Ethnic Quota and Unintended Effects on Women’s Political Representation in Singapore

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Abstract

This article examines the effects of ethnic quotas on women’s political representation in Singapore. The 1988 electoral reform requires at least one ethnic minority candidate to be fielded in the multimember constituencies based on the party list plurality bloc vote system. Based on elite interviews, party publications and electoral data, this article argues that the increases in the district magnitude of the multimember constituencies have had the unintended effect of improving women’s political participation. More broadly, the article shows the conditions under which electoral rules shape behaviour, focusing on how ruling party leaders in Singapore act as critical gatekeepers through central candidate selection method that have a direct impact on legislative diversity.

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Introduction

Presently, more than fifty countries in the world have made legal provisions to ensure the descriptive representation of ethno-religious minority groups and women in politics. While we know much about the institutional solutions to protect minorities in ethnically divided societies (Lijphart, 1977; Horowitz, 1985; Norris, 2004; Reilly & Reynolds, 1999) and the use of gender quotas to “fast-track” women into politics (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005; Tripp & Kang, 2008), less is known about intersections between ethnicity and gender in terms of the implications of affirmative action strategies. Comparative work on the representational politics across the two identities remains limited. Indeed, few studies have explored how ethnic quotas affect gender representation and vice versa. Given that electoral rules have intended and unintended consequences (Grofman & Lijphart, 2003; Lijphart, 1990) and the selection of “one remedy for underrepresentation over others will generally shape the future trajectory of a social group” (Htun, 2004: 451), this article will study how an ethnic quota policy in Singapore affects women’s political representation over time.

Singapore introduced an ethnic quota policy in 1988 although ethnic minorities already constituted 19 percent of the Parliament, approximating its share of the population. In contrast, women received no legal provisions, despite occupying less than five percent of seats. Singapore’s selective quota policy presents a puzzle and deserves attention for three reasons. First, even without gender quotas, women’s overall legislative representation improved phenomenally, from five percent in 1988 to a high of 22 percent after the 2011 general election. While no woman stood in the 1980 election, a total of 32 women candidates contested the 2011 elections. Currently, the Parliament has 20 elected women MPs, 23 percent of the total legislators – the highest in the country’s electoral history. How the Singaporean women managed to raise their political representation without the use of quotas merits further study.

Second, the adoption of a quota policy for ethnic minorities and not for women highlights the social differences between the two groups and the consequences of electoral engineering. As Posner (2004) suggests, the salience of ethnicity is higher than gender as it can be mobilized by elites to gain electoral support. Unlike gender, ethnicity often coincides with – rather than crosstabs-partisan alignments (Htun, 2004: 439). The case of Singapore shows how changes in the rules of the game are historically contingent and politically motivated. As Reynolds notes, assessing when communal groups are awarded special electoral rights is important as it sheds light on why the rights were given and motivations behind the electoral design (2005: 308). More could be learned about group representation politics if we avoid conflating the experiences of the two identity groups (Krook & O’Brien, 2010).

Third, the adoption of ethnic quotas in 1988 led to a change in the electoral system used in Singapore, from a single-member plurality system to one that combines single-member constituencies (SMCs) and multimember constituencies based on party list bloc vote. The country’s unique electoral choice is shared only by three other authoritarian regimes in Africa: Cameroon, Chad and Djibouti. It diverges from the “Asian model” of a mixed system that combines list proportional representation and a plurality-majoritarian element (Reilly, 2007). The creation of multimember constituencies, also known as the Group Representative Constituencies (GRCs) has been found to penalize smaller parties and generate high electoral

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disproportionality (Tan, forthcoming; Croissant, Bruns & John, 2002). This article argues that the creation of multimember constituencies mandating the nomination of ethnic minorities also offers more opportunities to field women. Indeed, the “district magnitude” or the number of politicians who are elected in each electoral district makes a key difference (Salmond, 2006; Studlar & Welch, 1991). In Singapore, the sizes of GRCs grew over the years. Presently, there are nine SMCs and 15 GRCs of various sizes, \(^3\) which guarantees about 17 percent of 87 total seats for ethnic minorities. By tracing the political trajectories of the two groups at the party and national levels over the last two decades, the analysis shows that the multimember seats have facilitated the inclusion of not only ethnic minorities but also women.

