Party Linkages in Federal States: An Examination of Elections and Parties in Ontario and Canada

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Introduction

Whether it is electoral devolution in the United Kingdom and Spain, the supranational elections of the European Union, or the federal arrangements found in Canada and Australia, multi-level governance is an increasingly common and widespread phenomenon. In fact, nearly 2 billion people worldwide live under some form of multi-level governance (Thorlakson, 2006:37). Despite its growing importance, we know very little about the ways in which multi-level governance impacts traditional political institutions such as political parties. While a great deal of attention has been devoted to understanding and classifying party models and the different types of party organizations (Carty, 2002; Duverger, 1954; Katz and Mair, 1995; Kirchheimer, 1966; Panebianco, 1988), emphasis in the party literature has focused on the party at the national level and the focus has tended to be on states that have a unitary structure. Describing what he calls the "national bias of traditional party research," Detterbeck argues that the literature is guilty of "taking the nation state as the ubiquitous institutional and social context shaping party politics" (2012:2). Until very recently, little attention has been devoted to political parties that operate in different contexts. While interest in the European Union (Poguntke et al., 2008), Europarties (Bardi & Calosi, 2009; Hix and Marsh, 2011) electoral devolution (Fabre, 2008; Bradbury, 2006), and multi-level governance (Deschouwer, 2003; Hooghe & Marks, 2003) have begun to redress this issue, there still remains a need to examine political parties in non-unitary states.

One way to study political parties and party organization in a multi-level context is to examine the degree of vertical integration that exists between parties at the national and sub-national level. Although integration between parties can take a number of forms (ideological, behavioural, cognitive), organizational linkages dominate the party literature (Thorlakson, 2006:38). In his discussion of the relationship between provincial and federal political parties in Canada, Dyck suggests that “where a political party functions more or less successfully at both levels of government and where the relations between the two branches are generally close, it can be called an ‘integrated’ party” (1996: 186).¹ Huckshorn et al. echo an organizational definition of integration similar to that of Dyck, noting that “Integration involves a two-way pattern of interaction between the national and state party organization” (1996: 978). Likewise, Thorlakson agrees with both Dyck and Huckshorn et al., defining party integration as “the organizational linkages, interdependence and cooperation between federal and state party organizations in both the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary arenas” (2007: 161). For these scholars, integration is first and foremost concerned with the structure and organization of political parties.

Following the emphasis on organization, most students of Canadian party politics suggest that parties were highly integrated and tightly knit groups in the first half of the twentieth century but have since become increasingly disentangled as integration has weakened (Esselment, 2010: 871). The accepted conclusion has been that Canadian parties have responded to the federal structure by opting out of integration. Rather than creating vertical links that bridge the national and provincial jurisdictions, parties have created "two political worlds" (Blake, 1985), each separate and distinct from the other. Although recent research has begun to cast doubt on the

¹ Although much of the focus is on party organization, it should be noted that Dyck does include non-organizational indicators such as policy disputes in his analysis of Canadian political parties.
universality of these claims (Koop, 2011; Esselment, 2010), the view of Canadian parties as separate and independent is still dominant.

Perhaps the biggest shortcoming associated with this view of party integration, and the literature that it has generated, is what it leaves out. The emphasis placed on organizational linkages overshadows other forms of integration such as voter behaviour, shared and consistent ideology, campaign and election support, overlapping memberships, and a number of informal mechanisms that can link parties even in the absence of interconnected party structures. A brief example using party membership will be illustrative of this problem. Due to the strict emphasis on formal rules and party structures, a national and sub-national political party that share party members as a result of an organizational requirement are considered to be integrated. Conversely, two parties that operate in the absence of organizational requirements but still achieve high levels of overlapping membership are not considered integrated. We must therefore reconsider what it means for two parties to be integrated: Is it the joint membership structure that integrates two parties or is it the members? If it is the latter, if members are integrating agents, then the way two parties come to share members is less crucial than the extent of common membership. This broader view of what it means for parties to be integrated posits that party members, regardless of how or why they overlap, are an integrating force. This, of course, extends beyond the example of party members and applies to party personnel broadly.

