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The Mobilization of Identities

A Study on the Relationship Between Elite Rhetoric and Public Opinion on National Identity in Developed Democracies

Some have argued that societies premised on an inclusive orientation towards national identity are better able to cushion the negative consequences of ethnic diversity, whereas others worry about the extreme right's exclusionary nationalism exacerbating them. Either way, the underlying assumption is that elite rhetoric can influence expressions of national identity at the mass level. While this argument is widely discussed in both public and academic debates there is, surprisingly, hardly any empirical research on this issue. We set out to test this relationship by combining the 2003 wave of the International Social Survey Program and content analysis of elite mobilization rhetoric from the Comparative Manifesto Project. Results indicate that the articulation of cultural issues by the political elite is not only associated with higher inclusive ideas of citizenship, but even more with exclusionary views on identity. More particularly, while exclusive mobilization affects both civic and ethnic identities, inclusive mobilization has no effect. Whereas the inspiration of public policy to use identity politics is rather to 'unite' societies, this study rather suggest a perverse effect of 'dividing' societies.

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1. Introduction

With an unprecedented influx of immigrants to Western societies (Cornelius & Rosenblum, 2005; Hooghe et al., 2008), warning bells about the erosion of trust, social cohesion, and social harmony more generally are frequently heard (Putnam, 2007; Uslaner, 2012; Hooghe et al., 2009). Putnam and others have claimed that in the medium-run, societies premised on a civic and inclusive understanding of nationhood should be better able to reconcile diversity with social cohesion compared to societies in which such an inclusive understanding of nationhood is absent. In short, an inclusive orientation of nationalism – an identity superordinate to existing social and cultural cleavages and opposed to an ethnic orientation towards identity that rather divides – is able to foster cross-group trust and social solidarity (Kymlicka, 2001; Miller, 1995; Putnam, 2007).

Although there is little empirical support for this proposition (Reeskens & Wright, 2013a), it has been eagerly endorsed by a number of European political elites. One example is the initiative of *le grand débat sur l'identité nationale*, launched by former French President Nicolas Sarkozy and his immigration minister, Eric Besson. Suggested initiatives included putting more emphasis – especially in the school curriculum – on national symbols, such as the tricolore, *la Marseillaise*, and the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. Another is UK Prime Minister David Cameron's 2011 speech at the Munich Security Conference. In order to build stronger societies, he argued, the UK needs a "much more active, muscular liberalism" that imposes the liberal values that undergird British societies onto all its citizens.

The argument is a chain of many links: political rhetoric on diversity issues leads to inclusive national identity at the mass level, and ultimately to increased tolerance and social cohesion. Or, from the standpoint of anti-immigrant parties, anti-immigrant rhetoric leads to exclusive national identity at the mass level, and ultimately to votes and parliamentary influence. While these linkages seem plausible, we have little empirical evidence either way on the relationship between elite-level rhetoric and mass-national identity. Indeed the only study we know of that has addressed this question shows no relationship between political mobilization and patriotism, i.e. affective or warm feelings towards the nation-state (Hjerm & Schnabel, 2010). Yet, research touching upon normative dimensions of identity – descriptions that distinguish 'us' citizens from 'them' noncitizens and therefore strongly touch upon the existing diversity debate (Putnam, 2007; Reeskens & Wright, 2013a) are, to our knowledge, absent.

In this study, we will analyze data from 25 countries present in the 2003 National Identity wave of the International Social Survey Programme, supplemented with indicators measuring political mobilization on diversity issues obtained from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). The results of our study indicate that the salience of diversity issues among political parties heightens not only inclusive nationhood conceptions, it has an even stronger effect on exclusive orientations.

2. Background

Social-psychological work on national identity has emphasized its multi-faceted nature, distinguishing between its salience to individuals, the strength of their emotional connect to it (patriotism, national chauvinism, and so on), and its normative social boundaries (e.g., Citrin & Sears, 2009). Here, our emphasis is on national identity's normative content, or, in other words, the criteria individuals use as "symbolic boundaries" (Lamont & Molnar, 2002) to distinguish "us" from "them". The importance of this distinction cannot be overstated, the reason being that if we want to know anything about why national identity matters to attitude and behavior more generally, we need to know where the symbolic boundaries of that identity lie (Schildkraut, 2007;

Theiss-Morse, 2009).

And, if history tells us anything, these boundaries are varied, malleable, and contested. Scholars of nationalism have constructed models of nationalist types from the study of laws and institutions, texts of popular culture, official speeches and celebrations, and the content of public education. A long lineage of studies culminating in the work of Greenfeld (1992) and Brubaker (1992) distinguishes between two historical models of nationhood, the "ethnic" and the "civic". The ethnic type defines itself on the principle of descent; the nation is a marriage of blood and soil. Objective and ascriptive criteria define whether one is considered a "national" or not, and citizenship is in turn accorded along *jus sanguinis* principles. Civic nationalism, on the other hand, is premised on the *jus soli* principle of devotion to basic liberal values.

