda (Stone 1989). Within such an urban regime no one would dispose of absolute power, but business power would certainly have a privileged position as financial assets could be most readily converted for achieving significant policy results. Depending on the composition of this government coalition certain population groups can be effectively excluded from power while marginal potential opposition groups may be bought in by small-scale material incentives. The formation of stable regime structures, however, is by no means certain, and while existing government coalitions in some cities may adapt to changing political circumstances, in other cities they may be effectively challenged by newly forming opposition groups and protest movements.

In recent years, neo-institutionalism is gaining ground in urban research to complement the dominant approach of urban regime theory. In contrast to the discredited old institutionalism, new institutionalism accounts not only for formal institutions, but also for power asymmetries replicated by informal conventions and coalitions of governments and bureaucracies (Lowndes 2009). The old model of administrations being hierarchically controlled by electorally accountable governments seems no longer viable in a context of autonomous and closed governance networks that cannot longer be over sighed by the legislature, thus rendering public accountability a central challenge (Kjaer 2009). Administrative agencies and street-level bureaucrats are exposed not only to multiple hierarchical principles but they also develop informal ‘decision rules’ emerging from task performance as well as ‘attention rules’ that might privilege certain neighbourhoods or citizen groups above others (Jones 1995, 84–85).

As scholarly attention has moved from the formal institutions of municipal government to the opaque and potentially exclusive character of bureaucratic practices, policy networks and government coalitions, we may contend with Mark Warren (2009) that the most radical potentials of democratization have also shifted from electoral democracy into democratic governance, the field of technocrats and administrators. We may, in fact, be witnesses of a trend that Warren eloquently calls ‘governance-driven democratization’. According to Warren (2009, 8), “elected governments have become increasingly aware that electoral legitimacy does not translate into policy-specific legitimacy.” Initiated from within government and administration, new forms of democratic participation have emerged. These are not meant to replace other forms and spaces of democracy such as electoral democracy, social
movements or deliberation through the media but might be supplementary to it (Warren 2009, 8). These new forms are not to be confused with direct participation in the form of direct legislation, they are often democratic experiments commonly engaging a relatively few citizens and rather have the potential to constitute a means of representation of the broader population. Warren proposes to critically assess the opportunities and dangers of governance-driven democratization as measured by the democratic values of inclusion of the affected, empowerment, representation, and deliberation.

In a similar vein, Graham Smith (2009) develops a comparative framework that allows for the comparison of very different modes of citizen participation based on the "manner and extent to which they realize desirable qualities or goods that we expect of democratic institutions" (Smith 2009, 12). More specifically he compares participatory budgeting, deliberative citizen assemblies, direct legislation and e-democracy with regard to the 'democratic goods' of inclusiveness, popular control, considered judgment and transparency. Brigitte Geissel (2012), in turn, proposes to compare different forms of democratic innovations by their degree of inclusive equal participation, perceived legitimacy, and deliberative quality, but also by their impact on the citizens’ democratic skills (civic education) and on the actual achievement of collectively identified goals (effectiveness).

An even more detailed account of single participatory processes all over the world is strived for by the Participedia project (A. Fung and Warren 2011). This open-source repository collects qualitative and quantitative data on institutional design and democratic outcomes of participatory processes in the whole range of possible policy fields. Design choices are categorized in order to capture the selection method of participants, the modes of communication and decision and the extent of authority and power assigned to exercises of public participation. With regard to democratic outcomes, contributors to the project are asked to assess a number of aspects: increased voice of those affected, increased relevant information, development of citizen capacities and organizational capacities, deliberative quality, and limited levels of corruption and undermining patronage systems.

In contrast to the aforementioned proposals we do not intend to comparatively evaluate different forms or single instances of participatory processes. Rather, the aim is to assess the democratic quality of governance across cities. Our units of comparison are thus cities, and we are interested in a broader assessment of democratic qualities within that urban space. If we want to assess the level of governance-driven democratization, we need to make an overall evaluation of how existing participatory processes have led to particular democratic outcomes. In any case, these participatory processes must be evaluated against the background of potential urban regimes, policy networks, administrative practices and protest politics that may have remained unaffected by the participatory processes at hand. More specifically, I propose to assess the level governance-driven democratization by two broad criteria of democratic outcomes: empowered advocacy and accountable administration.