We should therefore not only look to organizations for measuring party integration but to individuals as well. Viewing integration this way recognizes that parties are more than formal rules, constitutions, and structures. At their core, parties are a collective of individuals, or "teams of men" as Downs (1956) defined them. Despite their great importance, those individuals that make up parties remain understudied and their role in party integration under-theorized. Shifting our focus and including other aspects of parties (e.g., party personnel) in addition to the formal party organization should yield a much richer understanding of how parties operate in multi-level environments. This paper departs from the organizational focus that dominates the literature and will instead use party personnel as a measure of party integration. We are particularly interested in those individuals that are closely involved in the machinery of parties and elections. This includes Members of Parliament (MP), candidates, activists, and party members.

This paper addresses two questions. First, it explores how party personnel respond to the multi-level structure of Canadian politics. The extent to which federal and provincial parties share key party personnel can provide a new measure of the strength of party integration in Canada. Second, the paper examines two competing explanations of party integration and seeks to uncover whether differences in party organization or ideology best explain divergent levels of party integration. Vertical integration between parties in multi-level systems has consequences for national unity and federal stability (Thorlakson, 2009:158), the performance of democracy (Riker, 1964:91), accountability (Dyck, 1996: 184), party strength (Koop, 2012: 4), and intergovernmental relations (Esselment, 2009:2). Despite the numerous and far reaching consequences, little work has been done to understand the causes of party integration or the reasons for differing levels of integration between parties that compete within the same jurisdiction.
To answer these questions this paper draws on data from recent Ontario provincial and federal elections. The paper argues that overlapping membership provides a crucial integrating link between parties at the federal and provincial level and that differing levels of overlapping personnel cannot be attributed to organizational differences alone. To develop this argument, the paper begins with a brief theoretical overview of party integration and situates current Canadian parties into existing frameworks. The second section illustrates how informal means of integration are present in Canadian parties. Finally, the paper ends with a discussion of the findings. By departing from traditional organizational indicators, this paper demonstrates that party integration can be present even in the absence of formal mechanisms and interconnected party structures. In doing so, it challenges the conventional wisdom and demonstrates that Canadian parties are not as separate and distinct as the literature suggests.

**Hypotheses**

Although research examining divergent levels of party integration is limited, two competing explanations can be identified. The first, and the most common view in the literature, is a structural perspective. This view of integration posits that interconnected organizational structures provide the channels and incentives necessary to promote vertical linkages between national and sub-national political parties. Having interconnected organizations allows for, and even encourages, the flow of individuals and resources between national and sub-national parties. By contrast, where these structures are absent, resources and individuals remain, for the most part, separate and distinct from one another.

**H1:** Those parties that are formally and organizationally interconnected will have the highest levels of vertical integration. Due to organizational incentives, party personnel in interconnected parties will exhibit high levels of cross membership and consistency.

The second, and less common view of integration, suggests that ideology is a powerful force for integration. Where national and sub-national political parties share a strong and consistent ideology, they are likely to also share members, resources, activists, and so on. This ideological dimension can help to mobilize the same individuals at both levels and provides an incentive for parties that share an ideology to cooperate and coordinate their efforts to win elections, regardless of whether the party has formally connected party structures. Conversely, where parties are less ideological, or ideologically inconsistent, they will find it difficult to mobilize the same individuals to participate at both levels. As a result, behavioural linkages between the parties will be unlikely.

**H2:** Those parties with coherent ideology that is consistent across multiple jurisdictions will have the highest levels of vertical integration. Due to the partisan dimension, party personnel in ideologically coherent parties will exhibit high levels of cross membership and consistency.

Before evaluating the different accounts of party integration we must first situate the federal parties and their counterparts in Ontario in terms of their organization and ideology. In an effort to systematically categorize the different organizational strategies available to parties operating in a multi-level context, Dyck (1996) established a threefold typology of political parties. Depending on the level of organizational integration, parties can be classified as being *integrated, confederal,* or *truncated.* Integrated parties are those with significant vertical linkages.
between party organizations, confederal parties are those that exist at both levels but retain autonomy and operate separately from one another, and truncated parties are those that exist only at one level of electoral competition. As Koop (2011) reminds us, however, these party models are ideal types and serve as broad heuristic devices. In practice, integration should be viewed as operating on a continuum with parties falling anywhere between integrated and truncated. When applying Dyck's typology to the current slate of political parties, we find considerable variation. Rather than acting in a universal fashion towards separation and independence, political parties in Canada have adopted a number of different organizational strategies. The diversity is such that each of Dyck's party models is represented.

