Abstract

Largely inspired by Max Weber’s instrumental vision of social science, the modern political science likes to see itself as an enterprise where researchers choose freely among different methods for the only sake of advancement of knowledge. Adam Przeworski, for example, a name in comparative politics and in democratization studies, calls his methodology eclectic and opportunistic. This presentation challenges the understanding of modern political science as an eclectic and opportunistic methodological enterprise. My conclusions are based on the analysis of the writings of a few authors in the discipline, including Przeworski. I will show that despite the full academic freedom to choose among different research techniques and methods of interpretation, most scholars prefer to stick with limited number of similar instruments. I will investigate the reason(s) why these authors, including Przeworski himself, do not answer the call for eclectics and opportunism.

This research was launched as reflection on a statement made by Adam Przeworski, an assertion that kept me perplexed ever since. Przeworski is a celebrity in comparative politics and in democratization studies; we owe him some of the most elegant definitions of democracy as a system of institutionalized uncertainty, or a regime where the rules are predictable, but not the electoral results (1991). While presenting his methodology, he calls it “eclectic and opportunistic”. He stated that he does not take “theorems” too seriously. “Whenever the structure of the problem is sufficiently clear, I rely of deductive arguments. Whenever systematic empirical evidence exists, I bring to bear the “facts”. But I also do not shy from trusting authorities, looking for intuitions in particular historical events, or simply asserting prior beliefs” (1999: 25). He calls himself “methodological opportunist who believes in doing or using whatever works. If game theory works, I use it. If what is called for is a historic account, I do that. If deconstruction is needed, I will even try deconstruction. So I have no principles” (Kohli, Evans, Katzenstein, Przeworski et al., 1995: 16). Researchers so far have taken these claims at their face value; they push their acceptance to the point to suggest social researchers similar theoretical and methodological eclecticism (Dexter and Sharman 2001: 493).

The reason I find Przeworski’s statements puzzling rather than enlightening is that this affirmation runs very counterintuitive to my general impressions about this author and his work. I must acknowledge, however, that similar statements should not be considered without longer pedigree in social sciences. Such assertions may be inspired by Max Weber’s (1904) instrumental vision of scientific research. According to this vision, the modern social sciences, political science among them, like to be seen as intellectual enterprise where researchers choose freely among different methods for the only sake of advancement of knowledge. It is quite different understanding from the positivist vision regarding the role of social researchers, completely detached from their subjective prejudices, choosing objectively methods and techniques that follow the object of their study. The key difference between these two approaches is the place of
researchers. Within instrumental vision, they are free actors who arbitrary choose among theories and methods; within positivist vision, they are simple agents who passively report social reality in a systemic way. Think about these two visions as we think about the difference between inventors and discoverers. Inventors create something new, not known for their peers; discoverers find something that did exist but nobody found it earlier. On the invention-discovery scale Przeworski’s statement seems putting him closer to the inventor’s, if not to the artist’s, point of view. It seems as if he is suggesting that he is not bound by established ways of theorizing. It seems that he also chooses methods and techniques according only to the principle of utility, a very Weberian way of justifying research methodology. My research question(s), simple as it can be, is what did Przeworski mean by making such statement, whether it was true or not, and whether what was true for Przeworski might be generalized to other researchers in the domain of political science. In other words, I want to investigate the presence of eclectics and opportunism in modern political science.

Political science, unlike other disciplines, is in what Kuhn (1996) calls preparadigmatic state, meaning lack of paramount theory and methodological protocol. Following on Kuhn’s footsteps, Belanger (1998) points out at several alternative and equally possible ways of doing research within the discipline; he sees the possibility of monopolization of research around certain theoretical and methodological postulates, such as methodological individualism and theories inspired by economic reasoning (Belanger 2008). McFalls (2008), on the other hand, not only looks at the discipline as an undisciplined object; he also sees no immediate risk of changing this status quo. Therefore, answering my research question(s), I will also locate my findings within the frame of Belanger-McFalls debate on the future trends; whether theoretical and methodological eclectic in modern political science represents converging or divergent trajectories.