**Empowered advocacy.** Instead of relying on highly idealistic accounts of an equal voice to everyone affected, improved civic skills and the deliberative quality of decision, I believe that an overall assessment of democratic governance in the context of potentially exclusive policy networks, government coalitions and administrative practices requires a far more pragmatic conceptualization of empowerment and advocacy. Individuals pertaining to marginalized population groups typically play a minor or no role in these processes (Getimis, Heinelt, and Sweeting 2006, 13). All the more important is the involvement of representatives for all potentially affected population groups throughout the whole process of policy formation,
decision making, implementation and monitoring. This requirement does not mean, however, that the final decisions and administrative acts must accommodate to the needs and desires of all affected population groups equally. Some people might be promoting more particularistic interests, while a decision made at the neighborhood or higher level might weight collective goals of other affected population groups more heavily. The balancing of narrow interests will depend on a power balance between involved representatives and the role of public officials and elected leaders in initiating governance processes, selecting participants, structuring interactions and considering conflicting goals and interests in their final decision making and implementation acts.

Now, who are the representatives of potentially affected population groups to be considered for involvement? Again, my approach will deviate from the idea of selectively or randomly assigning citizens to represent citizens with similar characteristics. Particularly if participatory exercises are designed as purely consultative, its actual impact on decision making and implementation will depend on the involvement of organizations that dispose of a high capacity to mobilize their members and sympathizers in the case public officials should ignore their positions. Whereas unorganized citizens might be more susceptible to co-optation by more powerful interests, neighborhood organizations and advocacy groups at neighborhood or higher levels will usually make for a more empowered advocacy, provided they must not fear a shortage of public funds (see Archon Fung 2004, chap. 3.9, 7.3). In cases where resourceful groupings lobby against a broader cause, public officials and urban leaders will have to publicly justify their stance and convince the broader public of their reasoning.

**Accountable administration.** Independently of whether participatory processes succeed in securing empowered advocacy of all affected or not, practices of governance may also be democratized by exposing technocrats and administrators to public accountability (Getimis, Heinelt, and Sweeting 2006, 16). Participatory processes may serve this goal by requiring public officials to present information and justify their stance towards participating publics. Depending on the relevance and publicity of governance processes, mass media may take interest and deliver a more or less differentiated media coverage, allowing for a broader public awareness and public accountability of ongoing governance processes. Even though public accountability does not include immediate sanctioning mechanisms, the mere need of public officials to listen to different needs and justify their stance to affected population groups may lead to adapting attitudes and innovative practices. Moreover, public officials are not immune to public pressure and might wish to avoid provoking public criticism that can be anticipated.

2.2. Democratic Local Government: Accountable Leadership, Representation, Rule of Law, and Self-Rule

Even if urban regime theory and the new institutionalism have focused on leadership, informal coalitions and administrative practices, scholars of urban politics have not neglected the importance of formal government institutions and local autonomy for framing these governance processes, particularly when theorizing in an international perspective (e.g. Wolman 1995; Goldsmith 1995; Bäck 2005). A typology which has been widely used in comparative local government studies was put forward by Hesse and Sharp (1991). The
variation of local state traditions in western states can be appreciated in the extended
typology by Loughlin and Peters (1997), as shown in table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is there a basis</th>
<th>Anglo-Saxon</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Germanic</th>
<th>Scandinavian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>for the ‘State’</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-society</td>
<td>Pluralistic</td>
<td>Antagonistic</td>
<td>Organicist</td>
<td>Organicist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relations</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Jacobin, ‘one and indivisible’</td>
<td>Integral/organic federalist</td>
<td>Decentralized unitary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of political organization</td>
<td>Incrementalist ‘muddling through’</td>
<td>Legal technocratic</td>
<td>Legal corporatist</td>
<td>Consensual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis of Policy Style</td>
<td>‘State power’ (US); local government (UK)</td>
<td>Regionalized unitary state</td>
<td>Co-operative federalism</td>
<td>Strong local autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of</td>
<td>Countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decentralization</td>
<td>UK, US, CAN (but not Quebec), IRE</td>
<td>FRA, ITA, SPA (until 1978), POR, Quebec, GRE, BEL (until 1988)</td>
<td>GER, AUT, NET, SPA (after 1978, BEL (after 1988)</td>
<td>SWE, NOR, DEN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Loughlin and Peters (1997, 46)

