Bowling with Terrorist: Resilience, Social Capital and Hybrid Security in the Effort to Prevent Terrorism

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"If much of the world is vague, diffuse or unspecific, slippery, emotional, ephemeral, elusive or indistinct, changes like a kaleidoscope, or doesn't really have much of a pattern at all, then where does this leave social science? How might we catch some of the realities we are currently missing? Can we know them well? Should we know them? Is 'knowing' the metaphor that we need? And if it isn't, then how might we relate to them?"  John Law, After Method

Introduction

In the aftermath of the Boston bombing in the United States, President Obama invoked the theme of resilience, which no doubt resonated with a country once again shaken by violence. This theme was echoed in Canada the following week when a terrorist plan was apparently thwarted before it became operational, a testament to Canada’s counter-terrorism policy titled Building Resilience Against Terrorism, in particular its efforts to ‘build resilient communities’.1 It is easy to dismiss the use of this term as just another example of jargonistic buzz. Indeed, the pervasiveness of the concept fills shelves of self-help books and populates the policies of global governance where its reach sweeps from disasters and diseases to development and the global economy.2 Within security literature, resilience is both promoted as a new approach to security in response to what is perceived as the growing complexity of the global order, and derided as an extension of neoliberal practices.3 This paper enters the conversation by questioning what resilience does and how it works in the context of counter-terrorism policies in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), which have policing similar to one in Canada mentioned above. By examining the context in which resilience emerges as part of a counter-terrorism strategy and the programs and activities that are used to implement it, I make two complimentary arguments: first, that resilience is best understood as a method of hybrid security based on top-down interventions aimed at developing bottom-up approaches to address perceived vulnerabilities; and second, that social capital is critical to this process. In the context of counter-terrorism where the primary vulnerability is seen to be the nature and quality of Muslim communities suspected of ‘bowling with terrorists’ this results in an effort to both rebuild Muslim civil society and to use this social capital as a means of policing and intelligence.

Resilience as Method: Hybrid Security

This paper approaches resilience as method: as a way of doing security. Specifically, it argues that resilience represents a hybrid approach to security based on top-down interventions by the state to create bottom-up responses to perceived vulnerabilities. In describing resilience as a form of hybrid security, this argument builds on a theme in the literature that represents resilience a method of security. Some argue that it marks a new decentralized way of doing security. For example Stephen

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1 Canada. Public Safety Canada, Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy; “Building Resilient Communities to Counter Violent Extremism.”
2 O’Malley, “Resilient Subjects”; Walker and Cooper, “Genealogies of Resilience.”

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Flynn argues that a key component of resilience is its ability to tap into the traditional strengths of American civil society and private sector. Similarly, Jack Caravelli argues that the US approach to counter-terrorism emphasizes the need to build self-sufficient, “can-do” communities, which is also highlighted in descriptions of ‘community resilience’ as bottom-up security. Others read this as little more than a neoliberal practice of privatization that emphasizes individual responsibility, and Mark Duffield equates it with public abandonment in favour of private, elite protection in the form of ‘bunkerization.’

Closer to the idea of hybridity is the argument that resilience is based on multi-level governance. Peter Trim, for example describes resilience in terms of information sharing, trust, collaboration and a community-oriented perspective, and argues that it requires a multi-stakeholder global governance approach from the local to the international level. Similarly, reflecting on the remarkable resilience of cities, Savitch emphasizes the importance of multilevel governance and the role of the national government for sustaining local resilience. Likewise, Coaffee calls for a “mutli-scale resilience governance infrastructure” that includes local governments and businesses as part of a new approach to counter-terrorism. My argument of hybridity takes a step beyond these descriptions, however, by considering how this process works, and in so doing emphasizes resilience as a form of intervention. This argument is informed by recent literature on post-liberal, hybrid approaches to peacebuilding that explore the interaction between the agency of local actors and the top-down approaches to intervention based on international norms and agendas that have traditionally characterized ‘liberal’ peace. Along this line, David Chandler has tied resilience to humanitarian intervention, arguing that it represents a ‘post-liberal’ approach that seeks to create “self-securing agency.” But, as Kevin Grove argues with regards to climate change and intervention in the global south, the ability of “dangerous populations” to secure themselves is viewed as problematic because they exist outside of and thus threaten the existing social order; intervention is required to apply knowledge and strategies from the developed world to these populations. Resilience follows a similar logic, but replaces ‘dangerous’ populations with ‘vulnerable’ populations. As Frank Furedi explains, the emphasis of resilience on vulnerability stems from the limits of knowledge in complex systems that drives a shift from probabilistic to ‘possibilistic’ thinking and attention to unending vulnerability. In this sense, resilience is part of a new emphasis on anticipatory governance that has been highlighted in recent literature. The focus of this literature is on the challenge of knowing and coping with future, unknown threats, but the focus on

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4 Flynn, “Homeland Insecurity: Disaster at DHS”; Flynn, The Edge of Disaster.
7 Duffield, “Challenging Environments”; Duffield, “Total War as Environmental Terror.”
9 Savitch, Cities in a Time of Terror, 162.
10 Coaffee, Terrorism, Risk and the Global City, 263.
11 Richmond and Mitchell, Hybrid Forms of Peace; Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance; “The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace.”
12 Chandler, “Resilience and Human Security.”
13 Grove, “Preempting the Next Disaster.”
14 Furedi, “Fear and Security.”
15 Aradau and Munster, Politics of Catastrophe; Walker and Cooper, “Genealogies of Resilience”; Grove, “Pre-empting the Next Disaster”; Cooper, “Pre-empting Emergence.”
vulnerability that characterizes resilience means that it is concerned with the potential of the referent—the population being secured—to become a threat.