Methodology

I personally favor inductive approach while demonstrating scientific proof. This means that instead of taking as a basis a particular theory or a multivariable model, which is analytically filtered down to hypotheses, which are in turn tested to findings, I prefer to advance in the opposite order. I collect findings corresponding to specific methodological criteria, then I analyze them, and only then, if possible, I try to frame them into theoretical schemes, either confirming or infirming the existing ways of theorizing.

In this research I focus on Przeworski and on five other social scientists that partly share his interests in democratization (see Appendix). Each of them is also focusing on other issues away from purely democratic studies. For example, Johnson is interested in political economy, institutional change, and political identity matters; Schatz is interested in identity political and political ethnography as particular methodology. My sample includes a few peer-reviewed articles from each author, in at least two different personal research programs.

As far as content analysis of these articles is concerned, I tend to emphasize on the following important elements. First, I look at the title and its possible relevance within particular “theorem”, to use Przeworski’s own words. This may, although it is not necessary, reflect particular leaning toward hypothetico-deductive approach, quite contrary to Przeworski’s statement implying initial theoretical equidistance. Second, I look closely to the research question, which may be explicitly stated or only assumed; in this case I am trying to deduce it from other general statements in the article. Third, I look at the methods and techniques for information gathering used in the article. I pay
special attention to possible change within this methodology over the years and as the authors move back and forth from one research program to another. Within methodological analysis, I consider in particular how they, if any, justify their choices. This content analysis is carried out using semiotic techniques of information compilation. I put a particular emphasis on the semantic and pragmatic level of analysis; the latter means that the positioning of the authors and their works close to eclectic theoretical and methodological pole or its opposite would be determined holistically from the entire work instead of short statements taken outside the large context. I do not intend to replicate the research used in the sample or to do police investigation; it is not therefore my task to judge the quality of the research itself. I am only concerned about it as an illustration pertinent in the context of my own research question(s).

Findings

I summarily present findings of all six authors from the sample in Table 1. The table includes the author and the year of publication; the title and the research question are briefly presented with their relevance toward large debates within the discipline; the table is wrapped by brief description of methodological tools.

Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author, year of publication</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Research question</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Johnson (1994)</td>
<td>Institutions framed within the debate between continuation and change</td>
<td>Why institutions fail? (Russian banking system)</td>
<td>Secondary sources (including media reports), analytical narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson (2001)</td>
<td>Path contingency between structural and agency institutionalisms</td>
<td>Policy failures due to institutions or to policies?</td>
<td>Formal analysis, secondary sources, analytical narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest &amp; Johnson (2002)</td>
<td>No reference to particular theory or debate</td>
<td>Role of symbolic capital in national identity transformation</td>
<td>Secondary sources (including media reports), analytical narrative; non-representative survey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson (2006)</td>
<td>Diffusion framed between material incentives and socialization</td>
<td>Role of incentives and cultural norms in policy diffusion</td>
<td>Secondary sources (including media reports), analytical narrative, open interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Title/Concept</td>
<td>Focus of Analysis</td>
<td>Methodology/Source</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kubicek (2002)</td>
<td>Civil society - Tocqueville vs. Huntington</td>
<td>Discussing link between weak civil society and political oligarchy</td>
<td>Chronological narrative, analytical narrative (incl. counter-factual scenario), secondary sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kubicek (2005)</td>
<td>No reference to particular theory or debate</td>
<td>Article closer to journalism than to social science</td>
<td>Chronological narrative, analytical narrative, secondary sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McFaul (1989/1990)</td>
<td>Debate among paradigms in international relations</td>
<td>Arguments against established position within the discipline</td>
<td>Chronological and analytical narrative, secondary sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McFaul (1990)</td>
<td>No reference to particular theory or debate</td>
<td>Assessing impact of process through case study</td>
<td>Analytical narrative, secondary sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McFaul &amp; Stoner-Weiss (2008)</td>
<td>Different models of political development</td>
<td>Claim for spurious correlation between economy and politics</td>
<td>Analytical narrative, secondary sources, incl. statistical data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Przeworski &amp; Wallerstein (1988)</td>
<td>Debate between Marxism and neoliberalism</td>
<td>Claim against theories of structural dependence</td>
<td>Formal analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Przeworski &amp; Vreeland (2002)</td>
<td>Model of cooperation within game theory</td>
<td>Finding equilibrium point (zone) that makes bilateral cooperation possible</td>
<td>Formal analysis, case study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Przeworski (2005)</td>
<td>Model of democracy within game theory</td>
<td>Finding equilibrium point (zone) that makes democracy possible and sustainable</td>
<td>Formal analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benhabib &amp; Przeworski (2006)</td>
<td>No reference to particular theory or debate</td>
<td>Finding equilibrium point (zone) that makes democracy possible and sustainable</td>
<td>Formal analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I present Johnson’s work with four peer-reviewed articles published between 1994 and 2006. They partially overlap as far as their research object is concerned. For example, Johnson (1994; 2001) discusses case studies within large debate between historic and rational choice institutionalisms within political science; Johnson (2001) and Forest & Johnson (2002) are also part of post-communist democratization studies; Forest & Johnson (2002) and Johnson (2006) look at the cultural dimensions of political change. Regarding the titles of these four articles, at least three of them (1994; 2001; 2006) clearly show consideration for current debates within the discipline. As far as the research question is concerned, again, at least three out of four article (1994; 2001; 2006) part from the premise that a debate within the discipline requires additional research. In all these three articles such research leads to synthesis compromise, where elements of each antagonist are used in order to produce superior explanation. As far as the methodology and techniques of information gathering are concerned, Johnson shows conservatism coupled with slow evolution. This author uses predominantly secondary literature, which is framed with analytical narratives. These narratives are social science research method seeking to combine historical narratives with the rigor of rational choice theory, particularly through the use of game theory (Bates et al, 1998). Exceptionally, Forest & Johnson (2002) use non-representative surveys for quantitative purposes. Johnson (2006) adds to methodological arsenal open interviews. The only article that stands apart from
the group, Forest & Johnson (2002), is a collective work, which may present valuable information as of the reason for this exceptionality. An indirect proof that this may be the case is the research program of the other member of the team, Benjamin Forest. Unlike Johnson, he uses Pierre Bourdieu’s structural sociology as basis for his research (Forest 1995); he also is more inclined to use quantitative methods of demonstration (Forest 2002). Thus, in sum, Johnson’s research is conservative as far as methodological change is concerned. This author prefers to start from working hypotheses inspired from conflicting theoretical paradigms; methodologically, she frames her findings as analytical narratives with strong emphasis on secondary literature and marginal use of triangulating open interviews. When a sudden turbulence is observed within her sample articles, it is possible that it is due entirely on the influence of the co-author.

Kubicek’s sample includes four peer-reviewed articles published between 1997 and 2005. Like Johnson’s articles, they partially overlap as far as their research object is concerned. For example, Kubicek (1999; 2002) discusses different angles of post-communist trade-union development and civil society development in general; Kubicek (1999; 2005) focuses on West-East relations that take trade-union development and larger civic society issues as illustrations; Kubicek (1997; 1999; 2002) hovers over post-communist development issues; all articles to a different degree treat aspects of social and political development as illustrations of game theory. Regarding the titles of these four articles, at least three of them (1997; 1999; 2002) clearly show consideration for current debates within the discipline. As far as the research question is concerned, again, at least three out of four article (1997; 1999; 2002) part from the premise that a debate within the discipline requires additional research. Unlike Johnson search for synthesis compromise, Kubicek intellectual thrust in these three articles (1997; 1999; 2002) leads to clear winners among the initially presented alternatives. The only article where such winner is not produced (2005) is also unique in other ways; its title is descriptive rather than analytical; its research question is open-ended; and there are no clearly identified theoretical oppositions. It seems that the author is confused to identify clear-cut conclusion without maneuvering within well-delimited theoretical framework. As far as the methodology and techniques of information gathering are concerned, Kubicek is very conservative and risk-free entrepreneur. His favorite starting point, after presenting in brief key theoretical debate, is to move on presenting historic background, which gradually is engaged in analytical narratives, based exclusively on secondary literature. The only deviation from this straightforward path is his discussion of the role of trade-union movement in post-communist democratization (2002) where he briefly develops a counter-factual scenario as part of his analytical narrative.