Another perspective on local governments is proposed by Hendriks (2010) who adapts the highly influential democracy typology set forth by Lijphart (1999) to the local level, by identifying majoritarian and consensual characteristics of local governments (table 2). In the UK, the prototype of the majoritarian system, local governments continue to be dominated by majoritarianism, despite some recent efforts to introduce selective consensual traits (Hendriks, Loughlin, and Lindström 2011, 717). The Rhinelandic countries in contrast dispose of a consensual pattern at the local level as well, although the federal state of Germany with its ‘two-and-a-half party system’ and strong directly elected mayors shows some elements of a majoritarian democracy (Hendriks, Loughlin, and Lindström 2011, 720). The Nordic countries with their unitary welfare states lack the strong meso-level found in the Rhinelandic countries and disposes of a multi-party system that is often biased towards one or two dominant parties (Hendriks, Loughlin, and Lindström 2011, 721). The southern European states, finally, “share a history of strong centralization and concentration of political and administrative power”, with France, Greece, Portugal, and Malta still being dominated by the majoritarian model, notwithstanding the decentralization efforts in France since the 1980s (Hendriks, Loughlin, and Lindström 2011, 722).
Table 2: Majoritarian and consensual characteristics of local governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Majoritarian</th>
<th>Consensual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party system</strong></td>
<td>Two-party system</td>
<td>Multiparty system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cabinet</strong></td>
<td>One-party with simple council majority</td>
<td>Multiparty coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government-council relations</strong></td>
<td>Executive dominance in monistic government</td>
<td>Balanced relations in dualistic government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral system</strong></td>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interest groups</strong></td>
<td>Pluralism</td>
<td>Local corporatism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Division of local power</strong></td>
<td>Unitary, centralized</td>
<td>Multi-tier and multi-unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Division of regulatory power</strong></td>
<td>Concentration, vertical lines from committees to sectoral bureaucracies</td>
<td>Dispersed, need for horizontal coordination of policy sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local autonomy</strong></td>
<td>Home rule, local autonomy</td>
<td>Institutionalized interdependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal-administrative supervision</strong></td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Oversight by external bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial-economic auditing</strong></td>
<td>Under local political control</td>
<td>External ‘courts of audit’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hendriks (2010, 55, 72-73)

Although these accounts are illustrative of the large variation across local governments, our primary concern are not these institutions, but the democratic quality of urban governance taking place within that institutional context. The question is therefore, how well are different institutional designs suited to promote democratic outcomes? I will argue that the democratic outcomes to be considered within the realm of local government are: accountable leadership, inclusive representation, considered self-rule, and substantive rule of law.

**Accountable leadership.** Given the modest resources commanded to local governmental authority in most countries, studies of urban governance have stressed the importance of urban political leadership for energetic governance (Stone 1995). Even though political leadership can be exercised by a variety of people across a city, most studies focus on those people at the top of the formal political institutions as this group "has influence over public resources and hence has accountability and power relations with all the citizens within the area" (Greasley and Stoker 2009). Key tasks of these political leaders are: maintaining political support, developing policy direction, representing and defending the authority’s goals in negotiations with other bodies, and ensuring task accomplishment (see Leach et al. 2005). Leader’s success to attain their goals has often been explained by contextual factors and personal skills and capabilities, but also by the institutional structure in which they operate. In a comparative study of 14 countries Mouritzen and Svara (2002) differentiated four ideal types of governmental forms. In strong mayor systems an elected mayor controls the majority of the city council and is responsible for all executive functions. In the committee-leader form the political leader is charged with some executive functions, but other functions are assigned to standing committees and to the top administrator (CEO, city manager, secrétaire générale or the like). In the collective form there is one elected collegiate body that is responsible for all executive functions, where the mayor presides the body. Finally, in the council-manager form,
all executive functions are in the hands of a city manager who is appointed by the city council, where the mayor is formally assigned presiding and ceremonial functions only. The authors note, however, that the governmental form does not automatically relate to a strong policy leadership. Instead they find that leaders in strong mayor and leader-committee forms are more likely to figure as party leaders bringing their party concerns into their role.

In the earlier mentioned European comparative research project the evidence does not support the general hypothesis of enhanced leadership in systems with direct mayoral elections, consolidated party systems or strong parliamentary support. Instead it is particular leadership styles that are encouraged depending on the institutional and political context (Bäck 2006). The more fragmented the institutional and political landscape, the more likely are leadership styles that facilitate cooperation and consensus. Constitutional arrangements that vest the political leader with high degree of legitimacy through direct elections, in contrast, are favourable conditions for a visionary style, where a leader gains the support of different sides to promote innovative policies. However, the same constitutional feature may also encourage a city boss style, with the political leader promoting his agenda without anticipating capacity building in local or regional actors.