**Bowling with Terrorists: The Problem Knowing and Preventing a Fluid Threat**

The attacks of 9/11 gave rise to what has become known as the ‘new’ terrorism, which is generally described in terms of fluidity, unpredictability and ambiguity. Indeed, a recent report claims that “What has been described as the ‘new terrorism’ appears to function across a global dimension, while being more fluid, dispersed and unpredictable than previous terrorist threats.”

A similar observation has been made by Mark Giuliano, Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division who stated that “I do not think this nation has ever faced a more fluid, more dynamic, or more complex terrorism threat.” Likewise, in writing about the role of intelligence-led policing in ‘policing uncertainty,’ Martin Innes has described the threat as “morphing, fluid, and decentralized.” This poses a challenge for intelligence: how can we know and prevent a threat that is constantly changing and emerging? Most literature on security and anticipation emphasizes practices that aim to create new forms of information based on what Aradau and Van Munster call ‘conjunctural knowledge’ based on imagining and enacting possible futures. However Cavelty and Mauer pose this question from the perspective of more traditional intelligence gathering, arguing that horizontal intelligence networks are needed for ‘post-modern intelligence’ in a complex, uncertain and unpredictable world. Such networks have been arising, however, and are well detailed in policing and criminal justice literature that explore the integration of policing and intelligence agencies through ‘intelligence-led policing.’ Connecting this to the paper’s theme of hybridity, McCulloch argues that this model represents a new hybrid model of criminal justice fused with national security. Indeed, the process of ‘fusion’ is a growing theme in this literature, with increasing attention paid to the emergence of new institutions that ‘fuse’ or ‘integrate’ policing and intelligence and in some cases the private sector through processes of information gathering and sharing. Referred to as Fusion Centers in the US, Integrated National Security Intelligence Teams in Canada, and Counter-Terrorism Units in the UK, these institutions were born from the spectacular intelligence failures that have characterized the contemporary terrorist threat. However, this literature is predominantly focused on horizontal integration of various government units and departments, and largely overlooks the role of the public in the vertical integration of local knowledge into national intelligence processes. Mirroring arguments about the role of fear in motivating ‘resilient citizens,’ Clive Walker argues that counter-terrorism policing conscripts the public into

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18 Innes, “Policing Uncertainty,” 3.
20 Cavelty and Mauer, “Postmodern Intelligence: Strategic Warning in an Age of Reflexive Intelligence.”
policing terrorism by making it an offense to withhold information. However, by focusing on fear and an individualist approach to citizenship that characterizes neoliberalism, most of the critical security literature on resilience ignores its emphasis on social capital – community, cohesion, engagement and trust – that are central to descriptions of resilience in other fields.

The following cases examine the rise of resilience in efforts to prevent and predict future terrorism in the UK, where the strategy originates, and in the US, which has recently adopted such a strategy. Drawing on a framework of resilience as a form of hybrid intervention, I argue that the resilience turn in counter-terrorism is driven by a focus on social capital: that it is a response to a perceived problem of social capital in ‘vulnerable’ communities that are suspected of ‘bowling with terrorists.’ In turn, resilience represents an effort to intervene in such communities with the purpose of not only rebuilding civil society, but integrating it with counter-terrorism policing and intelligence efforts. But unlike traditional forms of intervention, resilience is a hybrid: it is not only applied to local communities but requires their participation. As Tim Donais explains, such forms of hybridity or ‘vertical integration’ are negotiated; they require the consent and cooperation of the community, or in other words, social capital.

**Interventions in Social Capital and the Failure of Hybridity in the UK**

The concept of resilience as a security measure first emerged in the UK in the context of social vulnerability following a series of civil emergencies in 2000 and 2001 – in particular drought, flooding, civil strikes, foot and mouth disease, and ‘Muslim’ riots – that prompted a renewal of the Civil Contingencies Act which had previously been focused on Irish terrorism and external threats. The new Act (2004) emphasizes an ‘all-hazards’ approach that devolves responsibility for emergency management to communities through the creation of Local Resilience Teams composed of first responders and the private sector. Resilience thus adopted a double connotation invoking both a positive outcome following a disturbance and a method of security based on local capabilities to cope with and contain a crisis.