I present McFaul’s work with four peer-reviewed articles published between 1989 and 2008. They fall within two clearly distinctive groups, dealing with case studies in international relations (1989/1990; 1990) and with post-communist political development in larger comparative perspective (2002; 2008). Regarding the titles of these four articles, at least three of them (1989/1990; 2002; 2008) clearly show consideration for current theoretical debates within the discipline; these three articles part from the premise that particular theoretical debate within the subdiscipline, international relations or comparative politics, requires additional research. Unlike Johnson’s sample articles but much like Kubicek’s works, McFaul does not make compromise with established truths; he defends ideas that oppose current understandings on the subject. An important
difference with Kubicek is that McFaul’s research is not about judging which among opposing arguments is superior; it is as if he produces himself this superior argument. As far as the methodology and techniques of information gathering are concerned, McFaul shows conservatism coupled with slow evolution. Like previously presented authors, he uses predominantly as primary source secondary literature, which is framed with analytical narratives. Exceptionally, McFaul & Stoner-Weiss (2008) include within discussed information some statistical data. This is a teamwork, which may present valuable information as of the reason for this slight evolution in methodological tools. An indirect proof that this may be the case is the research program of the other member of the team, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss. Unlike McFaul, she uses statistical data as illustrations (Stoner-Weiss 2002).

Przeworski’s sample includes four peer-reviewed articles published between 1988 and 2006. Only one of them (2005) is solo work; others are co-authored. They treat different topics, from the relative independence of the state from economic interests (Przeworski & Wallerstein 1988) and possibility of bilateral cooperation (Przeworski & Vreeland 2002) to points of equilibrium that make democracy economically feasible (Przeworski 2005; Benhabib & Przeworski 2006). Despite this appeared difference, they all are based on identical assumptions about human behavior, inspired by game theory. Regarding the titles of these four articles, at least three of them (1988; 2002; 2005) show clearly either considerations for current theoretical debates or are inspired by clear theoretical paradigms, such as game theory. Przeworski’s style is different from any of those previously presented. In three out of four articles (2002; 2005; 2006) he builds models that do not make any reference to established alternatives, as if he works on clear table, unobstructed by other theorizing on the subject. Only once (1988) he mentions theoretical nemeses – Marxism and neo-liberalism, only to discard them as false; in this unique case of confrontation he resembles McFaul’s style, although the methodology that he uses is quite different. This exception within the sample is most probably due to the influence of the co-author Michael Wallerstein, those works attack the simplistic correlation between economic and political development (1980) or fill the lack of academic attention for particular social issues (1987). As far as the methodology and techniques of information gathering are concerned, Przeworski, quite ironically, given his statement that triggers this research, shows deep conservatism. Instead of expected eclectics I see quite confident use of only one methodological approach, the formal analysis. Only once, in Przeworski & Vreeland (2002), this formal analysis is coupled with a case study that analytically demonstrates superiority of the new model. Here again, this methodological nuance is most likely due to the presence of co-author, James Raymond Vreeland, those work (2002) is focused on the same case study.

I present Putnam’s sample with four articles published between 1988 and 1995. Three of them (1988; 1994; 1995) are solo work; one is co-authored. They treat two quite different topics, from international relations and comparative politics; two focus on G-7 summits either as illustration to new version of game theory (1988) or as descriptive narrative representing American perspective (1994); the other two treat social capital as possible explanatory variable toward different social processes (1995; Helliwell & Putnam 1995). Regarding the titles of these four articles, at least three of them (1988; 1995; Helliwell & Putnam 1995) are either inspired by theoretical paradigms, such as game theory, or impose new theoretical paradigms, such as social capital. Putnam, like Przeworski, builds theoretical explanations that do not make references to existing
alternatives, as if he works on clear table, unobstructed by outside theorizing on the subject. As far as the methodology and techniques of information gathering are concerned, Putnam, much like the other authors from the sample, shows deep-rooted conservatism. He mixes formal analysis and analytical narrative. I observe a small nuance only once (Helliwell & Putnam 1995), when he and his co-author create their own measurements in order to reveal the real impact of their most important variable, the social capital, in the framework of an empirical analysis. Here again, this methodological nuance is most likely due to the presence of co-author, John F. Helliwell, those work (1994) reveals the same attention for empirical demonstration of proof.