To understand the resulting increase of women, this article builds on the growing scholarship on gender quotas (Krook & O’Brien, 2010; Krook, 2010; Darcy, Clark & Welch, 1994) and electoral politics (Grofman & Lijphart, 2003; Norris, 2004). The analysis demonstrates how party leaders act as gatekeepers and that candidate selection is “the choice before the choice” that determines the composition of the legislature (Rahat, 2007; Field & Siavelis, 2008). Candidate selection is significant for hegemonic party systems such as in Singapore, as one party, the People’s Action Party (PAP) has maintained legislative supermajority overtime while opposition parties are “second class, licensed” parties that cannot compete with the hegemonic party in an antagonistic or on equal basis (Sartori, 2005: 204–5). Despite the PAP’s recent trend of declining vote shares, the party has retained an average of 95 percent seat shares over the last five decades. Even with 24 registered parties in the country, only five to six are active or contest in elections. Hence, in Singapore, the ruling party’s candidate selection is critical as it largely decides the composition of the legislature.

This article is organized as follows. The first section will survey the adoption of ethnic and gender quotas in Asia while the second considers the claims and politics behind the selective adoption of ethnic quotas in Singapore. The third section compares and examines the effects of the ethnic list quota on the representation of ethnic minorities and women at the national level. Finally, it demonstrates how multimember slates in Singapore offer parties incentives to field not only minorities but also women in the last three elections.

Protecting Ethnic Minorities and Women Rights in Asia

In Asia, women are still underrepresented in governments and less likely to join political parties than men. The “higher, the fewer” pattern persists (Bashevkin, 1993). In Asia, the average proportion of women parliamentarians of 18 per cent continues to lag behind global average. Besides, the average women cabinet ministers in the Asia Pacific region is still less than 10 per cent (Norris, 2012). Overall, women’s representation is below the global average in all four subregions in the Asia Pacific (True, George, Niner, et al., 2013).\(^4\) Socio-cultural factors such as “Asian values” or traditional patriarchal social structure are often cited as factors for women’s underrepresentation (Richer, 1990; Stivens & Sen, 1998; Edwards & Roces, 2013; Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Consequently, dominant explanations for Asian women’s rise to political

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\(^3\) The size and composition of GRCs have changed frequently, from 13 (48 percent of total 81 seats) in 1988 to 15 (87 percent of 87 seats) by 2011 (Tan, 2012a: 27).

\(^4\) The UNDP report shows that women’s political representation is the lowest in the Pacific subregion at 3.65 per cent (excluding Australia and New Zealand) while East Asia is at 17.6 per cent and Southeastern Asia is at 18.09 per cent (including Brunei) and South Asia with 19.76% (True, George, Niner, et al., 2013).
leadership tend to focus on non-institutional family or dynastic ties (Thompson, 2004; Ayaz & Fleschenberg, 2009; Bauer & Tremblay, 2011). Alternatively, studies have been made to consider economic and human development\(^5\); electoral institutional factors (Gaunder, 2009; Hickman, 1997); incumbency effects (Shair-Rosenfield, 2012; Schwindt-Bayer, 2005) and degree of democratization on women’s representation (Paxton, Hughes & Painter, 2010). However, apart from the United Nations Development Programme and World Bank reports that reviewed the gender disparities and effects of gender quotas in Asia, large-scale comparative studies remain scarce (Pande Rohini & Deanne Ford, 2011; Norris, 2012; True et al., 2013).

Globally, more than 40 countries have imposed gender quotas, reserved seats or party quotas by amending the constitution and changing the electoral rules to improve women’s political representation in the last two decades.\(^6\) In the 1990s, Asian countries began adopting gender quotas as a “fast track” model to improve women’s underrepresentation (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005; Tripp & Kang, 2008). At the same time, some parties have introduced informal party quotas to ensure that a higher number of female candidates are fielded in the elections. In Asia, the use of gender quotas was in part spurred by the region’s economic modernization and historical turn towards “majoritarian democracy”(Reilly, 2007). For example, in the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and Cambodia, modernization triggered regime democratization and electoral reforms that include guarantees for ethnic minorities and women.