Although 9/11 was not the initial driver of this process, its timing coincided with this existing context of domestic unrest and crisis in civil society. In particular, the attacks of 9/11 followed months of ‘Muslim’ rioting in Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford that prompted a process of civil renewal based on community cohesion, integration, and active citizenship – what has since been termed ‘resilience.’ This sense of civil decline and vulnerability resulting from community diversity provided a critical framework for interpreting what became known as the ‘new’ terrorism. As the Denham Report of the Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion stated in its findings titled “Building Cohesive Communities,”

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26 Walker, “Conscripting the Public in Terrorism Policing: Towards Safer Communities or a Police State?”
27 Putnam, “Bowling Alone.”
29 Donais, *Peacebuilding and Local Ownership*, 5.
31 HM Government, “Civil Contingencies Act.”
32 UK govt document on Local Resilience Teams. See also definition in 2004 Civil Contingencies Act.
regarding the riots, "The importance of our work has been underlined by the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC on 11 September and the consequent rise in racial incidents and community tensions." To tackle this challenge, the government focused on improving the social conditions of vulnerable communities through housing, transportation, education and health services and community regeneration. The process of civil renewal thus informed counter-terrorism in the UK from as early as 2001, however it was not until after the attacks on the London transportation system by ‘homegrown’ terrorists on 7 July 2005 that it emerged as a centrepiece of counter-terrorism policy under the mantra of resilience.

The UK’s contemporary counter-terrorism policy – CONTEST – mirrors approaches to emergency management based on a four-pronged approach labelled ‘prevent’, ‘pursue’, ‘protect’, and ‘prepare.’ The first version completed in 2003 was not publicly released but a later government report indicates that it primarily emphasized the component on protection. But the attacks on London on July 7 2005 (7/7) highlighted two weaknesses to this focus: the failure of traditional intelligence approaches and the vulnerability of Muslim communities to extremist ideology. As Martin Innis explains, not only was there was no intelligence on the individuals involved in the 7/7 attacks, but these individuals came from Leeds, which was "renowned for radicalism or community tension." It is in this context that the concept of resilience emerged as a means of preventing terrorism with a focus on civil society and efforts to rebuild social capital as a means of supporting counter-terrorism goals.

The government response in the immediate aftermath of 7/7 demonstrates a concern that Muslim civil society was not sufficiently integrated and ‘British.’ On 5 August 2005 then Prime Minister Tony Blair issued a statement on a series of proposed anti-terror measures that overwhelmingly targeted the Muslim community. These measures included more traditional coercive measures targeted at suspected terrorists such as deportation and control measures. But they also made Muslim citizenship a central feature of counter-terrorism by suggesting the need to raise the threshold for acquiring citizenship in order to better integrate Muslims into the community. Moreover, he emphasized that ‘….coming to Britain is not a right. And even when people have come here, staying here carries with it a duty. That duty is to share and support the values that sustain the British way of life.’ In a separate speech Blair indicated that while British society had responded to terrorism with “tolerance,”’ this tolerance was being “stretched.” The fear was that Muslim civil society was encouraging terrorism: that Muslims were ‘bowling with terrorists.’ A series of policies and programs was thus initiated that broadly aimed to intervene in and rebuild Muslim civil society in order to support counter-terrorism aims of preventing radicalization and extremist ideology and integrating social capital into a system of vertical intelligence gathering and sharing, which became known as ‘building resilient communities.’

The basis of this ‘resilience’ approach to counter-terrorism was established through a series of engagement efforts with Muslim communities that convened seven working groups under the umbrella Working Together to Prevent Extremism. The final report of these workshops notes a “clear and undeniable recognition that the Muslim communities along with other faith communities, had a deep vested interest in promoting a strong civil society built on shared notions of good citizenship, social

35 Ibid.
36 House of Commons Community and Local Government Committee, Preventing Violent Extremism.
38 Blair, “Full Text: The Prime Minister’s Statement on Anti-terror Measures.”
cohesion, religious tolerance and peaceful co-existence.”

The recommendations from these consultations focused largely on efforts to rebuild and reorient Muslim civil society through a focus on engaging and mobilizing women and youth, educational efforts, and strengthening voluntary and civic organizations. It also included a call to develop a British Muslim Citizenship Toolkit to “articulate a new vision for a British Islam and equip university Islamic Societies, mosques/imams, parents and the youth to deal with violent/fanatic tendencies.” Finally, it recommended efforts to improve knowledge about Muslim communities through efforts such as data collection and community mapping, and linking community cohesion with community safety, and creating stronger partnerships between police and Muslim communities including the ability of the community to provide “intellectual and human resources” to policing. This dual process of rebuilding Muslim civil society and integrating it with counter-terrorism efforts was later reflected in the updated version of CONTEST under the category of prevention.

Unlike the initial version of CONTEST, the publicly released 2006 update included a strong focus on ‘prevent’ that called for greater awareness by and active support of citizens through partnerships with communities with two key aims: strengthening civil society; and encouraging better cooperation with police. Like the Muslim riots in 2001, radicalization was interpreted as stemming from a problem with civil society and could be ameliorated by improving social capital: “…the drive for equality, social inclusion, community cohesion and active citizenship in Britain strengthens society and its resistance to terrorism here in the UK.” Indeed, the initial policy tools used in this regard efforts to improve social capital and cohesion that emerged following the 2001 riots. For example, the Improving Opportunities, Strengthening Society program (2005) focused on enhancing racial equality and cohesion through access to public services such as health, education, housing and employment. This program included the Faith Communities Capacity Building Fund (2005) that was directed at “disadvantaged communities” with the aim of “strengthen groups’ organisational capabilities to enable them to sustain themselves in order to play a fuller part in civil society and community cohesion, and engage more effectively with public authorities.” A Commission was also established to once again study integration and cohesion (2006); its report titled Our Shared Future emphasized the “common desire to build a strong society….where people are…..committed to being good neighbours and active citizens.” Emphasizing the negative social consequences of globalization, it called for cohesion on the part of all citizens and integration on the part of newcomers who have a responsibility to adapt to British society.