In terms of organization, the New Democratic Party (NDP) is Canada's most integrated party. One of the distinguishing features of the party is its unitary membership structure. When an individual joins a provincial wing of the NDP, a federal membership is granted automatically. In addition to their joint membership structure, provincial party offices service both levels of the party which ensures continued and frequent contact between the multiple branches (Dyck, 1991:208). Additionally, as outlined in the federal NDP Constitution, two officers from each provincial party have seats on the federal council, ensuring provincial representation at the federal level.

While there are provincial wings of the Liberal Party of Canada, unlike the NDP each provincial wing retains autonomy and control over their own affairs. Beyond sharing a name, the Ontario branch of the Liberal Party of Canada and the Ontario Liberal Party have shared a Toronto headquarters for nearly two decades (Esselment, 2010: 886). Although staff for each party is distinct, this represents a formal and cooperative arrangement between the parties nonetheless. Moreover, as Dyck notes, "there is regular contact between national headquarters and the various provincial party offices..." (1991:190). Indeed, Dyck goes on to suggest there is "probably weekly communication between national and Ontario parties" (1991:190). As a result, the Liberal Party can be best understood as a semi-integrated party type.

Finally, the federal Conservatives have no formal organizational ties to their provincial counterparts. When the federal Progressive Conservative Party, a party that had provincial wings in provinces across the country, and the Canadian Alliance, a party that existed only at the national level, merged in 2003 to establish the new Conservative Party of Canada (CPC), the party had crucial organizational decisions to make. Confronted with the multi-level framework of Canadian politics, the newly formed CPC embraced a truncated organizational structure and made no effort to form provincial wings of the party. As such, the party operates at a single level and remains organizationally distinct from the existing PC parties in the provinces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integrated</th>
<th>Semi-Integrated</th>
<th>Truncated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>Conservatives</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Figure 1: Organizational Continuum of Political Parties in Ontario*

In addition to differing on the organizational dimension, Canadian parties also differ on the ideological dimension. By this we are not referring to the type of ideology, but rather the
difference between brokerage and ideological politics. Evidence suggests that the NDP and Conservatives are more consistent in their ideology and their members more coherent in their policy views compared to the Liberals (Cross and Young, 2002). As Cross and Young note, "a key characteristic of ideological parties is the substantial agreement on important policy questions exhibited by their members, whereas members of brokerage parties are characterized by competing views on the principal issues" (2002: 876). The need to broker and accommodate a variety of competing and often conflicting views prevents the Liberals from establishing coherent and consistent ideology and set of policies. This, however, only points to ideological differences at a single level. While this is useful, we are more interested in ideological differences between parties operating in different electoral arenas.

One way to examine party ideology in a multi-level system is to study the level of ideological consistency across jurisdictions. In this regard, party platforms are a useful source of information. Researchers in Western Europe have engaged in quantitative analysis of parties’ election platforms in more than 50 countries since 1945. The Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) codes platforms according to a set of 54 pre-defined policy categories. Based on the content of party platforms, the CMP coding provides an easy-to-interpret score on the left-right dimension ranging from -100 to 100 for each party. A party platform that is dedicated entirely to left-wing issues is coded as -100 whereas a platform entirely devoted to right-wing issues is coded as 100. Using this score, we can compare federal and provincial party platforms to discover which parties are more consistent in their ideology.

When we compare 2011 provincial platform scores with the 2008 federal scores, the evidence supports the argument that the Conservatives and New Democrats are more ideologically consistent than the Liberals. Table 1 demonstrates the differences between the federal and provincial parties. While the difference between federal Conservative and New Democratic parties and their counterparts in Ontario is rather small (2.7 and 2.8 respectively), the difference between the federal and provincial Liberals is substantial (28.1). Even at a single level, the Liberals appear to be inconsistent with federal scores ranging from -12.1 in 2006 to 5.2 in 2008, a difference of 17.3.

Table 1: Federal-Provincial Platforms Compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>-22.9</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
<td>-20.7</td>
<td>-17.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Federal scores retrieved from Budge et al., 2001.

The remainder of this paper is dedicated to exploring how party personnel respond to multi-level structures and evaluating these two competing explanations of party integration. Given that each party has adopted a unique organizational response to the question of multi-level governance, if the organizational hypothesis is correct, we should expect to find a very clear pattern based on the different organizational designs that the parties have adopted. We should find evidence of a strongly integrated New Democratic Party, a moderately integrated Liberal Party, and a weak or

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2 Federal scores are taken from the CMP while provincial scores are taken from the MEDW project.
non integrated Conservative Party. If, however, ideology is the primary force behind integration, we should expect to see very different results. If this is the case, we should find integrated New Democratic and Conservative parties and a weakly integrated Liberal Party.