For the most part, empirical research on normative conceptions of nationhood has been preoccupied with whether or not they exist in public opinion, and their relationship with out-group sentiment. On the former question, researchers have identified civic and ethnic conceptions of national identity at the mass level, both across countries and within them (e.g., Jones & Smith, 2001; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010; Wright et al., 2012). On the latter, civic and ethnic nationalism both encourage prejudice against immigrants, though less so for the former variant than the latter (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2008; Kunovich, 2009; Maddens et al., 2000; Pehrson et al., 2009; Wright, 2011a; Wright & Reeskens, forthcoming).

But where does national identity come from? At the individual level there are three broad classes of explanations in play. First, the literature on political and social attitudes suggests that national identities are the product of *socialization*, in that they are of high emotional significance, formed early in life, and largely stable thereafter (e.g. Sears & Levy, 2003) with the young and better-educated generally more inclusive in their normative definition of "we" (Schildkraut, 2007; Theiss-Morse, 2009; Wright, 2011a). A second set of explanations regards modernization of both economic and cultural varieties. Globalization, with its encompassing economic, political and cultural transformations has created so-called winners and losers (Beck et al., 2003; Kriesi et al., 2012). Socioeconomic 'have-nots' should express more parochial national identity because they perceive heightened ethnic diversity as an economic threat to both self- and group position. Cultural modernization suggests that more "ethnic"/ascriptive national identity is linked to various measures of socially "traditionalist" values: for example, those with materialist rather than post-materialist orientation evince a more "ethnic" identity, largely because of the social threats presented by heightened demographic diversity. A third and final set of individual-level explanations regard political and moral conservatism, with ethnic national identity, xenophobia, disapproval of multiculturalism, and affective nationalism are all strongly and positively predicted by right-wing self-identification across countries (Citrin & Sides, 2008; Citrin & Wright, 2008; Schatz et al., 1999; Wright 2011a).

At the macro-level, the normative boundaries of national identity have been traced to several sources: first, both theoretical (Barber, 2003; Held, 1997) and empirical studies (Norris & Inglehart, 2009; Tilley & Heath, 2007; Ariely, 2012; Jones & Smith, 2001; Kunovich, 2009) support the notion that economic modernization is erosive to parochialism in national identity. Kunovich, for example, argues that precisely because globalization challenges tradition and authority, citizens are more likely to outweigh achieved or inclusive orientations towards identity, while they reject ascribed or exclusive ones (2009). Demographic change, too, has received a great deal of attention in the broader literature on "social cohesion" (see Harell & Stolle 2010 for a review), with some finding a negative relationship (attributed to cultural threat) between immigrant diversity and the inclusivity of national identity (Wright 2011a).

What is missing from the vast majority of these accounts is *politics*. As noted above, the one exception in the empirical literature is Hjerm & Schnabel (2010), who find no linkage between elite rhetoric on national identity and patriotism at the mass level (see also Weldon 2006). While we do not dispute this finding (or lack thereof), we do argue here that these authors were in some sense looking in the wrong place: there is more reason to believe that rhetoric about diversity, pluralism, immigration, and national "insiders" versus "outsiders" will influence mass attitudes in exactly these domains (rather than nationalistic or patriotic sentiments), including the ascriptivity of national identity.[1]

The lack of attention to rhetoric's influence on the contours of identity is also somewhat surprising, since it is widely agreed their normative boundaries are politically-constructed, and that national identity has always been an elite-driven political project. This view is common among those writing about the rise of nations, where the assumption is that broad sociological, economic, and technological developments became tools with which elites crafted a broader sense of "nationhood": some emphasize socio-economic development and modernity (Deutsch, 1966 [1955]; Gellner, 1983), whereas others focus on democratic development and political entrepreneurship (Breuilly, 1994; Tilly, 1996; Hechter, 2000) and cultural determinants (Anderson, 1991). This sentiment also emerges among opponents of politically-sanctioned "multiculturalism", the argument being that liberal nation-states work to de-politicize (through privatization) religious and cultural cleavages: "centrifugal society requires centripetal state policies to keep it together. Historically, the liberal, difference-blind state with its universal citizenship, which is now found fault with, had exactly emerged as a peacemaker to a hyper-diverse society torn by religious wars in seventeenth century Europe" (Joppke, 2004, pp. 239-240; see also Barry, 2002). And, where theorists and historians have led empirical researchers have begun to follow, with some recent empirical evidence that "politics" matters to these kinds of outcomes beyond baseline economic and demographic factors. For instance, some have examined the role of "policy regime" – usually in the domain of citizenship access, multiculturalism, and welfare policy – in generating inclusiveness v. exclusiveness (e.g. Crepaz, 2008; Kesler & Bloemraad 2010; Weldon, 2006; Wright 2011b; Wright & Bloemraad, 2012).