Schatz’s sample includes four peer-reviewed articles published between 2003 and 2008. Two of them are co-authored; he alone writes the other two. The co-authored articles treat general methodological questions in political science; the solo works focus on political development in Central Asia, more particularly in post-communist Kazakhstan. Regarding the titles, the two methodological articles are fairly descriptive; those focusing on Central Asia political development are open-ended within large framework of democratization studies and democracy-autocracy dichotomy. Regarding research question, the two articles on Central Asia posit correlation between forms of power legitimacy and current forms of political regime in order to explain soft authoritarianism version that prevails in post-communist Kazakhstan. As far as the author’s style is concerned, he tries to build his own explanation in opposition to what most of his peers do. The same applies to his methodological choice of ethnography, where he clearly stands with minority within the discipline. As far as his way to demonstrate proof is concerned, he always uses analytical narratives, and only once adds a particularly illustrative case study (2008) within larger narrative.

Analysis

Having presented the findings, the main research question may have quite a simple answer; political science, despite all its theoretical and methodological diversity, does not show even a single case of theoretical or methodological eclectics on individual level of analysis. To the contrary, each author from the sample is deeply embedded within his or her own ways of proof demonstration. They find them obvious, to the point of not revealing in details why they have chosen to use one or another set of theoretical and methodological assumptions. When any sudden shift is observed, it is always due to the presence of co-authors who, although it is not necessary, import different tools and points of view. The time span seems leading toward further consolidation of the ways people do their research, not to erosion of the once chosen ways of reasoning.

Such unequivocal rejection of the Przeworski’s statement, not supported by the works of any other author within the sample, including himself, opens the door for further investigation. Usually researchers do not make any statement about their epistemological beliefs; therefore Przeworski could hardly be accused of missing important elements of his research if he could also skip this part altogether. Not all researchers, as we have seen from the sample, do bother to set up clearly their research questions too. It is only via the answers that they are providing that the readers can successfully try to reconstruct the original questions. Therefore I personally feel in debt to Przeworski, the only person within the sample, who dares to make general statement about his method. I feel compelled to go further investigating his claim, instead of simply rejecting as unproved
his words about his theoretical and methodological eclectics. If, on purely semantic level, his statement is simply not true, I will try to find another point, from which it could be true.

This point is the self-interpretative position each author takes within the discipline as far as his or her work may or may not relate to those who asked the same or similar research questions. I claim, based on the sample, that even if each researcher remains basically unchanged as far as his theoretical approach and methodological tools are concerned, he or she sees himself or herself differently from his or her peers. This difference relates to the interpretative self-image that each researcher makes of him or of her. Within such interpretative self-imaging, some researchers, Przeworski among them, may think about themselves as theoretically free despite their theoretical consistency over time. Researchers may think about their position as more or less embedded within existing theoretical paradigms; some of them may think about their place within discipline as serving different roles for advancement of knowledge.

From this particular interpretative point of view, the sample researchers want to play quite different roles. They simply take different positions on the scale of emancipation from arguments that are used as theoretical basis for their research. I hereafter describe the roles played by the sample researchers as if these authors were verbalizing about their goals. They represent ideal-types, more logical than real creatures. Working within inductive framework, I do not claim that I embrace all possible interpretative self-images. Such more exhaustive study may be subject of a separate research.

The judge. I call this self-image the judge because it really tries to stand above two opposing arguments, giving the right to one of them and automatically rejecting the other as false. On the scale of emancipation this image is heavily dependent on existing theoretical approaches; it cannot exist without identifying more than one opposing ways to explain particular phenomenon. The scientific value consists in providing new evidence, whether from independent field research or from new analysis of secondary sources, that finally tilts the balance in favor of one of the opposing arguments. Researchers who work within this paradigm will hardly see themselves as totally independent of existing theoretical views; these researchers need them in order to position themselves within the discipline. From the authors’ sample Kubicek is such a researcher; he is someone who limits his role in choosing winning argument among two he has already identified. Three of his sample articles (1997; 1999; 2002) produce proof demonstration in a form of a verdict, where existing theories models or particular explanations, e.g. neo-realism vs. hegemonic stability or Tocqueville vs. Huntington’s interpretation of the link between civil society and political modernization, are set to compete for explaining real questions and issues, such as why integration fails in Central Asia or what is the role of post-communist transition regarding trade-union development. The author takes the arguments as already done, accomplished, not subject to any improvement; he then makes a clear-cut decision in favor of one of the opposing arguments. He does not claim or want to go beyond this point; he does not want to reconcile elements of two or more existing models, and he does not want to offer a brand new approach to his research questions.

