Contemporary debates on the relationship between social justice and national identities continue to be dominated by liberal nationalists who link social justice to an ethical national community and cosmopolitans who feel nations and states are morally irrelevant. In spite of intense debate, it is still unclear whether social justice and nationalism should or must go hand-in-hand. The arguments become almost predictable, with liberal nationalists emphasizing the empirical need for national identities to motivate social justice between co-nationals and cosmopolitan scholars attacking, instrumentalizing, or ignoring nationalism while normatively and directly arguing for dramatically more global support for the globe’s poorest and most powerless. Providing a definitive answer to this larger question is clearly beyond present purposes. This paper’s aims are more modest, exploring the plausibility of what might seem like a paradoxical claim to some: normatively and practically speaking, achieving more universal forms of social justice in multinational contexts requires considerable, though not unlimited, respect for national identities. Put differently, achieving meaningful and lasting social justice beyond the nation-state must always, to a large extent, take existing national identities as given, working with them instead of over them to promote, eventually, the equal social well being of all community members.

My argument is rooted in a broader view of social justice that not only considers the need for economic redistribution, but also recognizes national groups on democratic grounds that acknowledge their psychological sense of self. This is because economic liberation of the form typically promised by redistributive justice offers little consolation for those whose just political or cultural claims are constantly under attack or ignored. Nothing short of full consideration for both dimensions and their interrelationship can provide the centripetal forces necessary to bring us all closer to a truly multinational, and perhaps even a cosmopolitan, project. I conclude that such an approach is necessary to simultaneously reduce the barriers to social justice within nationalist communities, as well as eliminate unjust power relations between national communities. Eliminating nationalist sentiments therefore does not represent an aim of such a project, though making them benign vis-à-vis global social justice of course must be proven to be both desirable and achievable.

The discussion proceeds as follows. The first section introduces two multinational political communities that are strong candidates for considering whether we can seriously and lastingly push social justice beyond the nation while respecting nationalism: Europe and Canada. Each case represents a more-or-less sincere if still imperfect attempt to widen the scope of social justice beyond the nation yet short of the globe at what I term the multinational level (akin to supranationalism). The section’s conclusion suggests that both multinational projects face a common challenge: prioritizing a shared social identity in multinational contexts seems more likely to cause more division than greater social unity. The second section begins by considering liberal nationalist and cosmopolitan approaches to this problem. It is suggested that, though they respectively draw our attention to the current value of nationalism and the importance of pursuing global social justice, it is still far from clear that either offers a tenable and realizable account of social justice beyond national
borders. The section closes by considering to what extent the benefits of both approaches can be combined, specifically focusing on Tan’s attempt to do so in what he calls cosmopolitan liberalism. The third and final section suggests that although cosmopolitan liberalism breaks new ground on the compatibility between nationalism and cosmopolitanism, its normative account of nationalism is lacking. Though this is problematic on its own, because it threatens the very nations it is meant to protect, it also makes it more difficult to overcome the motivational problem. I therefore aim to show that greater consideration for the diverse nature of nationalism and social justice claims makes broadening its scope more realizable.

1. Social Injustice in the European Union and Canada

On the surface, it seems odd to speak of global justice when we still see tremendous injustice within multinational political communities. Of course, cosmopolitan theorists should not let this fact prevent them from dreaming large, nor does it force them to consider its attainment by way of ‘scaling-up’ justice from the national via the multinational to the global. I nevertheless move ahead on the assumption that promoting multinational social justice is both good in itself and offers insights into how global justice might be realized. This section introduces the currents state of affairs in two existing multinational communities that inform the broader discussion: the European Union and Canada.

1.1 The European Union (EU)

With twenty-seven member states, the EU continues to receive considerable attention for its ‘supranational’ character. The term itself suggests that the member states have joined a political community that goes beyond their distinct mono- or multinational characters. Applying the term supranational to the EU needs to be qualified in at least two interrelated ways. First, EU membership has enhanced – not transcended or dissolved – the policy capacities of member states (Millwood 1992; Mayall 1999). Though member states have surrendered some of their sovereignty as traditionally defined, it is more accurate to say that they have collectively rearranged it, through internal “division and combination”, so that “the scale of the Community enhances the independence of action of its members collectively and perhaps even individually for some purposes” (MacCormick 1999: 133). Within this constellation, the nation-states (and to some extent substates such as Scotland or Catalonia) remain the key building blocks of Europe’s supranational project – a fact celebrated by some (e.g., Bellamy and Castiglione 2000; Keating 2001). Second, the European project has focused to a larger extent on economic integration and much less on social integration. “The original constitutional deal was premised upon a transfer of responsibilities for economic integration to EU institutions while domestic institutions retained their fundamental role in defending social solidarity” (Armstrong 2010: 232). European economic integration and liberalization pressures, however, add additional strain to domestic social redistribution policies beyond the internal demographic and global competitiveness pressures felt by all states. In response, social justice advocates increasingly believe that a social Europe must go alongside a fiscal Europe to protect and administer a robust European welfare state system (Habermas 2001a; Vandenbroucke 2012). They feel that social integration might not only slow, but indeed reverse the weakening of European welfare states and their vital redistributive function.

Establishing a social Europe must nevertheless contend with several challenges. EU member states differ greatly in terms of their socio-economic status. Bulgaria’s minimum wage is less than 10% that of the Netherlands, and its per-capita gross domestic product (adjusted for purchasing power parity) is only about a third. This example extends to the EU as a whole,
with the first fifteen member states (EU15) being much wealthier than the twelve states (EU12) that have joined since 2004. If poverty is defined as 60% of the EU-wide median income, about 15% of the EU15 lives in poverty while, shockingly, more than 70% of the EU12 fall below the line (Vandenbroucke 2012). Moreover, member states exhibit considerable differences in terms of how they provide social services. It is possible to speak of four social models across the EU15:

- A Nordic model (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands) that has the most generous and comprehensive set of social programs;
- An Anglo-Saxon model (Ireland and the United Kingdom) that has fewer labour market protections and more of a safety-net or last resort function;
- A Continental model (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg) that focuses on social insurance, unemployment assistance, and pensions; and,
- A Mediterranean model (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) that concentrates a much larger amount of social spending on old-age pensions (Sapir 2005).

All of this does not include the new member states, which could describe additional weaker models that, as expected, spend a smaller percentage of their smaller gross domestic products on social programs. All of these practical differences play into a positive feedback loop with national identities and national self-interest that makes it difficult to achieve European social unity.1 At present, highlighting a sense of social solidarity between member states seems more likely to provoke contestation as it is to stimulate a shared social identity and collective social action (Habermas 2001a; Weiler 2002). As Armstrong (2010: 235) summarizes, “paradoxically, given the importance attached … to giving the EU a social identity, rescuing the welfare state through EU constitutionalism could turn out to be a potentially frustrating and disappointing venture.” The example of Canada, to which I now turn, tells the same story in a slightly different way.