Data and Methodology
The focus of this paper is on the relationship between political parties in Ontario and their federal counterparts. Ontario provides a unique and useful case to study party linkages for a number of reasons. First, Ontario parties represent each of the party models discussed above (integrated, semi-integrated, and truncated). Ontario can therefore serve as a crucial case to test whether interconnected organizational strategies influence other aspects of party integration such as career paths and overlapping membership. Second, Ontario provincial elections share the same boundaries as their federal counterparts. This ensures that riding level factors are held constant. Finally, Ontario provincial elections have occurred roughly at the same time as the Canadian federal elections. This includes the 2003 and 2007 Ontario elections, the 2004 and 2008 federal elections, and both the Ontario and federal elections of 2011. Although this study limits analysis of party integration to the case of Ontario, the patterns and approach taken here can be applied to other provinces and jurisdictions.

Data used for this paper are derived from a variety of sources. First, information was collected on the career paths of Members of Parliament (MP) elected in the province of Ontario. Data include all individuals who served in the Canadian House of Commons between 1988 and 2011. Information about each parliamentarian was coded for the direction of the career path, party affiliation, and inclusion in cabinet. Second, candidate information was gathered from a 2011 post election online survey of provincial New Democratic and Liberal candidates and a 2008 mailback survey of federal NDP and Liberal candidates. Finally, membership numbers come from a survey of federal party members which was conducted in the spring of 2000. Subject to the availability of data, there are a number of limitations. First, party membership numbers for the federal Conservative Party are not available. This, however, is not completely insurmountable. While membership data is not available for the Conservatives, we can collapse membership numbers from the Progressive Conservative Party and the Canadian Alliance into a single variable that will approximate the membership of the newly formed federal party. Additionally, comparable candidate data is not available for the Conservatives.

Party Members
Shared and common membership can provide a significant and continuous linkage between federal and provincial parties. As parties continue to provide members with avenues for greater and more meaningful participation within internal party affairs (Young and Cross, 2002), the role of ordinary members should not be overlooked. Members choose party leaders and nominate candidates, they volunteer and work on election campaigns, and they vote on policy at party conventions. Due to their role in internal party affairs, party members are an integral component of the party apparatus. Two political parties that have high levels of cross membership will therefore share an important linkage that spans the jurisdictional divide.

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3 With the exception of one northern federal riding being divided into two ridings at the provincial level.
4 I am grateful to Bill Cross and Lisa Young for providing their survey data of candidates and members.
Despite the potential reasons for single level or inconsistent membership\(^5\), a majority of party members in Canada's political parties hold memberships in both provincial and federal political parties. As Table 2 demonstrates, more than two-in-three party members at the federal level also belong to a political party at the provincial level. If we define consistency, as others have, as membership in two parties that does not cross partisan lines (Esselment, 2009:132), then those Canadians who hold memberships at both levels exhibit considerable consistency. In total, 90% of those members that hold dual membership do so consistently. The figures for Ontario members are not dissimilar to that of the country as a whole. Overall, 70% of federal party members from Ontario hold dual membership while 97% of those members hold consistent dual memberships.

Table 2: Types of Party Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Single Level</th>
<th>Dual Level</th>
<th>Consistent within Dual</th>
<th>Dual and Consistent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>32% (1218)</td>
<td>68% (2581)</td>
<td>90% (2328)</td>
<td>61% (2328)</td>
<td>3799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>30% (354)</td>
<td>70% (810)</td>
<td>97% (783)</td>
<td>67% (783)</td>
<td>1164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When we turn our attention to the individual parties, we find interesting cross party differences. As shown in Table 3, 100% of federal NDP members simultaneously belong to the Ontario NDP, an accomplishment that is due to the party's unified membership structure. Perhaps unsurprising to some, we find stark differences between the NDP and its two competitors. While the NDP achieves 100% membership overlap, 68% of Liberal and 62% of Conservative federal party members report belonging to a provincial party in Ontario. What is surprising, however, is the only minor difference between Liberal and Conservative party members in terms of the percentage who hold dual membership. Our Chi-square test of significance revealed that dual membership did not differ significantly between the Liberals and the Conservatives, despite the Liberals opting for a semi integrated organizational style compared to the truncated Conservatives.\(^6\) As suspected, the difference between the NDP and its competitors is significant. It is also worth noting that those party members that do belong to parties at both the provincial and federal level are remarkably consistent in their membership. As Table 3 demonstrates, members of the federal Conservative Party migrate, almost universally, to the Progressive Conservatives in Ontario, and members of the federal Liberal Party join the Liberal Party of Ontario (Table 3).