Still, most of this literature tends to assume (at least implicitly) that the normative contours of national identity are forged by broad-scale policies that define their nations, with the mechanism being political socialization in the Almond & Verba (1963) sense of the term. This is fine and well as one possible means through which elites can influence mass conceptions of the nation over the long-term, but what is missed in these kinds of accounts is that people may also respond to shorter-term political activity. This is all the more relevant as it has been shown that both economic and cultural integration-demarcation cleavages have become important traits of Western politics since the 1990s (Kriesi et al., 2008; 2012). In the light of globalization processes and the lowering of national boundaries political debates turn more and more around questions of national identities and the composition of national communities. At the same time cultural diversity has become the favorite issue among populist right-wing parties (Martin, 2000, pp. 256-65; Betz, 2004, ch. 2; Skenderovic 2007, pp. 157-60).

Specifically, we argue here that political elites can and do make use of normative features of "nationhood", with the specific aim of leveraging what is known to be a highly salient attitude for political mobilization. In short, then, the very things that make national identity important to an

[1] Moreover, we think that not only the emphasis of nationalistic arguments should be accounted for as Hjerm and Schnabel (2010) did. Mobilization *against* nationalistic ideas as well as mobilization against and in favor of *multiculturalism* are equally relevant to capture the elites rhetoric. As will become clear below these aspects are also included in our analyses. Weldon (2006) examines for far-right party electoral strength in his study on how citizenship regime types affect tolerance for ethnic minorities. Since discourses on cultural diversity and related issues have become salient political issues for other parties as well we prefer to capture elite rhetoric of all political parties.

individual also make that individual vulnerable to elites' manipulation of that identity. With this in mind, the question becomes the following: do elites' advocacy for one or the other models of nationhood resonate with broader mass conceptions? Is it the case that promotion of ethnic (or civic) myths of nationhood among elites will result in a similar ethnicization among their followers?

3. Data and Methodology

In our analysis, we study the 2003 National Identity wave of the International Social Survey Programme, which is unique in that it queries respondents extensively about the normative dimensions of identity that distinguish insiders from outsiders. This cross-national survey project has been carried out in more than 40 countries, which we restrict to 25 liberal democracies[2] for which we dispose of data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) that measures elite rhetoric.

3.1. Measuring Normative Identity Dimensions

Our dependent variables are respondents' symbolic conceptions of their nation's social boundaries, operationalized by questions querying the importance of civic and ethnic traits to becoming a "true" Frenchmen, Swede, etc. In the ISSP survey, the prompt is as follows: "Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is …" Eight different criteria are probed: being born in the country, having legal citizenship status, having lived in the country for most of one's life, speaking the dominant language, adhering to the dominant religion, respecting the laws, and 'feeling' a member of the community. Respondents could rate the importance of these criteria on a four-point ordinal scale, ranging from not important at all (0) to very important (3) (Table 1).

Table 1. Exploratory Factor Analysis on the National Identity Indicators

How important is it …	Factor 1: Ethnic	Factor 2: Civic
To have been born in [country]	**0.928**	-0.193
To have [country nationality] citizenship	**0.459**	0.296
To have lived in [country] for most of one's life	**0.701**	0.074
To be able to speak [country's language]	0.105	**0.512**
To be a [religion]	**0.456**	0.044
To respect [country nationality] political institutions and laws	-0.157	**0.653**
To feel [country nationality]	0.239	**0.428**
Cronbach's alpha of bold items	0.739	0.572

Note: Entries are the result of an exploratory factor analysis with Promax rotation.

The exploratory factor analysis in Table 1 (with Promax rotation) shows that two latent factors appear, one that can be labeled as 'ethnic' indicators, including the items "to have been born in [country]", to have [country nationality] citizenship', "to have lived in [country] for most of one's

[2] These countries are Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and United States. Israel and Slovenia are excluded from our analyses as some important questions (on left-right positions and parents' immigration status) that we need for our models have not been included in the questionnaire in these two countries.

life", and "to be a [religion]". The second factor refers to 'civic' traits, namely "to be able to speak [country's language], "to respect [country nationality] political institutions and laws", and "to feel [country nationality]". The respective items have been means-scaled in order to construct the two distinct dependent variables. Cross-national distributions of the variables can be found in Table 2. It appears in the last two columns of Table 2 that, overall, the civic criteria are considered as more important (2.4 on a scale from 0 to 3) than the ethnic criteria (1.9). This is hardly surprising as for most people with an ethnic understanding of citizenship the civic criteria are also important to be considered a true citizens of their country.

3.2. Manifesto Variables

Our independent variables are elite rhetoric regarding the national community, operationalized via the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006). In the CMP dataset information on 56 issue domains has been coded from party manifestos that have been published in the context of national elections. Data is available for most Western countries for the period 1945 – 2003 and for Eastern European countries since 1990. The CMP dataset is thus the only dataset that provides measures to investigate positions of political parties towards issues concerning cultural heterogeneity and national identity for a large number of countries.[3] It has already been fruitfully explored in other studies examining the elite-level political space over such issues (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Green-Pedersen & Krogstrub, 2008; Arzheimer, 2009; Hjerm & Schnabel, 2010; Alonso & da Fonseca, 2012; Helbling et al., 2013a, Anderson and Just 2013).