1.2 Canada

Not surprisingly, European federalist and cosmopolitan thinkers tend to draw comparisons with the United States of America and not Canada. The analogous idea of a United States of Europe has been particularly popular among European federalists for quite some time. Habermas, in a recent incarnation of this idea, suggests Europe needs a constitution that creates “a Parliament that would resemble Congress … a legislative ‘chamber of nations’ that would have more competencies than the American Senate, and a Commission that would be much less powerful than the White House … a European Court that would be as influential as the Supreme Court” (Habermas 2001b: 22). America’s constitutional moment creates a great deal of envy for many European federalists, as perhaps it should. Moreover, its appeal also relates to its similar population and the existence of federal social systems spanning its many states.2 Though it could be called a ‘postnational’ federation, making it a model worth emulating, it nevertheless is distracting when the analogy is taken too far. Comparisons with the United States tend to emphasize the goal; inadequate consideration is often given to the very different roles nationalism plays in each case. In this respect, Canada provides a better comparison of a more-or-less common political community trying to achieve social justice in a multinational context.

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1 For example, Nagel (1991) believes that global socio-economic inequality is sufficient to ensure that the powerful resist redistribution. In the cases considered here, this still exists though it seems to be less of a factor.

2 For a more balanced treatment of how Europe can emulate some of the admirable qualities of the US system, see Van Parijs (2012).
Canada presents a more comparable case of a multinational political community struggling to achieve social justice. This is not only because of the more widely discussed relationship between Canada’s English-speaking majority in the ‘Rest of Canada’ and the French-speaking minority concentrated in Québec. The question of social justice between these two groups seems minor when compared to the European example. In fact, there is ample evidence to suggest that the two groups are socially integrated as much as can reasonably be expected.\(^3\)

For instance, the Human Development Index (HDI) in Québec is almost identical to that of Canada (Hazell et al. 2012). Moreover, French-speaking Canadians largely have nested identities, often positively identifying with both the nation of Québec and the Canadian state (Mendelsohn 2002). De Schutter (2011: 169) suggests that both secession and a unitary state would unjustly destroy Canada’s multinational federalism as it “would be tantamount to compelling some to live according to the cultural context of the others”, the former harming those who identify with Québec and the latter Canada. Yet, the “success” of Canadian federalism, as some incorrectly categorize it,\(^4\) always overlooks its terrible record with respect to the over one million Indigenous peoples living in Canada.\(^5\)

A deep socio-economic divide exists between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. Though using census data concerning Indigenous peoples can be problematic given data-collection challenges, the following comparisons nevertheless paint a clear picture. Indigenous people have:

- A population that is growing much faster than the Canadian average (45% versus 8% between 1996 and 2006) (Statistics Canada 2008);
- A secondary school drop-out rate that is two to four times higher and a post-graduate education rate that is about one-third that of non-Indigenous peoples (BC Stats 2008);
- Unemployment rates that can be six times higher, with those that do work making only 70% of the employed average (BC Stats 2008);\(^6\)
- Life expectancies that are 8.1 years shorter for men and 5.5 years shorter for women (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 2001);
- Poorer living conditions, with about 20% living in houses in need of major repair, double the national average (Adelson 2005);
- Lastly, and perhaps most telling of all with respect to their quality of life, youth suicide rates that are five to six times higher (eleven times higher for the Inuit) than the Canadian average (Health Canada 2010).\(^7\)

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\(^3\) After all, “We cannot expect the Quebecois to express unconditional allegiance to Canada, or to put ’Canada first’. The only sort of unity we can achieve is one which allows national minorities to give equal standing, or even primacy, to their national identity, and to give conditional allegiance to Canada. … weak bonds of social unity may nonetheless be enduring bonds, and that conditional allegiances may nonetheless be powerful allegiances” (Kymlicka 2001: 116-117).

\(^4\) This premature sense of success often shines through in subtle ways. For instance, Bickerton (2011) does well to provide some degree of balance to the issues facing Canada’s Indigenous peoples, but ultimately and erroneously concludes that Canadian federalism has so far been successful (see p. 177). This reflects a general trend in the Canadian literature that at best speaks to the Canada-Québec relationship.

\(^5\) This number is conservative. Many people with full or partial Indigenous ancestry suppress their identity because of the lack of respect it is given in society. For evidence of this fact, consider the dramatic increase of Māori self-identification in New Zealand as a result of greater societal respect and influence (Sullivan 2003).

\(^6\) This and the previous statistic were compiled only for British Columbia, though there is no reason to believe that the trend would be dramatically different in other parts of Canada.

\(^7\) Where numbers exist, similar stories exist around accidental deaths or homicide rates. Cycles of violence and abuse plague many, if not most, Indigenous communities.
To my knowledge, no socio-economic indicators paint a different picture. According to some, Indigenous people in Canada have – on average – an HDI comparable to Albania (Barsh 1994). It seems safe to say that they are at least as poor as the poorest in the EU27, while Canada as a whole always ranks in the top 10 – a ranking that would only be higher if Indigenous peoples were excluded from the measure. It is clear to anyone that has visited Indigenous communities, rural and urban, that socio-economically inequality leads to a significantly lower quality of life than those they now live alongside.

Many Canadians find this shocking considering that Indigenous peoples have equal access to the state’s relatively robust social system. The same people often quickly point out the fact that the federal government alone spends over $10 billion annually on Indigenous peoples, including programs for improving housing, settling past injustices (e.g., residential schools), and compensation for development on traditional territories. Though mainstream Canada focuses on the money, it has proven to be an imperfect solution.

More than in Europe, the idea of a shared identity seems likely to promote division than unity. Unlike the Québec-Canada relationship, the majority of Indigenous peoples express a very weak or conflicted Canadian identity, if not outright hostility at the idea (Ladner 2003; Alfred 2009). Practically speaking, Indigenous peoples have little reason to share in a Canadian identity as currently constituted. For starters, it has much in common with Canada’s troubling colonial past, which repeatedly (and even to this day) links the idea of shared identity to the elimination of Indigenous difference in all its forms (see Johnson 1993; Macklem 2001). Normatively, the demand for a shared identity also lacks force given that solutions exist to accommodate Indigenous peoples based on democratic principles and normative arguments rooted in their prior and unceded sovereignty over traditional lands (Williams 2004; Ladner 2005). As I have argued elsewhere (Woons 2008; 2013), a shared social identity also seems a long way off and an unlikely first step toward social justice in the Canadian context. Instead, Indigenous peoples largely support the recommendations from the 1996 Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Canada 1996), which suggests the state must return significant portions of traditional territories to Indigenous peoples so that, over time, state financial support can be reduced until it is no longer needed. For them, social justice is not simply about socio-economic equality within the existing political community, but through social recognition as distinct peoples with links to traditional territories. Indigenous peoples might not even be concerned at all about socio-economic equality in the narrow sense advocated by many liberal egalitarians, instead believing in the social, and even spiritual, rejuvenation powers that come with greater recognition whatever the financial cost. Not surprisingly given the its dramatic implications, or the majority’s perception as such, the Government of Canada has let the Report sit on the shelf ever since.