Whereas strong policy leaders backed by their council might be desirable in terms of their achievements, a strong and visible leadership might also bolster the public accountability of urban politics. On the other hand, strong urban leaders must not always entertain active relationships of accountability with the broader public. Effective accountability requires that urban leaders listen to the needs of the urban population, inform about ongoing processes and give public justifications of their stance in controversial matters. A critical public debate is also conducive to an informed electoral debate, where elections represent a potential sanctioning mechanism for urban leaders and their supportive councillors.

Inclusive representation. While population groups should dispose of empowered advocacy in governance processes affecting their everyday life, their needs and wishes should also be forcefully represented at the level of local government. Representative councillors may initiate policies and projects that are vital to their constituents while also serving the broader population of the city. Just as well, representative councillors may effectively challenge some policies and developments favouring certain population groups at the expense of the majority of the population.

Inclusive representation, however, has not everywhere been the primary concern when institutionalizing local government. Indeed, the variation in important institutional aspects noted earlier can be attributed to different fundamental values in different societies. For the case of the United States, Wolman (1995) identifies three such fundamental values: Participation, pluralism and representation, and economy and efficiency. Jefferson’s ‘sovereignty of the individual’ was the animating force behind the early American local government, which in New England took the form of town meetings but in other places also the use of local referenda and initiatives. In reaction to the Jeffersonian concern with participation the pluralist version of local democracy consists of conflict among diverse groups, which needs to be resolved by representative decision makers, combined with the checks and balances reflected in the separation of the executive (mayor) and legislative power (council). As a reaction to machine politics and corruption, the Progressive movement in the beginning of the 20th century propagated the role of municipal government to be primarily that of the efficient delivery of local services. This led to the implementation of a council-manager form of government – where the manager is appointed by the council and is
an expert on the efficient delivery of services – non-partisan elections and at-large rather than ward elections – to eliminate small area interests (Wolman 1995, 136–139).

These latter efficiency-oriented government reforms in the United States have been critically debated (see Wolman 1995, 143-148). The reform movement has been accused of pursuing own economic interests against immigrant desires in the name of the general good. Moreover the reforms “were not neutral in terms of the values of pluralism and representative democracy” (Wolman 1995, 145). At-large elections and non-partisan elections seem to reduce voter participation and representation of low-status groups. While upper-class groups retain a channel of expression through various civic organizations, the lower class has need for direct political representation.

Wolman (1995) contrasts the American values and local government structure to Britain, where local government is primarily seen as a counterweight to national government and as a device for efficient and effective local service delivery. Responsiveness is brought about by representative democracy, where the electorate chooses a council in partisan elections. The council is organized into a committee structure with the dominant party or coalition controlling each committee, the committees being responsible for a particular public service and its administration. It is notable that in the British local government there is no single locus of executive authority; executive authority is invested in the council as a whole. Unlike the United States, the critical assessment of governmental structures has centered more on efficiency than on representation and participation.

**Considered self-rule.** The British and US-American values could also be contrasted with the case of Switzerland, where direct participation has certainly become a dominating feature. While town meetings similar to those in New England have an older tradition in rural communities, also cities with implemented parliament have in the late 19th century introduced extensive rights of direct participation through initiatives and referenda (Bützer 2007, 34–43). In the early 20th century direct democratic instruments at the local level were adopted in some US-states and several Western European countries, and they were also adapted in several Eastern European countries after 1989 (Schiller 2011). In order to contribute to democratic urban governance, popular votes regarding important matters of people’s every-day life must be frequent and decisive. In order that the popular vote considers the needs of the community in general and of marginalized population groups in particular, a high and inclusive turnout is imperative. Considered self-rule also requires an engaged public debate preceding the vote, resulting in more sensible and better informed voters.