There are some concerns about using party manifestos to capture "elite rhetoric". Kriesi et al. (2008: 67) for example argue that voters cannot be influenced by party manifestos as they do not read them. However, as we have already argued elsewhere, even if this is true manifestos still provide the basis for statements given by politicians in public debates (Helbling et al. 2013a; see also Robertson, 1976: 72). Helbling and Tresch (2010) have shown that political actors' positions in public debates reflect what has already been stated in their party manifestos. Moreover, it has been shown that the manifesto data lead to similar results as data from expert or population surveys (Marks et al. 2007; Netjes & Binnema, 2007; Ray, 2007).

For our analyses we collapsed the information that is provided by two issues that are covered in the CMP-data set, namely 'multiculturalism' and 'national way of life' (see also Helbling et al. 2013a). For each of these two categories there is a positive and a negative formulation: 'Multiculturalism: negative' (MultiNeg) is defined as "enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration" (Volkens, 2001, p. 35). On the other hand, 'multiculturalism: positive' (MultiPos) is defined as "favorable mentions of cultural diversity, communalism, cultural plurality and pillarization; preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country including special educational provisions". 'National way of life: positive' (NatPos) is defined as "appeals to patriotism and/or nationalism; suspension of some freedoms in order to protect the state against subversion; support for established national ideas". Finally, 'National way of life: negative' (NatNeg) means opposition to patriotism and/or nationalism or to the existing national state.

To measure the effect of mobilization we have created three indices:

$$ExclusiveMobilizationIndicator = (MultiNeg + NatPos)$$

$$InclusiveMobilizationIndicator = (MultiPos + NatNeg)$$

[3] The unit of analysis is a quasi-sentence that can be defined as an argument, i.e. the verbal expression of one political idea or issue in a party manifesto (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006). In its simplest form, a grammatical sentence is the basic unit of meaning. In many cases, however arguments are combined and related into one sentence. Take the following sentence: "Party X is in favor of language rights for its national minorities but against the religious rights of Muslim immigrants." Two arguments are made in this grammatical sentence, once in favor of immigration and once against the construction of mosques.

$$OverallMobilizationIndicator = (MultiNeg + NatPos + MultiPos + NatNeg)$$

We first built an index that measures discourses against the idea of cultural diversity (exclusive mobilization). For this we added the two categories MultiNeg (discourses against multiculturalism) and NatPos (discourses in favor of nationalism and patriotism). On the other hand, we built an index that reflects mobilization in favor of cultural diversity (inclusive mobilization). For this we added the two categories MultiPos (discourses in favor of multiculturalism) and NatNeg (discourses against nationalism and patriotism). These two indices allow us to test whether mobilizing in favor and against cultural diversity resonates differently among the masses; for example whether prompting nationalism leads to more ethnic understandings of citizenship and emphasizing multicultural ideas to more civic understandings of citizenship. It might also be that the framing itself does not play an important role and that salience of these issues (irrespective of whether the discourses are in favor or against cultural diversity) plays an important role. For this reason we have also built a third index that adds up all four categories. For each index we took the data from the election preceding the ISSP survey in 2003. We collapsed the data from each political party of a country that has been coded and weighted it by the parties' electoral strength.

The manifesto approach is based on saliency theory and thus all data entries are percentages (standardized by the total number of quasi-sentences in a given manifesto). All categories range (theoretically) from 0 (no mention of such issues) to 100 percent (no other issues are mentioned in the manifestos). However, it is almost inconceivable that a party might dedicate its manifesto exclusively to one issue. Rather, a large number of issues are addressed in a typical manifesto program. Accordingly, the individual percentages are relatively low. In their study, Alonso and da Fonseca (2012) have shown that the mean salience score of the 56 categories is 1.62 with a standard deviation of 1.47. In the third column in Table 2 we see that the overall mobilization of nationalism and multicultural issues varies between 0.1 and 10.1 percentages (countries are listed according to their overall salience indices). We also see that these issues are mainly made up of exclusive mobilization. In Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2 it appears that overall mobilization in favor of nationalistic ideas is clearly more salient than mobilization in favor of multiculturalism and cultural diversity.