The realization that institutional means are the fastest and more efficient way to improve women’s representation also encouraged Asian feminist groups in Taiwan, South Korea and Mongolia to use international agreements such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) to lobby for affirmative action (True, George, Niner, et al., 2013; Norris, 2012). In others, the promotion of gender equality as a component of the international democracy has led to gender quota adoption in the most unlikely places as in Afghanistan, East Timor and Bangladesh (Tripp & Kang, 2008; Krook, 2004, 2006). Strategic calculations by political elites for international legitimacy and other incentives could have motivated these traditional, patriarchal societies to undertake the nominal reforms (Bush, 2011; Htun & Jones, 2002). Broadly in Asia, efforts to address gender inequalities have ranged from the adoption of legislative quotas (China, Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, North and South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan and Uzbekistan) to reserved seats (Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, and) and voluntary party quotas (Thailand). See Table 1. However, others such as Cambodia, Burma/Myanmar, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and Sri Lanka have resisted.

[Insert Table 1 here]

The resistance towards the “quota regime” stems largely from concerns with violations against the principle of equal opportunity, substantive representation of women parliamentarians and credibility issues that perpetuate the image of women as symbolic figures legislators (Hughes, 2011; Shair-Rosenfield, 2012). Following Kymlicka, critics contend that: “[T]he general idea that of mirror [descriptive] representation is untenable” (1995: 139).

\(^5\) However, studies show that there is an absence of systematic relationship between Gender Development Index and proportion of women in political politic in Asia. For example, Japan, one of the most affluent, post-industrial societies has only 11.3% of women in the Diet while Afghanistan, of the poorest societies has 28% in the Wolesi Jingga (Norris, 2012: 6).

\(^6\) See (Krook, 2009) and (Tripp & Kang, 2008) for the varieties of gender quotas.
Moreover, the substantive representation of women and ethnic minorities are still in question. As Young says: “having such a relationship of identity or similarity with constituents says nothing about what the representative does” (1997). Studies show that while quotas affect women’s representation, they are not always at levels legislated by law and the substantive effects could vary greatly across cases (Paxton, Hughes & Painter, 2010; Roberts, Seawright & Cyr, 2012). Indeed, while quotas can “fast track” women into power, whether their qualitative representation would improve women’s interests remains unclear (Foust & Haring, 2012).

Unlike gender quotas, the practice of seat reservations has long existed prior to the 1980s (Grofman & Handley, 2008; Grofman, Handley & Niemi, 1994; Reynolds, 2005). In Asia, fewer countries have used legal measures to guarantee the political representation of ethnic minorities than women. While about seventeen countries in Asia use gender quotas or other forms of parity laws at the national and party levels, only about eight countries (India, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Fiji, Pakistan, Singapore, Taiwan and China) have made special provisions for ethnic and religious minority groups. Unlike the arguments for gender quota, the debate for reserved seats or quotas for minorities originates from security concerns and desire for ethnic peace. The inclusion of minorities in representative bodies is now held as a necessary but insufficient condition for conflict management (Reynolds, 2006: 3). In ethnically fractionalized countries such as in India, Afghanistan, Fiji and Singapore, seat reservations or quotas for ethnic groups are key components of post-conflict management or multi-ethnic accommodation (Fraenkel & Grofman, 2006; Dunning & Nilekan, 2013). Similar to the quota literature, the consensus is that proportionate electoral systems such as the PR party list systems are more effective than majoritarian ones for managing ethnic relations (Lijphart, 2004; Norris, 2004). However, there is no agreement on which “consociationalist”, power-sharing model is best. Critics contend that there is no “one size fits all” model for every divided society (Reilly & Reynolds, 1999: 1; Horowitz, 2003) and the concern that quotas could reinforce ethnic cleavages and identities remained unresolved (Htun, 2004; Simonsen, 2005).

**Singapore’s Model of Regulating Ethnic Relations**

Singapore is one of Asia’s most culturally diverse and ethnically fractionalized countries. Geographically surrounded by large Muslim neighbours, the small island has a population of about 5 million made up of 74 per cent Chinese majority and 13 per cent Malay and 9.2 per cent Indian minorities (Statistics Singapore 2011). The country’s history of low-intensity attacks from Indonesia during the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation from 1962 to 1966, expulsion from the Malaysian Federation and two racial riots in 1964 and 1969 were critical junctures that left an indelible mark on the leaders’ psyche. Since then, the fear of the resurgence of racial conflicts has largely dominated the country’s public policies.