**Substantive rule of law.** The expressed desirability of empowered advocacy, leadership and self-rule does not mean that there is no space for rule of law in democratic urban governance. Popular desires pushed forward by advocacy groups and urban leaders must not transgress the basic freedom rights, political rights or property rights of any individual. Legal standings, independent legal-administrative courts, judicial procedures, external ‘courts of financial audit’ and ombudsmen will contribute to the consideration of affected interests and of the environment, while alleviating arbitrary ruling and corruption by public officials.
2.3. Democratic Metropolitan Governance: Advocacy of Affected Localities, and Capacity for Collective Action

The considerations so far have centred upon participatory governance processes and local government institutions within the bounds of a local political jurisdiction. The urban scale, however, usually expands beyond a single core municipality, and increasingly so with continuing population growth and urban sprawl. Urban dwellers commute across that shared urban space for work, social relations and environmental experience, utilize common infrastructure, and stand in dense economic relations with each other. In order to reflect this social and economic community and with the aim to deliver public services more efficiently, adherents of the metropolitan government school in the early and mid-20th century have called for the establishment of metropolitan governments either through annexation, city-county consolidation or the establishment of a new metropolitan tier (e.g. Maxey 1922). In response to the supposedly inefficient and unresponsive service delivery by centralized bureaucracies, the public choice school from the 1950s onwards saw the fragmentation of local government as a virtue, as inter-local competition for mobile taxpayers would lead to tax-service packages matching the local needs (e.g. Tiebout 1956; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961).

Concerned by the neglect of questions of equity, scholars of new regionalism have since the 1990s focused on forms of metropolitan governance that combine hierarchical forms of strategic decision making with horizontal cooperation and coordination (e.g. Rusk 1993; Savitch and Vogel 1996). However, the successes of the so called ‘governance without government’ in “reducing the growing urban-suburban disparities, enhancing regional growth policies to reduce sprawl, producing affordable housing in the suburbs, and leading to a more competitive city in the world economy” have been disappointing (Savitch and Vogel 2009, 114). Moreover, Neil Brenner (2002) argued that new regionalists missed the broader context of new regional dynamics. Instead of being experiments for strengthening local autonomy and ameliorating the urban crisis, new forms of regional governance would reflect a “postfordist urban restructuring and neoliberal (national and local) state retrenchment” (Brenner 2002, 3). In his grand theory the rescaling and reterritorialisation of the city-region is seen as a part of a larger restructuring of statehood in response to the pressures of global capitalism (Brenner 2004). This brief sketch of different approaches to metropolitan governance, as well as the following overview table, is based on Savitch and Vogel (2009).
### Table: Theoretical frameworks on regionalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time-frame</th>
<th>Metropolitan government (Old regionalism)</th>
<th>Public choice (Polycentrism)</th>
<th>New regionalism</th>
<th>Rescaling and reterritorialisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core focus</td>
<td>1900-1960s</td>
<td>1950s-1990s</td>
<td>1990 to present</td>
<td>2006 to present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern of urban development</td>
<td>Monocentric</td>
<td>Multi-centered but core still dominant</td>
<td>Multi-centered but core less dominant</td>
<td>Megalopolis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Centralisation</td>
<td>Equity/competitiveness</td>
<td>Competitiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution</td>
<td>Hierarchy: Establish metropolitan government</td>
<td>Market: Tax competition, good public services, economic attractiveness</td>
<td>Horizontal Cooperation: Strategic metropolitan decisions through consolidation or governance arrangements</td>
<td>Rescaling/Restructuring: realignment of boundaries, roles, functions, and resources and relations with private and non-governmental actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major critique</td>
<td>May lead to lack of responsiveness, problem of minority dilution</td>
<td>Lack of equity as poor can’t move easily</td>
<td>Weak regionalism, unlikely to reduce disparities</td>
<td>Tendency towards economic determinism, high level of abstraction, and ‘absence of politics’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Toronto (1954)</td>
<td>St. Louis Pittsburgh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miami (1958)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>London (1965)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Abbreviated version of Table in Savitch and Vogel (2009, 108–109)