Table 2. Cross-National Distribution of the Variables of Interest

	Party Mobilization			*National Identity*	
	Inclusive	*Exclusive*	*All*	*Civic*	*Ethnic*
Sweden	.1	0	.1	2.5	1.5
Portugal	.1	.9	1	2.4	2.2
Ireland	.8	.3	1	1.9	2.2
Germany	.6	1.3	1.8	2.3	1.7
Netherlands	.6	1.4	1.9	2.5	1.5
Canada	1.7	.2	1.9	2.6	2.2
Norway	1.4	.6	2	2.6	1.8
Austria	1.2	1	2.2	2.5	2.1
Japan	1	1.3	2.3	2.1	1.9
Czech Republic	.6	1.9	2.5	2.3	1.9
France	.8	1.9	2.6	2.6	1.7
Hungary	.1	2.6	2.7	2.5	1.9
Poland	0	3	3	2.4	2.3
Slovakia	.4	3	3.3	2.1	1.7
Great Britain	1	2.4	3.4	2.3	1.9
United States	.2	3.5	3.6	2.7	2.4
Finland	2.1	1.6	3.7	2.4	1.8
Spain	4.2	0	4.2	2.2	2

Latvia	.8	3.6	4.4	2.3	1.8
Bulgaria	3.4	2	5.4	2.6	2.3
Australia	.1	5.4	5.5	2.5	1.9
New Zealand	1	5	6	2.5	2
Switzerland	1.9	4.9	6.8	2.3	1.7
Russia	.4	6.4	6.8	2.4	2.2
Denmark	2.1	8	10.1	2.6	1.9
Means	*1.1*	*2.7*	*3.8*	*2.4*	*1.9*

Note: Entries represent the salience indicators for positive, negative, and overall mobilization of diversity, as obtained from the Comparative Party Manifesto project. Civic and ethnic conceptions of identity are constructed of the basis of the variables as presented in Table 1, and aggregated at the country level. They vary between 0 and 3. Countries are listed according to their overall salience indices.

3.3. Controls

Following previous literature in this domain (Wright, 2011a, 2011b; Reeskens & Wright, 2013b), the model also controls for age, gender, i.e. distinguishing men (reference) and woman, ethnic descent, i.e. distinguishing respondents whose parents have been born abroad from native respondents (reference), factors related to individual economic insecurity, namely levels of education, and work status, distinguishing between the employed (reference), the unemployed, students, the retired and respondents with another work status. Further, we include political ideology along the left-right dimension (e.g.; Kunovich, 2009; Wright, 2011a).

At the country level, we need harmonized data on the proportion of each country's population that is foreign-born, which we obtain from the UN Population Division Statistics (2013). Though the preference in some other studies on national-level diversity has been for OECD measures (Gesthuizen et al., 2009; Hooghe et al., 2009), for which information on a large number of countries in our sample is unavailable, UN and OECD estimates are highly correlated among common countries, and other studies have fruitfully employed the UN figures we use here (Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010; Reeskens & Wright, 2013a). Because UN estimates are available for 2000 and 2005 but not 2003, we calculate the latter using linear interpolation.

3.4. Estimation

For estimation, we employ multilevel multiple regression analysis (Gelman & Hill, 2006; Hox, 2010), a strategy that provides unbiased standard errors for individual-level parameter estimates in the presence of clustered data (such as that existing when respondents in cross-national data sets are sampled within countries).

4. Results

In Table 3, we show six analyses, distinguishing between an overall index that captures both exclusive and inclusive expressions of the mobilization of diversity in Model 1, exclusive mobilization (mobilization of cultural homogeneity as well as support of nationalism) in Model 2 and inclusive mobilization (mobilization of cultural pluralism) in Model 3. In each model we test the effect of elite rhetoric on both civic and ethnic understandings of citizenship. Parameter estimates for the control variables are in line with previous studies (e.g. Wright, 2011a; 2011b).[4]

[4] The analysis shows that the elderly and women draw higher symbolic boundaries (both civic and ethnic nationhood). Citizens of foreign origin express lower conceptions of civic and ethnic identities. Lower levels of education

First, with regard to the influence of elite rhetoric on civic conceptions of identity, Table 3 shows similarities between the three models, as there are positive but only partly significant parameters of both exclusive and inclusive mobilization on civic nationhood conceptions. It needs to be stressed that not only exclusive mobilization on patriotism and cultural pluralism, but also inclusive mobilization on opposition to patriotism and cultural homogeneity show positive patterns. Further, the overall index, which combines exclusive and inclusive mobilization, is statistically significant. The analysis thus indicates that civic identities are only mobilized by elite rhetoric to a limited extent. Most notably, there are not influenced at all by inclusive mobilization.

Table 3. Multilevel Analysis of Civic and Ethnic Nationhood Conceptions Regressed on Political Mobilization, 2003