Table 3: Types of Party Members by Federal Political Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Single Level</th>
<th>Dual Level</th>
<th>Consistent within Dual</th>
<th>Dual and Consistent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>32% (85)</td>
<td>68% (179)</td>
<td>96% (169)</td>
<td>65% (171)</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>38% (270)</td>
<td>62% (433)</td>
<td>97% (420)</td>
<td>60% (416)</td>
<td>703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
<td>100% (198)</td>
<td>100% (198)</td>
<td>100% (198)</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be clear that membership acts as a significant linkage between provincial and federal parties in Canada. A majority of party members in both Canada and Ontario have responded to

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6 Significance tests for all data in this paper are done using a Chi Square test. Difference between parties is statistically significant at the < 0.05 level.
the multi-level nature of Canadian politics by opting to participate in party politics at both levels. What's more, the vast majority of these party members have done so consistently, despite the institutional challenges associated with federalism. Rather than opting out of integration, party members represent a significant linkage between federal and provincial parties.

Activists
More than the general membership, active party members are those individuals who provide the machinery for election campaigns and actively participate in party affairs on a regular basis. While membership as a whole can act as an integrating link because of the quantity of overlap, active members represent a linkage because of the quality of their participation. Writing about party activists, Blake et al. noted that "it is their commitment to democratic participation that sustains electoral politics in contemporary liberal democracies" and that "Canadian political science has too often ignored them" (1991:1). Little has changed in the two decades since Blake and his colleagues wrote of the importance of party activists. Although activists are the lifeblood of electoral politics, we know very little about them, especially about how they respond to the two political worlds created by the federal structure (for some exceptions see Jacek et al. 1972; Koop, 2011).

In order to identify activists, party members can be categorized based on their level of activity within the party. Based on the number of hours party members report spending on party activity in an average month, members can be separated into three distinct groups: those members that are active (3+ hours/month), those members that are moderately active (1-3 hours/month), and those that are inactive (less than 1 hour/month). Categorizing members this way allows us to capture party activists in addition to the broader party membership.

When we examine those active party members from Ontario, the trends are similar to that of the party membership as a whole. Again, as a result of the organizational structure, fully 100% of those active members of the federal NDP are also members of the Ontario NDP. Liberal cross membership, however, increases from 68% of the membership as a whole to 80% when we focus our attention on active members. Similarly, cross membership for the Conservatives rises from 62% to 72% (Table 4). While the percentage of federal party members who also belong to provincial parties increases for both the Liberals and the Conservatives, the gap between the two parties and the NDP persists. Like the findings for the general membership, there continues to be no statistical difference between the Conservatives and the Liberals while the gap between the NDP and the others remains significant.

Overall, more than three-in-four (76%) active federal party members from Ontario also belong to a political party at the provincial level. Like the membership as a whole, these individuals are remarkably consistent in their dual memberships and do not cross partisan lines when joining a political party at another level of electoral politics. In total, 100% of active federal Liberal and New Democratic party members and 97% of active federal Conservative members are consistent in their dual party memberships.
Table 4: Types of Active Party Members by Federal Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Single Level</th>
<th>Dual Level</th>
<th>Consistent within Dual</th>
<th>Dual and Consistent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>20% (12)</td>
<td>80% (45)</td>
<td>100% (45)</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>28% (42)</td>
<td>73% (106)</td>
<td>97% (103)</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
<td>100% (22)</td>
<td>100% (22)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legislators

Previous research has demonstrated that very little provincial-federal migration takes place in the career paths of Canadian legislators (Barrie and Gibbins, 1986; Dyck, 1996). In their study of parliamentary careers in Canada, Barrie and Gibbins found that only 7% of federal members of parliament had previously been elected at the provincial level. The low levels of career transition become more apparent when compared to the career paths of legislators in other federal states. In Germany and Austria, for instance, nearly 15% of federal members are ex regional members (Stolz, 2011:228). Nonetheless, it will be useful to examine the career paths of Canadian legislators, comparing across parties. In this regard, we can examine if those provincial parties with connected organizations provide greater access and incentive to transition to federal politics and vice versa. Writing about the migration of party politicians from one level to another, Deterbeck notes that these individuals "will bring in experience and personal contacts from their prior position" (2011:250). Due to the relationships and contacts that they bring, those individuals who have been elected at both levels of government can create a significant linkage between parties.