1.3 A Common Motivational Challenge

This section introduced two cases and a common challenge they face in expanding social justice. Europe and Canada were shown to be socially fragmented multinational political communities. In both cases, social inequality falls most prominently along national lines. Both cases also highlight the tremendous difficulties that exist in trying to resolve social imbalances by establishing a shared identity. With respect to socio-economic disadvantage along national lines, pushing shared identities in Europe and in Canada appears to be a non-

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8 The last two serious attempts by Cairns (2000) and Flanagan (2000) to promote a shared identity have meet with serious resistance in Indigenous circles. For those even willing to give a written response, see Turner (2006).
starter, risking further conflict instead of greater social harmony. Yet, all is not necessarily lost. Weinstock (2010: 177) breathes new life into the debate when he suggests that shared democratic institutions do not only reflect the democratic will of an antecedently existing political community. Such institutions can also create community by engendering habits of cooperation and shared membership. There is thus greater plasticity in people’s capacity for communal affiliation than national democratic theorists have allowed.

Finding ways of doing what Weinstock suggests requires careful consideration of how such institutions mould existing national identities toward achieving social justice. Perhaps the greatest question is whether social justice requires that national identities be left alone, accommodated, transformed, or done away with entirely.

2. Dominant Views: Liberal Nationalism, Cosmopolitanism, & Tan’s Middle Way

Though cosmopolitans agree that justice has a wide scope, significant differences remain on what obligations result from showing equal respect and consideration to every member of the global community. As mentioned at the outset, though a cosmopolitan telos is adopted here, the narrower goal involves questioning whether and to what extent social justice can meaningfully and lasting cross national borders. Though debates often focus on what social justice demands (versus what is simply good) and who owes what to who based on certain relationships (or, alternatively, all of mankind), I wish to focus on the question of whether nationalism furthers or detracts from social justice understood as showing equal concern for all humans. On this question, the two dominant approaches are almost diametrically opposed between liberal nationalists who see nationalism as the only source of social justice and those who see it as the main roadblock to wider forms of justice. The first two parts of this section broadly define these views on the subject of nationalism. The third considers an attempt by Tan to reconcile the two, concluding that his approach is useful, though is not without normative and practical limits of its own.

2.1 Liberal Nationalism

Liberal nationalists believe that nationalism is the best and perhaps the only way to secure fundamental liberal democratic principles of individual freedom, deliberative democracy, and social justice (Canovan 1996; Kymlicka 2001: 225-226). Though the first two dimensions are no less important, the third is of most interest here. Only co-nationals share solidaristic bonds and the communicative means necessary to facilitate mutual sacrifices within a common political community. According to Miller (1994: 143, emphasis added), “a viable political community requires mutual trust, trust depends on communal ties, and nationality is uniquely appropriate here as a form of common identity.” A belief in the intrinsic nature of such links means that national communities are ethical communities that demarcate two sets

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9 The discussion is limited to cosmopolitanism as a moral ideal, not as an institution claim. For a discussion of this distinction, see Beitz (1999). In summary, the idea is not necessarily to achieve some form of world state, but a set of institutions that may or may not involve global institutions that secure and promote the equal moral worth of all individuals.

10 In this sense, I draw from but do not engage entirely in the debate on what is just versus what is good, or what relations, if any, ought to be those that inform social justice as redistribution (or recognition for that matter). Examples of relational accounts (and their advocates) include the shared nationality example below (Miller 1995, 2007; Kymlicka 1995; 2001), coercion (Nagel 2005), or shared public goods (Sangiovanni 2012).

11 For a critical account of liberal nationalism and individual freedom see Patten (1999).
of duties: those we owe to co-nationals and weaker humanitarian obligations we owe to all human beings (Miller 1995, 2007). In a surprising turn given his earlier liberal egalitarian views, even Rawls (1993, 1999) suggests that global justice allows for a global “society of peoples” that allows for “decent” nonliberal nations. It is therefore within mono-national states – with their common territory, histories, traditions, and institutions – that deliberative and procedural justice manifests among each distinct people.

Institutionally, this leads liberal nationalists to conclude that political boundaries should be drawn around national communities. Each nation requires a territorially separate state (Miller 1995; 2007) or that territorial federalism must allow for national sub-states against which minorities can protect themselves from the state’s national majority (Kymlicka 1995; Kymlicka and Opalski 2002). Miller seems sceptical of federalism as a way of promoting social justice beyond the nation.

Where a single state embraces two or more nationalities, the problem will not be one of implementing a system of distributive justice, but one of legitimating it in the eyes of the populace… [each community] will agree to state transfers only if it has an assurance it will not lose, overall, in relation to the other communities (Miller 1995: 84-85).

Any multinational political communities must therefore become highly decentralized (or even be divided) so that every national community can effectively administer their own social justice. Kymlicka’s view is less restrictive in that he recognizes that nations and (sub)states do not always align, and that federalism provides an appropriate institutional response that allows for broader social justice. According to Kymlicka (2001: 92),

federalism … respects the desire of national groups to remain autonomous, and to retain their cultural distinctiveness, while none the less acknowledging the fact that these groups are not self-contained and isolated, but rather are increasingly and inextricably bound to each other in relations of economic and political interdependence.

Yet, like Miller, Kymlicka sees the world as made up of territorially contiguous units wherein a singular national community rules and where national minorities gain self-government rights to protect themselves. Federalism is little more than an institutional overlay of the same nation-state-centric global view shared by Miller.

Liberal nationalism’s strength comes from its recognition of the mechanisms that promote social justice in today’s world. Yet, this is also its weakness as it then turns this into a normative claim, stifling any serious consideration for theories that promote the development

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12 Miller (2004: 24-25) does note, in the edited volume by Van Parijs, his belief that all peoples can ascribe to general principles of justice but that they quickly diverge in their interpretations of said principles.