Subsumed under a nation-building rationale, the PAP government makes no apologies for introducing racially discriminatory policies to promote racial integration (Tan, 2005, 2012a). For example, all Singaporeans have to carry identity cards to declare their racial group based on

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7 Since the mid-twentieth century, many colonial administered territories have reserved seats for indigenous groups (Reynolds, 2005). See (Horowitz, 1985; Reilly & Reynolds, 1999; Reynolds, 2006).

8 For ways to achieve proportionality through non-PR methods, see (Lijphart, 1986).

9 For debates on the “consociationalist” model, see (Grofman & Lijphart, 2003; Fraenkel & Grofman, 2006; Horowitz, 2003; Lijphart, 2004; Reilly & Reynolds, 1999; Selway & Templeman, 2012).
Chinese, Malay, Indian or Others racial categories. State sponsored “self-help groups” to promote the welfare of communities are also organized along racial lines while immigration policies seek to maintain a Chinese majority in the national racial distribution (Oon, 2009). Aside from the legal constraints, the PAP government also created “broker institutions” such as the People’s Association— a statutory board - to build a wide network of grassroots political organizations and inter-racial activities to foster national identity. In addition, social-ethnic integration is maintained through national conscription and making English the lingua franca.

By the late 1970s, draconian and intrusive measures have eliminated labour strikes and racial unrest in the country. However, a myriad of rules such as the Presidential Council for Minority Rights, the Public Entertainments Meeting Act, the Miscellaneous Offences Act, the Newspaper and Printing Presses (Amendment) Bill, the Internal Security Act, the Singapore Societies Act, the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act and the Seditious Act are actively enforced to ensure ethnic and religious harmony. The manner which these rules and laws are applied and infringed on civil and political liberties is well-documented and requires no elaboration (see Rajah, 2012; George, 2012; Thio & Tan, 2009). It suffices to note that individuals who attempt to mobilize support based on racial or religious issues would be met with dire consequences.11

Rationale and Timing of Ethnic Quotas

By the mid-1980s, the PAP leaders’ concern with ethnic voting12 led to a new electoral initiative to ensure the legislative representation of its ethnic minorities, especially the Malays. Despite opposition, even from the Malay community, the party list bloc vote system was introduced to ensure at least one ethnic minority candidate in each group representative constituency (GRC). Each party contesting in a GRC has to field four to six members with at least one Indian or Malay. Three-fifths of all GRCs have to have at least a Malay candidate in each GRC, while the rest could have other minorities.

The rationale and timing for the ethnic quota policy in Singapore is controversial for two reasons. First, as Figure 1 shows, minority legislative representation was not poor to begin with. Even though there was a slight declining trend, by world standards, Singapore still has a comparatively high level of minority representation. Even at the lowest point of minority representation from 1984-88, the Parliament had 11. 4 per cent Malay MPs and 6.3 per cent Indian MPs (slightly below the total national average of 14 per cent Malay and 7 per cent Indian in 1988). Besides, the GRC scheme was not widely supported by the Malay community.13 Based on elections results from 1955 to 1988, the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) found no evidence that Singaporeans were voting along racial lines (Tan 2012a, b). Besides, a study of ethnic minority candidates contesting SMCs before 1988 showed that both the PAP and

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10 Independent watchdog organizations such as Freedom House(2012), Reporters Without Borders (2012) and Berterlsmann Index (2010) exclude Singapore as a liberal democracy.
11 The prosecution of the opposition candidate, Lawyer Tang Liang Hong, in 1997 is the most infamous example of how campaigning on race or religion could lead to defamation suits (Mauzy & Milne, 2002: 134–5).
12 To date, PM Lee Hsien Loong maintains that ethnic voting persists and that minorities will “always be at a disadvantage” (Lee, 2011).
13 The PAP’s minority candidates typically earned an average of 76 percent vote shares. Some had even won seats without contests in the 1968, 1972, 1976 and 1980 elections (Tan, 2012a).
opposition parties had no difficulties fielding minority candidates – although on average, Indian candidates tended to perform better than Malay candidates.\textsuperscript{14} Presently, the number of minority MPs has exceeded the national minority population share of 25.9 per cent.