While most empirical studies of metropolitan governance have been concerned with questions of efficiency and equity, a newer branch of research has focused on the question of the democratic quality of metropolitan governance arrangements. An international research team around Heinelt and Kübler (2005) found that cities within Europe and North America have chosen different paths for building area-wide governance capacity in city regions, and that these paths were coupled with different democratic outcomes. Due to the high value assigned to local self-government, cities following the North and Middle European state tradition were found to either rely on governance arrangements dominated by municipalities, or to establish new metropolitan governments, but either way democratic legitimation is achieved through traditional forms of democratic participation such as voting and participation. Cities of the Anglo Saxon tradition, with their low legal status, have been much
more dependent on higher government interventions for building metropolitan governance capacity. In a context of new government organisations, quasi-governmental bodies and private actors, network-based governance is needed to pool the resources and competencies necessary for achieving particular policy objectives. Legitimation of these processes is therefore much more dependent on new forms of public involvement and on accountable leadership at the metropolitan scale. In cities within the French tradition of local government, public services have traditionally been managed at higher levels of government, while the function of local political leaders is to represent local interests against higher levels. Accordingly, the form and implementation of higher level initiatives for building metropolitan governance capacity were highly dependent on local political leadership. While cities in Greece and Spain seemed to be more keen towards achieving governability through ‘social dialogue’ as opposed to corporatist arrangements found in Northern and Middle European countries, the research team could not find any systematic patterns of actual openness of policy networks towards civil society actors across the different local government traditions (Heinelt and Kübler 2005, 194–198).

Given the wide variation of metropolitan institutions even within the same country and the multitude of functional governance arrangements within one and the same city region, it becomes difficult to define specific criteria of democratic quality in an international comparative perspective. Kübler and Schwab (2007) have analyzed twenty schemes of area-wide policy coordination in five Swiss metropolitan areas in order to assess the democratic consequences of the shift from local government to metropolitan governance. The coordination schemes considered as ‘complex governance’ (ad-hoc horizontal interactions involving non-state actors and possibly supra-local authorities) showed to be superior in terms of inclusion as compared to the more traditional core-city decision making or multi-tier government, as associations and citizens were not only consulted but even empowered to co-decide. Simultaneously, the actors of these schemes were barely accountable to citizens, neither through elections or referenda, nor indirectly through actors elected at the second tier. With regard to the deliberative quality of governance, the authors find no evidence for a more deliberative or consensual decision making mode in new regionalist arrangements. In a very recent article Kübler (2012) turns to a comparison of four established metropolitan governments and finds that the political logics and territorial interest representation in these bodies converged towards more consensual patterns of decision making, even if local and regional representation are characterized by majoritarian traits.

The difficulty now is: how to compare assessments of network-based governance with governance where a metropolitan government has been implemented? Inclusion, accountability and deliberative quality take very different forms in these institutional settings. More fundamentally, while these three criteria may be useful as a general framework for assessing the democratic contributions of innovative, participatory and deliberative procedures (Papadopoulos and Warin 2007), they do not seem to fit to account for the central problem of democracy at the metropolitan scale. The central problem of democratic metropolitan governance, as I would pose it, is to secure advocacy of affected localities while at the same time ensuring capacity for collective action at the urban scale. Although the two aspects are in intertwined in reality, it is worth to consider them separately.

**Advocacy of affected localities.** Given the dense networks of interdependencies in city regions, decisions and actions in one locality will likely affect other localities. In her model of
regional democracy, Iris Young was particularly concerned about the exclusionary processes of racial and class residential segregation that contain disadvantages and preserve privilege:

“Autonomous local jurisdictions exclude some people and activities through their use of zoning regulation; with their tax powers wealthy communities run high-quality schools and first-rate services while a neighbouring poorer municipality has a much lower tax base and need for more costly and complex service provision. The planning and development decisions of one jurisdictionally autonomous unit affect the investment patterns and atmosphere of many neighbouring communities who have no say in these decisions.” (Young 2000, 229)

Young builds on O’Neill’s theory of the ‘scope of obligations of justice’ and contends that people in metropolitan regions have obligations of justice to one another “because their lives are intertwined in social, economic, and communicative relations that tie their fates” (Young 2000, 233). While she acknowledges legitimate desires for differentiated affiliation and self-determination at the neighbourhood and local level, regional governance institutions need to simultaneously assure that local governments “take the interests of others in the region into account, especially where outsiders make a claim on them that they are affected by the actions and policies of that locale” (Young 2000, 233).

Young considers that the groups differentiated by culture or lifestyle should be represented in wider regional institutions which would be complemented by fora where such local or cross-local groups meet for public discussion about region-wide concern (Young 2000, 234). Theories of public choice have analyzed such interlocal conflicts of interests in terms of positive and negative externalities that lead to collective inefficiencies. Instead of metropolitan institutions of representation and deliberation, public choice theorists view interlocal negotiation for internalizing these externalities as more efficient than central state intervention that would ignore local preferences. A more critical rational choice account has been given by Richard Feiock (2009), who classified different tools of regional governance in a spectrum from consolidated regional authority, over inter-local contract networks to informal policy networks. While he observes that municipalities do selectively cooperate on some issues, he also notes the limits of self-organized cooperation in redistributive questions where the externality producer has a dominant bargaining position. Moreover, he explicates how the transaction costs involved in self-organized coordination critically depend on contextual factors such as state-level rules, the ease of measurement and monitoring of a particular good, demographic homogeneity across institutional units, and internal political structures.