13 Miller (2001) later softens his position toward the idea of nested identities.

14 Miller is even highly skeptical of group-differentiated rights for national minorities. See Miller (2004).

15 This view is itself empirically highly problematic. It fails to take into account the complex ways that shared sovereignty and nested linguistic and identity communities can co-exist. Individuals can identify with several languages, several states and sub-states (De Schutter 2011) and multiple nations can have legitimate claims to a given territory (Woons 2008). For this reason, Kymlicka and other liberal nationalists tend to spend more time talking about the merits and drawbacks of secession from a homogenous national point of view than on managing increasingly complex interdependence between national communities and the impact this has on the social well-being of unknown others outside one’s national community. This explains the struggle by Miller (1995: 173-174) to make sense of coexisting British and Scottish sentiments. Similarly, Kymlicka (1995) has a hard time finding solutions that give Indigenous peoples in Canada the security extended to the Québécois through territory.
of social justice across or beyond national boundaries. This does not mean that their ideas should be dismissed. Far from it, liberal nationalists draw our attention to the project of nation building, which in itself contains hints of how best to extend the project beyond existing national borders. Paraphrasing the earlier quote from Weinstock, we instead should reject the idea that institutions should reflect existing national feelings and that institutions can instead transform national feelings. Sadly, liberal nationalists have much less to say about expanding the level of social justice. Though Kymlicka often points out the success of Québec in Canada, he believes economic globalization makes expanding social justice through broader social unions between nations unnecessary (e.g., Kymlicka 2005: 115).16 Most of all, liberal nationalist global visions focus on existing states showing greater respect for their national minorities (see Kymlicka 2007). To use the language of social justice as redistribution versus social justice as recognition, they focus almost entirely – and, in my estimation, disproportionately– on the latter while offering only minimal support for the former in the form of basic humanitarian aid (Miller 2007). Instead, past nation-building projects should be celebrated to the extent that they have promoted social justice within territorially defined national political communities and can provide important lessons for expanding it within existing and emerging multinational (and global) contexts. This desire exists most among cosmopolitans.17

2.2 Cosmopolitanism

Most cosmopolitans believe nations and states have an instrumental role at best. Often following Kant, they promote the primacy of moral universalism, envisioning a single global community whereby the equality and freedom of all individuals is recognized and secured (e.g. Pogge 1992; Held 2003). Van Parijs (2011: 25-26) states,

> All attempts to restrict egalitarian justice to ‘our people’, ‘our nation’, our ‘demos’, our ‘ethnos’, our ‘fatherland’, our ‘community’ will then look like pathetic self-serving efforts to dig shallow trenches or build flimsy fences, soon to be swept away by the following conviction: any honest attempt to think seriously about justice for our century must downgrade nations and states from the ethical framework to the institutional toolkit.

Others unapologetically deride the role of nations as entirely unjust. According to Nussbaum (1994), “to give support to nationalist sentiments subverts, ultimately, even the values that hold a nation together, because it substitutes a colourful idol for the substantive universal values of justice and right.” Nussbaum clearly wants individuals to achieve a global sense of moral solidarity above all other identities and loyalties. Waldron (2000: 227) suggests that cosmopolitans seek “a way of constructing an identity for oneself that is different from, and arguably opposed to, the idea of belonging to or devotion to or immersion to a particular

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16 As a result, Kymlicka has been accused of protecting the territorial sovereignty of the state against self-determination claims of smaller minorities such as indigenous peoples, only granting them rights that allow them to sustain their cultures in a narrow sense. There appears to be an often-unjustifiable bias toward maintaining the current state order (see De-Shalit 1996; Murphy 2004; Turner 2006).

17 It is important to note that Miller considers himself to be a weak cosmopolitan. Speaking to Miller’s view, Tan (2004: 11) says “Weak cosmopolitanism is still a form of cosmopolitanism because it recognizes the equal moral worth of individuals; but it is a weak form of cosmopolitanism because it takes the respect for the equal moral standing of individuals to be discharged by ensuring that individuals are able to live minimally adequate lives (however that may be defined). Once this goal of ensuring minimal adequacy is achieved, any remaining inequality between persons is not a concern of cosmopolitan justice. Strong cosmopolitanism, in contrast, takes the ideal of equal concern for persons to entail a commitment to some form of global distributive equality, and will aim to regulate inequalities between persons, even above the threshold of minimal adequacy, against some appropriate distributive principle.”
culture.” But even Kant conceded that the rational conclusion of a global state encompassing all humans was morally and rationally too demanding of its future citizens. Consequently, he proposed a global federal system encompassing all states whereby non-nationals would be treated according to more limited principles of justice (Waldron 2000). Today, scholars with cosmopolitan sympathies still question how intermediate or alternative institutional arrangements – such as those associated with European supranationalism – can expand moral communities beyond national borders.

Habermas (2012) clearly highlights the tension between having a cosmopolitan bias18 and being forced to consider the contemporary force of nationalism. In essence, Habermas is trying to replicate three coinciding aspects of nation-building at the European level: 1) a process that establishes an association among free and equal citizens with individual rights, 2) a distribution of powers that effectively reflects the will of the people, and 3) a way to create a sense of civic solidarity across national borders that allows for democratic deliberation. Whereas liberal nationalists tell us all of this is only possible within nation-states or national sub-states, Habermas openly wonders how each can manifest beyond such traditional borders. It is in his framing of the question that we catch a glimpse of the possible compatibility, and even mutually enhancing characteristics found within cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism. Habermas’ own solution, of ‘civic’ solidarity, cherry-picks from the liberal nationalist emphasis on the role of the nation-state in building welfare states and promoting a communicative space while rejecting the idea that a political community need be based on a prepolitical community with a common descent, language, or culture (Habermas 2001a). He therefore endorses a thinner form of shared identity that he believes “advances humanity toward the values implicit in the rational discourse itself, for example, the inclusion of all capable of speech, the refusal to suppress relevant arguments, the supremacy of persuasion over force, and the condition that all affected by a norm must find it to be in their interests” (Exdell 2009: 135). As cosmopolitans are often quick to point out, globalization is only making such questions – and the need for cosmopolitan answers – more salient than ever. It is a difficult observation to refute, particularly given often-dramatic increases in economic and environmental interdependence, greater migration, and the expansion of communications via means such as the internet.