[Insert Figure 1 here]

Second, the fact that ethnic quotas were introduced at the lowest point of the PAP’s vote share also raised doubts about the political motivations of the initiative. Concerns about ethnic voting emerged only after opposition minority candidates became competitive in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{15} The PAP had retained full control of all legislative seats since 1968. In 1981, however, a PAP Chinese candidate lost to an ethnic minority leader in a by-election, and by 1988 the vote share of the PAP minority candidates had slid to a low of 55 percent from a high of 83 per cent in 1968. And at this point, the PAP changed the rules of the game.

Studies show that the PAP Malay MPs suffered from credibility problems as they are often from educated or middle-class backgrounds, with difficulties connecting with working class Malays (Mutalib, 2012; Rahim, 2008). Hence, the declining support for the PAP’s minority candidates could better explain why the PAP introduced the ethnic quota to improve the electability of their minority candidates in the party list bloc vote system.\textsuperscript{16} Critics thus see the government’s inconsistencies in the regulation of racial politics as being more concerned with self-preservation than with safeguarding the minorities’ position (Kassim, 1974; Mutalib, 2004, 2012; Rahim, 2008). For example, when the PAP’s minority support was weak in the 1960s, the PAP leaders were quick to co-opt many Malay leaders into the higher party ranks and governmental positions. But once the support of minority voters was less critical, it was less concerned with protecting Malay rights (Rahim, 2008: 111).

In addition to ethnic quotas, the PAP government also introduced an ethnic housing quota (Ethnic Integration Policy) to encourage ethnic integration and prevent the formation of ethnic enclaves so no ethnic minority group would exceed 20 percent in any constituency.\textsuperscript{17} Each housing estate is curbed at 84 percent for Chinese, 22 percent for Malays and 10 percent for Indians or others. As the government provides more than 80 percent of housing in Singapore, the housing quota affects a large proportion of residents (Chua 1991, 1997). The combination of the GRC and ethnic housing quota ensure that all ethnic minorities will always remain a minority in every constituency, both in numbers and in electoral strength. The spatial distribution of minorities across in 27 constituencies implies that parties cannot canvass support based on ethnic issues.\textsuperscript{18} Essentially, these measures wiped-out Malay-based parties such as the

\begin{itemize}
\item[14] The Workers’ Party (WP) minority candidates generally performed better than others, earning more than 35 percent of vote shares in the 1972, 1976, 1980 and 1984 elections (Tan, 2012a).
\item[15] In the 1981 by-election, the PAP Chinese candidate was beaten by J.B. Jeyaratnam, a Sri Lankan lawyer from the WP. In the 1984 election, more than nine opposition minority candidates (from the WP and the Malay-based PKMS) gained more than 35 percent vote shares.
\item[16] The PKMS has publicly regarded the GRC as a “PAP ploy to force it to merge with others and make Malays abandon the PKMS in favour of the PAP Malay leaders” (Mutalib 2004, 216–7).
\item[17] While some argue that the EIP increased social integration (L.L. Sim et al. 2003), others contend that it marginalized the Malay and Indian underclass (Chih, 2002a, 2002b).
\item[18] The PKMS enjoyed Malay support and could have possibly won in Malay-dominant constituencies with about 40 percent Malays before the EIP. The PKMS is now a spent force as it has failed to win any seat in the post-independent period.
\end{itemize}
Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu (PKMS), which had survived on promoting Malay rights and interests (Mutilib, 2004). With the quotas in place, there is no constituency where Malays are numerous enough to form a majority and pose an electoral challenge. Ethnic politics is effectively suppressed.

Singaporean Women in Politics

Unlike ethnic minorities, women were severely underrepresented in politics from the 1970s to the 1990s. While Malay, Indian and other minorities contested in all elections and had an average of 23 percent legislative presence from 1968 to 1988, women constituted less than five percent of all candidates and legislators during the same time period. Yet, despite this, nothing was done for women. In fact, for more than two decades, a university admission quota was in place to curb the number of women medical students to one-third of every cohort in Singapore’s medical school. Even when Singapore faced a shortage of doctors, the quota to restrict women medical students was enforced until 2004 (Devasahayam, 2011).

A combination of socio-historical and political factors explains the different treatment of ethnic minorities and women in Singapore. When asked about the rationale behind the double standards toward gender and ethnic representation, a former PAP woman Minister, Lim Hwee Hua explained that: “[Gender] quotas can be self-defeating and detract from the true basis of merit.” While it was clear that the PAP does not see a need for quota to encourage women’s political participation, no clear explanation has been given as to why ethnic minorities cannot be equally elected based on merit. Singapore is an affluent, developed country; human development or accessibility to resources is not viewed as an obstacle to women’s access to power. In fact, Singapore women enjoy a high 94.1 percent literacy rate and constitute more than 55 percent in the labour force (Singapore Statistics, 2011). They are perceived to have the equality of opportunity and resources to win office based on their own merit, without the need for affirmative action to undermine their credibility.