The peacemaker. The peacemaker is another self-image. The author does not limit his or her task to judging which among the arguments is better and which is worse. The
goal is to find common ground between arguments, elements that make them theoretically compatible, and to establish a new synthesis. Like the judge, the peacemaker is heavily dependent on existing theoretical approaches; it cannot exist without first identifying more than one opposing ways to explain particular phenomenon. Unlike the judge, and perhaps this is the single most important difference between the two, the peacemaker does not take the existing approaches as already done and unchangeable, without room for further improvement. The scientific value of seeing the self as peacemaker in science consists in providing evidence, whether from independent field research or from new analysis of secondary sources, that makes the existing scientific debates obsolete. Researchers who work within this paradigm, like the judges, will hardly see themselves as totally independent of existing theoretical views; these researchers need them in order to position themselves within the discipline. The peacemakers, however, establish new theoretical positions, different from all previous models; these new positions logically combine elements from considered to be mutually incompatible views. Johnson is the peacemaker within the sample; her research is the way of bringing peace within the discipline by reconciling elements of different approaches to her research questions. Three of his sample articles (1994; 2001; 2006) produce proof demonstration in a form if not of a peace treaty, then at least of a truce. She looks at the institutions, path contingency, and diffusion as points of equilibrium between structure and agency, continuation and change, and material incentives and socialization. Unlike the authors who work strictly within the limits of these particular paradigms, Johnson sees her work as a new synthesis that transcends the mutually incompatible positions. This new synthesis is closer to and better explains social reality, whether it is the reason why institutions fail, whether policy failures are due to institutions or to policies, and what is the role of incentives and norms in policy diffusion.

The prophet. The prophet is a self-projected charismatic personality in the realm of scientific research; charismatic in the sense that Weber gives (1994) when he evokes Jesus Christ’s words “It was written… but I say unto you”. The author does not limit his or her task to judge other arguments or to extract useful elements from them; these arguments are wrong and must be rejected in the name of more rigorous approach to the particular subject matter. The prophets, however, like the judge and the peacemaker, are heavily dependent upon those who preceded them. Like Jesus in the New Testament, they cannot make their revolutionary statements without evoking the arguments of those who they reject. They find a common point that embraces the entire literature that preceded them and apply all their force of destruction, thus creating a sense of anticipation for something big and extraordinary to come, nothing short than a new paradigmatic shift concerning the subject matter. I consider McFaul as a good example of the prophet phenomenon in social research. Three article out of four (1989/1990; 2002; McFaul & Stoner-Weiss 2008) are dominated by his willingness to prove the faults of existing explanations in general, be they in the realm of international relations, comparative politics or international development. His method is either to identify the dominant approach and overthrow it, or to put all existing models within one group, where they may look similar on a point McFaul describes as paramount, and then to reject them by offering a new understanding, which suites best the cause of advancement of knowledge. In his explanation of Angolan national reconciliation he rejects the dominant “Reagan doctrine” (1989/1990); he rejects the entire literature on political transition to democracy
attacking its common point of linking mode of transition with the resulting political regime type (2002), an attack that does not take into account the uncertain and tentative conclusions of key transitologists, such as O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986). McFaul also attacks the conventional understanding for correlation between authoritarian political regime and economic growth (McFaul & Stoner-Weiss 2008). He never tries to present his arguments and conclusions as a verdict between the relevance of two or more conflicting arguments; it seems for him that he does not see any intellectual pedigree for his new approach. He also does not seem to want to make peace with his predecessors; it is precisely his willingness to prove them wrong on the point he considers paramount that motivates his publications.