A central problem in Habermas’ work, and with cosmopolitan theories in general, is their lack of convincing motivational account. Achieving successes in this regard requires breaking the mutually reinforcing nature that exists between the very three factors Habermas cites as existing at the national level. Promoting even a thin identity or meaningful constitution that transcends national borders requires ways of establishing identities that look beyond the nation. Establishing identities that look beyond the nation requires institutions. In many cases, the democratic will of historically constituted peoples denies obligations toward others, whether they are neighbours as in Europe or prior inhabitants as in Canada. This leaves political philosophers and their theories of justice competing for favour with the more power national groups with whom their theories often receive lukewarm responses. In Canada, the majority resents Indigenous nationalism. In Europe, richer states often resist coming to the financial aid of weaker states. It may simply be an unavoidable reality that redrawing political communities in an age of liberal democracy differs greatly than the often

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18 I use the terms cosmopolitan sympathies and bias to describe Habermas because he follows Kant’s normative-practical distinction. Though he has cosmopolitan intent, he feels a truly cosmopolitan order would be minimal because “the ethical-political self-understanding of citizens of a particular democratic life is missing in the inclusive community of world citizens.” (Habermas 2001a: 107-108). This leads Tan (2004: 135-143) to call Habermas a patriot and not a cosmopolitan. Habermas’ work, however, does align fully with the more modest multinational question being asked here.
extremely illiberal nation-building projects of centuries past, as seen both in Europe and her former colonies.

2.3 Tan’s Cosmopolitan Liberalism: A Middle Way?

What do the above accounts tell us of the role of nationalism in promoting social justice? Taken together, they suggest that a defense of stronger forms of cosmopolitanism (i.e., beyond the nation) requires overcoming two highly related problems. The first is highlighted by the common cosmopolitan criticism of liberal nationalism: for normative reasons, theories of social justice need to look beyond the nation. This problem, from a cosmopolitan perspective, arises when the liberal nationalist empirical view takes on normative meaning. The second would be the liberal nationalist criticism of cosmopolitanism: for practical or motivational reasons, cosmopolitans need to provide stronger motivation that do not interfere with justifiable forms of nationalism or the social justice that nationalism currently provides. We are therefore left with two problems that both demand answers: 1) what normative account of cosmopolitan social justice should we endorse, and 2) what motivational account can be provided for pushing it beyond national borders?

In part because of the significance of both dominant approaches in recent years, and also because of their unresolved tensions, greater attention has been given to the idea that liberal nationalism and cosmopolitanism are compatible in ways that can resolve the two problems just mentioned (see Tan 2004; 2005; De Schutter and Tinnevelt 2010; Brock 2011). Tan’s approach, called cosmopolitan liberalism, exemplifies such an approach focusing specifically on the question of social justice. “Once the goals and content of cosmopolitan global justice, on the one hand, and the parameters of liberal nationalism, on the other, are properly defined and identified, the perceived conflict between liberal nationalism and cosmopolitanism disappears” (Tan 2004: 87). Fundamentally, Tan argues that for liberalism to remain consistent, it must be cosmopolitan. Against Rawls, and liberal nationalists, he believes we cannot erect walls between individuals based on nationality or other historically contingent factors. Whereas those he argues against believe that nonliberal or ‘decent’ societies should be tolerated, Tan suggests that liberals must prioritize consistency over such tolerance when the two conflict.

This leads him to endorse a “strong” and “moderate” form of cosmopolitanism. By “strong” Tan (2004: 11) “takes the ideal of equal concern for persons to entail a commitment to some form of global distributive equality [that aims] to regulate inequalities between persons, even above the threshold of minimal adequacy, against some distributive principle.” In this respect, he identifies more with the cosmopolitan view than the liberal nationalist view as outlined above. Yet, he tempers this by endorsing a “moderate” position over an “extreme” position, which are both defined as follows:

Extreme cosmopolitanism takes cosmopolitan morality to be the sole and unifying source of value in the sense that all other moral commitments must be justified by reference to cosmopolitan principles or goals. Thus special concern, say, between compatriots is justified, on the extreme cosmopolitan account, on the ground that this special concern offers a useful division of moral labor for realizing cosmopolitan goals, … Moderate cosmopolitanism, thus, does not take a reductive view of special obligations, accepting that there may be moral reasons for certain kinds of special obligations that are not ultimately explainable in cosmopolitan terms. It recognizes that treating all special obligations as being worthy only because they promote, or are derived from, cosmopolitan principles,
misrepresents and devalues some of the special ties and commitments that matter to people (Tan 2004: 11-12).

Thus, “a cosmopolitan commitment to global distributive equality need not deny the independent moral significance of patriotism and shared nationality” (Tan 2004: 12). In putting forth this view, Tan supports liberal nationalism on the grounds that it promotes a cosmopolitan egalitarian view; from another perspective, cosmopolitans must allow for liberal forms of nationalism and citizenship that respect the need to promote greater global social justice by supporting other national contexts.

How does Tan walk the fine line between the seemingly contradictory claims of both sides of the debate? This involves reconciling the two through their mutual reinterpretation. Starting with liberal nationalism, his reinterpretation follows a line one would have expected Rawls to follow had he not supported toleration over global liberalism. Simply put, Tan believes leading liberal nationalists permit what a liberal should not permit, that is nonliberal relations between self-determining national communities as communities. In other words, liberal nationalism should not only have something to say about what they should tolerate within the nation, but also externally among national communities in not only (negatively) respecting but also (positively) supporting the self-determination of others.

Unlike chauvinistic nationalism, which recognizes no constraints on its nation-building methods, even if this means destroying other nations in the process, liberal nationalism accepts limits on how its nationalist goals may be pursued. Liberal principles set constraints on how a nation may exercise its right to self-determination, and one such constraint is that the nation does not use more than its fair share of the world’s resources when exercising this right. … To insist, then, that self-determination implies that (well-endowed) nations may not be compelled to redistribute their resources globally is to permit the exercise of self-determination to overstep the bounds of liberal justice itself (Tan 2004: 100-101).

In this way, Tan - borrowing from Rawls’ domestic account - endorses the idea of a global basic structure that promotes justice between national self-determining communities by not just respecting their self-determination rights but also providing for redistribution to allow for greater global equality between nations. Tan also makes a more straightforward criticism of liberal nationalists who exclusively assume that only ‘national affinity’ provides moral motivation. Individuals can have affinities beyond the nation, and national affinities are not fixed and can therefore become more inclusive over time (Tan 2004: 104-105). Based on these two arguments, Tan believes that liberal nationalists can support cosmopolitan liberalism. His work goes yet one step further, suggesting that liberal nationalists have little choice in the matter.