Table 5 highlights the number of times an MP with provincial experience was elected to the House. In total, MPs with previous elected experience in Ontario have been elected to the House of Commons on seventy-seven occasions between 1988 and 2011.\(^7\) Consistent with earlier findings, this represents 10% of all MPs elected from Ontario during this period. The findings also demonstrate that the direction of the career path exclusively in a single direction. Only one individual between 1988 and 2011 began with a career at the federal level and later moved on to provincial politics. In the remainder of the cases, the career trajectory was from provincial to federal politics.

Beyond the general figures, a number of important findings emerge from the career patterns of Ontario's politicians. In particular, the NDP's federal caucus is consistently made up of a higher percentage of MPs who have previously served in the provincial legislature. In 2006, for example, nearly one-in-four NDP caucus members from Ontario had previously been elected to the Ontario Legislature. The NDP numbers point to a modest amount of cross membership with 16% of NDP MPs having been previously elected to the Ontario Legislature. Following the NDP, the Conservatives have elected MPs with previous experience twenty-three times and the Liberals forty-three times. This represents 11% and 8% of all Conservative and Liberal MPs respectively. Similar to other types of party personnel discussed in this paper, we find that there is no meaningful difference between the Liberals and the Conservatives in terms of career transitions from provincial to federal politics. Despite its truncated nature, the Conservatives

\(^7\) 77 cases does not refer to unique members of Parliament. Instead, 77 represents the number of times that a Member of Parliament with provincial experience in Ontario was elected to the House of Commons. Analysis for unique Members of Parliament demonstrated the similar patterns as those reported here.
offer a career path that is similar to the Liberals. The difference between the New Democratic Party and its competitors, however, is statistically significant.

We also find that, like other party personnel, provincial MLAs are, for the most part, consistent in their multi-level activities. With only two exceptions, all provincial MLAs that went on to federal politics became members of their federal counterpart. The Conservative figures are higher than one might expect given the truncated nature of its party structure. Without a direct organizational link, Ontario PC MLAs are more free to choose which party to run for once they enter federal politics. Despite this freedom, Ontario PC MLAs are consistent in their transition to the federal arena. That only two members switched parties in their transition, and that both migrated to the Liberals, a party that has historically been in government at the federal level, demonstrates the consistent nature of parliamentary career transitions.

Table 5: Frequency of MPs elected to the House with Previous Provincial Experience by Federal Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of times an MP with provincial experience was elected to the House</th>
<th>Percent of total MPs elected to the House of Commons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perhaps more important than the broader party caucus is cabinet. Not only is cabinet where effective power resides (Savoie, 1999), but historically it has been a body where strong regional ministers could represent the provinces (White, 2005). Moreover, a cabinet position is a prestigious appointment and a significant dimension to the career paths of MPs. In 1974 Smiley wrote that so far "as federal-provincial relations is concerned, ministers deal with one another in the absence of either personal experience or personal ambition related to the other order of government" (174). As he noted in his own analysis, from Diefenbaker through Clark (1957-1980), no federal cabinet had more than three ministers with provincial experience. Although not concerned with party integration, Smiley warned that the lack of cross membership between federal and provincial parties could have negative consequences for national integration and the overarching stability of the state.

In contrast to Smiley's 1974 observations, today we find that a significant percentage of federal cabinet and shadow cabinet ministers do have personal experience with their counterparts at the provincial level. In fact, ministers with previous provincial experience are typically overrepresented in federal cabinets. Although MPs with provincial experience constitute approximately 10% of all members, they make up a much higher percentage of cabinet. While in government between 1993-2006, Liberal MPs with previous elected experience in provincial politics constituted 24% of all Ontario MPs appointed to cabinet. Likewise, between 2006-2011, Conservative MPs with previous elected experience in Ontario constituted a slightly higher 26% of all cabinet ministers from Ontario. Moreover, this number increases to one-in-three (35%) for the Conservatives when high level non-elected positions in the provincial party are included.8

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8 Cabinet minister Peter Van Loan, for instance, was previously the president of the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party.
Since the NDP has never formed a government at the federal level, we do not have comparable data on the number of cabinet positions held by members with previous provincial experience. In Westminster tradition, however, the opposition creates its own shadow cabinet - an alternative cabinet with critics for all government portfolios. In absence of government data, using the shadow cabinet is the best approximate for NDP figures. While in Opposition from 2006-2011, 17% of NDP shadow cabinet members from Ontario had been previously elected in Ontario. We should, however, be careful in interpreting the results given the unusual makeup of NDP shadow cabinets. With one exception, all members of the NDP caucus in 2006 and 2008 were given a critic position. With that said, one-in-six NDP shadow cabinet ministers has been previously elected at the provincial level in Ontario.