There was also no strong demand for quota from women themselves. For example, an informal survey conducted by the author in February 2013 with 18 women candidates who contested in the 2011 general election indicate that all the respondents (100 percent) agree that more women should join parties and be elected to Parliament. However, less than 50 percent of those surveyed considered quotas to be helpful for women to join politics. Besides, there was no strong feminist lobby for gender quota. As a feminist leader, Dr. Lai Ah Eng said: “This is a complex issue but in general, I think having quotas sounds good in principle but has to be carefully applied depending on context and time. Singapore is such I don’t think we need it. If issues of family-work life and childcare that traditionally preoccupy women are largely resolved, then more women might want to enter party politics and Parliament. And I would rather go this way as the women would have fought their battles to deserve going in than to be given a place via a quota.”

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19 The quota to curb women medical students was introduced in 1979 based on the claim that 15 to 20 percent attrition rate among women doctors, who quit medical practice to focus on child rearing was wasting state funds.
20 For the exchange between the author and former Minister, see (Lim 2009; Tan 2009).
21 Personal communication, 28 Jan 2013.
Ethnic Quota and District Magnitude

Electoral systems have a strong, systematic effect on the legislative representation of ethnic minorities and women (Grofman & Lijphart, 2003; Norris, 2004). Despite some debate, the general consensus is that single-member district (SMD) plurality/majority systems are less favourable to women and minorities than proportional ones (Lovenduski & Norris, 1993; Matland, 1998; Matland & Studlar, 1996). The reason is that the winner-takes-all aspect in SMD means that the incentive is to field a candidate who can attract a large vote share and less attention is put on gender or ethnic balancing. Women and ethnic minorities, perceived to be electorally risky, are then less likely to be nominated in SMD systems, where parties choose only one candidate per constituency. SMD systems are often more candidate centred and allow gender or ethnicity factors to affect voting behaviour (Norris, 1987: 130). This phenomenon is most evident in contexts where social prejudices persist against women, viewed to be less political experienced or financially connected (Moser & Scheiner, 2012).

SMD systems are also less conducive for women candidates because of the difference in the district magnitude. PR systems with larger multi-member district tend to have higher numbers of women legislators as the chances for their nominations are higher (Yoon, 2011: 103). This is because increases in district magnitude in PR systems enhance opportunities for social engineering through ticket-balancing at the constituency level. Such balancing becomes easier as the district magnitude increases and parties have more incentives to include women and minorities to appeal to a wider range of voters (Matland & Studlar, 1996; Norris, 1985). Hence, in mixed electoral systems, women and minorities do better in seats elected by PR. In particular, closed-list PR systems are found to be statistically and substantively significant in promoting women’s representation than open-list ones because they tend to mute cultural bias against women and ethnic minorities as voters have no choice of individual candidate but have to vote for the parties (Moser & Scheiner, 2012: 211).

In Singapore, the GRC scheme turned more than 90 percent of the single seats into multimember constituencies. Essentially, the multimember constituencies/GRCs behave like a closed-list PR system where the party determines the whole slate of candidates who will be voted in en-bloc through simple plurality in each constituency. The ethnic quota policy that mandates parties to field at least one ethnic minority candidate ensures parties are broad-based and inclusive in order to be electable. To be successful, ethnic-based parties have to seek out other ethnic groups to stand as a multi-ethnic team. In sum, the GRC scheme modified candidate selection methods in Singapore. As indicated, the PAP was worried about the popularity of its own ethnic minority candidates in the 1980s. Being more vulnerable in the SMCs, the PAP refrained from fielding minorities in SMCs for 15 years after the GRC was introduced.

As for women, very few (and only from the opposition parties) were fielded in the SMCs in the post-independent elections. When Singapore was under the single-member plurality system from 1970 to 1984, not a single woman was elected MP in the House. It was only in the 1984 election that the PAP experimented with sending three women candidates to SMCs. However, the loss of single seat by a woman minister in the 1991 election shocked the PAP.