To make this bolder claim, Tan employs liberal nationalism in the name of cosmopolitan liberalism as the only just form of liberal egalitarianism. Ascribing moral weight to national communities, Tan explicitly suggests a Rawlsian model can anchor his arguments (Tan 2004: 109). The primary argument for present purposes relates to the relationship between a Rawlsian model and promoting the equal ability of all nations to self-determine. 19 Though each nation has a right to self-determination and the resources falling under their jurisdiction (e.g., their territory), cosmopolitan liberalism and liberal nationalism taken together demand that nations not only concern themselves with their own affairs but also support nations that

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19 Tan (2004: 123-131) also discusses why liberal nationalists should be cosmopolitan liberals for reasons related to immigration.
are worse off. The liberalism of liberal nationalism demands that individuals show equal regard for both individual and national others whom they do not know but who deserve the same right to individual freedom which includes access to not only one’s national group but a national group with equal resources as all others. “To take self-determination seriously entails a genuine commitment to ensure that all nations enjoy the material conditions necessary for the exercise of national self-determination. … Political or legal recognition of the right to self-determination is not sufficient if some nations lack even very basic wealth and resources” (Tan 2004: 115). Tan derides economic inequality between national communities, which allows powerful nations to dominate and set the terms that weaker nations must follow. His solution is to compensate for global market power imbalances by achieving greater economic equality among nations as nations in order to secure individual equality. “If liberal nationalists take the idea of self-determination seriously as a universal ideal, they must also be committed international egalitarians. The goal of self-determination can be achieved only in a context of, among other things, economic equality between nations. Meeting a predetermined basic needs level may not be enough to secure self-determination, given the fact of competitive interactions among nations.” (Tan 2004: 121).

2.4 Conclusion

It should be clear by now that tensions exist between both social justice’s scope and the role, if any, of nationalism in modifying or adjudicating various claims. Of the three positions outlined, Tan’s effort to reconcile the claims of the first two goes the furthest in pushing the limits of social justice to liberalism’s cosmopolitan conclusion while still recognizing the significant, even ethical, place of nationalism in the lives of individuals. In this way, it seems more likely to address the two problems mentioned earlier of providing a normative account that also seems more likely to overcome motivational problems in multinational and global contexts. It therefore also provides a more constructive starting point for the final section, which in many ways reinforces his approach. Yet, his normative understanding of both liberalism and nationalism are too restrictive. Practically, this leads to residual motivational problems in many cases.

3. Cosmopolitan Liberalism’s Limit in the Multinational Contexts of Europe and Canada

In this final section, I once again take up the situations facing Europe and Canada to highlight the normative and practical strengths and limitations of Tan’s cosmopolitan liberalism. Though it recognizes the importance of social justice as recognition and as redistribution, the first two parts provide normative critiques that suggest that cosmopolitan liberalism offers too narrow an account of what recognition must provide. More specifically, Tan’s social justice as recognition fails to consider 1) the strong relationship between culture, economics, and recognition and 2) the importance of recognition as a democratic claim to self-determination. The third part discusses how a more profound understanding of national recognition provides a better starting point, and foundation, for realizing social justice. This is particularly true in the Canadian context where greater national diversity understood in economic and political terms exists, though greater respect for European economic and political diversity might also be warranted.

3.1 The Economic Dimension of Cultural Recognition

Following Nancy Fraser (1998: 5), I share the general belief that “the task is to devise a ‘bivalent’ conception of justice that can accommodate both defensible claims for social equality [i.e., redistribution] and defensible claims for the recognition of difference”. Though social justice is fundamentally about achieving equal dignity and respect for every individual
As individuals, she points out that economic and cultural (or, in our case, ‘national’) spheres cannot easily (or totally) be separated in its pursuit. However, cosmopolitan liberalism, liberal nationalism, and even Fraser’s own limited application of the idea to nationalism inadequately consider the possibility that in many cases the national claim challenges the idea of economic inclusion in global markets. The point I wish to make here is the following: national recognition must not presume that all national groups should ascribe to a dominant economic worldview. On the other hand, in cases where various nations already share an economic worldview, more limited and common forms of recognition might suffice. This is certainly the case in Europe, and particularly between the EU27 and aspiring member states, where economic integration both reflects and reinforces a shared economic understanding. In the Canadian context, such an assumption runs into serious difficulties. Though it is a fact that globalization has seen a global economic regime emerge that is difficult to resist or hide from, for many the idea of national recognition also involves – at least initially – protection from the assimilatory forces that come from external economic pressures (e.g., Harty and Murphy 2005: 100). This seems contrary to Tan, who sees economic redistribution as allowing for national groups to compete fairly in global markets. Such a view seems like economic assimilation – a scary fact for national groups whose culture has little in common with the dominant economic situation found in the world today.

As an example, consider the frequently hailed Nisga’a Final Agreement (1999), which shows how social justice as redistribution can fall short in this regard. In exchange for $200 million and exclusive jurisdiction over eight percent of their traditional territory, the Nisga’a population of 6,000 people surrendered the vast majority of their lands and their tax-exempt status under the Indian Act (see Corntassel 2008; Tully 2008). Alfred (2001: 57) believes that this will eventually go against the Nisga’a desire for self-determination as they “find themselves having to sell off land, mineral, fish and timber rights to fund their government and social programs.” Tan might say that more money should be continually transferred to the Nisga’a until economic equality ensues, though he says little if anything about granting more lands or greater isolation for them to pursue traditional ways of life. In effect, it is unclear how his view would be anything short of permanently enforcing the alienation of Indigenous peoples from their lands, limiting their individual and collective choices to either internal dependency or economic assimilation into the mainstream economy. Similar stories could be told about not only the Sámi of Northern Europe, but also rural parts of Canada and Europe who face globalization’s full assimilatory force despite cultural wishes to the contrary (see Parkins and Reed 2012). The failure of redistribution has made its way into court rulings. Increasingly, the Supreme Court of Canada sees the unjustness of even the most generous of financial agreements, with two recent rulings from 2004 – Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia and Haida Nation v. British Columbia – showing its unprecedented willingness to pressure the state to recognize the full implications of prior Indigenous sovereignty as a form of national recognition being advocated here (Slattery 2005; Hoehn 2012).

The tension in economic worldviews usually receives the most attention when existing states deny rural or Indigenous access to lands that provide cultural meaning (see Jentoft et al., 2003). The debates are rarely about who should get the profits from the economic endeavor, despite the fact that states frame it this way and will often promise jobs to national minority members as a form of ‘recognition’ best seen as economic assimilation. Instead, such debates are more about the cultural uses of the landscape. Rural or Indigenous peoples often want to continue with forms of subsistence or mixed economic forms, while the state wishes that they yield to global economic pressures. This describes the famous Alta affair in Sápmi (the homeland of the Sámi) in Northern Europe and the prosperity mine controversy in
Tsilqot’in territory in British Columbia, Canada (see the court case *Tsilqot’in Nation v. British Columbia* 2007).