	Model1		*Model2*		*Model3*	
	Overall Mobilization		*Exclusive Mobilization*		*Inclusive Mobilization*	
	Civic	*Ethnic*	*Civic*	*Ethnic*	*Civic*	*Ethnic*
Of foreign origin	-0.081***	-0.313***	-0.081***	-0.313***	-0.081***	-0.313***
	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.019)
Woman	0.043***	0.037***	0.043***	0.037***	0.043***	0.038***
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Age	0.004***	0.008***	0.004***	0.008***	0.004***	0.008***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	0.039***	0.270***	0.039***	0.270***	0.039***	0.270***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Unempl	-0.029	0.007	-0.029	0.007	-0.029	0.007
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.024)
Student	-0.007	-0.049*	-0.007	-0.049*	-0.007	-0.049*
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.024)
Retired	0.034**	0.111***	0.034**	0.111***	0.034**	0.111***
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Other work status	0.010	0.101***	0.010	0.101***	0.009	0.101***
(ref.: being employed)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Left-right scale	0.053***	0.097***	0.053***	0.097***	0.053***	0.097***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Share of foreigners	-0.001	-0.012°	0.001	-0.010	0.003	-0.007
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Political mobilization	0.179*	0.290**	0.152°	0.238*	0.262	0.525
	(0.083)	(0.102)	(0.084)	(0.106)	(0.304)	(0.387)
Constant	1.954***	1.007***	1.974***	1.041***	1.978***	1.038***
	(0.068)	(0.084)	(0.068)	(0.086)	(0.074)	(0.094)
N	18,039	18,039	18,039	18,039	18,039	18,039
G	25	25	25	25	25	25

° $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Note: Entries represent parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses) of six separate multilevel regression models.

For ethnic mobilization, patterns are clearer. Table 3 shows that the exclusive mobilization of cultural issues has a strong positive effect on ethnic sentiments among the masses. Also, exclusionary sentiment is higher in societies with a lot of inclusive mobilization of such issues, even if the effect is not significant. Thus, also an emphasis on pluralism and nationalism augments exclu-

are associated with more pronounced civic and ethnic conceptions, whereas work status is inconsistently related to these conceptions: only the retired and residents with a not-listed work status have more ethnic conceptions of identity. In line with previous studies, conservative respondents at the right express more ethnic and civic nationhood conceptions. The share of foreigners, last but not least, is unrelated to our dependent variables.

sionary feelings towards newcomers. Combined, the overall indicators show a strong effect of the political mobilization of cultural issues on ethnic nationhood conceptions. In nation-states where the political elite puts strong emphasis on cultural issues, citizens draw thicker symbolic boundaries that demarcate outsiders from insider citizens.

5. Discussion

Political mobilization on cultural issues brings about thicker (that is, ethnic or ascriptive) symbolic boundaries that distinguish between 'them' noncitizens from 'us' citizens. The fact that political mobilization affects ethnic identities more than civic ones is, in our opinion, due to the following reasons: Ethnic issues are more likely to engage emotionally salient predispositions. That these issues are also more polarized than civic issues among ordinary citizens appears when we look at their distributions (see Table 2): While a large majority deems the civic citizenship criteria important, people are more divided on the ethnic criteria. As a consequence there is more scope for an effect since the baseline scores assigned to the ethnic criteria are lower than for the civic ones.

Four qualifications need to be invoked that might hamper our conclusions. The first issue concerns the use of latent scales for the measurement of civic and ethnic identity conceptions. In the past, authors have warned about inconsistencies in cross-national comparisons using latent scales on the proposed ISSP-measures for the reason that they lack equivalence (Heath et al., 2009; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). Put differently, some of the indicators – and especially the ones that have been identified as more cultural (e.g. speaking the dominant language or being a member of the dominant religion) – tend to be more civic or ethnic in different contexts, which makes that latent scales based on these indicators lack precision in comparative research. To qualify this issue, we have re-run our three models using the most exemplary indicators for civic and ethnic nationhood conceptions (cf. Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010), namely resp. "to respect the [country nationality] political institutions and laws" and "to have been born in [country]". The results, which can be retrieved from Appendix Table A1, show stable yet less significant (in a statistical sense) results. Thus, despite warnings of measurement inequivalence, the latent scales nonetheless parcel out a certain amount of error that makes that the explanatory variables fit the model better.

The second issue regards the generalizability of the findings based on the 2003 National Identity wave. It has been shown that immigration became salient from the 1990s onwards and the favorite issue among populist right-wing parties (Kriesi et al., 2008; 2012). This raises the question whether similar results as discovered in Table 3 exist in previous times, and are stronger at present. Although we cannot adequately respond to the present situation because of data issues – the next ISSP National Identity wave is fielded this year – we can go back in time and analyze the 1995 ISSP National Identity wave. The results of this analysis can be found in the Appendix in Table A2 where we included data for both waves and all countries that participated in both waves. We included a dummy variable for the two waves and interactions between the mobilization variables and this dummy. For the interaction models this allows us to observe the mobilization effects for the year 1995 alone and how the estimated effect changed between 1995 and 2003.

We see that mobilization had very little effect in 1995, if at all. We also see that the effects of the overall mobilization and inclusive mobilization become significantly stronger over the eight year period. This finding could have been expected on the basis of previous arguments on the salience of diversity issues. If we extrapolate this trend, we might at present find even stronger effects of the mobilization of cultural issues on civic and ethnic symbolic boundaries. Future studies, however, need to address this issue in further detail.