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22 However, political context also matters: social norms that downgrade the status of women cancel out incentives to promote women in PR systems (Moser & Scheiner, 2012: 214–5).
leaders and deterred them from fielding any woman in the SMCs for 15 years. Eventually, the GRC scheme allowed the parties to position women candidates to balance the multi-member ticket. As the district magnitude of the GRCs grew over time (from groups of three in 1988 to groups of four to six by 1997), more seats were available for minority and women candidates. As Figure 2 shows, the number of women candidates fielded by the PAP climbed significantly after 2001, the same time when larger GRCs (groups of five to six) were created (Tan, 2012b).

Legally, the ethnic quota imposed on all the GRCs guarantees about 17 percent of legislative seats for ethnic minorities. However, because the PAP fields more than one minority candidate in the GRCs, actual minority legislative representation rose to 27.6 percent by 2011. Likewise, for women candidates, sometimes, more than one is placed in a GRC. For example, in the 2011 election, Tanjong Pagar, Marine Parade and Aljunied GRCs that were led by senior PAP ministers, had two women candidates in the five-member teams.

**Candidate Selection and Party Leaders as Gatekeepers**

The PAP’s early exclusion of women from elections, avoidance of gender quota and use of admission quota to curb women medical students indicate that it was not a women-friendly party and the rise in women’s political representation was rather “unintended”. To understand why ethnic quotas and the multimember constituencies have the effect of boosting the political numbers of women, there is a need to focus on the candidate selection system. In Singapore, parties do not hold primaries and the party leaders choose the candidates directly. In the hegemonic party system, the PAP’s centrally controlled, candidate selection process effectively determines about 90 percent of the legislature’s composition. Indeed, the turning point for the rise in women’s legislative numbers was the decision by the PAP to field more women candidates in the 2001 general election, two elections after the introduction of the GRC scheme, doubling the number of women candidates from the previous four to ten. At the same time, the district magnitude of the GRC had also increased to groups of five and six, making it easier for parties to include women to show inclusivity and balance.

Faced with a younger and more educated electorate, the PAP was eager to revamp its image and appeal to a wider range of voters. As one senior PAP leader said: “These younger Singaporeans, born after Independence, now form the majority of our population. The political leadership must, therefore rejuvenate itself with the infusion of younger men and women who are able to connect and empathise with them.” (Wong, 2004) By 2009, the PAP then announced it will “gradually” increase the percentage of women MPs to 30 percent (Koh, 2009). In the same year, a first woman was appointed as a Cabinet minister. Without gender quotas, the number of women candidate rose, from 0 in 1980 to 32 by 2011. By the 2011 general election, a total of 20 women (19 from the PAP) were elected to the House (23 percent). Without the PAP’s decision to place women in the GRCs, this would not have occurred.

Changes in mass attitudes towards women politicians could also have encouraged parties to nominate women in elections. In 2002, the World Values Survey conducted in Singapore showed that about 50 percent of respondents agreed or agreed strongly with the statement that “Men make better political leaders than women do” (World Values Survey, 2005). After a decade, one might expect the social prejudice toward women politicians to have
changed. Positive media exposure and performance of women MPs on the ground could have contributed to the electability of women.

What is clear in Singapore is that women have performed well in recent elections (see Table 2). In the 2011 general election, a total of 32 women candidates ran. Some women who stood in GRCs such as in Marine Parade and Aljunied outshone their male counterparts. The 2011 election was exceptional as three women were fielded in the SMCs for the first time since 1991. To the surprise of many, a woman, Dr. Amy Khor, won by a large margin and was the PAP’s best performing candidate. Dr. Khor’s victory was critical as it dispelled the myth that women are non-electable in SMCs. Likewise, the handsome win of an opposition female candidate Lee Lilian against her male PAP counterpart in the 2003 Punggol East by-election also showed that connection with the voters was more important than gender (Au Yong, 2013). Following the resignation of the PAP’s speaker of the House due to his extramarital affair, a Malay woman, Halimah Yacob, was nominated to be the Speaker – making her the first women Speaker of Parliament in Singapore (Musfirah, 2013).