### 3.2 Political Recognition

A further challenge can be mounted against the limited cultural recognition found in cosmopolitan liberal and liberal nationalist theories. They only support policies that preserve and promote national cultures as much as needed to secure individual freedom. For them, recognition is normatively justified on instrumental grounds, mostly in the form of self-government rights within an existing state where a larger cultural majority would otherwise threaten minority cultures. Yet, this understanding of recognition unfairly underemphasizes and even ignores many of the arguments found in nationalist claims for greater self-determination (De-Shalit 1996; Murphy 2001). All multinational political communities have to consider self-determination claims from constituent nations, based not a desire to preserve their culture but on a more fundamental democratic claim to “determine its own future as free as possible from external interference or domination by another nation or collection of nations” (Murphy 2001: 374). They assert the same democratic right as national groups who control a state. This shifts the onus to liberal nationalists to defend why their normative accounts allow for preserving the power within existing states. Instead, I suggest that if liberal nationalists want to remain consistent on their treatment of *nations* then they must provide equal access to self-determination as a national political-democratic right as opposed to the much more limited cultural-preservation right. This is not to suggest that recognizing the legitimate self-determination rights of all nations must be both exclusive and territorial, but that the democratic principle must come first. In fact, territoriality and exclusivity are being challenged based on intermarriage, globalized culture, and so on. Yet, this is not happening between equal national groups. It is therefore even more important that marginalized nations receive protection based not just on cultural grounds but on democratic grounds so that they can equally protect themselves and participate fairly in an increasingly interconnected world.

The above criticisms need not entail support for nonliberal regimes either. Instead, a weaker claim is being made, which is that supporting self-determination should not stop at simply a narrow view of cultural support; cultural support means much more given the economic and political implications mentioned here. More specifically, cultural support entails toleration for greater economic diversity and stronger democratic claims to ensure that all national groups are equal in the sense Tan suggests is necessary for cosmopolitan liberalism to flourish. Otherwise, global economic and political pressures will either wipe out cultural differences or maintain a power imbalance whereby weaker nations continually resist and experience social inequality. For many liberals, the former is acceptable if this happens over time. While I concur with the ability and even necessity for convergence, the point being made here is that this needs to be done in a way that national groups enjoy the same power to influence what that future looks like. Simply put, true equality between nations must logically precede cosmopolitan convergence if it is to be meaningful and lasting. Unfortunately, Tan and others overestimate the ability of an economically

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20 Sadly, many self-declared liberals seem to feel that intermarriage and other forms of socio-economic integration (or assimilation) between groups of different power structures diminish the claims of the weaker to the benefit of the stronger. In the Canadian case, see Cairns (2000). Yet, the empirical reality does not reduce the normative claims of weaker national groups who can be accommodate through shared-rule arrangements that often are needed where territorial overlap occurs.

21 In a future draft, I hope to take up the Western liberal bias more fully. This will also involve controlling for liberal values in promoting a richer form of nationalism.
homogenized world to give all national groups an equal footing and equal influence in shaping the world and their place in it.

3.3 The Motivational Challenge Revisited

In the first section it was suggested that a shared identity offers an unlikely starting point for promoting social justice in multinational contexts where socio-economic inequality primarily falls along national lines. In reintroducing the motivational challenge here, I suggest that cosmopolitan liberalism similarly struggles to provide a strong motivational account. Instead, deeper recognition of the economic and political dimensions of national groups provides a better, and perhaps the only, starting point possible for promoting policy and institutional reforms aimed at increasing social justice across national borders in multinational political communities. Central to this claim is the belief that in the age of post-nation-building we require more patience, always being biased toward less dramatic changes than in past centuries where nation building destroyed, instead of moulded, identities.

If my claim is correct, alleviating the socio-economic equality in Canada requires greater and more fundamental national recognition than in Europe. This is because the worldviews of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples are much farther apart. Moreover, Canada has universal redistribution programs that do not exist in the EU. Finally, Canada has not recognized Indigenous people’s to the extent I propose, and only minimally to the extent Tan might endorse. Therefore, in the Canadian case, my theory suggests that greater recognition of Indigenous economic and political difference is the only way to achieve not just greater socio-economic equality, but also a better quality of life for Indigenous peoples even if it cannot be measured in financial terms.

To highlight this point, I believe it is useful to talk of the psychological dimension of shared citizenship, which is just as crucial yet more difficult to achieve in multinational contexts. The psychological dimension of shared citizenship offers a new way of understanding the relationship between citizens and the state. Complimenting other dimensions of citizenship that tend to emphasise rights, entitlements, or even obligations, it better explains the extent in which peoples feel a sense of connection to others. Speaking to this added dimension, Carens (1996-1997: 113) states that “[one] way to belong to a political community is to feel that one belongs, to be connected to it through one’s sense of emotional attachment, identification, and loyalty.” This has appeal because it does not demand a shared identity as such, but implies that reinforcing multinational citizenship, including its social dimension, requires a positive mutual identification with the state. Everyone should feel positively reflected and respected in shared relationships and institutions despite having different identities or worldviews. Borrows (2002:143) extends this idea of common belonging to include the importance of transformative processes:

> citizenship must also take into account the varied self-perceptions people hold within communities, and these views must sometimes mingle to create common understandings and a larger vision of who we are as fellow citizens…. Citizenship in the state must begin to develop an interactive reciprocity on certain matters of vital concern and address the more subjective elements of who people ‘feel they are’ in relation to others in society.

At minimum, the psychological dimension helps describe the connection or lack of connection between national groups and common citizenship within a shared state. It explains why non-Indigenous Canadians – particularly in English-speaking Canada – have a much stronger attachment to institutions such as Parliament and the Queen as Head of State.
It also explains why Indigenous peoples prefer to pursue low-trust approaches to self-determination through avenues such as the courts and treaty negotiations despite facing serious limitations. More optimistically, however, such a view speaks to a fundamental basis for building shared institutions that both mirror existing national differences and reflect the ways that they collectively wish to move forward, together. For all national groups to be motivated in such a project requires that every nation be equally respected and be equally able to influence such a project as individuals who are also members of distinct nations. Tan’s account highlights the importance of such an approach, but fails to capture the full extent of what it takes to establish such a foundation.