The third issue concerns the potential effects of relevant policies. It could be assumed that political mobilization not only has a direct effect but has an indirect influence via policies that in turn influence national identities. It has been argued that policy regimes might affect national identities as it is the aim of multicultural policies to reduce boundaries between ethnic groups, to promote social harmony and to socialize tolerance through education (Weldon 2006; Wright 2011). Institutions can be considered as (discursive) opportunity structures that influence political debates and the way political actors frame a political issue and how citizens think about certain issues (Koopmans et al. 2005; Weldon 2006). According to the political culture theory citizens learn certain norms and values through socialization processes not only in their near environment but also when they are in contact with state institutions (Almond an Verba 1963).

For these reasons we also included information on policy regimes in additional models that are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix. We retained data from the Multicultural Policy Index for the year 2000 that comes closest to the year of the survey (Banting and Kymlicka 2006). The MCP-index refers to integration policies and more specifically to cultural rights that are accorded to immigrants. In their index, Banting and Kymlicka (2006: 56-57) seek to measure the degree of public recognition, support or accommodation for ethnocultural minorities to maintain and express their distinct identities and practices. They thus capture very similar aspects as the multicultural indices of the manifesto data. Since the MCP data are available for only 18 countries of our sample we first run the same models as in Table 3 for the 18 cases only and in a second step included the indicator that measures multicultural policies. We see that policies have no effect on national identities and do not distort the effects of our mobilization indices. As we have heavily reduced the sample, overall, the effects are however smaller.

Finally, we also need to be careful with potential outliers. Given the small N nature of the sample an outlier analysis needs to be performed in order to understand the robustness of our result. In Graph 1 we plotted the relationship between the overall mobilization index and ethnic identities (we get a very similar picture for civic identities). It appears that there is no outlier that might distort the inclination of the correlation line. If Denmark has an effect at all on the findings it should affect the intercept of the equation. In Table A4 we run our main models excluding Denmark, and we see that the results remain stable.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, we wanted to address the question whether the mobilization of cultural issues translates into thin (or civic-inclusive) rather than thick (or ethnic-exclusive) symbolic boundaries. The relevance of this study cannot be minimalized, as the present prominence of identity politics aims at readjusting public opinion on national identity into more inclusive forms that are accepting of immigrants but nonetheless asks from them that they adopt the basic liberal values of the nation-state.

There are of course a couple of issues worth noting in interpreting these findings, which we flag at the moment for future research. First, we have assumed that the causal arrow runs from mobilizing rhetoric to mass national identity. This is supported by a variety of work that characterizes political elites as "opinion-leaders" and the masses as "cue-takers" (e.g. Zaller, 1992), but it is of course possible that parties mobilize to take advantage of a constituency that already exists. Second, we have for the most part assumed away the possibility that some underlying dynamic drives both elite-mobilization and mass national identity, in some sense spuriously underpinning the relationships we observe. While both of these concerns are valid, data limitations prevent us from doing much at this stage to allay them. Other studies have however shown partly by means of time-series models that there is indeed a strong top-down effect from political parties, media sali-

ence and policies on individual attitudes (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart 2007; Hopkins 2010; McLaren 2010). In a different field and by means of instrumental variable estimation Anderson and Just (2013) have shown how parties' positions towards the status quo of their countries' policy regimes (also measured by means of the manifesto data) influence citizens' support of their political system.

However, even if one fully contests the causal relationship we proclaim, our findings show that there is a strong relationship between political mobilization and national identities. And the picture we reveal is both important and rather grim. A inclusive mobilization of cultural issues – on nationalism and cultural pluralism – is indeed correlated with the desired more inclusive orientations towards national identity. However, residents of countries with a strong mobilization on nationalism and pluralism raise also the undesired ethnic boundaries. A negative mobilization of such issues, then, namely opposition to nationalism and cultural homogeneity, is not surprisingly, related with strong ethnic nationhood conceptions. But also civic conceptions are higher in countries with mobilization in more negative terms. The overall conclusion of our study is thus that political mobilization on cultural issues relates with civic but even more with ethnic and exclusive orientations towards identity.

As political elites want to mobilize an inclusive orientation towards nationhood, they want to highlight positive aspects of nationalism, on positive feelings towards the nation-state as well as on pluralism. The best example in this respect was the French identity initiative, emphasizing a stronger stress on national symbols to augment awareness on the common identity that unites instead of divides the French. Our study shows that inclusive as well as exclusive identities are more common in countries where these positive aspects of nationalism are expressed. In spite of a cross-sectional design, our study thus suggests a catch-22 situation: it is not possible to mobilize inclusive identities without simultaneously not sparking more ethnic conceptions. The situation is even more problematic when the significant patterns of 2003 are contrasted with the null findings of 1995. If these insights are extrapolated to present times, when diversity as well as identity politics are ever more salient, it can be expected that our findings might have been even stronger.