The god-creator. This is the final and most emancipated author’s self-image, emancipated from peer environment and any intellectual pedigree. The god-creators do not need to think about anybody as reference, positive or negative, in order to set up their ideas. They make their demonstrations as if they are the first to engage in scientific reflection regarding particular subject matter. They are not necessarily founders of discursively in the sense that Foucault gives to the term (1994); Marx, on the one hand, whom Foucault considers as example of founder of discursivity, constantly puts himself against different theoretical alternatives in order to present his own intellectual identity. The god-creator, on the other hand, acts as if there is no yesterday, as if the understanding of the research question begins with himself. He also does not need environment to present his identity; it seems that the author is self-sufficient. Therefore, unlike the prophet, he does not need to find common trait in the literature in order to focus his critical thrust. He is working as if there is no other literature to be considered, even as a negative leverage. The god-creator, of course, is not solipsistic creature, he does live in intellectual environment that makes him create research questions and provide answers. Yet, he is convinced he does not have such environment to acknowledge. To solve this paradox, the god-creator needs finding theoretical paradigm that will look within the circle of its devotees as having no intellectual history. Przeworski is a sample author who epitomizes this type. He is clearly the most emancipated as far as his relations with his peers are concerned. To put bluntly, it seems he does not think of himself as engaging in peer discussions. He sets problematic and finds solutions as if there is nobody but him in the field, as if he is the first to enter the realm of this particular research, as if he has no theoretical foundations. Three out of four sample articles (Przeworski & Vreeland 2002; Przeworski 2005; Benhabib & Przeworski 2006) follow this line; only one article (Przeworski & Wallerstein 1988) is based on opposition toward existing theoretical alternatives and this is due, as already mentioned, to the author’s style of the co-author. The other three are looking to points or zones of equilibrium for different social phenomena, such as international cooperation and democracy, within the game theory. Within Przeworski’s mode of analysis, this theory has nothing to do with particular way of theorizing as opposed to possible alternatives; it is considered as representing objective social reality that needs no further justification. It is akin of open-source set of tools that anybody has right to use at will without paying attention to intellectual pedigrees and relevant alternative theorizing.

Understanding the place of Przeworski among his peers, the place he himself delimits, helps understanding the apparent contradiction of his opening statement, his self-depicting as eclectic and opportunistic researcher, as somebody having no principles.
My findings clearly showed that Przeworski was loyal to his style, so in that sense he had firm principles to stand upon. He embraces economic vision of society, a vision that takes people as simple economic agents, who have no reason to cooperate, wage wars and keep democracy other than their material interests. He does not move away from this vision and in that sense he is not eclectic, far from it. He, however, considers himself detached from the need to position his work within theoretical schemas established by others as a process of gradual accumulation of knowledge. He interprets this detachment as a proof of being independent from theorems, or statements that have been proven on the basis of previously established statements. Przeworski’s reasoning does not allow for such theoretical basis. As a researcher deeply influenced by economic analysis, he does not question the intellectual foundation of his own economic reasoning.

In stead of conclusion

At least two questions remain open, questions that were constructed as far as this research moved ahead. First, are these four types of researcher’s self-image: the judge, the peacemaker, the prophet and the god-creator, the only possible types? I personally doubt this. A very small sample of six researchers revealed four possible interpretative schemes and my intuition tells me that the point of saturation, the point where adding new cases does not add new knowledge is not yet reached. Second, the sample showed remarkable continuity within each type, researchers did not make changes over many years; the only reason why they made any change in their research design was to accommodate co-authors, strategic rather than cultural way of coping with new environment. None of these researchers was analyzed from A to Z, from their very first manuscript after graduation until their most recent. Although my intuition does not tell me to expect huge surprises, I nevertheless look forward to see possible mutations within some of these types.
Appendix

Brief biographical notes


Edward Schatz - Associate Professor, University of Toronto; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin. Research interests: identity politics, social transformations, social movements, anti-Americanism, and authoritarianism with a focus on the ex-USSR, particularly Central Asia. Some key publications: *Political Ethnography* (University of Chicago Press 2009); *Modern Clan Politics* (University of Washington Press 2004).


Michael McFaul - Associate Professor, Stanford University; PhD, Oxford University. Research interests: Russian and Eastern European politics, democracy, and international political economy. Some key publications: *Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2004); *Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin* (Cornell University Press 2001); *Post-Communist Politics: Democratic Prospects in Russia and Eastern Europe* (Center for Strategic & International Studies 1993).


Robert Putnam - Peter and Isabel Malkin Professor of Public Policy, Harvard University; PhD, Yale University. Research interests: Comparative politics, social capital, Italian politics, international politics, religion and politics, and social mobility. Some key publications: *American Grace* (Simon & Schuster 2010), *Better Together: Restoring the American Community* (Simon & Schuster 2003), *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and
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