There might be a lesson in this for the EU. Unlike Canada, the EU – small minorities aside – does well to recognize national groups through its member states who in turn largely have ways of recognizing their national minorities in line with liberal nationalism. This is in large part because of Europe’s history of nation building and the impact of Westphalian principles over the last number of centuries. This leads me to conclude that those who criticize the EU in its current form may do so too hastily. After all, nation-building processes took centuries to unfold, while the EU is still extremely young. It is younger still when we talk about the socio-economic differences between the EU15 and the EU12 – a merger that is still less than a decade old. Moreover, on the question of European identity, about two-thirds of EU citizens feel they are European. This is a number that seems likely to increase as the youngest cohort, those aged 15-24, responded with 71% compared to only 58% for those over 55 (European Commission 2010). But if nested identities – whether civic and national or national and national – seem to be the best way of promoting social redistribution, as suggested above with Indigenous peoples and mentioned earlier in the case of Québec in Canada, then this is promising fact even if it says little about the strength of such identities. Moreover, it seems that Europe should consider greater tolerance for difference as a way of cultivating such an identity by, for example, not expecting the various social models to converge – at least initially – but by recognizing the ways in which they are entrenched in a broader ways of life such people value.

Though this seems challenging, it offers more by way of a motivational institutional account than Tan who simply hopes his arguments alone should largely suffice. This is most evident in his assertion that nothing about national affinity excludes broader affinities. Though this is certainly true, it says nothing about the scope, content, and motivations for promoting broader affinities over or alongside national ones. My proposal, instead, places less emphasis on immediate economic convergence and more emphasis on recognition for practical reasons. To promote the former without the latter simply leads to greater resistance. However, prioritizing the former while appealing to the latter seems like the only even if imperfect way to cultivate common feelings across differences.

Before concluding on this topic, it is important to at least briefly discuss the idea that recognition comes at a cost to redistribution. Empirical evidence on this is limited, though in perhaps the most comprehensive edited volume on the topic Banting and Kymlicka (2006) conclude that while context matters, there is no evidence to suggest that one comes at a cost to the other in the case of national groups (specifically, Banting et al 2006: 81-82). In part because of the statistical uncertainly due to small samples and in part the influence of political and historical context, the main conclusion from the volume is that policy must be designed appropriately to reinforce the two forms of justice. In other words, they are not

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22 I have not considered the Indigenous or similar small minorities within the European context because this issue, despite its equivalent moral weight, is not as salient or prevalent.
inherently conflicting and can often be mutually reinforcing. Yet, the forms of recognition proposed here to promote a psychological sense of inclusion often go much farther than any empirical studies conducted so far. It therefore raises the question of how such recognition might strengthen, or might perhaps weaken, socio-economic redistribution. Though this question will have to go unanswered in empirical terms, it nevertheless should be given its proper weight. Though the two forms of social justice often exist in a delicate balance, it seems that national groups prioritize that which is most lacking. In Canada, Indigenous peoples may be willing to sacrifice the stated goal of the Canadian government to achieve equal levels of health care outcomes if it means giving them the ability to control significant resources to promote traditional forms of medicine alongside the existing system. Similarly, EU12 member states may be willing to pool sovereignty with the EU if it means reducing socio-economic disparity between them and the EU15. Most important is the quest for a balance that ensures all national groups have equal access to protect their own way of being on equal terms while participating in broader multinational arrangements.

3.4 Conclusion

For both normative and practical reasons, it has been argued that social justice as recognition is a precondition for developing multinational social justice. Moreover, encouraging national communities to extend social justice beyond their borders requires extending not only cultural, but also economic and political recognition to all national groups. The context determines the specific challenge involved. In the Canadian context, Indigenous peoples at best only enjoy limited forms of cultural recognition. In Europe, nation-states and sub-states protect the majority of national cultures and their political rights to self-determination, at least in comparison to the Canadian example. Moreover, Europe tends to share a singular economic paradigm that has become the foundation of the European Union. In both cases, a common identification with the multinational community depends on such national respect. The immediate question for policy-makers therefore becomes how to promote both forms of social justice at the same time in mutually reinforcing ways. This more practical task likely requires more patience as it can take time to develop and shift identities – particularly in the Canadian case where a truly shared multinational identification is still an idea.

Final Remarks

I have attempted to solve perhaps one of the pressing dilemmas for those seeking social justice beyond the nation in multinational contexts: is it best to respect or reduce the influence of nationalism? Should we follow liberal nationalists who wish to secure national social justice or cosmopolitans who feel their influence must be reduced or eliminated to promote social justice beyond national boundaries? In answering this question, I have followed theorists like Tan who suggest that we must have it both ways: we have a global obligation to equalize power imbalances between nations because nations secure an important part of what gives individuals freedom. Yet, I have suggested that Tan inherits a common problem also found in liberal nationalism, namely that it limits national security to claims of cultural difference. It ignores the strong link between nationalism, culture, and economic diversity. It also underemphasizes or overlooks the more fundamental democratic principle of self-determination. I therefore suggested that Tan’s model of national equality must be expanded to protect economic diversity vital to national survival and give all nations the same political access to self-determination most typically enjoyed by nations who control a state. Where territorial overlap exists, power-sharing arrangements must follow.
This normative account also provides a much more likely starting point for overcoming the paradox highlighted by Armstrong in the European case, but that applies even more so to the Canadian case: prioritizing a shift of identity to the higher level over respecting national identities will cause more conflict instead of greater identification with the broader political community. More specifically, I have suggested that the only starting point for a multinational political project can be the full recognition of national difference – cultural, political, and economical. This should minimize resistance to common solutions and promote greater solidarity as national communities come together to solve common problems in an increasingly globalized world. Without a deeper understanding of recognition, Tan’s proposal would in fact end up solving social disparity, if at all, while assimilating weaker nations to the current hegemonic economic order – leaving them with sad, symbolic traces of a culture they once lived instead of simply performed on special occasions or hung on the wall.23

This is not to say that this conception is perfect. It seems to require patience given that multinational-level social identities can take time to develop. Yet, the EU is still quite young, and younger still when one considers when the less well-off EU12 were added less than a decade ago. In the Canadian context, it has only been forty years since Indigenous nationhood started gaining greater respect. In this case, a long and terrible colonial history needs to be overcome to foster the co-operation, respect, and trust needed to make multinational social justice work. Putting the project of multination building into perspective suggests that we may in fact be on the right track. The main task at present is to simply push for the broader forms of nationalism endorsed here in a cosmopolitan context envisioned by Tan. In so doing, the idea is to always respect national identities but always remaining biased toward reinforcing social justice beyond the nation on the practical road we must inevitably follow.

23 This reminds me of the Stalinist national policy of “national in form, socialist in content”, which allowed the people under the Soviet economic system to retain their cultural forms (language, costume, folklore, etc.) but required them to integrate into the economic and social structures as part of national communist economic development (see Kuoljok 1985). “‘National form’ was acceptable because there was no such thing as national content” (Slezkine 1994: 142)
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