[Insert Table 2 here]

The increased presence of women MPs, their popularity on the ground and positive media exposure could have changed the prejudice of women as being electorally risky. Party leaders are learning that the presence of women MPs makes the party look good and more appealing to a wide range of voters. Now, both the PAP and the Reform Party (RP) have a “Women’s Wing” to recruit women member. Interviews with opposition party leaders also indicate that active efforts are under way to encourage women to join political parties. However, the recruitment of women remains an uphill task (Interviews with Jeyaretnam, 5 Oct 2010 and Goh, 23 Sep 2010). Despite recruitment efforts, the number of women in the party’s highest decision-making body remains low. Clearly, women in Singapore have not overcome all the socio-economic or institutional barriers to political participation and more work is required to understand why they remain underrepresented at the higher levels.

Conclusion

The politics behind quota adoption is complex and can have unintended consequences. This study has examined the claims and effects of the representational policies for ethnic minorities in Singapore. Ethnic quotas imposed on public housing and candidate selection in the multi-member constituencies have repressed ethnic based politics and improved the legislative presence of ethnic minorities. However, it is also argued that without gender quotas, the ethnic quotas have had the unintended effect of expanding women’s political participation. Recent developments show that the ruling party’s candidate selection decisions were critical and the availability of the multimeber constituencies had also opened more opportunities for the nomination of women so that the multi-member slate will appear more balanced. Specifically, the growth in the magnitude of the GRCs after 2001 elections increased the number of available seats in the multi-member slate for women. Similar to the effects seen in closed-PR list system, Singapore’s party bloc vote system had positive effects on both ethnic minorities and women. In addition, changes in the attitudes of the party leaders to field the minorities and women beyond the quota requirement were also vital in improving their legislative numbers. Hence, a combination of electoral constraints, incentives and changes in elite attitudes explain why both groups each gained more than 20 percent seat shares in Parliament over the last two decades.
What remains to be seen is whether the increased legislative presence of ethnic minorities and women make a substantive difference to their respective groups. In Singapore, an MP cannot claim to just represent minority or women’s interests, as he or she is part of a multi-member team. Likewise, the same could be said about women MPs. Besides, ethnic minority MPs are also constrained by the myriad of regulations governing race and religion. Singapore’s experience with ethnic quotas suggests that electoral institutions can improve legislative diversity. But whether the legislative diversity brings about substantive democratic development is another question that deserves further study.
### Table 1: Gender Quotas and Reserved Seats in Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of women Candidates</th>
<th>Reserve Seats (%)</th>
<th>Party Quota</th>
<th>Year Adopted</th>
<th>% of women (Election yr)</th>
<th>Electoral Reform</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Alternative Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>38.5 (2012)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>18.6 (2009)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Open List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>15.6 (2009)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Alternative Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>22 (2008)</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Parallel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Must include women</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25-100</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>22.9 (2010)</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Parallel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>33.6 (2012)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Parallel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>15.8 (2011)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Parallel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22 (2010)</td>
<td>TRS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data extracted from (IDEA, 2003; IPU, 2011; Krook, 2009; P Rohini and Ford, 2012). [FPTP = First-Past-the-Post; SNTV = Single Non-Transferable Vote; PR = Proportionate Representation; TRS = Two Round System].

### Figure 1: Representation of Ethnic Minorities and Women in Parliament, 1968-2013

Source: Based on data from Singapore Elections website.
Figure 2: Total Number of Ethnic Minority and Women Candidates (1968-2011)

Source: Based on data from Singapore Elections website.

Table 2: Candidate Selection & Women’s Legislative Representation (1980-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAP Women Candidates</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Women Candidates</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Women Candidates</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected Women PAP MPs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected Women Opposition MPs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Elected Women NCMPs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Elected Women MPs (%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (3.8)</td>
<td>4 (4.9)</td>
<td>2 (2.4)</td>
<td>4 (4.8)</td>
<td>10 (11.9)</td>
<td>17 (20.5)</td>
<td>24 (22.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by author based on data from Singapore Parliament website.
References


http://books.google.ca/books?id=uYldKFFLeCOC&pg=PA38&lpg=PA38&dq=Dynasties,+Daughters +and+Democrats.+Female+Political+Leaders+in+Asia&source=bl&ots=Axy4xNgqWu&sig=dPlbhN 7iWGUg3sMONa72OHRXxyk&hl=en#v=onepage&q=Dynasties%2C+Daughters%20and%20Democrats.%20Female%20Political%20Leaders%20in%20Asia&f=false.


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