**Capacity for collective action.** Even though are faced with interdependence on a global scale, dealing with these problems is being hindered where democracy is understood as a theory of resistance, and not as a theory of collective action. Jane Mansbridge (2012) observes that liberal democratic theory has been primarily concerned in separating and limiting powers in order to protect individual liberty. While radical traditions of democracy call for common action, this common action is often conceived as in opposition to representative government. According to Mansbridge a ‘democratic theory of action’ would need to take problems of collective action more seriously and strengthen the capacity of representatives to negotiate and enforce policies promoting public goods.
The concern for capacity for collective action is particularly pressing for city regions. Savitch and Kantor (2002) give an account of the political economy of globally competing cities. Vertical and horizontal intergovernmental support is conceived as a central structural precondition for effectively promoting integrated plans and strategies for the production of public goods such as infrastructure, environmental protection and equitable public services at an urban scale. Rivaling municipalities in fractionalized city regions, in contrast, dispose of a weak bargaining position towards businesses and developers and engage in a down to the bottom race with regard to taxes and the provision of public services. The concern of collective action thus goes beyond the internalization of externalities and the voice of local needs described above, but also beyond the economies of scale gained through a regionalized production of public goods (or contract networks), usually discussed in the economic literature on metropolitan governance (e.g. Feiock 2009).

3. The Comparative Framework for Democratic Urban Governance

In the concluding chapter of the second edition of *Theories of Urban Politics* (2009), Clarence Stone calls for a research agenda which addresses the international challenge of comparative urban governance less in terms of political outcomes and more in terms of genuinely democratic ideals. The proposed comparative framework builds on broad theories of urban politics and proposes a set of normative democratic criteria which can be applied to three levels of urban governance, i.e. participatory processes, local government and metropolitan governance. Figure 1 gives an overview of the framework deduced in the preceding sections.

The proposed framework for assessing democratic quality is innovative in several ways. Firstly, the layered approach to these three levels of governance allows for a more differentiated account of the complex processes of urban governance. Second, it makes a clear distinction between formal democratic institutions (left hand side of the figure), and their democratic outcomes (right hand side). While broader measures of democracy often confound indicators of formal institutions (‘rules in form’) with indicators of democratic outcomes (‘rules in practice’), the framework proposed here does not rely on the manifold assumptions implied when assigning formal institutions different degrees of democratic qualities. Instead the causal arrows between institutional designs and democratic outcomes remain to be empirically investigated, where democratic outcomes might also be promoted by particular institutional arrangements or the local political culture. This means, thirdly, that the democratic outcomes must be assessed by looking at actual political processes taking place within more or less formalized institutions, from closed negotiations in policy networks over justifications by political leaders to interlocal negotiations and metropolitan capacity building. Forth, we must consider that processes of different policy fields are usually shaped by different institutional arrangements and characterized by different degrees of democratic outcomes. A city region might therefore be governed very democratically with regard to the provision of school and health services, while being highly exclusionary with regard to social services and urban planning. At the aggregate level, however, democratic urban governance will have to secure the overall coordination and prioritizing across policy fields, as decisions in one policy field often affect the options and outcomes in other policy fields.
Figure: Comparative framework for the assessment of democratic urban governance

**Urban regime / policy networks / administrative practices / protest politics**

- **Participatory processes:** administrative-legislative procedures/time points of public involvement, selection method, role of mayor/representatives/officials, information/independent experts/mediators, communication mode, decision mode/authority, publicity/active information

**Local government system:** local autonomy, direct mayoral elections, one-party government, concentration of regulatory power in special executive boards, transparent campaign and party financing

**Local representation system:** legislative powers and capacities, extent of constituency, registration, proportional electoral system, neighborhood authorities

**Direct legislation institutions:** popular referenda and initiatives, authority, scope, barriers, constituency, moderated discussion fora

**Justice system:** legal standings, independent legal-administrative courts, judicial procedures, external 'courts of financial audit', ombudsman

**Metropolitan governance institutions:** tiers of government/respective authority, direct elections, public involvement, communication mode, decision mode