‘Prevent’ was allotted even greater focus and articulation through a new 2007 strategy, which was reflected in the 2009 version of CONTEST. It now included five components: challenging ideology; disrupting people and places that promote extremism; supporting individuals vulnerable to radicalization; building community resilience to violent extremism; and addressing social grievances. These aims were to be achieved through three interrelated programs: the Preventing Violent Extremism programme – a community-led approach run through the Department of Local Government and

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41 Ibid., Recommendation 11.
42 Ibid., Recommendation 9.
43 HM Government, “Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy.”
44 Ibid.
47 HM Government, “Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism.”
Communities – the integration of neighbourhood policing teams with counter-terrorist policing; and the Channel program designed to help local communities identify and treat individuals vulnerable to radicalization. The concept of resilience cut across all three of these programs and formed the basis for measuring success through National Indicator 35: “Building Communities Resilient to Violent Extremism.” NI 35 stated that

The aim of the Prevent work stream of the CONTEST strategy is to stop people becoming or supporting violent extremists. Local partners have a key role to play in developing programmes in support of each of these objectives – notably objectives to enhance the resilience of communities to violent extremism and to identify and support individuals vulnerable to recruitment to the cause of violent extremism.

In this sense, resilience involved both rebuilding Muslim civic communities for the purpose of challenging extremist ideology and integrating it with counter-terrorism policing and intelligence functions.

The core of the community-rebuilding effort was delivered through the Department for Local Government and Communities program Preventing Violent Extremism, which launched its “Winning Hearts and Minds” action plan in 2007 aimed at implementing citizenship education and schools and madrassahs; using curriculum and universities to promote faith understanding and citizenship; and building civic capacity and leadership with a focus on Muslim youth and women. A program delivery strategy and guide to local partners was released in 2008 with the claim that “Cohesive, empowered and resilient communities are best equipped to confront violent extremists and support the most vulnerable individuals.” Key implementation activities included cultural training for police officers, developing the role of the Muslim Women’s Advisory Group and the Young Muslims’ Consultative Group, developing the skills and knowledge of people leading faith communities, and funding projects to tackle violent extremism.

In order to implement these projects, 80-million pounds was provided toward community-led initiatives to prevent violent extremism in Muslim communities. Called the Pathfinder fund, the strategic objectives amounted to rebuilding a British brand of social capital within Muslim communities whereby people: identify as part of British society; reject violent extremism; isolate violent extremists and cooperate with police; and develop a capacity to deal with problems. The Guide to Local partners states that “At its heart, building community cohesion is about building better social relations – this improves wellbeing, reduces disorder, and makes communities more resilient and able to solve their own problems.” It further stated that preventing violent extremism is primarily about “winning hearts and minds” and tasked local Muslim communities themselves with this challenge.

In addition to building civic participation by women and youth in order to counter extremist narratives, many of the projects sponsored involved remodeling key institutions within civil society reflecting a

48 Ibid.
50 Department of Community and Local Government, “Preventing Violent Extremism - Winning Hearts and Minds.”
52 Department of Community and Local Government, “Preventing Violent Extremism - Next Steps for Communities.”
54 Ibid.
sense that extremism and terrorism were emerging from within key Muslim social institutions: Mosques, madrassahs, and university campuses. In response, funds were used to target particular schools, mosques and madrassahs – using them as a tool for community outreach and education about radicalization. For example, the Bradford Citizenship Madrassahs project developed curriculum to educate young Muslims about citizenship through local madrassahs, and the North Central London Mosque worked with the Metropolitan Police Force to develop and distribute materials related to violent extremism and a guidance document was developed for universities about how to combat radicalization on campus. Similar efforts to intervene in civil institutions have been prevalent in Birmingham. In 2007, Communities Secretary Hazel Blears emphasized the need to better govern local mosques:

I don’t know in terms of the police inquiry whether the culprits were born and bred in Britain, but people were saying it’s really important to reach out to young people - and there are many young people in Muslim communities - and make sure people discuss these issues. Making sure in the mosques that imams speak in English and are able to have a proper explanation of what real Islam is, this is very important.

Blears further claimed government support to imams in this process. Indeed, a review of Birmingham’s early resilience programs shows that projects were heavily skewed toward governance and leadership of mosques. Subsequent projects organized under the Hall Green Prevent Working Group in Birmingham, formed in 2009 in cooperation with the West Midlands Counter Terrorism Unit focus on “increasing community resilience” through a variety of forums to engage youth and women in particular on the dangers of extremism.

‘Resilient communities’ within the Prevent strategy referred not only to a flourishing British brand of social capital to combat perceived vulnerabilities within Muslim civil society, but also the integration of those communities into policing and intelligence efforts. Following the failure of traditional intelligence process to disrupt the 7/7 plot, there was a strong feeling that members of the Muslim community knew things that the police did not. This concern was raised in the media following the 7/7 attacks in an interview by Irshad Hussein, a friend of one of the bomber’s family, who claimed that members of the community have bits and pieces of information that may seem irrelevant but could be important, however suspicion of the police prevents them from cooperating together. The main vehicle for filling this gap is the development of community intelligence through intelligence-led policing. Community intelligence is distinct from traditional, actionable intelligence. Former police lead for Preventing Violent Extremism Sir Norman Bettison refers to it as the sharing of “unspecific and ambiguous information.”