What these findings suggest is that a considerable percentage of federal cabinet ministers from Ontario have worked with and have personal relationships with their provincial counterparts. While Smiley found that three ministers with provincial experience was the ceiling for the entire cabinet in the 1970s, this analysis demonstrates that there are routinely three or more cabinet ministers with provincial experience from Ontario alone. The current, Conservative cabinet, for instance, has three senior ministers who served in PC cabinets in Ontario: the Minister of Finance, Foreign Affairs, and the President of the Treasury Board. If similar patterns are found in other provinces, we can expect to find cabinets with a considerable degree of provincial experience and networks. Furthermore, when shadow cabinets are considered, this number increases further. Rather than working in the absence of personal experience, a significant percentage of federal cabinet ministers from Ontario, and likely other provinces as well, have worked with and have close personal ties to their counterparts at the provincial level.

Candidates
Thus far, we have examined federal-provincial overlap of party members, activists, and elected legislators. Candidacy for election, even when the seat is not won, can also represent an important linkage between parties. Like legislators, those candidates with previous experience at another level of government will bring contacts, experience, and networks to their current position. Shared candidates can therefore represent a unique linkage between federal and provincial parties. Table 6 shows the number of provincial candidates who have sought a nomination federally and vice versa. Slightly more than one-in-five provincial New Democratic candidates in Ontario have sought a federal nomination in the past, twice as many as their Liberal counterparts. When federal candidates are asked if they have ever sought a nomination at the provincial level, the findings are similar. Again, twice as many federal New Democrats have previously sought a provincial nomination compared to their Liberal counterparts. In total, 22% of federal candidates, and 12% of provincial candidates have previously sought a party nomination at a different level of electoral politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Federal candidates who have previously sought a provincial nomination</th>
<th>Provincial candidates who have previously sought a federal nomination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>14% (23)</td>
<td>9% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
<td>30% (51)</td>
<td>21% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22% (74)</td>
<td>12% (15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Additionally, it is worth noting that one-in-five federal Liberal candidates and 28% of New Democrat candidates report being previously elected to the provincial party executive. In this regard, the difference between the NDP and the Liberals is not significant. What is interesting, however, is that federal candidates in both parties are more likely to have been previously elected to the provincial executive of their party than the federal executive. Combined, their experience as provincial candidates and as members of the provincial party executive demonstrates the important role that candidates can play in linking federal and provincial political parties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Federal candidates who have been elected as a member of the federal party executive</th>
<th>Federal candidates who have been elected as a member of the provincial party executive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>7% (12)</td>
<td>19% (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
<td>12% (20)</td>
<td>28% (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9% (32)</td>
<td>24% (80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, beyond being active at both levels, the candidates themselves view the parties as being connected to one another. A majority of provincial candidates in both parties believed that their electoral fortunes were tied to the success and failure of their federal counterpart in the most recent federal election. According to provincial New Democratic candidates, the success that the federal party enjoyed six months prior to the provincial election had a positive impact on their own campaign. Likewise, Ontario Liberal candidates viewed the poor showing of the federal Liberals as an obstacle in their campaign that had to be overcome. In total, more than 70% of NDP candidates believed that the federal results helped them in their campaign as compared to 67% of Liberal candidates who felt that the federal results hurt their chances. In other words, the vast majority of provincial candidates in both parties felt that the federal election campaign and results had a significant impact on their own provincial election.

**Discussion and Conclusions**

Given the evidence presented in this paper, it should be clear that party personnel link federal parties and their counterparts in Ontario in a number of ways. Rather than opting out of integration, those individuals closely involved in party politics have responded to federalism by participating at multiple levels. The parties examined here share a majority of their members and activists while also exhibiting modest connections between their candidates and elected officials. To use the language of Katz and Mair (1993), party personnel on the ground appear to be highly integrated whereas personnel in public office remain modestly integrated. When we narrow our focus from parliament as a whole to cabinet, however, the overlap between parties in public office becomes more apparent. Overall, the evidence presented here suggests that Canadian parties may be more integrated than previously thought. When we work with a broader definition of integration - one that includes people as well as structures - it is clear that Canadian parties share a number of important linkages.