**Empowered advocacy:** representation of all potentially affected throughout all governance processes, balancing of narrow interests, capacity for mobilization

**Accountable administration:** public justification of official's stance, differentiated media coverage, public awareness of processes

- **Accountable leadership:** strong and visible leadership by mayor and councilors, support in the council, public justifications, informed electoral debate

- **Inclusive representation:** decisive involvement of representatives, competition, multiparty representation, turnout, descriptive representation

- **Considered self-rule:** frequent and decisive popular votes, inclusive participation, public debate, informed voters

- **Substantive rule of law:** effective protection of property, judicial consideration of affected interests and environment, low corruption by public officials

- **Advocacy of affected localities:** effective voice of special needs, claim of external costs and benefits

- **Capacity for collective action:** integrated plans and strategies, overcoming negative-sum rivalries
4. Outlook

The framework presented here is a first draft aiming at taking an encompassing view on what democracy might mean at the urban scale. While the existing institutional typologies and newer democratic theories of democratic governance will serve as a starting point, the overall project of assessing democratic urban governance will need to refine and systematize the proposed institutional framework, and the considerations on the democratic outcomes need to be integrated into a more coherent theory of urban democracy.

But even a more elaborated framework must remain provisional, as long as it is not tested for its usefulness in international comparisons. In a first step, I am planning a comparative study on the case of urban planning in the prosperous cities of Vancouver, Lyon, Stuttgart and Zurich, each disposing of a different state tradition. Urban planning is chosen as all four cities are face with common challenges of urban growth and as the vertical distribution of competencies of urban planning are less dependent on the state traditions, making a first test of the comparative framework more feasible.

While the four cities share important socioeconomic conditions, they depart from very different state traditions. The institutional variation is best illustrated by the cities of Zurich and Vancouver. When compared internationally, Zurich clearly exhibits very direct democratic characteristics, combined with a strong separation of powers between a collegial government heading the administrative departments, a parliament counting 125 councilors, and rigorous judicial review. Vancouver in contrast corresponds to a North American prototype of local government: Mayor-council system, city manager with executive powers and at-large elections, not of parties but groups. While in Zurich the government council meetings are closed to the public, the meetings of the city council include the mayor and are publicly broadcasted. A remarkable democratic process in Vancouver was the creation of an Electoral Reform Commission that held 17 public forums in neighborhoods to discuss whether at-large elections should be replaced by a ward system. This process was concluded by a popular vote in 2004, deciding to keep the at-large system. Although Vancouver involved communities at neighborhood level to create ‘Community Visions’ for the future, it is difficult to assess from the outset whether such democratic innovations are more advanced than the open forums and sounding undertaken by the administration of Zurich, or whether the pro-growth regime found in Zurich (Crivelli and Dlabac 2006) has an equivalent in Vancouver as well.

With regard to institutions of metropolitan governance both cities lack the consolidated metropolitan institutions found in Lyon and Stuttgart (see Kübler 2012). While the other metropolitan regions in Canada have established metropolitan governments, Vancouver relies on a metropolitan governance body created in 1967, pursuing some mandated and some voluntary functions from the province of British Columbia. This arrangement is particularly involved in regional growth planning and public mass transportation (TransLink), yet some observers argue that this flexible arrangement based on consensus decision making has reached its limits (P. J. Smith and Oberlander 2006). We find even more institutional fragmentation in the Greater Zurich Area (132 communes), were metropolitan governance is pursued through purpose-oriented coordination schemes (Kübler and Schwab 2007), e.g. for mass transit (majority votes), tax equalization schemes imposed by the regional government, water
provision by the central municipality (majority voting confined to central city) or services for drug users (consensus decision making).

I will derive global qualitative assessments of democratic outcomes for the 1970s and for the present, using the process-tracing method to relate the democratic outcomes to different institutional arrangements and their particular design. Wherever possible the comparative analysis will include quantifiable measures of democratic outcomes and institutional variation. Possible data sources for assessing these democratic dimensions comprehend: Comparative data on laws and institutions, party competition, political participation; data on elections and direct legislation; content analysis of media coverage; survey data; and expert interviews. While the qualitative case descriptions will help to critically test the developed comparative framework on its conceptual adequacy, the aim of the final phase is to specify a measurement instrument of democratic urban governance based on reliable indicators for institutional arrangements and democratic outcomes that can easily be assembled for a broad range of Western cities.
References