As Martin Innes explains

...community intelligence covers a range of issues, frequently being used by police to build a picture of the contextual risks that a particular community groups feels concerned about. Community intelligence applied to counterterrorism is precisely the type of data that might help police to circumvent the intelligence gaps and blind spots that seemingly inhere in their established methods.

55 Ibid.
56 Pinch, “Blears in Pledge to City Muslims.”
58 Keeley, “Celebrating Good Practice in Birmingham’s Neighbourhoods.”
59 “Bombers’ Community May Hold Clues.”
60 Bettison, “Preventing Violent Extremism--A Police Response.”
61 Innes, “Policing Uncertainty.”
Encouraging this cooperation is a central feature of the resilient community approach to counter-terrorism. As the 2009 CONTEST document states, improved intelligence is a related objective of Prevent, primarily through the vehicle of community policing.\(^6\) The importance of policing and intelligence to the Prevent strategy of resilience is detailed in the Prevent Guide to local partners.

Local police have a critical role to play in working with local communities to build their resilience to violent extremism and intervening to support individuals at risk of violent extremism. Prevent community engagement will be delivered locally through local policing units... supported, in the areas of highest priority, by dedicated Prevent policing resources. Local forces will work to mainstream the Prevent agenda across all existing engagement activities, including neighbourhood mapping, support for those individuals in the community most at risk of becoming involved in violent extremism (through the Channel Scheme), schools liaison and community intelligence..... Prevent counter terrorism intelligence officers (CTIOs) will also be deployed... to enhance the role of acquiring, interpreting, assessing, developing and disseminating national security intelligence, and will also act as a crucial link or bridge with local community information.\(^6\)

The guide further explains the activities that fall under the purview of “increasing the resilience of key organisations and institutions and supporting early interventions,” which include local intelligence gathering and sharing, the ability to act on concerns/intelligence, mechanisms to identify vulnerable communities and deradicalization activities in “key institutions – such as universities, colleges and schools – and key locations.”\(^6\)

Central to this process of developing community intelligence is the creation of social capital between Muslim communities and police, in particular trust. Indeed, the development of trust is the raison d’etre of community policing through processes of sustained community engagement.\(^6\) In describing the Prevent program, Sir Bettison highlights the importance of building trust through community engagement, which is distinct from but reinforces processes of community intelligence.\(^6\) This trust depends on the two-way flow of information, and several programs were established to facilitate such sharing. For example, the Muslim Safety Forum – which has subsequently been replaced by the London Muslim Communities Forum – was developed as a means of dialogue between local police and Muslim communities.\(^6\) Similarly, the Muslim Contact Unit also serves as key trust-building function.\(^6\)

Established in 2002 “to avoid the mistakes made during the IRA campaign of alienating the Irish community,” its purpose is to work with key Muslim leaders to identify and isolate terrorists and to develop intelligence on the emergence of extremism in specific communities.\(^7\) And media reports claim that Police Community Support Officers are used to distribute information to communities during terrorism-related investigations.\(^7\)

\(^6\) HM Government, “Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism.”


\(^6\) Pickering, Counter-terrorism Policing.

\(^6\) Bettison, “Preventing Violent Extremism—A Police Response.”

\(^6\) Spalek, “Community Policing, Trust, and Muslim Communities in Relation to ‘New Terrorism’.”

\(^6\) http://content.met.police.uk/News/London-Muslim-Communities-Forum-launched/1400007687255/1257246741786; Police-Muslim Engagement and Partnership

\(^6\) Spalek, “Community Policing, Trust, and Muslim Communities in Relation to ‘New Terrorism’”; “London Muslim Communities Forum Launched.”

\(^6\) “Seumas Milne: We Need to Listen to the Man from Special Branch | Comment Is Free | The Guardian”; “Special Branch to Track Muslims Across UK | UK News | The Guardian.”

\(^7\) Collins, Lancefield, and Doyle, “Brown Death Threat Suspect ‘White Convert’.”
The pursuit of resilience under the auspice of preventing terrorism has been controversial. As Kevin O’Brien explained, it is the most difficult component of counter-terrorism because it requires the ongoing consent and cooperation of the community. And on this front Prevent – and by association resilience – has been largely discredited as a failure mired in mistrust. The primary challenge seems to arise from the hybrid nature of the program and the effort to fuse bottom-up community efforts with top-down government approaches. A government report on Prevent based on consultation with partner communities reveals that issues surrounding intelligence were particularly damaging, particularly due to the perceived overlap between community engagement activities intended to bolster civil society and the Channel program intended to provide a means for ‘front-line’ community staff to identify and refer individuals vulnerable to extremism either to police or community-based deradicalization efforts. Despite claims to the contrary, several community organizations claimed that engagement efforts were simultaneously used for surveillance, thus eroding trust in the process. They also complained that the government was trying to manufacture a particular, moderate brand of Islam by selectively engaging with particular groups and many were thus reluctant to be associated with the program. Moreover, despite the community-building focus of Prevent, many Muslim neighbourhoods were still subject to more intrusive counter-terrorism measures such as stop and search and control orders. Reflecting Ben Anderson’s observations on counter-insurgency operations, Muslims were situated as “both the source of dangerousness and in need of protection.”