It should also be clear that the parties examined in this paper do not enjoy the same levels of cross membership and overlap of party personnel. For each of the types of personnel that this paper has discussed - members, activists, candidates, and elected officials - the NDP stands apart from its rivals. In each of these dimensions the NDP has more overlap and shares a greater
percentage of its party personnel than either the Liberals or the Conservatives. In this regard, the NDP seems to confirm the hypothesis that organizationally connected parties will provide a channel and incentive to share party personnel and foster high levels of overlap. Organization and party structure, however, cannot explain the similarities between the Liberals and Conservatives. If the organizational hypothesis were correct, we would expect the Liberals to be more integrated than the Conservatives. Instead, we find that for most indicators, there is no meaningful difference between the Liberals and Conservatives. Despite the fact that the Liberals are semi-integrated (shared name, shared headquarters, organizational history, etc.), they are unable to attract more membership, activist, or legislator overlap than the Conservatives accomplish with their truncated and organizationally distinct party structure. This suggests that organizational design is important, but only to a degree.

To be sure, organization does matter. We can look within a party to examine the potential impact of organizational design on the shape of party membership. While the Liberal Party in Ontario has adopted a semi-integrated organization, it has more integrated organizations in certain provinces. In New Brunswick, for instance, the party shares a headquarters, uses same membership forms, and maintains a close organizational relationship (Esselment, 2010:96). While the party has not adopted a joint membership structure per se, prospective members in New Brunswick have the option of joining at a single level or both simultaneously. As a result of these organizational differences, federal Liberal Party members in New Brunswick are considerably more likely to belong to the provincial party when compared to their counterparts in Ontario. It total, 98% of federal Liberal Party members in New Brunswick belong to the provincial Liberal Party, compared to 68% of federal Liberal Party members in Ontario.

Ideological differences, however, do not offer a complete explanation either. If they did, we would find comparable levels of integration between the New Democrats and the Conservatives. The evidence, however, demonstrates a significant gap between these two parties. Despite both parties embracing ideological politics over brokerage, these parties do not attract similar levels of shared party personnel. What this suggests is that integration is likely a factor of both ideology and organization. The NDP, having an interconnected structure combined with its ideological nature, creates strong incentives for integration. It ensures overlap through party structure but also mobilizes the same individuals to participate at both levels through shared and consistent ideology. Combined, this accounts for the high levels of integration between the New Democratic parties federally and provincially. The Liberals on the other hand, with their semi-integrated organizational structure combined with their brokerage ideological nature, provide far fewer incentives for integration. In this case, the party has some minor organizational incentives but cannot rely on ideology to mobilize party personnel to become active at both levels. Since the party lacks consistency, individuals interested in policy at one level are not inherently directed to their party counterpart at the other. As such, the Liberals maintain modest levels of integration but remain behind the NDP. By contrast, the Conservatives are able to make up for a lack of organizational incentives through their ideology. As a result, the Conservatives, in terms of members, activists, and elected officials, are able to close the gap left by the lack of organizational linkages through the ideological nature of the party. The result is that the Conservatives achieve similar levels of integration as the Liberals despite being organizationally truncated.
The findings presented in this paper have a number of important implications. In a recent article, Esselment demonstrates the powerful role that partisanship can play in intergovernmental relations (IGR) (Esselment, 2012). Like partisanship, overlapping personnel is likely to have important consequences for IGR for at least two reasons. First, as Truman noted in his work on interest groups, those groups with high levels of overlapping memberships would be pressured to temper their arguments and claims vis-a-vis other groups and the state (Truman, 1951). Following Truman's logic, two parties that share members, candidates, activists, and legislators, will have a strong incentive to cooperate in the intergovernmental arena. Otherwise, political parties risk alienating key party personnel that belong to both parties. Second, as Putnam notes, membership in a group has the impact of increasing trust and creating norms of reciprocity. The end result, as Putnam argues, is that groups and individuals can solve collective action problems as they are encouraged to cooperate (Putnam, 1993). When working with their former colleagues, the stockpile of social capital and social trust that these individuals have accumulated is expected to improve IGR. In a decentralized and competitive multi-level governance context such as Canada, those mechanisms that can reduce conflict, even informal ones such as overlapping party personnel, should be the subject of further study.

References