Therefore, with regard to enhancing the social fabric of advanced industrialized societies that have become increasingly diverse, the political choice of identity politics seems to be an unsuccessful path to follow. Even though the political starting points and the underlying theoretical argument, i.e. that inclusive orientations are able to cushion the negative impact of diversity on social cohesion, identity politics most prominently augments ethnic identities that have shown to be related to out-group prejudice and suppressed solidarity with immigrants. This is of course not surprising, as the salience of cultural diversity, no matter in what forms, emphasizes who 'we' are. By doing so, such rhetoric also emphasizes who are not 'we', and thus augments the strong symbolic boundaries that distinguishes 'them' from 'us'. Identity politics might thus increase instead of reduce the social tensions present in society. In order to strengthen social cohesion in diverse societies, other roads, e.g. multicultural policies (Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010) and inclusive integration policies (Helbling et al., 2013b) might thus be more promising routes to follow.

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Appendix

Table A2. Effects of Political Mobilization across the waves 1995 and 2003

	Overall Mobilization				*Exclusive Mobilization*				*Inclusive Mobilization*			
	Civic	*Ethnic*	*Civic*	*Ethnic*	*Civic*	*Ethnic*	*Civic*	*Ethnic*	*Civic*	*Ethnic*	*Civic*	*Ethnic*
Covariates ind. level	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Year (1=2003)	-0.080***	-0.017	-0.111***	-0.069***	-0.087***	-0.027*	-0.094***	-0.032*	-0.071***	-0.001	-0.094***	-0.057***
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Share of foreigners	0.014***	-0.014**	0.015***	-0.014**	0.016***	-0.013*	0.015***	-0.013*	0.011**	-0.021***	0.009*	-0.027***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Political mobilization	0.058***	0.092***	0.002	-0.001	0.066***	0.106***	0.034	0.087*	-0.029	-0.061	-0.060	-0.138*
	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.051)	(0.065)	(0.051)	(0.066)
Mobilization*year			0.064***	0.106***			0.029	0.017			0.204***	0.510***
			(0.017)	(0.022)			(0.021)	(0.026)			(0.049)	(0.063)
Constant	1.897***	1.228***	1.921***	1.268***	1.898***	1.228***	1.908***	1.234***	1.957***	1.337***	1.981***	1.404***
	(0.052)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.065)	(0.052)	(0.066)	(0.050)	(0.070)	(0.050)	(0.071)
N	29,734	29,734	29,734	29,734	29,734	29,734	29,734	29,734	29,734	29,734	29,734	29,734
G	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21

Table A3. Effects of Political Mobilization, including variable on multicultural policies

	Overall Mobilization				*Exclusive Mobilization*				*Inclusive Mobilization*			
	Civic	*Ethnic*	*Civic*	*Ethnic*	*Civic*	*Ethnic*	*Civic*	*Ethnic*	*Civic*	*Ethnic*	*Civic*	*Ethnic*
Covariates ind. level	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Multicultural policies			0.030	-0.009			0.029	-0.010			0.029	-0.009
			(0.019)	(0.023)			(0.020)	(0.024)			(0.021)	(0.025)
Share of foreigners	-0.002	-0.007	-0.009	-0.005	-0.000	-0.005	-0.007	-0.002	0.004	-0.001	-0.003	0.002
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Political mobilization	0.183°	0.242*	0.189*	0.240*	0.160	0.193°	0.163°	0.192°	0.160	0.193°	0.163°	0.192°
	(0.097)	(0.110)	(0.092)	(0.110)	(0.098)	(0.113)	(0.092)	(0.113)	(0.098)	(0.113)	(0.092)	(0.113)
Constant	1.937***	0.899***	1.933***	0.901***	1.955***	0.923***	1.952***	0.924***	1.934***	0.870***	1.926***	0.872***
	(0.098)	(0.112)	(0.092)	(0.111)	(0.099)	(0.116)	(0.094)	(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.127)	(0.106)	(0.126)
N	14,647	14,647	14,647	14,647	14,647	14,647	14,647	14,647	14,647	14,647	14,647	14,647
G	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18

° $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Note: Entries represent parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses) of six separate multilevel regression models.

Graph A1: Correlation overall mobilization and ethnic understandings of citizenship



Table A4. Effects of Political Mobilization, excluding Denmark

	Model1		*Model2*		*Model3*	
	Overall Mobilization		*Exclusive Mobilization*		*Inclusive Mobilization*	
	Civic	*Ethnic*	*Civic*	*Ethnic*	*Civic*	*Ethnic*
Covariates ind. level	X	X	X	X	X	X
Share of foreigners	-0.000	-0.015*	0.001	-0.012	0.003	-0.008
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Political mobilization	0.170°	0.385***	0.136	0.292**	0.192	0.611
	(0.094)	(0.107)	(0.091)	(0.111)	(0.315)	(0.402)
Constant	1.949***	1.039***	1.966***	1.081***	1.969***	1.071***
	(0.070)	(0.080)	(0.069)	(0.085)	(0.075)	(0.095)
N	17,005	17,005	17,005	17,005	17,005	17,005
G	24	24	24	24	24	24

° $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Note: Entries represent parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses) of six separate multilevel regression models.