Efforts to engage local communities in counter-terrorism also proved problematic for the government which faced opposite accusations: that by engaging key actors in vulnerable communities, funds went to support groups that promote the type of extremism the program was intended to prevent. The Prevent program was subsequently overhauled in 2011 and almost all references to ‘resilience’ have disappeared, replaced with ongoing ‘integration’ efforts organized through the Department of Local Government and Communities, and ‘counter-terrorism’ efforts run through the Home Office. However, the primary effect of this change seems to be a specified division of labour with specific programs remaining in place, for the most part. Community policing remains central to Prevent in the 2011 version of CONTEST, and Prevent Engagement Officers will continue to “connect counter-terrorism policing, neighbourhood policing and communities.” The integration and community cohesion components are becoming broader, no longer targeting only large Muslim communities, which caused resentment from other groups. Channel – the counter-terrorism component focused on specific individuals – has become more central, treating vulnerability to extremism more along the lines of a mental health issue than a community one. But the focus on extremism has broadened to include efforts to curb not just support of violence, but non-violent extremists as well, which “create an environment conducive to drawing people into terrorism.” And while the social element of terrorism

71 House of Commons Community and Local Government Committee, Preventing Violent Extremism.
75 House of Commons Community and Local Government Committee, Preventing Violent Extremism.
76 Anderson, “Facing the Future Enemy.”
77 HM Government, “Prevent Review: Summary of Responses to the Consultation.”
78 HM Government, “Prevent Strategy.”
80 This is in one of the reports.
82 HM Government, “Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism.”
and radicalization continues to be highlighted, there is a shift in focus from neighbourhood communities to online communities and social media, suggesting a new target space for hybrid security.\(^83\)

**Resilience in the US: From Surveilling Suspects to Engaging Citizens**

Immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, the US government started a process to collect what might broadly be interpreted as community intelligence through a Department of Justice (DOJ) program to interview 5,000 non-citizen Arab Muslims residing in the United States. Based on an initial list of 7,600 men, the goal was to try to piece together ‘community’ information on the attackers or others planning similar efforts.\(^84\) This program involved a specifically social approach to intelligence: by sharing demographic characteristics with the suspects, the DOJ claimed that it made interviewees “more likely to reside in the same communities or be members of the same social groups and, therefore, more likely to be aware of suspicious activity.”\(^85\) In a report on the project, the DOJ claimed that the interviews contributed to community building by “forging stronger ties between the law enforcement and Arab communities” but views about this effect from officers and lawyers were mixed.\(^86\) This effort to collect intelligence on Muslim communities remains a hallmark of American counter-terrorism efforts. However, the recent rise of a ‘resilient communities’ approach to prevention and intelligence gathering – similar to that in UK – seems to indicate a shift in strategy from surveillance and infiltration to citizen engagement that follows a shift in viewing terrorism as a tactic to an ideology and a change in emphasis from protection to prevention: whereas America was initially viewed as vulnerable to terrorist attacks, *American citizens* are now viewed as vulnerable to violent extremism.

The devastation of 9/11 cast a shadow of vulnerability over the American nation. Early accounts of this vulnerability focused on the structure of American society that made it susceptible to terrorist attacks. The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security declares that

> Our population and way of life are the source of our Nation’s great strength, but also a source of inherent vulnerability. Our population is large, diverse, and highly mobile, allowing terrorists to hide within our midst. Americans congregate at schools, sporting arenas, malls, concert halls, office buildings, high-rise residences, and places of worship, presenting targets with the potential for many casualties. Much of America lives in densely populated urban areas, making our major cities conspicuous targets.\(^87\)

Terrorism is viewed as a tactic of war by non-state actors: “Terrorism is not so much a system of belief, like fascism or communism, as it is a strategy and a tactic—a means of attack.”\(^88\) And the threat of this tactic comes from foreigners: “Each year, more than 500 million people cross the borders into the United States, some 330 million of whom are non-citizens.”\(^89\) Each of these elements of vulnerability poses a challenge for intelligence:

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81 Ibid., 39.
84 GAO 2003, pg. 1
85 GAO 2003, pg. 7.
86 GAO 2003, pg. 16-17.
89 George Bush in DHS proposal.
Whereas we almost always know the identity, location, and general capabilities of hostile nations, we frequently do not know
the identity or location of non-state terrorist organizations. The indications of terrorist intent are often ambiguous. Terrorists
are able to infiltrate and move freely within democratic countries making themselves effectively invisible against the backdrop
of an enormously diverse and mobile society. Efforts to gather intelligence on potential terrorist threats can affect the basic
effects and liberties of American citizens.90

It is in this context that efforts are thus made to dig deeper into American society for relevant
information on the terrorist threat and to rally the public behind the variety of new security measures
that were introduced. The 2002 Strategy called on individual volunteers to “...channel their energy and
commitment in support of the national and local strategies....to help Americans achieve a shared
cooperation in the area of homeland security for years to come.”91 The Citizen Corps – a program under
the then newly established Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – was created in 2002 as the
primary vehicle to harness the civic spirit of Americans by recruiting volunteers for the homeland
defense mission. Although it was and remains predominantly focused on emergency response efforts, it
was also envisioned as a means of providing community intelligence on potential terrorist threats
through programs such as Neighbourhood Watch through which citizens were asked to “help police.”92
But more significant, however, was a planned program named Operation TIPS (Terrorism Information
and Prevention System), that was to recruit intelligence volunteers working with the American public. As
the 2002 DHS Strategy states:

All of us have a key role to play in America’s war on terrorism. Terrorists may live and travel among us and attack our homes
and our places of business, governance, and recreation. In order to defeat an enemy who uses our very way of life as a
weapon—who takes advantage of our freedoms and liberties—every American must be willing to do his or her part to protect
our homeland.93

TIPS was intended to be “a nationwide program to help thousands of American truck drivers, letter
carriers, train conductors, ship captains, and utility workers report potential terrorist activity.”94 Accused
as a program encouraging “neighbors spying on neighbors” by the American Civil Liberties Union, it was
eventually dropped by the government, at least in name.95 But the goals of the project seem to have
survived through subsequent programs, including the creation of state-run fusion centers, which as part
of their mandate to collect and share local “threat-related information” have trained thousands of
police officers and other individuals involved in public safety, fire service, public health, and the private
sector to recognize and reports signs of terrorism.96 The first pilot program for these Terrorism Liaison
Officers begin in California in 2002,97 and is described by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) as
“casting an ever-wider net to train more people in the city as public data collectors.”98 TLOs have since
become prolific – for example the state of Colorado now has more than 500 trained data collectors.99
However, the rise of resilience as a means of preventing terrorism has shifted this process of
‘community intelligence’ from predominantly surveillance and information gathering to engagement
and information giving through the development of social capital.

90 DHS National Strategy 2002, pg. 15.
92 DHS Strategy 2002, pg. 12; Neighbourhood Watch online.
94 DHS 2002 p.f 12.
95 http://www.aclu.org/stop-government-turning-neighbor-against-neighbor
96 http://www.dhs.gov/national-network-fusion-centers-fact-sheet;
97 http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/states/california/
98 LAPD convergence
The concept of resilience first appears in Homeland Security documents in the 2007 update of its strategy following Hurricane Katrina in reference to critical infrastructure - “structural and operational resilience” – and business continuity – “operational resilience” – with a brief reference to the “resilience of American spirit.” Like in the UK, resilience is primarily devoted to efforts to prepare and respond to disasters and refers to both an outcome and a method of security based on bottom-up engagement with civil society. For example, the subsequent 2008 Strategic Plan 2008 highlights the need for trust, collaboration, and partnerships between all levels of government, the private sector, and the public in order to build “active layered defenses and national resilience.”

Resilience becomes a more central feature of homeland security following the arrival of President Obama to the White House; the 2010 Quadrennial Review of Homeland Security (QRHS) and the Bottom-up Review (BUR) of the Department of Homeland mark this turning point. The QRHS outlines a new strategic framework for homeland security in which resilience becomes prominent and the idea of ‘security’ is replaced with the tripartite ‘safety, security, and resilience’. As an outcome of security, resilience features primarily as one of the five core missions of homeland security: ‘ensuring resilience to disasters.’ In this sense it is defined as ‘individual, community, and system robustness, adaptability, and capacity for rapid recovery.’ However resilience also seems to indicate a bottom-up, decentralized method of security. In this regard, the QRHS notes that resilience is a continuation of previous civil defense efforts:

This concept is not new, and different eras in our history reflect an unwavering focus on building national resilience. The history of civil defense in the United States, for example, is marked by sweeping national debates about concepts that, if not by name, were nevertheless entirely about resilience. Notable among these was the debate spanning the Truman and Eisenhower administrations about whether to expend resources on sheltering individuals in the face of nuclear attack or to focus investments in a national highway system to facilitate mass evacuation of urban populations. These issues were beset with the same challenges that confront us today, including how to foster a decentralized approach to security, and how to best meet the challenge of helping our citizens prepare psychologically and materially for attacks and disasters that do occur. The rapid evolution of national security threats and the arrival of the information age have increased the urgency of building up—and reemphasizing—our historically resilient posture.

In terms of emergency response, the strategy notes that resilience requires a strategy shift from top-down emergency management to bottom-up engagement of stakeholders including individuals, families, and communities. This return to a community-based strategy of civil defense is connoted by the emergence of the “homeland security enterprise” concept, which “connotes a broad-based community with a common interest in the safety and well-being of America and American society.”

More importantly, the QRHS shifts focus of homeland security not only in terms of method but also from terrorism as a tactic to an ideology with focus on extremism and homegrown terrorism. Although resilience is not specifically mentioned in the section on preventing terrorism, it is echoed in claims that “we must also stop the spread of violent extremism. In this regard, it is important that we actively

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100 DHS Strategy 2007 pg. 27, 29, 31.
101 DHS 2008 Strategic Plan p. 4.
102 QRHS, ix.
103 QRHS, ix
104 QRHS, 16.
105 QRHS, 31.
106 QRHS, 12.
107 QRHS, 6.
engage communities across the United States” and calls for clear and accessible mechanisms for citizens to report suspicious behaviour. Moreover, it speaks to a shift in how American vulnerability to terrorism is viewed, pointing to a weakness in the social capital of immigrant populations who fail to integrate, and places an onus on them to address this vulnerability by becoming ‘responsible citizens’:

“Promoting integration reinforces a resilient public where all people belong, are secure in their rights, are confident to exercise their civil liberties, and have opportunities to be full participants in America. The integration process ensures a stronger and more cohesive American society by inviting newcomers from every background to share in our core beliefs and be able to embrace the rights and responsibilities of citizenship....This includes learning English and the civic principles that form the foundation of responsible citizenship.”

The Nationwide Reporting of Suspicious Activity program and accompanying ‘See Something, Say Something,’ campaign was subsequently launched in 2010, which has been the focus of most analyses on public participation in counter-terrorism. Like it’s counterpart in the UK, however, a new ‘resilience’ approach was later launched to both prevent violent extremism and encourage contributions to policing and intelligence by Muslim populations that are suspected of ‘seeing’ but not ‘saying.’ This strategy directly borrows from the Prevent strategy in the UK. It follows a report by the House Committee on Homeland Security titled The Radicalization of Muslim Americans, which reinforces the message implied in the QRHS that a lack of integration and civic responsibility make Muslim communities vulnerable to the ideas of violent extremism. Two key findings in particular are that Muslim-American families are not sufficiently cooperating with police on counter-terrorism efforts, and that there is a need to confront the Islamist ideology that drives radicalization. The report also places blame on Muslim civil society organizations, claiming not only that community leaders are failing to report suspicious activity but that some mosques are actively participating in radicalization and that community leadership groups such as CAIR are encouraging Muslims not to cooperate with police. In other words, Muslim communities are bowling with terrorists.

The implementation plan for the new strategy states that

...the Federal Government will support and help empower American communities and their local partners in their grassroots efforts to prevent violent extremism...including sharing more information about the threat of radicalization; strengthening cooperation with local law enforcement, who work with these communities everyday; and helping communities to better understand and protect themselves against violent extremist propaganda, especially online.

As in the UK, the centerpiece of this new approach is the fusion of community policing based on the development of trust and social capital through regular engagement, with intelligence gathering based on previous strategies aimed at ‘guns and gangs’ problems. Key activities include cultural training for police, fusion centers and other government departments as well as extensive outreach and consultation with communities. For example, the LAPD has recently created a Muslim Forum to better

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108 QHSR, 21, 39.
109 QHSR, 51.
110 Napolitano, “Progress Toward a More Secure and Resilient Nation.”
111 The White House, “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.”
112 Silk, “Community Policing to Prevent Violent Extremism.”
inform police about the needs of the Muslim community. However, unlike the UK there is less on building a particular brand of Muslim civil society and efforts that are in place to mobilize the community are more strongly linked to policing services. Notably, the LADP tries to “converge their community-building efforts with those of the LAPD.” Similarly, the NYPD reportedly sponsors cricket leagues to develop relationships with young Muslims and holds regular meetings with Muslim leaders.

Building trust is clearly the major thrust of this effort. Indeed, one of the flagships projects is the Building Communities of Trust program run by the DOJ and DHS, which seeks to develop a stronger relationship between local law enforcement, fusion centers, and communities by providing education on the Nationwide Suspicious Activities Reporting Initiative and processes for protecting civil rights and liberties. This approach to violent extremism appears to suggest both the limits of traditional means to gather intelligence on threats that emerge from within the community, and the need for cooperation and support from the public to do so. Certainly, the need for public trust in how fusion centers collect and handle information has been noted as a critical for continued feasibility of this model based on significant resistance in cities such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Portland. But efforts to empower and mobilize civil society to counter narratives of violent extremism are focused on the online community, for example, through connecting activists with technology experts and training bloggers.

Conclusion: The Failure of Hybridity?

The rise of resilience as a counter-terrorism strategy signals a shift in emphasis from external threats to the vulnerability of citizens and communities to extremist ideas, which has prompted an effort to intervene in local communities to address the source of this vulnerability, namely the lack of appropriate social capital. This intervention is hybrid in nature: it is a top-down effort intended to elicit a bottom-up response, and it depends on the willingness of citizens to trust and participate in such efforts. Although this is a mode of counter-terrorism that has recently gained ground in the United States and Canada, the UK experience suggests problems with this form of hybrid security, specifically the challenge of integrating bottom-up resilience with national security. Trust is a fundamental component of resilience. And while much of the focus of counter-terrorism efforts is on building trust through community engagement, this process co-exists with other forms of surveillance and population control that destroy trust. This approach to using social capital as a means of providing intelligence is also inimical to trust: how can we build a more cohesive civil society if we suspect that our neighbours are spying on us? These issues as well as others have been raised in various government reviews of the UK Prevent strategy, and the separation of resilience and integration from counter-terrorism activity indicates that they have been taken to heart.

115 “Police Chief Magazine - View Article.”
116 Downing, “Policing Terrorism in the United States.”
119 Johnson, “United We Stand (with Related Video).”
121 Implementation plan.
However, the shift in strategy of community/identity-building and community intelligence processes to the online world through the use of social media for both advocacy and surveillance suggests a strong conclusion: that states have found a way of achieving the prevention goals of counter-terrorism without the need for social engagement with broad communities. It may be that technology is replacing the need for citizen acceptance and participation as hybridity takes on more technological forms.

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